RECALIBRATING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF "CULTURES OF PEACE": A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY OF NONVIOLENT ATTITUDES

by

MATTHEW E. P. EDDY

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Department of Sociology
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

September 2013

DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE

Student: Matthew E. P. Eddy

Title: Recalibrating Conceptualizations of “Cultures of Peace”: A Cross-National Study of Nonviolent Attitudes

This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Sociology by:

Michael C. Dreiling	Chair
Gregory McLauchlan	Core Member
Ellen K. Scott	Core Member
Daniel J. Tichenor	Institutional Representative

and

Kimberly Andrews Espy	Vice President for Research and Innovation; Dean of the Graduate School

Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School.

Degree awarded September 2013

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Matthew E. P. Eddy

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology

September 2013

Title: Recalibrating Conceptualizations of “Cultures of Peace”: A Cross-National Study of Nonviolent Attitudes

This dissertation pursues three broad questions. First, what are the correlates of nonviolent attitudes around the world? Second, which nations exhibit characteristics of robust “Cultures of Peace”? Third, are there signs that history and collective memory shapes attitudes, i.e., do cultures “learn” from experiences of war, peace, or nonviolence? A multi-method approach sought to further our understandings of propensities for peace at both the national and individual levels. First, an analysis of nation-level Gallup World Poll data (*N*=136 nations) identifies correlates of nonviolent attitudes and advances a critique of the Global Peace Index (GPI), grounded in the observed disconnect between structural and attitudinal indicators of peace in many nations. The Gallup World Poll analysis suggests that many forces of modernization instill forms of “callous cruelty” while failing to cultivate pragmatic nonviolent attitudes. For example, poor nations and nations with recent successful nonviolent revolution are more likely to affirm that nonviolence “works” than wealthier nations ranking high in the GPI. Moreover, it is argued from Gallup data that the accumulation of “peace capital” is quite specific, with a frequent disconnect between forms of principled and pragmatic nonviolence. Second, survey data were collected from two “maximally different” cases, university students in the U.S. (*N*=403) and Costa Rica (*N*=312), which have starkly divergent structural and

historical relationships to peace and militarism. Utilizing a new survey instrument, factor analyses helped to identify cross-national variations in respondent adherence to ideologies of violence and nonviolence: militarism, realism, just war, or nonviolence. The results show Costa Ricans were significantly more peaceful than U.S. respondents on 48 out of 52 items. Susceptibility to "elite cues" was tested in an experimental section. Tests revealed gaps in historical knowledge of nonviolence offering support for the theory that "ideology has no history." Finally, a cross-national sample of state-approved history textbooks from 8 nations (Germany, Norway, Ghana, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and the U.S.) were analyzed as outcomes of collective memory processes. The relative neglect of significant nonviolent revolutions and campaigns in the majority of these textbooks suggests formidable obstacles to the proliferation of nonviolent ideology around the world.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME OF AUTHOR: Matthew E. P. Eddy

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon
Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey
Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, California
Austin College, Sherman, Texas

DEGREES AWARDED:

Doctor of Philosophy, Sociology, 2013, University of Oregon
Master of Science, Sociology, 2008, University of Oregon
Master of Divinity, 1999, Princeton Theological Seminary
Bachelor of Arts, Religion, 1994, Austin College

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

Sociology of Peace and War
Social Movements
Sociology of Religion

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Teaching assistant, Department of Sociology, University of Oregon, 2005 to present

Teaching assistant, Department of Religious Studies, University of Oregon, 2010-2011

Instructor, Department of Sociology, University of Oregon, 2006-2013

Instructor, Northwest Christian University, Eugene, Oregon, 2011-2012

GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS:

Elise Boulding Graduate Student Paper Award, 2011 (Peace, War & Social Conflict Section of the ASA)

Data Collection Award, Sociology Department, University of Oregon, 2011

Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Department of Sociology, University of Oregon, 2005-2013

Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Department of Religious Studies, University of Oregon, 2010-2011

Wasby-Johnson Sociology Dissertation Research Award, Sociology Department, University of Oregon, 2010

Woodenfish Scholarship, FoGuang Shan monastery, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 2008

PUBLICATIONS:

Eddy, Matthew P. Forthcoming. "'We Have to Bring Something Different to This Place': Principled and Pragmatic Nonviolence Among Accompaniment Workers." *Social Movement Studies.*

Eddy, Matthew P. 2012. "When Your Gandhi Is Not My Gandhi: Memory Templates and Limited Violence in the Palestinian Human Rights Movement." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 34: 185-211.

Eddy, Matthew P. 2011. "Freedom Summer Abroad: Biographical Pathways and Cosmopolitanism Among International Human Rights Workers." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 31: 209-258.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I offer thanks especially to my Mother and Papa, whose love of learning, spiritual wisdom, social engagement, and tremendous pride in having been a part of the nonviolent action of the U.S. Civil Rights movement set me on a rewarding path.

Sincere gratitude also goes to Michael, Greg, Ellen, and Dan for helping me navigate through academia and for generously giving of their time. I was so fortunate to work with each one, as each to an uncommon degree models academic excellence, social engagement, and gracious well-rounded humanity. Thank you to Michael for mentoring and guiding me through numerous hurdles. As an organic intellectual, nonviolent sage, and keeper of the fire, Michael will always be an enormous inspiration to me. Thank you to Greg McLauchlan, whose fascinating lectures inhis course Systems of War and Peace, was a crucial spark for this project. Thank you to Ellen and Greg for being wise sounding boards full of good advice over the past few years. Thank you to Dan Tichenor, who provided methodological guidance on case study approaches, as well as encouragement and strategic insight at a key juncture of the project which helped to secure funding.

This investigation was supported by the 2010 Wasby-Johnson Sociology Dissertation Research Award, Sociology Department, University of Oregon, and a 2011 Data Collection Award, Sociology Department, University of Oregon. A special thanks to the University administrators, professors, and students in Costa Rica (at the University of Costa Rica, Universidad Latina (Heredia), and Universidad Hispanoamericana (San José)) who generously gave of their time to complete the surveys, and to Dr. Dreiling who facilitated the surveys at the University of Oregon in 2010. Thanks also to Chuck Hunt for facilitating two surveys of UO students in 2011, on heroes and knowledge of

civil rights movement organizations. For help in statistical analyses, thanks to Richard York, and for help with factor analysis, thanks to Robert O'Brien. For support in Costa Rica, special thanks to Francisco Cordero Gené and the Friends Peace Center, San José.

I am grateful to several people for help in acquiring textbooks abroad: For generously donating the *Tidslinjer 2* Norwegian history textbook: Madeleine Bernstein Harris &theH. Aschehoug& Co. W.Nygaard AS publishing house (Oslo, Norway); For acquiring the *Portal* Norwegian history textbook in Norway: Kevin Sennewald, UO undergraduate student; For help in acquiring the El Salvador history textbook: Mauricio EstebanCaceres Alvarenga; For acquiring the Guatemalan history textbooks in Guatemala: Christie Brown, Executive Director of Miracles in Action; For acquiring the Ghana textbooks in Ghana: Leslie Steeves, University of Oregon, and Caroline Stauss, UO graduate student; For acquiring the Chile history textbooks in Chile and interviewing history teachers in Chile: Scott Erdman, UO undergraduate student; For help acquiring the German textbook: MarilenaSchwaderlapp.

Likewise, numerous individuals helped in the translation of the textbooks as well as the Costa Rican surveys, and I am grateful for their professional skills: For translation from German: Jacob Barto, University of Oregon graduate student; For translation from Norwegian: Ben Raymond Lode, University of Oregon; For Spanish translation in Costa Rica: Sergio Herrera Cordero and Milena EstefaniaPicadoRossi; For Spanish translation of surveys: Jesus Monsalve; For Spanish translation of textbooks: Michael Navarro, Diana Garcia, and Robyn Eddy.

For my wife, Robyn, who gives amazing support and love, and encouraged me to follow my passions.

For my children, Jasper and Eleanor, who tug me into the future with bright eyes and laughter.

For my parents, John and Betty, who have nurtured me with their love and wisdom.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

Table Page

Table Page

Table Page

Table Page

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION – THE SEARCH FOR NONVIOLENT ATTITUDES AND CULTURES OF PEACE

In 2000, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) launched the International Decade for a Culture of Peace. Although contradictions and inadequacies mar the conception of peace and peace movements in this relatively high-profile U.N. initiative (Ilcan and Phillips 2006, de Rivera 2004, Adams 2000), it was followed by a number of scholarly attempts to theorize and compile indicators of a "culture of peace." Of particular note, the annual release of the World Peace Index (WPI) began in 2000 and was joined by the better known Global Peace Index (GPI) in 2007. At the same time, large cross-national public opinion surveys probing violent/ nonviolent attitudes have recently emerged, offering researchers the chance to test long-held theories and assumptions about the relative presence of belligerent or pacific attitudes among mass publics throughout the world.

The present project grew out of preliminary analyses of the GPI and WPI. Both indexes employ objective socio-structural criteria for measuring the levels of peace among nations, and both largely fail to employ subjective, attitudinal indicators of peace. Historical factors are also largely neglected in the GPI, as the GPI only measures the past five years of each nation's internal and external conflicts. Most significantly, when national scores in the 2008 GPI are compared with their national mean scores in peaceful attitudes (using data from the 2008 Gallup World Poll and the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey), inconsistent and often negative correlations between objective and subjective measures of peace emerge, raising questions about what constitutes a "culture of peace."

For example, nations (e.g., New Zealand, Sweden, Denmark, Czech Republic, and Singapore) scoring highly in the peace indexes (employing objective-structural indicators of peace), often fail to score highly in nonviolent attitudes (subjective indicators of peace), while nations lacking structural peace and some of the most war-torn nations (e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Nicaragua, and Colombia) often score well-above the global mean in nonviolent attitudes. These initial findings motivated further research and will frame an initial critique of the GPI and WPI.

All cultures reproduce some elements of peace culture, and international travelers with fresh and discriminating eyes often bear testimony of this as they return from travels abroad. About ten years ago when backpacking through Ladakh, a Tibetan Buddhist region of northern India, I was taken with the notion that in the contemporary world, this region most closely resembles Hilton's (1933) mythical land of peace,*Shangri-La* (Hilton portrayed his mythical kingdom, isolated and surrounded by mountain ranges, as vaguely Tibetan Buddhist, and having no military). Surely, I thought, Buddhist and mountainous cultures must be among the world's most peaceful. The present analysis shows that I was wrong on both counts: On average, mountainous nations and Buddhist nations tend to hold less peaceful attitudes. But Ladakh is a region, not a nation, and this suggests some of the difficulties with the nation-level of analysis. When we average attitudes at the nation-level, are any nations markedly more peaceful in their attitudes – and if so, why?

Recently, an acquaintance who learned of my project asked me where Thailand ranked in peace. She explained that on a recent trip to Thailand she had been truly amazed at the peaceful dispositions of the Thai people. Even in the big cities, people seemed calm and relaxed in the midst of traffic jams. She suggested a theory that this

inner calm might be linked to the longstanding tradition in which Thai boys go to live in a Buddhist monastery for several months. She was very surprised when I told her that worldwide, Thailand ranked near the bottom in the Gallup World Poll's measures of peaceful attitudes. Because it is the largest cross-national survey to data, analysis of the Gallup World Poll data is likely to turn up newinsights about peaceful attitudes around the world.

This project hones in on three Gallup World Poll questions because they tap beliefs about the effectiveness of nonviolent methods and the moral acceptability of terrorism and state terrorism (i.e., cases in which the military *targets and kills* civilians). The three questions serve to operationalize forms of pragmatic nonviolence (i.e., does nonviolence work?) and principled nonviolence (i.e., moral objections to violence at a low threshold, amounting to a "just war" orientation). However, the three questions are quite specific and limited in scope and methodology. For instance, rather than Likert-type questions they are essentially forced either-or choices. In this project I test whether these Gallup questions might serve as "keystone" indicators of violent/ nonviolent attitudes.

In short, this dissertation project pursues three broad questions. First, what are the correlates of nonviolent attitudes? Second, where are cultures of peace? Third, are there signs that history and collective memory shapes attitudes, i.e., do cultures "learn" from experiences of war, peace, or nonviolence? More specifically, the research questions are:1) Where are "cultures of peace" in the world today, and what factors explain their emergence and reproduction? Do some nations display both structural and attitudinal indicators of peace propensities? 2) In large cross-national datasets, at the individual-level, what are the correlates of nonviolent attitudes?At the nation-level, which cultural

and structural characteristics tend to be associated with peaceful attitudes?3) In the U.S. and Costa Rica, two nations with very different historical and structural relationships to war and peace, how do ideologies of violence and nonviolence differ?On the individual level, what are the correlates of nonviolent attitudes in these two nations? What demographic groups and personality types are most likely to embrace nonviolent attitudes?4) Given the widespread success of nonviolent revolutions and campaigns in the 20th and early 21st Centuries, why is confidence in "peaceful means alone" not more robust around the world?5) Do collective memory processes play a role in attitude formation? How are significant cases of nonviolent movements remembered in government-approved secondary school history textbooks around the world? What do these textbooks, as outcomes of collective memory processes, suggest about prospects for the proliferation of nonviolent ideology around the world?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Several scholars have theorized "cultures of peace" in terms of both socio-structural and attitudinal/ cultural dynamics, and accordingly, urged the employment of objective as well as subjective indicators in the measurement of cross-national levels of peace (Anderson 2004, de Rivera 2004, Basabe and Valencia 2007). Advancing a holistic understanding of peace, Boulding (2000) defined the subjective element of a culture of peace as involving "a mosaic of identities, attitudes, values, beliefs, and institutional patterns" that support distributive justice, equality, human development/ nurturance, and nonviolent means of conflict resolution (p.196). A few qualitative case studies of single nations (Milani and Branco 2004, Morales and Leal 2004) have suggestively analyzed the relative presence of a culture of peace while employing de Rivera's (2004) template of

objective and subjective indicators.Still more helpfully for our purposes, Diener and Tov (2007) examined the relationships between subjective and objective indicators of peace, but their subjective indicator was less than ideal as it was limited to the World Values Survey (WVS) question "willingness to fight in a war for your country."

Similarly, Basabe and Valencia (2007) compiled an impressive array of objective and subjective indicators of peace culture from existing cross-national datasets. However, in measuring beliefs and attitudes they turned to national scores on value indexes (e.g., Hofstede's (2001) Individualism-Collectivism index, Schwartz's (1994) Hierarchy index) and to World Values Survey data (Inglehart et al. 2004), all of which offer less than ideal indicators and proxies for violent/ nonviolent attitudes. For example, national means were used from WVS questions probing "willingness to fight in a war for your country," tolerance/ justifiability of homosexuality, sense of interpersonal trust, and a self-perceived quality of democracy index. Moreover, Basabe and Valencia (2007), like Diener and Tov (2007), only tested relationships among the variables, rather than ranking nations in overall peace or dimensions of peacefulness.

By far, the most comprehensive attempts to assess levels of peace cross-nationally are encompassed in the GPI and WPI. However, both of these peace indexes have significant flaws. One weakness is that they largely neglect to employ subjective indicators. The GPI includes only two measures of the subjective/ attitudinal dimension. The first measure is furnished by the Corruption Perception Index for each nation, compiled from public opinion surveys conducted by Transparency International. The second measure, "Level of distrust in other citizens" stems not from survey data, but from qualitative assessments of each nation by the GPI research team, and while this indicator

of social capital may be a proxy for the perceived threat of violence, it only applies to domestic peace and tells us little about the wider scope of violent/ nonviolent attitudes at the individual or cultural level. Similarly, the WPI's only subjective indicator is the Corruption Perception Index.

Clearly, the subjective indicators employed by these peace indexes do not approach the substantive core of nonviolent attitudes outlined in prominent conceptualizations of cultures of peace (e.g., UNESCO 1995, Boulding 2000). The appearance of a large-scale public opinion data set, the Gallup World Poll, offers new opportunities to measure more precisely the subjective culture correlates which, by definition, should be salient in a "culture of peace." Building from analyses of the Gallup World Poll, the present study will critique the GPI and WPI and sketch out routes towards improving conceptualizations, measurement, and theorizing of cultures of peace.

Taking advantage of recently released data sets, the present analysis will help further our knowledge of the global distribution of violent/ nonviolent attitudes.It has been common for peace scholars to argue, somewhat flippantly and with little empirical support, that every war creates new anti-war contingents (e.g., Kurlansky 2006).Chalmers Johnson (2004) argues that the intensity of combat during World War II, with 6,639 U.S. soldiers killed per month over forty-four months, made Americans "skeptical about future wars, particularly those in which there was no immediate threat to the United States or in which the United States had not been attacked" (p.55). Others contend that "the myth of redemptive violence" is alive and well, and that ideologies of violence are difficult to dislodge (Wink 1992). Likewise, for generations intellectuals have debated whether democracy tames state violence through the influence of peaceful citizens as in Kant's

theory of the democratic peace, or whether it allows the "belligerence of the masses" to emergeas Max Weber expected (Cortright 2008). Similarly, we can ask whether particular religious traditions or "civilizations" are more likely to reproduce peaceful attitudes.

Over recent decades, our abilities to test such assumptions have grown, as scholars have compiled large-scale survey data and historical event data sets (e.g., the Correlates of War Data, Uppsala Conflict Data Program) organized by taxonomies of conflict types, regime types, and war outcomes. The present project will utilize these tools in attempting to specify whether extended experiences of war or peace, or dramatic nonviolent successes (such as nonviolent revolutions) might significantly influence attitudes about violence and nonviolence. We will test whether nonviolent attitudes tend to become generalized across many domains, whether "cultures of peace" exist at the nation level, and why.

What has been lacking in the peace studies literatureis a large-scale cross-national analysis which takes nonviolent attitudes as the dependent variable, and analyzes the impact of relatively parallel historical events, such as traumatic war and successful nonviolent revolutions.As the number of democracies and the number of successful nonviolent revolutions proliferated in the 20thCentury, and especially after World War II and the end of the Cold War (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, Cortright 2008, Kurlansky 2006, Sharp 2005, Schock 2005, Schell 2003, Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher 1999;Ackerman and Kruegler 1994), we might expect to find evidence that conflict resolution attitudes are robustly nonviolentin many nations.If not, it raises serious

questions about the capacities for cultures to “learn” and to embed lessons in collective memory.

The Gallup World Poll 2008, sampling from over 100 nations, is the largest cross-national survey to date which has probed violent/ nonviolent attitudes. Up to this point, peace scholars have possessed few empirical grounds for making global generalizations on the violent/ nonviolent attitudes of mass publics. Previously, although some other relevant poll data existed, scholars (Basabe and Valencia 2007, Diener and Tov 2007, Dowley and Silver 2000, Inglehart 1990)analyzingviolent/ nonviolent attitudes in large cross-national polls have honed in on only one questionin the European Values Surveys (waves 1981 through 1999) and World Values Surveys (waves 1981 through 2005), which asks: “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?” Like the key questions in the Gallup World Poll, the hypothetical framing of thisWVS question probes what can be called a “generalized attitude” (Cohrs and Moschner 2002), presentingweaknesses as well as strengths for interpretation and theory-building.

In the “willingness to fight” survey question (WVS and EVS), the way respondents imagine “another war” in their country will likely vary by national context – contingent upon the kinds of wars the nation has recently experienced.That is, following theories of schematic reasoning (Kegley and Raymond 1999, Sewell 1996),it seems reasonable to assume that respondents reflexively use past conflicts as a template and project them onto wars in the hypothetical future.The “willingness to fight” question, at least in the English version, also carries the connotation that a future war would only be undertaken as a last resort (Diener and Tov 2007), perhaps leading respondents to

imagine a war of self-defense or a “just war.”In addition, it is easy to imagine that elderly cohorts, females (where national traditions exclude them from military service), or adult cohorts with dependent children, will say they are not willing to fight, though they may actually hold militaristic attitudes. Thus, the WVS questionpresents challenges for interpretation,only taps one circumscribed level of conflict, and precludes generalizing to otherviolent/ nonviolent attitudes associated with the wide variety of inter-state, intra-state, communal, or interpersonal conflicts that mark the social world. Fortunately, additional data is available.

The Gallup World Poll data can help further our knowledge of the global distribution of attitudes and moral values associated with conflict resolution as well as the violent/ nonviolent strategies employed by social movements and military forces. The Gallup World Pollincludes three measures of violent/ nonviolent generalized attitudes, one of which operationalizes a “pragmatic nonviolent” orientation, and two of which operationalize minimal thresholds for a “principled nonviolent” orientation – in the sense that not targeting and killing civilians is a minimal principled opposition to violence (or at least a constraint on violence), one which rejects “total war” and which is enshrined in international law (i.e., the Geneva Accords).Of course, to say that individual attacks on civilians and military attacks on civilians are “never justified” is in harmony with “just war” ideology.

The Gallup World Poll questions are general and abstract, but there are empirical grounds for asserting that such generalized attitudes are important in shaping individual views of particular wars and other forms of violence. Some studies have found that “general attitudes toward war predict opinions about specific military actions” (e.g.,

McAlister, Orpinas, and Velez 1999, p.254). Cohrs and Moschner (2002) surveyed German university students and found that "generalized political attitudes," including attitudes falling on a spectrum of militarism-pacifism, played a greater role than "specific antiwar knowledge" in shaping evaluations of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia (p.139).

Anderson (2004) has called for the measurement of "peace" through both objective and subjective indicators including survey data measuring nonviolent attitudes as they interface various micro and macro levels – self, interpersonal, local community, national, and international. At the level of power politics, some scholars write of a militarism-pacifism ideological continuum (Cohrs and Moschner 2002), but the key points along the spectrum of violent/ nonviolent beliefs might be better specified as militarism, realism, just war, or nonviolence (Megoran 2008).

Defining Nonviolence: Principled and Pragmatic

Principled nonviolence is Gandhian nonviolence. It designates attitudes which affirm the unity of means and ends, which accept self-suffering (rather than violent retaliation), which hold that nonviolence is morally and strategically superior to violence, and which include the aim of "converting," forgiving, and reconciling with opponents (Dudouet, 2008). Conversely, "pragmatic nonviolence" affirms that nonviolent action can be effective in some contexts, but the motivation for nonviolence is mostly strategic (Dudouet, 2008). Ideal typically, pragmatic nonviolent adherents do not condemn violence as immoral and they approve of the use of violence in some contexts (Eddy 2011, Eddy 2012).

It should be remembered that principled nonviolence subsumes pragmatic nonviolence under its umbrella, while the reverse is not the case (pragmatic nonviolent adherents will, at least in some contexts, justify the use of violence and/ or de-emphasize the moral superiority of nonviolence). In other words, only within Gandhian or principled nonviolence, is the moral and practical superiority of nonviolence equally affirmed.

Defining Nonviolence: The Distinction Between Conventional and Nonviolent Action

Martin (2008) helpfully distinguishes between violence, "conventional action" (whether it be political, economic, or social), and nonviolent action. Conventional political action is "anything that is routine within a society" and might include voting and lobbying, while nonviolent action "goes beyond routine behavior, often by challenging conventional practices" (p.236). But the boundaries between conventional and nonviolent action are context dependent. In the U.S., handing out a political leaflet is routine, but in nations with highly repressive governments it might be categorized as nonviolent action. Moreover, Martin argues that "in some places strikes are so common and widely accepted that participating in one might be considered conventional action" (pp.236-237).

I contend that compared with conventional action and pragmatic nonviolence, the distinctive emphases of principled/ Gandhian nonviolent ideology and its resonance with moral and spiritual traditions, help activists as well as journalists and historians to flag the role of nonviolence in movements. Another route, which facilitates the interpretation of nonviolent campaigns *as nonviolent* for movement participants, outsiders, journalists, and historians is to appeal to nonviolent action templates such as the Gandhian template. During the Montgomery bus boycott, the *New York Times* reported: "By emphasizing the Christian virtue of 'love thine enemy' the boycott was made a mass movement of passive

resistance – though it took months for the Gandhi similarity to be recognized" (Phillips 1956, March 4, p.E6). Actually, historians widely acknowledge that Dr. King's mentors in nonviolence, Bayard Rustin and Rev. Smiley, came on the scene in the first days of the boycott and heavily pushed Gandhian theory, which King eagerly adopted. But it is telling that the *Times* said it "took months" for the Gandhian parallels to be recognized – by the *Times* it would seem. This claim also exemplifies a challenge surrounding the perception of – and later collective memory of – nonviolence as nonviolent action, as opposed to conventional action.

I will contend that the reproduction of nonviolent ideology around the world is currently hampered by the failure of collective memory processes to explicitly name and theorize nonviolence. This collective memory challenge is not insurmountable. However, I believe the task for memory entrepreneurs becomes much easier when there is evidence that the *distinctive* logic, ideals, strategies, and motivations of *principled nonviolence* were an integral part of a nonviolent social movement or act of nonviolent resistance. The risk of forgetting historical campaigns of nonviolent action or of classifying it as merely conventional action is especially likely in campaigns which embrace pragmatic rather than principled nonviolence, because adherents of the former are likely to be less consciously strategic, ideologically distinctive, and disciplined in the use of nonviolence.

AN HISTORICIST UNDERSTANDING OF NONVIOLENCE: NGRAMS

Utilizing the Google "Ngram" dataset, we can track the rise of the word "nonviolence," its predecessor and cognate terms. This powerful new tool affords us the opportunity to analyze shifts in nonviolent conceptualizations over time. The significance of this rests in the notion that knowledge and thinking are processes of categorizing and

generalizing. The shifts in the names and political tactics of nonviolence represent shifts in the practice and ideological basis of nonviolence. With the recent eclipse of older terms like pacifism, by the word nonviolence, it seems likely that the stage is set for nonviolence to be increasingly named, perceived in the world, and theorized as a force in politics.

The Google Books Ngram Viewer dataset includes over 5.2 million books or about 4% of all books ever printed. However, the most complete data involves the English corpus between 1800 and 2000. Ngrams are single words or strings of letters or numbers (1-grams), e.g., “1880,” “love,” or “NAACP.” Ngrams can also be sequences of words, e.g., a phrase with three words is called a 3-gram. Only ngrams that appear in at least 40 books are searchable in the dataset. The dataset makes it possible to map changes in the lexicon through observing frequency counts of words appearing in published books, as well as to indirectly gauge changes in collective memory over time. Word frequency is “computed by dividing the number of instances of the n-gram in a given year by the total number of words in the corpus in that year” (Michel et al. 2011, p.176). That is, essentially results are “normalized” according to the number of books published each year. The “smoothing of 3” feature names how the yearly data is averaged with figures from 3 nearby years on either side of each yearly data point. These moving averages can make trends more clear.

The Ngram data is somewhat crude since the number of books published in any given year and their topical areas are subject to innumerable contingencies and even relative unknowns. For instance, how have authors and knowledge creators over the decades decided to publish a book rather than say, a magazine or a magazine article?

What determines the establishment or maintenance of a publishing stream within a small niche market? The data does not track the significance or readership of any book, so we are really tracking the decisions of authors, editors, and publishers to craft and market particular topics and ideas in the book format. The threshold of marketability, intellectual or pop cultural significance are likely to be quite low in some niche market publishing houses – including academic ones. Nevertheless, the data offers a glimpse into which ideas and people have gained relatively more traction within all of the decision-making mechanisms and other moving parts of the book publishing business.

N-gram searches revealed that the adjective "nonviolent" has been consistently utilized slightly more than the noun "nonviolence," and similarly, "pacifist" is utilized slightly more than "pacifism," and so in the n-gram searches reported below, we shall limit ourselves to the more commonly appearing versions of these terms.All of these terms, and still further cognate terms have their own histories and they are conceptually bundled with other context-specific meanings.

For example, the nonviolence of Gandhi and Tolstoy was closely linked to their spirituality and ascetic forms of spirituality (i.e., self-denial, and voluntary suffering). Hence, Tolstoy wrote, "To be good without fasting is as impossible as it is to walk without standing up" (Green 1978, p.19). As another example, perhaps the leading nonviolent activist of the U.S. in the 1800's, William Lloyd Garrison, did not use the word *nonviolence,* instead he always employed the term *nonresistance* because for him, the key ethical concerns were avoiding coercion and the exercise of human authority and he viewed any form of resistance as failing on these counts (Chernus 2004, p.36).Garrison called himself a "nonresistant," yet it has to be added that he "was not at

all passive" (p.37).Additional n-gram searches (not depicted here) revealed that *nonresistance* was employed more frequently than *passive resistance* from about 1802 to about 1818 and again from 1840 to 1845. In the intervening years, between 1818 and 1840, the use of the two terms closely tracked one another. But after 1845, *passive resistance* was used much more frequently than *nonresistance*. This despite the fact that Adin Ballou's important book *Christian Non-Resistance* was published in 1846 (Chatfield 1972).Ballou's book likely impacted Tolstoy. In his letter, "A Message to the American People" (1901), Tolstoy credited Ballou as well as Garrison, Emerson, and Thoreau as influences. Three years later, Tolstoy wrote, "Garrison was the first to proclaim this principle [of nonresistance to evil] as a rule for the organization of man's [sic] life" (Lynd and Lynd 1995, p.xi).

Passive resistance and *nonresistance* can be considered older terms for nonviolence, but today passive resistance often names a tactic. Thus, the Eugene, Oregon police department defines *passive resistance* in the process of setting forth policy on the use of pepper spray in crowd control efforts:

> spray should not be used against persons engaged only in passive resistance. For the purposes of this policy, 'passive resistance' means non-compliance with an officer's orders unaccompanied by any active or physical resistance. (An example of passive resistance would be a person who was limp on the ground, and who was not grasping onto an object or making other efforts to resist being taken into custody). (EW 2011, p.7)

Clarence Darrow, "America's foremost exponent of nonviolence in the years just prior to World War I" (Lynd and Lynd 1995, p.76), spoke and wrote of the "theory of non-resistance," but he also used the terms"passive resistance" (p.81) and "peaceable force" (p.76). The latter is a clear echo of Tolstoy (who used the terms soul-force and love-force (Gandhi 2008)), the primary source of Darrow's thinking on nonviolence. A

renowned lawyer of leftists and union leaders, Darrow's interest in nonviolence was grounded in his observations of the criminal justice system. He characterized nonviolence as "the opposite to the theory of punishment, or the theory of vengeance" (p.75) and linked nonviolence to Jesus's "turn the other cheek" teaching which explicitly rejected "an eye for an eye" vengeance. In a debate, circa 1910, with the Socialist Arthur Lewis, Darrow argued that the theory of punishment "is wrong" and does not reform criminals (p.78). Moreover, he contends the world is "steadily" moving towards embracing the theory of non-resistance, pointing to the abolishment or curtailment of the death penalty in "most civilized countries" (p.78).Darrow's argument for passive resistance was both pragmatic (p.81, p.78, p.110, p.112) and principled (pp.114-115), positing that "you cannot "cure hatred with hatred" (p.82). He suggests that if workers undertook a general strike and "quit feeding the race," it would be a powerful and effective form of "passive resistance – non-resistance" (p.81). The alternative path, of workers taking up armed struggle "cannot succeed" and never has succeeded, in part because only a "small minority" of workers would be willing to arm themselves and the power of the state is so much greater (p.81). He concludes: "The only force that can win is determination, non-resistance, peaceable force. There is such a thing as peaceable force that is more forcible than forcible force" (p.82).

In Darrow's toolbox of terms, "peaceable force" would likely have been less often misunderstood. Unfortunately, the phrase was not often repeated. As it was, in the 1910 debate with Lewis, Lewis repeatedly chided Darrow for subscribing to the "theory of the non-resistance of evil" (Darrow and Lewis 1911, p.95). Lewis characterized this theory as "suicidal" (p.94), an "obsolete" and ancient "Oriental idea" which he says passed from

Buddha to Jesus, Jesus to Tolstoy, and Tolstoy to Darrow (pp.54-55). Hence, Lewis's misinterpretation of non-resistance is explicitly linked to his misunderstanding of Buddhism and "the philosophy of the Orient" (p.60) as a "philosophy of resignation, renunciation, helplessness, submission and despair" (pp.60-61). For Lewis, pointing to these "Oriental," backward, and religious origins for "non-resistance" are enough to refute their adequacy (p.90). Such misperceptions of Buddhism persists in the West, partly because of mistranslations into English of the second law of Buddhism (commonly rendered as "in order to end suffering cut off desire," but which would be better represented by "purify desire"). For more than a century, probably very few cross-cultural diffusions into English have been more plagued by misunderstanding than this Buddhist tenet. Similarly, few concepts have been more poorly named than "non-resistance," which implies refusing to resist, and "pacifism" which sounds like "passive" (Addams 2002, p.353).

In any case, in the debate, Darrow attempted to disabuse Lewis of his error of linking "non-resistance" to purportedly religious views that force is "always bad" (p.92), or that evil, including diseases, can only have spiritual cures (p.90). Darrow clarified, saying, "I do not understand non-resistance to mean that you cannot fight disease, or destroy bedbugs, or take baths, or indulge in passive resistance. I do not think that anybody who has ever preached or taught non-resistance understood such a thing" (p.103). Moreover, once definitions of terms were finally reconciled through three rounds of debate, it seems Lewis and Darrow were not so far apart, for Lewis claimed to believe in "non-aggression," and thus, he was merely opposed to "the non-resistance of aggression" (p.93).

Below in Figure 1, we see how the older term “passive resistance” was rapidly eclipsed by the word “pacifist” after it was coined in 1901 (Cortright 2008). But around 1990, the word “nonviolent” superseded “pacifist” in common usage. Despite the rapid rise of the term “pacifist” and its widespread use, the word carried very misleading connotations which set up self-identifying pacifists for critique as spineless do-nothings. Indeed, the term best fit a small apolitical “quietist” subgroup of Anabaptists committed to withdrawal from the world (p.9), and though Anabaptists are an important originating source of nonviolent practice and theory, nonviolence has grown beyond those historical roots. Problems with the term are also recognized by Chernus (2004) who notes that there was a general trend in the Progressive era (1895 to 1920 (Norton et al. 1998)) toward “pacifism,” but this was different than principled nonviolence: “Because the mainstream Progressive peace movements were all called *pacifist*, it is useful to avoid that word when speaking of those committed to principled nonviolence” (p.77).

Of course, many observers have also pointed to the feebleness of the term “nonviolence,” as the negative formulation cued by the prefix non- is conspicuous for its failure to stake out a positive dynamic. The shining alternative is of course Gandhi’s

Figure 1. N-Gram Search of Nonviolent Terms in English Corpus, 1800-2000, With Smoothing of 3.



masterful term “satyagraha.” Unfortunately, neither satyagraha nor the English translations of Truth Force, or Soul Force and Love Force (the latter two being names which Gandhi (2008) cites Tolstoy as coining (p.309)) have achieved wide currency in American English as can be seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Figure 3 shows how Gandhi’s term satyagraha rose to greater prominence in American usage in the 1940s and again in the 1960s, but its English translation of soul force has been consistently outcompeted by satyagraha since 1940. Hence, to some degree, what Jane Addams (1931) wrote about nonviolence early in the last century still seems to apply: “This modern manifestation has as yet no term which exactly defines it. Tolstoy’s non-resistance is a very inadequate name for overcoming evil with good, and Gandhi’s soul-force is slow to come into English usage” (p.440). Similarly, Meyer (2012) has argued, “Though the term ‘nonviolence’ has long seemed negative to many, rehabilitating the phrase by reviving the more militant concept of ‘revolutionary nonviolence’ is also a process whose time has come.”

In the Spanish corpus, “pacifista” is more commonly used than “pacifism,” but “no violencia” appears more frequently than “no violenta.” Figure 2 below shows how cognate terms and related strategic traditions compare in popular usage in the corpus of American English from 1900 to 2000. As we see in Figure 3 below, unlike in English, in Spanish, the older term “resistencia pacifica” (for the English “passive resistance”) never gained currency in the 1800s or anytime thereafter (through the n-gram records in 2000). This may be because unlike English-speaking nations, Anabaptist immigrants did not come to Spain or Latin America. In fact, Lynd and Lynd (1995) write, “There is good

Figure 2. N-Gram Search of Nonviolent Terms in American English Corpus, 1900-2000, With Smoothing of 3



Figure 3. N-Gram Search of Satyagraha in American English Corpus, 1900-2000, With Smoothing of 3



ground for arguing that the Christian pacifism of the radical Reformation was kept alive from about 1650 to 1850 primarily by North Americans" (pp.xi-xii).

The term "huelga de brazos caídos" appears in the n-gram viewer in the Spanish corpus in about 1917. It was used to describe strikes from 1931 to 1961 in Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia (Parkman 1990, pp.14-15), and in Costa Rica (various Costa Rican high school textbooks use the term to describe the 1947 general strike). Of course, the n-gram Spanish lexicon is dominated by books published in Spain and the wealthier Latin American nations. Despite the significance of so many Central

Figure 4. N-Gram Search of Nonviolent Terms in Spanish Corpus, 1800-2000, With Smoothing of 3.



American civil strikes of historical importance using this term, the poverty of Central America (and the anemic publishing industries in this region) surely contributes to the low frequency of "huelga de brazos caídos" in the lexicon. This term is translated variously as a "peaceful demonstration of protest," "passive strike," and strike with "fallen arms"/ "arms down" (Parkman 1990, p.15), "strike with arms at your sides" (Lakey 2012b), or simply "work stoppage" (Becker 2003, p.7). The term implies a "conscious choice of nonviolent action," and the Spanish anarcho-syndicalist, Diego Abad de Santillán used it in a discussion of general strikes, contrasting techniques of "brazos caídos" with sabotage and fighting (Parkman 1990, p.15). In El Salvador in 1944, a "huelga de brazos caídos" played a key role in the successful movement overthrowing General Maximiliano Hernandez Martínez. This strike "of fallen arms" named "a movement not of the streets, but of hiding" (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.256). As a strategic label it meant "Nobody do anything. Simply stay [indoors] without going into the streets, so that there would not be possibilities for repression" (p.256). In Costa Rica in 1947, a "huelga de brazos caídos" (Arms Down Strike) played a key role in setting the stage for the 1948 Civil War.

But again, for us the key problem is that while these types of strikes are common in Latin America, they are "rarely interpreted as examples of nonviolent movements" (Becker 2003, p.1). Rather, it seems they are interpreted as conventional action, and so observers and readers of the histories of these movements fail to generalize from these movements to nonviolent theory. That is, observers fail to make the link that says, yes, nonviolent methods alone will work, here is why, and here is an example. The failure to make this link to nonviolent theory can result in over generalizing from mass street actions and failing to recognize that even "limited violence" (e.g., rioting, stone throwing, pockets of armed resistance, etc.) in a campaign can reduce mobilization levels and increase state repression in ways that sometimes shut movements down, or reduce their participants to the small numbers who want to employ revolutionary violence.

Additional Spanish n-gram searches revealed that the term "huelga de brazos caídos" was used at roughly the same frequency as "no violencia" and "desobediencia civil" from 1917 to 1950. At that point "no violencia" became much more commonly used, and after about 1965, "desobediencia civil" also began to outcompete "brazos caídos" in the lexicon. By 1985, "desobediencia civil" had caught up to "no violencia" in frequency of usage, as they tied in usage with each appearing in roughly .00005% of Spanish books (a tiny percentage to be sure). Meanwhile, in 1985, "huelga de brazos caídos," although it remained in usage at a steady but infrequent rate between about 1935 to 2000, appeared about four times less frequently than these terms, showing up in less than .000012% of Spanish books. Moreover, as can be seen in the figure above, in the year 2000, "pacifista" appears about twice as often in the Spanish lexicon as "no violencia" and "desobediencia civil" respectively.

Although Wink (1992) claimed that the word “nonviolence” was first used in 1923, Google n-gram searches make it possible to check that assertion. An n-gram search revealed that an article by Alice Stone Blackwell,appearing in a Unitarian newspaper published in Boston, *The Christian Register* (November 2, 1922 issue), responded to a Rev. Vrooman who had argued that “the Moplah rebellion of 1921 (a violent insurrection by a small section of the Moslems) was ‘incited by Gandhi’s teachings.’” In defense of Gandhi, Blackwell (1922) wrote, “Every one who has made any study of Gandhi’s teachings knows that he has always preached against violence, even carrying his advocacy of love and *nonviolence* to a degree that most Westerners would regard as impracticable” (p.1052). In March of 1922, an article in *The New Republic* wrote of “the principle of nonviolence,” and “the nonviolence principle” as Gandhi’s “central principle”(p.125). But a search of Gandhi’s *Collected Works* revealed that Gandhi’s earliest use of the word “non-violence” came far earlier. In a letter he wrote in South Africa in March of 1914, Gandhi mentioned“the way of non-violence” (Gandhi 1999 V14, p.114), and in February of 1915, he wrote of “non-violence” as one of the “five rules of life” (p.355).

In South Africa, Gandhi sponsored a contest to give nonviolence a name. The winner was “Satyagraha.” Gandhi expressed dissatisfaction with the older term of “passive resistance” and claimed to have abandoned it (Gandhi 1928, pp.109-110), but in actuality he continued to use it on occasion. Gandhi also adopted and then came to view Thoreau’s phrase “civil disobedience” as similarly incomplete (V67, p.400). Gandhi saw “passive resistance” as akin to what theoriststoday name “pragmatic nonviolence” and which he often termed “nonviolence as anexpedient”or merely a strategy, a concept he

also described as a “weapon of the weak” (V19, p.350). Thus,he writes of adherents of “passive resistance” such as suffragettes who have “admitted of violence” (V19, p.350). For Gandhi, the difference between satyagraha and passive resistance is that the former develops the “full logical and spiritual extent” of the “doctrine” of nonviolence, as marked by three distinguishing features: satyagraha is a “weapon of the strong,” rejects violence in all circumstances, and always “insists upon truth” (V19, p.350).

As Martin Luther King, Jr. led the Montgomery bus boycott, he spoke of “non-violence,” but *New York Times* articles during this period summarized the methods of the Montgomery movement in a variety of terms, which mostly referenced older terminology: “the doctrine of passive resistance,” (Philips 1956, February 27, p.17), “passive resistance and love” (Rowland 1956, March 26, p.27), “nonviolence” and “passive resistance” (NYT 1956, December 10, p.20), “a policy of passive resistance” and “a Gandhi-like passive resistance” (Philips 1956, March 4, p.E6), “a policy of quiet resistance,” a “passive-resistance campaign,” and King is said to have “translated Gandhi’s philosophy of passive resistance into Alabaman terms” (Barrett 1957, March 3, p.196).In any case, the recent shift towards the term nonviolence is likely to result in far less conceptual confusion that “passive resistance,” as even here we see the *Times* adding the unhelpful synonym of “quiet resistance” for the Gandhian template.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The peace studies literature encompasses competing definitions of peace: peace-as-the-absence-of-war and peace-as-social-justice (Kimball 1984). These are commonly termed negative peace and positive peace, respectively. The opinion surveys and world peace indexes considered in the present study tend to operationalize the former, but the

latter is vitally important as well. In fact, the present study focuses on attitudes towards nonviolence and violence partly because if the greatest root social problem, that of inequality or "structural violence," is to be more fully and more adequately addressed, societies and social movements around the world need methods of pushing for social reform. Nonviolent action is one such method.

Zizek (2008) argues that to understanddirect physical violence requires looking away from the spectacles and tragedies of behavioral violence, to their structural causes (pp.1-2). We are well-advised to follow this analytical approach to war as well as homicides.Between 2001 and June of 2012, more black youth have been killed by guns in Chicago (about 5,000) than U.S. soldiers have been killed in the war in Afghanistan (about 2,000) (Daily Mail 2012). Around the world in 2005, about 17,400 people were killed by direct political violence, but 18,124 Americans were murdered during the same period (Pinker 2011, p.51). In a typical year, world-wide "homicides outnumber war-related deaths, even if one includes the indirect deaths from hunger and disease" (p.221). But what murders and war have in common is a shared link to ideologies of violence, ideological and attitudinal orientations which legitimize violence, that mythologize violence as "redemptive" (Wink 1992) while discrediting nonviolent methods.

Turning away from the spectacles of violence, we confront still more carnage and tragedy. The UN reports that polluted water kills more people each year than all forms of violence including wars (Corcoran et al. 2010). The yearly death toll of polluted water includes over 1.8 children under five years-old, and what is more, "over half of the world's hospital beds are occupied with people suffering from illnesses linked with contaminated water" (p.5). Similarly, summarizing a variety of domestic and

international studies (e.g., Kohler and Alcock 1976), Gilligan (1999) makes clear the far greater consequences of structural violence:

> The 14 million to 18 million deaths a year estimated to be caused by structural violence were about two orders of magnitude (that is, a hundred times) greater than the death toll from behavioral violence (including war and murder) in that same year…very few actual or hypothetical forms of even the most deadly military violence could begin to compare with structural violence…every single year at least two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews. (p.232)

Yet, in 1998, the UN estimated that only $40 billion a year would be enough to provide universal access to health care, adequate food, clean water, and basic education. At the time, the cost was "less than 4 percent of the combined wealth of the 225 richest individuals in the world…" or less than the amount Europeans spent on cigarettes every year (Gillian 1999, p.232).

Through its grounding in public opinion data, the present study can contribute to ongoing discourses which invoke strategic, ideological, and moral legitimations for violent/ nonviolent means. While President Obama's 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech articulated a version of political realism and explicitly questioned the adequacy of Gandhian and Kingian principled nonviolence, new life has been injected into the debates over the strategic efficacy of nonviolent action, with the recent publication of two crucial studies – both reveal that nonviolent campaigns have been more effective than violent campaigns.

First, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) analyzed 323 conflicts between nonstate and state actors, covering the years 1900 to 2006, finding that nonviolent resistance campaigns achieved "success" 53 percent of the time, while violent campaigns were only successful 26 percent of the time. In other words, in more than 320 "…struggles for self-

determination against colonialism, military occupation, and colonial rule over the past century…nonviolent struggles were more than twice as likely to succeed as armed struggles" (Zunes 2011, p.396). This finding is all the more significant since the vast majority of wars in recent decades have been intrastate wars (Cortright 2008, p.5).

We also now know that nonviolent campaigns are more effective at mobilizing participants: "the average nonviolent campaign has over 200,000 members—about 150,000 more active participants than the average violent campaign" (Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, pp.32-33). Of the 25 largest campaigns (including violent and nonviolent resistance or revolution) in the world between 1900 and 2006, 20 have been nonviolent, and of these 70% succeeded as opposed to the 40% success rate of large violent campaigns (p.33).

Second, the NGO Freedom House conducted a study (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005), published as "How Freedom is Won: From Civic Struggle to Durable Democracy," which analyzed 67 nations where authoritarian governments have fallen since 1972. The study concluded that in 50 of the 67 political transitions, or over 70 percent of countries where dictatorships fell, nonviolent civic resistance (including tactics such as mass protests, boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience) played a major role in eroding support for authoritarian rulers, making regime change possible, and democracy viable. And, "transitions generated by nonviolent civic coalitions lead to far better results for freedom than top-down transitions initiated by elites" (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005).

In addition, revisionist historians have recently helped us see that nonviolence played pivotal roles in revolutions which our history textbooks have long led us to

believe were primarily violent revolutions. There is substantial evidence that the American, French, and Russian Revolutions all had key nonviolent stages (Kurlansky 2006, Schell 2003). The case of for American Revolution as primarily a nonviolent revolution is hardly a stretch. John Adams, our second President, acknowledged precisely this point on several occasions (Kurlansky 2006, p.79; Schell 2003, pp.159-163).

Yet for all this mounting evidence on the efficacy of nonviolence, Gallup World Poll data reveals that many nations have near majorities of respondents claiming that "peaceful means alone" will "not work" for oppressed groups. Does this reflect a lack of historical awareness, a failure to "learn" from history, or are ideologies of violence so hegemonic in some cultures that the historical track record of nonviolence is almost imperceptible? How do structural levels of militarism/ peace and historical experiences interact with this hegemony? At the individual level, are the standpoints, value orientations, or personality types of some people so predisposed to violent ideology, that learning about nonviolent efficacy becomes difficult? This study can further our understanding of this theoretical puzzle.

Chapter Summaries

Below I sketch out an overview of the dissertation. I begin by unpacking the theoretical context including long-standing debates over the meaningfulness of public opinion data, and the degree to which the public is influenced by "elite cues" or "policy cues." Related to this, is the question of whether cultures "learn" from historical experiences, such as war or successful nonviolent revolutions.

Next, the methodological tools and challenges are highlighted. The project is framed around a multi-method approach employing three data collection and analysis

efforts. First, an original survey was designed incorporating replications of existing questions on violent/ nonviolent attitudes as well as indices of the Social Dominance Orientation and Schwartz Values. The survey was conducted in the U.S. and Costa Rica because they were theorized as "maximally different" cases based on their starkly divergent structural and historical relationships to peace and militarism. Second, to help identify correlates of nonviolent attitudes, a large cross-national data set was constructed merging several dozen hypothesized indicators and covariates of structural and attitudinal peace drawn from numerous nation-level data sets. Third, a strategic cross-national sample of state-approved high school history textbooks was collected with the aim of uncovering how nonviolent revolutions and significant nonviolent campaigns around the world are preserved in collective memory. This effort is the first of its kind. While peace studies scholars have written widely on cases of successful nonviolent campaigns, what has been neglected is an analysis of how these are remembered around the world in state-approved history textbooks. Here I seek to help answer why confidence in nonviolence is not more robust globally, given the growing number of successful nonviolent revolutions, nonviolent campaigns, and democratic regimes.

Chapter II begins with a secondary data analysis of individual-level predictors of nonviolent attitudes. Surprisingly, published analyses of most large cross-national datasets have largely neglected to undertake any fine-grained analysis of individual-level correlates of nonviolent/ violent attitudes.Because the Gallup World Poll has not released individual-level data, this chapter helps to fill the gap in that level of analysis. The regression analysis of three attitudinal indicators offer a glimpse into the multidimensionality of nonviolence, as we observe inconsistencies across nonviolent

attitudinal domains. Here, I detail some of the consistent findings from the research literature on the social distribution of pro- and antiwar attitudes.

Next,I present the Costa Rican and UO survey samples, the respondent demographics, and the results sorted by national means. A core battery of 33 questions, developed for this project, tests respondent adherence to ideologies of violence and nonviolence on a spectrum theorized by Megoran (2008), but previously untested in poll data: militarism, political realism, just war, and nonviolence.

The next sub-chapter introduces the Schwartz Values and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) indicators, which have been found to predict prowar attitudes in prior studies. Building on Stempel (2006), one additional expected correlate of hawkish attitudes is introduced, a sports fan variable, though this was only tested in the U.S. sample. A multiple regression analysis of the full slate of demographic and other individual-level variables is conducted, identifying the strongest predictors of peaceful scores on the nonviolence index and the militarism index. Here it is shown that among all variables nationality is the strongest predictor of peaceful attitudes, with Costa Ricans significantly more peaceful than U.S. respondents. Interestingly, the “UO football fan” variable offers some support for Stempel’s (2006) findings as well as Chomsky’s (1992b) theories of a spectator sport-tribalism link.

In the context of debates over the coherence and meaningfulness of public opinion, I test whether a generalized sense of ideals mediated through memories of heroic figures might shape opinions on violence/ nonviolence. In both the U.S. and Costa Rican surveys, open-ended questions solicited the names of national heroes especially admired and respected.

Next, I explore the results from a few questions which were only asked of U.S. respondents. These include respondent views of the role of the U.S. military in international affairs, as well as respondent views of the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In addition, a set of questions probing views of aerial bombing and un-manned drone attacks were designed to test tensions and contradictions in how people think about the means and ends (i.e., strategic and ethical norms and goals) of deadly military technology.

Chapter III identifies correlates of war and peace, drawing primarily from the civil war literature (the dominant mode of warfare in the last several decades), as well as Pinker's (2011) meta-analysis of trends in human conflict, but utilizes these variables to test the Gallup World Poll data of opinions on nonviolent efficacy and military attacks on civilians. Here, I test whether such factors as democracy, industrialization, predominant religious tradition, education levels, and mountainous regions are associated with more peaceful attitudes at the nation-level. The next sub-chapter hones in on the correlates of peaceful attitudes by gender, and the distribution of the cross-national gender gap in attitudes.

Chapter IV develops a critique of the Global Peace Index (GPI), and briefly compares the World Peace Index and the GPI. The heart of the chapter identifies contradictions between the GPI's rankings and indicators of peaceful attitudes from the Gallup World Poll. One of the most important findings reported here is that some nations, including Costa Rica, reach a very high national mean threshold on both the principled and pragmatic nonviolent indicators of the Gallup World Poll. A regression analysis of the GPI and the Gallup attitude data is conducted to determine which better predicts the

peaceful behavior of nations whenthe outcome variables consist of the signing and ratification of important peace and disarmament treaties. The sub-chapter concludes by graphically showing how, for all of its weaknesses, the GPI does help to show how the U.S. is exceptionally militarized and lacking in peace compared to other established democracies, core nations, and post-industrial nations.

I continue to attempt to identify "cultures of peace" by drawing from a variety of cross-national poll data. Patterns are identified and tentative conclusions made based on the relatively smaller sample sizes, as compared to the Gallup World Poll data. Again, the multidimensionality of nonviolent attitudes is suggested as we observe that any one attitudinal indicator can offer an inadequate basis from which to generalize. The task of appropriately weighting objective and subjective indicators introduces significant challenges. A simple visual strategy is adopted through the presentation of a series of scatterplot graphs, helping us to identify possible candidates for "cultures of peace."

Chapter V turns to qualitative methods, analyzing history textbook portrayals of significant nonviolent campaigns around the world. Case studies of major successful nonviolent events in the following nations are analyzed: Germany, Norway, Ghana, Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala. I next explore salient events in Costa Rica's history including nonviolent revolutions and the demilitarization process.Finally, I consider a crucial nonviolent history case in the U.S., the explicit nonviolent strategy of Branch Rickey and Jackie Robinson as they re-integrated Major League baseball. The final sub-chapter offers a theoretical account of the textbook omissions of nonviolent campaigns documented throughout Chapter V.

THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Defining Categories: Orientations Towards Violence and Nonviolence

Following Megoran (2008), it was hypothesized that many people adhere to one of four ideological orientations regarding violence and nonviolence: militarism, political realism, just war, and nonviolence (including both pragmatic and principled nonviolence). The survey instrument probed respondent adherence to these orientations which relate heavily to the international political arena, but can overlap with intra-state and perhaps even inter-personal levels of conflict and conflict resolution. Brief definitions of each ideological orientation follow below.

Militarism. Militarism is "a set of beliefs and values that stress the use of force and domination as appropriate means to solve problems and gain political power" (Kraska and Kappeler, 1997, p.1); Militarism valorizes warfare as "ethically positive in some circumstances" (Megoran, 2008, p.477), and thus it can be said to represent "the glorification of war as a good in itself, rather than simply as a means to an end" (p.476). In addition, militarism involves an "expressive or redemptive theory of violence, both religious and secular" (p.476). Militarism can potentially exist apart from states, a view accommodated by Michael Mann's definition of militarism: "the persistent use of organized military violence in the pursuit of social goals" (cited in Lipschutz, 2000, p.175). Finally, Ceadel (1987) defines militarism as embodying a view that international relations are:

> ...wholly anarchical, from which it follows that there is no possibility of any trust or cooperation between states, let alone reform of the international system, and that frequent wars are unavoidable: it welcomes this fact, since it regards war both as a positive good (rather than a lesser evil) and as essential for human development…war is not caused by moral or political mistakes but by man's laudable drive to achieve his full potential. (p.21)

These definitions suggest that militarism takes the attitudes of political realism to a militant extreme, grounding belligerence in a Nietzschean/ Machiavellian ethical worldview that celebrates the quest for power if not domination as well. What these definitions overlook however, is the way in which *contemporary*adherents of militarism almost always cloak their ideology in more mainstream and palatable frames such as humanitarian interventions or the general need to further "peace and security." A great deal of survey research suggests that people are often reluctant to admit forms of prejudice. In a similar way, given that militarism represents an extreme attitude, *social desirability bias* was expected to come into play. For this reason, the survey sought to nuance this attitudinal orientation by operationalizing militarism with subtle questions. For example, re-working a question taken from Droba (1931), I asked whether respondents agreed with the following statement: "Military discipline develops good character in youth."

Political Realism/ Realpolitiks. Political realism, or realpolitiks, portrays war as inevitable and "outside the sphere of ethical reflection" (Megoran, 2008, p.477). It has also been called the "reason of state" doctrine, associated with Machiavellian, amoral versions of political realism in which "moral factors are deemed to be irrelevant" while expediency, military necessity, national interests of survival and victory are central (Secrest, Brunk, and Tamashiro 1991, p.201). Adherents of this orientation focus on power to the detriment of a broader political analysis. As the historian of war Azar Gat (2006) contends, "Critics have long suggested that realists tend to confuse ends and means…their overall correct focusing on the quest for power has made them lose sight of

the underlying reality that explains why the struggle for power takes place" (p.668).It is a state-centric theory of international relations which posits that states *naturally* are driven to survive, to act rationally and protect their own interests (Megoran, 2008). The "anarchic" structure of international competition/ conflict of interests limits co-operation between states, and makes it "futile and unenforceable" to try and "prevent or regulate [war] through legal mechanisms" (Megoran, 2008, p.477). In the present survey, one of the items probing this orientation was the following statement: "There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources through war because nations should protect their own economic security and interests."

One attempt to operationalize and test the prevalence of the realpolitiks orientation among U.S. elite groups revealed marked variation in agreement with the phrase "The only thing that matters in war is victory," with 58.6% of military officers, 42.3% of Congress members, 27.2% of journalists, 21.8% of diplomats, and 5.6% of Catholic Clergy agreeing with this item (Secrest, Brunk, and Tamashiro 1991). Obvious weaknesses in this study involved the use of just one item to test political realism, and similarly, the failure to test both positive and negative phrasings of the orientation to guard against agreement bias.

Just War. In the Just War tradition, war is "morally wrong but ethically permissible in some circumstances as the 'lesser evil'" and as a last resort (Megoran, 2008, pp.478-479). Just causes include self-defense against an unlawful attack, the righting of wrong, re-establishing peace, but not seizing territory or natural resources (Megoran, 2008). A second set of criteria involves "just conduct in war." This includes a ban on the targeting of civilians (an issue operationalized in the Gallup World Poll), but

indirect, “collateral damage” is not a crime. Just War criteria also dictate a principle of proportional force: force used against military personnel must be proportional to the aim (Megoran, 2008).

One criterion is that a war can be just only if it has a“reasonable chance of success.” Here, we see again how principled and pragmatic concerns often necessarily overlap. Although the Just War tradition is clearly an ethically grounded tradition, within its core criteria is this pragmatic question: can “we”“win”? I contend that answering this question implicitly requires historical knowledge. That is, knowledge of history and the interpretation of that history provides some of the ethical content of the Just War theory itself. Only when we consider the previous history of counter-insurgency warfare can we even begin to adjudicate whether such a war in Iraq or Afghanistan can be “won” by a foreign occupying force.

Because the Just War theory technically only sanctions legitimate governments fighting external aggression, we can *also* speak of a “Just Revolution” theory which emerged as a coherent theological-ethical argument in places like Nicaragua and South Africa, as Christian theologians and movements focused on oppression within nation-states (Lamola 1986, p.244). However, the Christian theological debate on violence shifted more broadly from Just War to Just Revolution following World War II, as wars of decolonization and North-South/ Cold War conflicts took center stage (p.244).

The "Tragedy of Culture" and Collective Memory/ Forgetting: The Relationship Between Ideology and History

Several of the open-ended survey questions in the present study probed for historical knowledge as well as knowledge of contemporary/ recent history. The poor performance of respondents on these questions is not terribly surprising. It illustrates what Georg Simmel called the "tragedy of culture" – the reality that individuals cannot keep pace with the developments of objective culture (history, art, science, philosophy, etc.). We cannot absorb all the insights, discoveries, and resources that humanity has created and stumbled upon. Thus, "We are doomed to increasingly less understanding of the world we have created" (Ritzer 2003, p.35). As discussed elsewhere, social scientists who specialize in nonviolence, understand better than ever before that nonviolent campaigns have been more effective in achieving their goals than violent campaigns. This discovery has been well absorbed by some academic specialists whose subfields overlap with nonviolence (e.g., social movements, revolutions, etc.), but not it seems by the political or military elites. Perhaps their ideologies of violence are well-shielded from new social scientific insights.

Hence, ideology can be termed a "strategy of containment," as it is "a way of achieving coherence by shutting out the truth about History" (Dowling 1984, p.77). Because of our ideological blinders, we cannot perceive or take in new historical information. Thus, Jameson proposes a nuance beyond the Marxist view of ideology as a form of false consciousness, or a "premature closing-off of thought to the truth about History" (p.77). For Jameson, ideology assumes a Freudian and collective form, it is the

"political unconscious," it is "the *repression* of those underlying contradictions that have their source in History and Necessity" (pp.77-78).

Similarly, Ollman (2003) contends that Marx "never criticizes ideology as a simple lie or claims that what it asserts is completely false. Instead, ideology is generally described as overly narrow, partial, out of focus, and/ or one-sided, all of which are attributable to faulty or...inappropriate abstractions of extension, level of generality, and vantage point..." (p.103). In the same way, Eddy (2012) showed how activists ideologically pre-committed to forms of limited violence co-opted Gandhi and King by over-generalizing from a few quotes or biographical incidents taken out of context. The core nonviolent messages of Gandhi and King, the overarching "spirit" of their life work was repressed through emphasizing the "letter" of a few carefully selected quotes (Eddy 2012). Likewise, the historian Steve Paulsson has said, "Ideologues always try to shoehorn history into their own categories and read into the past things that serve their own particular purposes" (Geller 2013, p.A7).

For Jameson, apart from underlying social-historical contradictions, what is the object of collective denial and repression? It is primarily the potential for revolution that is repressed. What we so often see visible in history is "not-revolution," and in these instances, all we have left to interpret is "the way the ideological structure registers the strain of having kept it repressed" (p.117).

In the present study, our data leads us to grapple with the possibility that the success of nonviolent methods and their successful utilization by the oppressed, must be repressed and forgotten for the health of the state – or more properly, the perceived interests of the elites. In addition, we must repress the insight that inequality is murder in

slow motion – that too is an "essential mystification" which allows the system to reproduce itself and repress revolution. It is likely that inequality is a contributing motivation in virtually all revolutions. The more that inequality can be legitimated through ideology and what Althusser called the "ideological state apparatuses" (Dowling 1984, p.129), the less visible inequality becomes, and the more that revolutionary potential is successfully repressed.

The example of Just War doctrine. "Just war" ideology is one of the four ideological views tested in the survey of the present study. Even in traditional just war doctrine, not a full-fledged nonviolent doctrine but one which recognizes constraints on the use of force, we find overlap between principled and pragmatic norms as well as the need for historical knowledge. For instance, in the "jus ad bellum" (right to go to war) principles of just war doctrine, we read that one criteria for a just war is, in so many words, can you win? That is, if there is a high probability of success this criteria is met, but if the war is likely to be futile, or successful only through disproportionate measures, then the criteria is not met. This criteria can not be evaluated without knowledge of historical cases and an ability to categorize wars, categorize constraining features of particular wars, compare, and generalize without over-generalizing.

This criteria takes on supreme contemporary relevance when we hear military experts remark that counter-insurgency wars (such as the recent war in Iraq and the ongoing war in Afghanistan) have almost never been successful, or never been successful when some fill-in-the-blank dynamic was present – such as a neighboring nation giving sanctuary or supplies to insurgents (e.g., Gentile 2012), or a local populace who fears foreign occupation and supports the guerrillas, or an opponent who kills civilians by

bombing from the air and thereby fails to win the "hearts and minds" of the local populace (Eland 2009). Moreover, even military experts have conceded that the U.S. Military's mechanisms of retaining institutional memory have failed, as David Donovon noted after attending a U.S. Army conference in 2006:

> The US military had had decades of counter-insurgency experience in Asia, Latin America and even Europe. Where were the lessons-learned manuals? Had no-one read them? Was no-one paying attention?... The conference was interesting but disheartening. It became clear from the presentations that many of the lessons learned in Vietnam and elsewhere had been lost from our institutional memory. General Petraeus acknowledged that and said the loss had occurred in the 1990s as the US military had been rebalanced after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those old lessons were still having to be relearned in Iraq and Afghanistan, he said. That was hard for former advisors to hear. Lessons and principles that should have been learned, partly from our own sweat and blood, had been discarded like a pair of old shoes. (Donovon 2012)

And so, without robust collective memory, the significant potential constraints of the pragmatic "can we win?" criteria recedes into inconsequentiality, and decisions to go to war plow ahead with ignorance, hubris, and ideology uninformed by praxis (i.e., a cycle of action, reflection, and strategic action informed by experience). Just war adherents risk embracing the ideology of the "political unconscious" (Jameson), built upon the repression of historical lessons. And so, the praxis of just war doctrine becomes severely compromised wherever collective forgetting occurs.

This means we must recognize how history, that is, historical learning, experiential capital, or praxis (a cycle of action, reflection, and strategically modified action) provides content for ethical reflection. The links between history, collective memory, ideology, principled and pragmatic concerns are closely intertwined.

Public Opinion Data: Confronting the "Ideological Stew"

Research on the U.S. public has suggested that the opinions, attitudes, beliefs, values, and ideologies of individuals do not fit into neat and consistent categories (Williams 1970, Rokeach 1973, Davis and Robinson 1996, DiMaggio et al. 1996). Instead, we are quickly confronted with an "ideological stew" (Snow 2004, p.397) when we probe attitudes using surveys (Converse 1964) as well as more qualitative methods (Blee 2002). Citizens often appear to be "muddle-headed" or "empty-headed" (Saris and Sniderman 2004, pp.337-38).This problem may be particularly salient in survey data. Because there is little at stake in surveys, survey-takers may feel little incentive for thinking deeply about questions and answers.

Among scholars questioning the meaningfulness of public opinion, a good deal of these critical views indict the faulty intelligence of the average person. Loewen (2007) sees rampant "nonthinking" in public opinion polls even among educated respondents (pp.350-351). Fromm (1965) argues that in modern society, the average person is likely to be either an "automaton" conformist or an authoritarian personality who both engage in forms of "pseudo thinking," taking what they have read in the newspaper or what their parent believed as their "own" political opinions or thoughts (pp.215-217). They lack critical thinking skills and their opinions are not "a natural combination of experience, desire, and knowledge" (p.216). In addition, it can be argued that people tend not to think or care about what they can not change (Alinsky 1971), and that in many contexts of political alienation, it can be construed as a "rational choice" to remain uninformed about politics and to avoid forming stable ideologies or attitudes (Downs 1957).

Habermas (1987) has argued that in the modern context, ideological legitimation of the status quo becomes less important, as "fragmented consciousness" replaces "false consciousness" (p.355). In this way, fragmentation becomes the "functional equivalent" of ideology (Delanty 1997, p.45).

Tying together several theoretical strains here, Adorno (1998a) writes that public opinion is "not due simply to people's inadequate knowledge but rather is imposed upon them by the overall structure of society and hence by relations of domination" (p.121). In the modern period, relations of domination serve to inculcate and reinforce fragmentation. We catch glimpses of this process as we turn to the ultra-specialized labor of modern bureaucratic and capitalist systems (concerns of Weber and Marx), the anti-union agenda of neoliberal globalization, or the recent decline of U.S. newspapers and the rise of hundreds of cable television channels broadcasting to niche audiences. We also see fragmentation in theoretical accounts which hold that modern people lack the inclination, resources, and time for remaining politically informed and do not make it a priority (Simon 1945, Lippmann 1997 [1922]).

We observe fragmentation in survey research which turns up responses expressing idiosyncratic ignorance, although some of these perhaps reveal mischievous sensibilities (whether due to indifference/ boredom with survey instruments, or to cover ignorance). Converse (1964) even describes respondents who he claims, were genuinely confused by the question of whether they were born in the United States (i.e., some said no, and gave the state of their birth), though one wonders if he is overlooking the potential formischievous respondents pulling the researcher's leg. I would contend that survey researchers often underestimate the potential for mischievous respondents to engage in

monkey-wrenching the survey instrument. In the present study, several respondents offered bizarre answers to the open-ended question which asked them to name the two nations in which Gandhi personally led nonviolent movements. It is impossible to know if some answers expressed genuine ignorance or comical/ mischievous sensibilities, such as the UO respondents who answered this question by typing: “Mahatma and India,” “Burma,” “India and Saudi Arabia,” “India and Germany,” “India and Italy,” “India and Egypt,” “Ghana,” “India and Ghana,” “India and China” (which received two votes,), “Britain and French” [sic], “India and France” (which received two votes), “India and Nepal” (which received two votes), “India and Tibet” (which received four votes), and “India and the USA” (which received three votes, not including an additional respondent who ventured “Asia and North America”). However, perhaps answers from respondents motivated purely by a comical sensibility would have provided even more outlandish answers. It may also be that mischievous answers are more likely to appear in the more anonymous online survey mode, as opposed to face-to-face surveys.

Interacting with the political realm are values, perhaps deep-seated values, and some have asserted that values are more stable than political opinions on particular issues. But in the realm of religion, we also observe a lack of coherent beliefs as well as the inability to articulate grounds or justifications for belief, have been found in qualitative studies of the religious worldviews held by individuals (e.g., Smith and Denton 2005). Recent surveys have also shown that despite the high percentage of Americans claiming affiliation with Biblical religions, Biblical illiteracy is the norm in the U.S., and born-again Christians are only slightly more informed about the Bible than the general population (Prothero 2007). Such patterns in religious belief seem likely to

be paralleled in the sphere of violent-nonviolent attitudes, since both spheres of belief rely on myths/ tradition/ narratives and heroes/ saints as well as elements of interpretation, perceived evidence, faith, and the prioritizing of values. Of course, attitudes of principled nonviolence in particular, have long found their source and justification in religious traditions, whether Hindu, Jain, Buddhist, Islamic, or Judeo-Christian.

In any case, the potential for a respondent to be confused or to lack knowledge of the meaning of particular words should not be underestimated. As several recent viral YouTube videos document, a great many U.S. high school students will readily sign petitions to "end women's suffrage." Because suffrage sounds like "suffering," students probably assume the meaning is similar or do not want to appear uninformed, so they bluff and hide their ignorance of the meaning of suffrage. Through pre-testing the present survey sought to avoid language that might be unfamiliar to the current generation of college students. For example, the language of "ends" and "means" was found to be unfamiliar to some students in pre-testing, so the words "goals" and "methods" were added (e.g., Q9_27, Q9_32).

There are also strong empirical grounds for doubting not just the stability of attitudes, but also the notion that attitudes impact behavior – and of course, behavior is an outcome that is arguably, more socially significant than mere attitudes. A generation ago, Wicker (1969) reviewed an extensive number of studies and concluded there is "little evidence to support the postulated existence of stable, underlying attitudes within the individual which influence both his verbal expressions and his actions" (p.75).But for all of the critiques against ascribing too much importance to survey data, there are still

instances in which it brings unique insights (difficult to obtain though other methods), perhaps especially where differences in the same survey responses are found over time or between cultures.

Although there are empirical grounds for asserting that opinions and belief systems are unstable at the individual respondent level, the point here is not simply that the mass of humanity is gullible, ignorant, or unreflective by the standards of systematic philosophers. Rather, these findings underline the complex nexus of factors shaping public opinions and their relative malleability. Moreover, some studies suggest that the public is in fact, relatively rational, consistent, and stable in their opinions at the individual level, but the place where stability and slow change in response to "learning" are really found is at the national level (Page and Shapiro 1992, Page and Bouton 2006). If this research stream is correct, a cross-national investigation is well suited to investigating attitudinal patterns.

Attitude formation and elite cues/ policy cues. While many researchers appeal to an "elite cues" theory (Paul and Brown 2001, Lupia 1994, Mondak 1993, Carmines and Kiklinski 1990, Brady and Sniderman 1985), media influence (Joslyn 2003), or an "elite leadership hypothesis" (Kelley and Braithwaite 1990, Stack 2004, Zimring and Hawkins 1986), there has been an unfortunate failure to specify distinctions between elite rhetoric and formally adopted social policies – or what I will term "policy cues"– which may be initiated or approved by elites (e.g., presidents, Supreme Court judges, etc.) or come about through national referendums. Of course, even in the latter case, elites but also moral entrepreneurs and activists lead mobilization efforts to get out the vote and shape the terms of debate. For instance, U.S. elites have heavily influenced the "knowledge-

shaping process" on environmental policy debates through aggressive multi-pronged mobilization efforts (Bonds 2011).

In many cases, the mass public may forget how policies originally came to be adopted. Elites are also likely to stop referencing social policies that have gained broad public acceptance and as the political leverage provided by debates over the policy recede. Hence, the operative authority becomes legislation or court rulings which are the law of the land (policy cues), rather than elite cues per se. In addition, policy cues represent policies of the "winners" in a political contest. Hence they represent a stage in the opinion formation process in which norms are likely to become increasingly reified and naturalized, as opposed to the relatively contentious stage represented by "elite cues." Although it is rarely noted in the literature, the "elite cues" model closely follows the Marxist dictum that the ruling ideas in any culture are the ideas of the ruling class (Marx and Engels [1848] 1955, p.30).

One of the most provocative cases of a positive "elite cue" influence which then turned into a "policy cue" concerns the abolition of the death penalty in West Germany in 1948. The policy was adopted by political elites even though 74% of the public favored the death penalty at the time. By 1980, only 22% of West Germans supported the death penalty (Zimring and Hawkins 1986). Although West German society underwent numerous changes during this period, and the study failed to control for socioeconomic predictors of death penalty support (Stack 2004), it seems highly plausible that some of the attitude change might be attributed to elite cues and policy cues. Controlling for 20 covariates, Kelley and Braithwaite (1990) found that residents of abolitionist states were only 5% less likely to support the death penalty. However, I would contend there is a

fundamental incongruency in comparing Australian state policies with West German national policies. State policies in a federalist system might carry much less weight as an authoritative cue than national policies. Much of the public is likely to be more aware of national policies, or even confused by hearing media reports about executions in other states.

Moreover, Stack (2004) analyzed data from 17 nations and found that, controlling for covariates, the number of years that the death penalty has been abolished in a nation significantly lowered the likelihood that a resident would support the death penalty: "each year of abolition lowered the odds of an individual's death penalty support by 46%" (p.87). Hence, this offers general support for the elite leadership hypothesis, as well as my contention that there may be a distinctly powerful role for "policy cues," as formally adopted social policies are more likely to become normatively reified and naturalized over time, assuming the role of solidified tradition.

The many well-documented studies of a "rally-'round-the-flag" effect – though often greater for whites than nonwhites in the U.S. – suggests that policy cues are powerful shapers of public opinion (Baker and Oneal 2001, Burris 2008, Lindsay and Smith 2003). But Baker and Oneal's (2001) analysis of U.S. militarized interstate disputes between 1933 and 1992 suggests that rallies are more likely when they are associated with assertive White House public relations "spin" and bipartisan support for the president's policies (p.661). Loewen (2007) cites a strong policy cue effect during the Vietnam War:

> In late spring 1966, just before the United States began bombing Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam, Americans split 50-50 as to whether we [sic] should bomb these targets. After the bombing began, 85 percent favored the bombing

> while only 15 percent opposed. The sudden shift was the result, not the cause, of the government's decision to bomb. (p.350)

With evidence such as this, we are led to the conclusion that much of the U.S. public has highly malleable opinions on issues of war.

Alternative Configurations of U.S. Attitudes Towards War

The present study tests Megoran's (2008) theory that many people adhere to one of four ideological orientations regarding violence and nonviolence: militarism, political realism, just war, and nonviolence. Page and Bouton (2006) argue from U.S. survey data that "most" Americans are political "realists" who support high levels of military spending, U.S. maintenance of long-term bases around the world, and who prefer the U.S. to remain the world's sole military superpower (p.100). Yet, they also observe that most Americans also prefer diplomatic methods and war only as a "last resort" (p.100) – in keeping with just war ideology. Moreover, they conclude that there "is no evidence that majorities of Americans are pacifist" (p.100).

Beyond Megoran's (2008) ideological scheme, alternative accounts of U.S. attitudes are worth considering, especially given the substantial debate about the lack of meaningful opinions in much of the mass population. Feaver and Gelpi (2004) argue from poll data that the U.S. population is divided up into the following four orientations towards war: 30 to 35% are "solid hawks" ("relatively indifferent to stakes, costs, or prospects of victory"), 10 to 30% are "solid doves," up to 20% are "casualty-phobic" (and the casualties specified here involve U.S. soldiers, rather than foreign civilians or soldiers, but see below), and 15 to 40% are "defeat-phobic" (p.186). Similarly, Joseph (2007) asserts that 15-20% of the population are "solid doves" (p.3), 25 to 30% are "solid hawks" (p.6), and the rest of the U.S. public (50 to 60%) comprises a large middle group

"that is pulled in different directions by war sensitivities [i.e., casualties and costs/ blood and treasure] and war support" (p.5, p.256). These configurations may well help to clarify the attitudinal landscape, but the present study suggests, at least among college students, that categorical ideological leanings as theorized by Megoran (2008) can be detected in survey data. Thus, we miss out on distinctive attitudinal orientation and predispositions if we group most of the public into an undifferentiated mass who are only pulled by pragmatic concerns of defeat and casualties.

Future research could seek to clarify how pragmatic concerns of defeat and casualties overlap with ideological leanings, but it may well be that these areas of overlap will vary on a case by case basis, and certainly over time. Indeed, below we consider how people think about means and ends, strategies and ideologies, are likely to interpenetrate one another and to change in changing contexts of conflict. For instance, we consider how respondents view drone attacks, a new technology which presents new challenges to moral and ideological views of war. While Joseph (2007) discusses the "casualty-phobic" (and the casualties specified here involve U.S. soldiers, rather than foreign civilians or soldiers) as one source of antiwar sentiments, some recent research suggests that sensitivities to casualties can not be generalized to the opponent. Cochran (2008) shows that: "concern for enemy civilians is only salient when U.S. casualties are low and when the U.S. is winning. When the U.S. casualties are high or when U.S. prospects for victory are dubious concern for civilian casualties takes a back seat." Thus, we have reasons to doubt Joseph's (2007) sweeping claim that the U.S. is becoming more peaceful.

Why is Confidence in Nonviolence Not Higher Around the World?

The short answer to this question is that ideology trumps all – it trumps history (Althusser 1971), it shapes historical perceptions and writings (White 1973), and it is one factor among others slowing the reception and integration of new social science research findings. Galtung (1995) proposes that the reason there is "not much more nonviolent struggle in the world" is due to the "uninformed" belief that "it does not work" (p.81). Indeed, a generation ago, Malcolm X argued,

> Christian? Gandhian? I don't go for anything that's non-violent and turn-the-other-cheekish. I don't see how any revolution – I've never heard of a nonviolent revolution or a revolution that was brought about by turning the other cheek, and so I believe that it is a crime for anyone to teach a person who is being brutalized to continue to accept that brutality without doing something to defend himself. If this is what the Christian-Gandhian philosophy teaches, then it is criminal – a criminal philosophy. (pp.8-9)

But in early 2011, after the "Arab Spring"/ nonviolent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the Gallup World Poll question on whether "peaceful means alone" "will work," if asked in early 2011 it would seem almost a proxy question for – have you been following the news lately? Tunisia and Egypt were largely nonviolent revolutions, though some limited violence (e.g., stone throwing) occurred among protesters. However, at the time of writing in early 2013, those who follow the news of the "Arab Winter" could just as easily conclude nonviolence does "not work." Already by late 2011, the Egyptian revolution devolved into the messy business of a fledgling democracy and repression by the Egyptian military. Meanwhile, the string of revolutions sparked by those in Tunisia and Egypt, including those in Syria and Libya, while initially nonviolent often morphed into violent revolutions. The role of nonviolence, limited violence, and violence in many of these revolutions is up for interpretation.

Hence, on the one hand, the pragmatic nonviolence question in the Gallup World Poll probes for an opinion, but in another sense it really probes for interpretations of history, as well as the historical knowledge and political and intellectual capital of respondents. Scholars now know that over the last century or so nonviolent campaigns (i.e., not always "peaceful means alone," but many mass movements have been largely nonviolent) have been more effective than violent campaigns in achieving movement goals (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008), and in fostering nascent democracies (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005).

Research is also mounting on the relative ineffectiveness of violent methods. In a cross-national analysis from WWI to the 1990 Gulf War, Robert Pape's (1996) book *Bombing to Win?: Air Power and Coercion in War* showed that the attempt by states to coerce civilians through bombing has always failed, but military elites have tended to deny and obscure the reality of this outcome. Downs and Cochran (2008) pursue the same question, but more broadly analyzing civilian victimization in data from 1816 to 2004, in a paper titled "Targeting Civilians to Win?" They conclude that in interstate wars, the strategy of civilian victimization has not yielded significantly better war outcomes, and the strategy has performed especially poorly in recent years. On the question of terrorism by nonstate actors, in a study of 28 of the most significant terrorist groups, Abrahms (2006) concludes that in over 90% of cases terrorism has not worked in achieving political goals. Yet, militant groups around the world have failed to learn this, as violent ideologies continue to reproduce faithful adherents.

Structural Factors Versus Psychocultural Orientations

In accounting for political violence, researchers and theorists have posited "structural" and "psychocultural" hypotheses, or syntheses of them (Ross 1986). The psychocultural approach can also be termed a "cultural heritage theory" (Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005, p.199). Bellah (2006) exemplifies this approach as he contends that Weber's Protestant Ethic is even more general than Weber theorized. Bellah endorses a study by David Vogel finding that among the world's top 21 richest nations, cultures with a Protestant religious heritage tend to have more vibrant economies, democracies, and environmental policies (pp.334-335). We might interject here a negative critique of this heritage, as some historians of Europe have seen in Protestantism an "elective affinity" (to borrow another concept from Weber) with militarism (see Ehrenreich 2006, pp.122-124), and U.S. history furnishes a poster child for that dark side. In any case, Bellah suggests there are "cultural codes embedded in national cultures and that those cultural codes, however transformed over time, are ultimately derived from religious beliefs" (p.335). Here, Bellah turns to Clifford Geertz's article "Religion As a Cultural System" in which Geertz (1973) wrote, "Culture patterns [are] sources of information that – like genes – provide a blueprint or template...." (p.92). For Geertz, religious symbols, beliefs, and practices "function to synthesize a people's *ethos*," making it appear "intellectually reasonable" and "emotionally convincing" (pp.89-90). An ethos is defined by Geertz as "the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood – and their world view" (p.89). We should note here that Vogel, Bellah, and Ronald Inglehart all agree that religious heritage matters, shaping cultures even after a nation moves in secular or pluralistic directions (Bellah 2006, p.336).

It is not an accident that Pennsylvania, with its pacifist Quaker heritage, in 1794 was the first state to abolish capital punishment for all crimes except murder (Hood and Hoyle 2008, p.11). But the Quaker influence in Pennsylvania diminished over time, and by 1965 nine U.S. states, 24 of the 29 Mexican states, and 11 nations had abolished the death penalty for all crimes, but not Pennsylvania (p.12).

As another example, state violence in Latin America is often assumed to be linked to a "shared cultural legacy, a part of the cultural heritage of the region," but counterarguments deserve consideration, such as those that arise through analysis of Costa Rican exceptionalism (Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005, pp.198-199). Several South and Central American nations, including Costa Rica (which abolished the death penalty for all crimes in 1877, only the third nation in the world to do so, after Venezuela (1863) and San Marino (1865)), have been world leaders in abolishing the death penalty, and recently the Vatican and the Catholic Church in Argentina have strongly affirmed abolitionism (Hood and Hoyle 2008, p.12, p.62, p.65).

As for synthesizing structural and psychocultural theories, an excellent example is research which finds that in many cases the adoption of social policies (i.e., changes to "structure") fosters changes in public opinion. Stacks (2004) analyzed public opinion support for the death penalty in 17 nations and found that residents of retentionist nations are far more likely to support the death penalty, while each year of abolition reduced support for the death penalty in abolitionist nations. In sum, it seems that "people on the whole support what has been the norm in their culture" (Hood and Hoyle 2008, p.376). What is more, it seems that young people who grow up in a nation that has never had a death penalty are far less supportive of the death penalty than older cohorts (p.377).

Studies of northern Europe suggest that even when the homicide rate fluctuates, “once abolitionist policies become embedded in the national consciousness sentiments in favour of the death penalty gradually diminish in the general population” (p.377).

Hence, the theoretical argument is that public policies tend to produce consensus around social norms. The present study supports this line of argument, as Costa Rica’s policy of demilitarization, first solidified in 1948 and 1949, continues to be reaffirmed by the public. My 2010 survey of Costa Rican college students found that 91% supported Costa Rica’s demilitarization.

Analyzing attitudes toward the death penalty in Costa Rica is a good test of this structural theory, since Costa Rica abolished the death penalty over 130 years ago. In 1994, only 36% of Costa Ricans favored a return to the death penalty. But just two years later in 1996, 58% of Costa Ricans said they would support a return of the death penalty (Sandoval-García 2004, p.157). The explanation? The shift may stem from dynamics unfolding when the racial composition of a nation/ local context begins to change, or is perceived as changing through the immigration of racialized “others.” Studies of the death penalty in the U.S. have found that racially prejudiced whites, especially those living in a context of black residential proximity, are more supportive of the death penalty (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003). In recent decades in Costa Rica, Nicaraguan immigrants have served as the primary threatening racialized “other” (Sandoval-García 2004). Accounts of crime by major media outlets in Costa Rica have exaggerated the impact of Nicaraguan immigrants on crime rates (pp.154-156) as well as their role in the “exhaustion of public services, especially health, education, and housing” (p.176). These twin discourses of the domestic impact of the racialized “other” have been called upon to

stabilize and maintain social inequality, and more specifically, to legitimate neoliberal policies (p.171), while shifting the nation's emotional climate towards authoritarianism, as indicated by attitude shifts on the death penalty (p.157) and increased investment in prison terms while stripping prisoners of benefits (p.156).

However, as depicted in Table 1, the survey revealed robust support for a ban on the death penalty, as only about 30% of Costa Rican respondents expressed support for the death penalty in Q9.31. Hence, it may be that Costa Rican culture is beginning to recover its balance after years of otherizing Nicaraguans. Moreover, compared to U.S. respondents, about 25% more Costa Ricans said they "strongly disagree" with the use of the death penalty, and about 18% more Costa Ricans disagreed overall, as the total percentage of Costa Ricans disagreeing was 70.88% versus the 52.79% of U.S. respondents.

Sharply rising crime rates in the Dominican Republic (where the death penalty was abolished for "ordinary crimes" (typically, this category only excludes crimes against

Table 1. T-Test on Death Penalty Views in the Cross-National Samples

Item (question letter label/ Q9 label) and primary category	**Costa Rica (*n* = 312)**				**USA (*n* = 403)**				$\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$
	Dis-agree	**Strong-ly Dis-agree**	**Total (Dis-agree)**	$\bar{x}$ / *SD*	**Dis-agree**	**Strong-ly Dis-agree**	**Total (Dis-agree)**	$\bar{x}^2$ / *SD*	
(ee/31) Death penalty (myth of redemptive violence): "The death penalty should be used for a person convicted of murder."	35.28	35.60	70.88	2.93 1.02	41.88	10.91	52.79	2.51 .85	.42****

Notes: Two-tailed t-test of significance: **** = p < .0001; "Total (Disagree)" = "Strongly Disagree" + "Disagree"; On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent; 2.5 is the midpoint; Values of answers: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); Questions in which "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree" are the peaceful answers (percentages). These questions are positively worded for agreement by adherents of violent orientations.

the state in wartime) in 1924 and for all crimes in 1966), Peru (where the death penalty was abolished for ordinary crimes in 1979), and South Africa (where the death penalty was abolished for all crimes in 1997), saw increases in public support for the death penalty. Nevertheless, increases in crime in Brazil (where the death penalty was abolished for ordinary crimes in 1979) has not produced shifts in public opinion on the death penalty (Hood and Hoyle 2008, pp.374-375). All of this suggests that factors like racial prejudice and demographic shifts, trust in the government's ability to fight crime, and the role of leaders who rally support for "tougher" punishments (as occurred in Peru), may be key mediating variables in explaining variation in support for the death penalty.

Theoretical Models of Opinion Formation

Table 2 sets forth in condensed form a variety of theoretical models of public opinion formation which are salient for understanding political, foreign policy, and hawk-dove attitudes.

Table 2. Models of the Reproduction of Political/ Foreign Policy/ Hawk-Dove Attitudes

Model	Representative Theorists/ Researchers and Explanations
Uninformed public	Public opinion is theorized as (and some survey data supports) unstable, malleable, and uninformed - such that opinions are not meaningful and not coherent (Bartels 2008, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Converse 1964). Similarly, Bourdieu (1972) contends, "Public opinion does not exist," and Adorno (1998) writes of an "opinion delusion society."
Rational public	Some theorists and researchers argue that the American public holds opinions which are rational, sensible, real (not meaningless or random "nonattitudes"), stable, coherent, and predictable (Page and Shapiro 1992, Page and Bouton 2006). Moreover, these opinions "*make sense* in terms of underlying values and available information" (Page and Shapiro 1992, p.xi). Similarly, Americans are said to hold "coherent, *purposive belief systems*" that shape policy preferences (Page and Bouton 2006, p.28).
Values-based, Personality type models	These models overlap with the above model. Research on the Schwartz Values and Social Dominance Orientation suggest respondents reliably select values that reflect their personalities.
Ideological continuum models	Megoran (2008) theorizes that many people adhere to one of four ideological orientations regarding violence and nonviolence: militarism, political realism, just war, and nonviolence. The classic left-right ideological continuum often correlates with particular political views, and ideological leanings can overlap with personality types (Haidt 2012a, 2012b). However, two cautions are in order. First, even where the left-right dimension reaches the .5 level of correlation with political issues (a somewhat common occurrence in Europe, but rare in the U.S.), the left-right variable explains less than 25% of the variance (Feldman 2003, p.478). Second, Converse (1964) found in open-ended questions that 37% of Americans could supply no meaningful definitions for the liberal-conservative distinction (p.220), 46% demonstrated "uncertainty and guesswork," leaving only 17% with a firm grasp of this basic ideological distinction (p.223). Further, Converse determined that only 3.5% of the voting public were ideologues, 12% were near-ideologues, but 45% conceptualized political issues mainly according to group interests and this plurality of voters also depended on elite cues in forming opinions (p.218, p.216). Somewhat similar results were found by Dalton (2002).

Model	Representative Theorists/ Researchers and Explanations
Hawks, Doves, and Others I	Feaver and Gelpi (2004) contend the U.S. population is divided up into the following four orientations towards war: 30 to 35% are "solid hawks," 10 to 30% are "solid doves," up to 20% are "casualty-phobic," and 15 to 40% are "defeat-phobic" (p.186). The latter two categories corroborate earlier research which found that much U.S. opposition to the Vietnam War was not moral or even sympathetic to war protesters, but rather related only to pragmatic concerns such as the failure to win the war or "traditional isolationism" (Schuman 1972).
Hawks, Doves, and Others II	Joseph (2007) asserts that 15-20% of the U.S. population are "solid doves" (p.3), 25 to 30% are "solid hawks" (p.6), and the rest (50 to 60%) comprise a malleable middle (p.5, p.256).
Elite cues/ policy cues	Although it is rarely noted in the literature, the "elite cues" model (Paul and Brown 2001, Lupia 1994, Mondak 1993, Carmines and Kiklinski 1990, Brady and Sniderman 1985) closely follows the false consciousness model/ Marx and Engel's contention that the ruling ideas in any culture are the ideas of the ruling class. Of course, that notion is not a conspiracy theory – it is much too deep and systematic to be merely that. The idea here is that because people do not have enough information to hold meaningful opinions, they make the rational choice to save time and effort (to become informed) and take their cues from elites, or from official state policies. Elite messages are mediated and filtered by the news media which shape opinions (Russett and Graham 1989) and can even reshape personal memory of one's earlier attitudes towards a war (Joslyn 2003).
Ideological hegemony/ Education as indoctrination	Althusser (1971) identifies institutions, including the educational system, media, family, and religious organizations which function as "ideological state apparatuses." These institutions socialize citizens into ideological hegemony. Similar to the above model, this perspective proposes that education (organized and directed by elites) tends to reproduce patriotism and to avoid controversial, critical views of national history (e.g., Loewen 2007). A variation of this model notes that textbooks are produced by profit-seeking corporations who want to avoid controversy in order to facilitate bookselling to large markets. The result is that we fail to reproduce critical attitudes towards war, even towards the Vietnam War (Griffen and Marciano 1979, Leahey 2010).
Socio-structural models	When peaceful structures exist within a nation (e.g., very low amounts of military spending), we are likely to find dovish attitudes. Alternatively, where large military-industrial complexes exist and compulsory military service, attitudes are likely to be more hawkish. There is overlap here with the "policy cues" model, but the socio-structural models include broader institutional and socialization factors shaping a given culture.
Allegiance and socialization model	Where deep forms of stratification and divisions of labor exist, those who are rewarded by the system are likely to express more social solidarity and conformity to official government policies, while those who do not benefit as greatly will be more critical. Loewen (2007) names the reproduction of "allegiance" and socialization through schooling during the Vietnam War era, explaining how U.S. citizens with more schooling (i.e., those with more wealth and who benefitted more from the U.S. economic and political system) were more hawkish and patriotic, while those with less education were more dovish and critical on the Vietnam War. Thus, ideas and attitudes are theorized as having a "material basis" in the Marxist sense – it is the material interests behind the ideas that generate ideology (Gregg 2003, p.166).
Standpoint model/ Group-based differences model (Burris 2008)	Here scholars seek to track demographic variables including gender, education levels, race, ethnicity, income, and class. This model overlaps with the above model. Political and foreign policy attitudes vary with differences in social position (Halle 1966) and socialized role-taking positions. Different life experiences and social conditioning produce different attitude tendencies (Cortright 2008, p.256). Thus, females socialized into nurturing, mothering roles have tended to be more dovish as well as opponents of policies furthering dominance and inequality. It is well-established that women in the U.S. tend to be more liberal (ANES 2004). And, many racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. have been more dovish (Burris 2008).
Nations/ Individuals "Learn": Historical/ Experiential/ Generational Cohorts Models	Several scholars (e.g., Inglehart 1977, 1990; Mannheim 1952; Moors 2007) have advanced a socialization by generations model, such that generational replacement produces gradual changes in political culture. In addition, Pinker (2011) joins Kant in proposing a theory of "peace-through-learning": antiwar sentiments seem to grow through painful experiences of war (p.293). Similarly, Page and Bouton (2006) suggest that the U.S. public has "learned" lessons from history including war history, but some are ambiguous lessons and still contested (p.13). They argue: "most Americans, ordinary citizens as well as politicians and experts, have learned certain lessons from our national experiences...History has helped inform Americans' views of what sort of foreign policy the United States should pursue...U.S. public opinion...should be taken seriously: it is rooted in historical experience" (p.16). At a higher level of abstraction, Bauman (1973) theorizes "culture as praxis," meaning that culture fundamentally involves the ongoing assimilation of new events and ideas (the polar opposite of Althusser's model below), but he suggests there is a right-wing praxis and a left-wing praxis (pp.155-156). Tilly (2001) depicts transformative historical events that alter relations through cognitive, relational, and environmental mechanisms. In the present study of attitudes towards violence/ nonviolence, the following experiences are likely to be salient: a) experiences of successful nonviolent movements; b) experiences of war trauma/ suffering on the territory of the nation; c) experiences of military defeat/ victory in war. The present study is focused on factors shaping the accumulation of "peace-specific capital" (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, p.515).

Model	Representative Theorists/ Researchers and Explanations
Nations/ Individuals Do Not "Learn": "Ideology has no history" (Althusser 1971, p.160)	Ideology tends to trump new historical developments. Our ideological blinders prevent us from perceiving or taking seriously historical counter-evidence. We cannot synthesize new historical information because ideological leanings lead us to perceive and interpret history through the biased lenses of tradition and other preconceived assumptions. And the problem is much deeper because the corollary of Althusser's claim is that history is infused with ideology. Historians emplot their writings on the basis of ideology (White 1973). Even history (i.e., written records) that could potentially challenge or revise our worldviews is already subjectively tamed, slanted, and cherry-picked to support our pre-existing, pre-assumed ideological worldviews.
Psychocultural models, Religious/ Symbolic orientations, "Social cosmologies" (Galtung 1981, 1997), Cultural "ethos" (Geertz 1973) "Civilizations" (Huntington 1996)	There is some evidence from political poll data that unstable individual opinions co-exists with strong consistency at the collective/ cultural level (Page and Bouton 2006, p.22). Hofstede (2001) and Inglehart at al. (e.g., Inglehart and Carbalio 1997, Norris and Inglehart 2004) have documented cross-national differences by nation, cultural region, level of development, and religious culture on several values dimensions. Similar to Althusser's de-historicized ideology above, religion is a symbolic orientation that tends to produce reified conceptualizations which obscure, mask, and repress historical change and development (Berger 1967). But religion also grounds values and motivations in a uniquely powerful way, partly because reified conceptualizations/ cosmologies perceived as stemming from divine revelation are difficult to reform. Thus, Geertz (1973) defines religions as symbol-systems which clothe worldviews/ a group's "ethos" with a "aura of factuality" and "establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations [that]...seem uniquely realistic" (p.90). Galtung (1997) argues that the world can presently be divided into seven spheres or regions, each headed by a hegemonic power: the U.S., the European Union, Japan, Moscow, Beijing, India, and Islam. Galtung proposes that the culture of a civilization involves "motivational syndromes" or "social cosmologies" that "program nations in general and national leaders in particular for patterns of international behavior" (pp.188-189). Civilizations are shaped by their sense of "chosenness, their myths, and their traumas" (p.188). Huntington's (1996), by now, infamous "civilizations" hypothesis has been challenged by numerous scholars, including Fox (2004) who finds evidence that religion has a greater impact on civil wars than does civilization.
Belligerent public/ Modern Bureaucratic "Callous Cruelty" (Collins 1974)	The cultural-political hegemony of violent methods of conflict resolution is such that Wink (1992) describes the "myth of redemptive violence" as the world's real religion, or dominant religion. In this view, much of the public is likely to assent to at least some ideologies of violence (e.g., just war, militarism, etc.). Theorists also propose that certain forms of social organization such as modern bureaucracies reproduce higher levels of "callous cruelty" (Collins 1974), and forms of otherizing discourse and moral legitimation can produce "moral disengagement" (Bandura 1990, 1996).
Peaceable public/ Democratic peace	Numerous theorists of nonviolence assert that the "general population" in most, perhaps all countries have no taste for direct involvement with violent resistance (e.g., Sharp 1973). This helps to explain why, compared with violent campaigns, nonviolent campaigns have been much more effective in mobilizing large numbers of participants (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). The prominent sociologist Randall Collins (2008) advances an argument from evolutionary sociobiology which contends that humans are genetically hard-wired for emotional sensitivity and cooperation with others, and this makes face to face killing very difficult (for a review of similar studies see Cortright 2008, pp.244-246). However, forms of social and cultural conditioning, and distancing from the act of killing, can produce aggressiveness and callousness towards killing as well as torture (Collins 1974). The theory of the democratic peace contends that citizens of democracies will tend to be more peaceful, but this is much debated (Cortright 2008, Pinker 2011, Ripsman 2007).
The "power of nightmares" model	This model suggests that the "politics of fear"/ "power of nightmares" (Curtis 2004) and the "paranoid style" of American politics (Hofstadter cited in Tonry 2008) should not be underestimated. A vivid scare-campaign of various nightmare scenarios from communism, to nuclear war, to terrorism can move the public decisively towards pro-war attitudes. Thus, the fear of another September 11th attack can motivate support for drone strikes on suspected terrorists abroad.

The Nation as the Unit of Analysis

The methodological and theoretical logic of the present study follows the rich tradition of studies which have taken the nation as the unit of analysis. Among these are recent studies which theorize and analyze the "emotional climate" of nations (Basabe and Valencia 2007; Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera 2007; de Rivera and Páez 2007; de Rivera, Kurrien, and Olsen 2007; Fernández-Dols, Carrera, de Mendoza, and Oceja 2007). Similarly, key strategies of survey research have aimed to assess public opinion

linkages to enduring traditional values that vary cross-culturally (e.g., Inglehart and Baker 2000, Inglehart and Carablio 1997, Inglehart 1997, Inglehart 1990, Inglehart 1977). Among other findings, the theoretical fruitfulness of cross-national studies of values and attitudes is suggested by Halman's (1995) analysis of longitudinal data (the European Values Survey) on civic and personal moral attitudes (including two measures of violent/ nonviolent attitudes: the justifiability of political assassinations as well as killing in self-defense), which concluded that cross-national differences were more significant than within-country differences across education and age groups.

In explaining cross-national variations, attempts to categorize nations, whether by world-systems position (e.g., core, semi-periphery, and periphery nations), levels of development (with the aid of the U.N. Development Index), predominant religious tradition, or other cultural markers can provide useful theoretical leverage. Huntington's (1996), by now, infamous "civilizations" hypothesis has been challenged by numerous scholars, including Fox (2004) who finds evidence that religion has a greater impact on civil wars than does civilization. But admittedly, there are significant areas of overlap between religion and civilization. Although some scholars argue that the idea that the U.S. has been deeply shaped by Protestant Christianity is a "fantasy" (Fernandez-Armesto 2003, p.194), others continue the Weberian or neo-Durkheimian/ communitarian strain in asserting that the predominant religious traditions in many cultures have shaped a variety of social and political values and structural outcomes (e.g., Bellah 2000, Inglehart and Baker 2000, Ingelhart and Carbalio 1997).

Following a neo-Durkheimian approach, a significant literature has emerged (from a seminal article by Bellah (1967)) which argues that cultures can be said to have

"civil religions," or distinctive values, reproduced through collective rituals, holiday cycles, national saints, and historical narratives. In the same vein, "collective memory" scholarship has explored and theorized the cultural role of historical narratives and commemorative symbolism which mythologize national memories (Olick 2007, Schwartz and Schuman 2005, Olick 1999, Olick and Robbins 1998, Schwartz 1996, Zerubavel 1996). Here, building on strains of Durkheim, Weber, and Geertz, collective memory is understood as a "cultural system" (Schwartz 1996). Likewise, analyses have exhibited a Weberian approach in which cultures are said to exhibit an ethos or ethic (Weber 1922, Weber 1930), a "social cosmology" (Galtung 1997, Galtung 1981), "cultural codes" (Bellah 2000), an "emotional climate" (de Rivera 1992), or ideologies and religions that function as "cultural systems" akin to genetic programs (Geertz 1973).

The prominent scholar of nonviolence Johan Galtung (1997) argued that the world could be divided into seven spheres or regions, each headed by a hegemonic power: the U.S., the European Union, Japan, Moscow, Beijing, India, and Islam. Galtung proposed that the culture of a civilization involves "motivational syndromes" or "cosmologies" that "program nations in general and national leaders in particular for patterns of international behavior" (pp.188-189). Civilizations are shaped by their sense of "chosenness, their myths, and their traumas" (p.188). Here, we see Galtung theorizing on relatively stable attitudes and values, but he also points to the ongoing interaction of cultural myths and historical events (e.g., "traumas"). Galtung explicitly claims this cultural interpretation over against competing interpretations of international behavior: "the Marxist assumption of economic primacy, the 'realist' assumption of military primacy, or the liberal assumption of the primacy of political institutions (e.g., as

conceptualized in the democracy-dictatorship dichotomy)" (p.188). However, the present project seeks to interrogate both structural and cultural factors.

Interpersonal Violence: Do State Structures and Policies of Militarism or Nonviolence Spillover to the Interpersonal Level?

Research from psychology and sociology suggests that people often compartmentalize their lives and so inconsistencies and contradictions in attitudes/ values and behavior are commonplace (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004, p.381; Wicker 1969). And, contradictions and hypocrisies are readily rationalized as people let themselves off the hook and deny culpability through forms of "moral disengagement" (Bandura 1990, 1996).

On the other hand, "spillover" between discrete sectors of life is also commonplace. For instance, workplace roles have been found to spillover and impact parenting practices in the home (Kohn 1969). And, slaughterhouse employment has been found to increase arrests for violent crimes and rape (a form of spillover into the surrounding community), suggesting a "Sinclair effect" unique to the violent workplace of the slaughterhouse (Fitzgerald, Kalof, and Dietz 2009). Several scholars have argued that violent and aggressive sports spillover into aggressive tendencies off the playing field. Others argue the opposite, casting violent sports in the role of a release valve. The sociologist George Ritzer (2003) has contended, "Perhaps if we allowed more violence in sport, if sport were less civilized, then we might have somewhat less violence elsewhere in the world" (p.131).In possible support of spillover, consider that U.S. Army soldiers engage in domestic violence in the home at "twice the rate found in similar groups of civilians" (Hedges 2003, p.20). Of course, it is certainly likely that those with

propensities for violence are more likely to join the military, but it is undeniable that the military also socializes its members into violence.

Research that engages broader cultural levels of analysis also suggests that spillover is an apt metaphor. Indeed, where cross-national differences – or similarities – in individual values, attitudes, and behaviors can be documented, theorists often turn to cultural and social-structural explanations (Schooler 1996). Thus, in a study of 6 industrializing nations, Inkeles (1969) found that a set of similar psychological/ attitudinal characteristics called "individual modernity" was associated with exposure to industrial factory work, urbanization, education, and mass media. But Inkles (1983) also concluded that across the data results, national differences were associated with real and powerful contextual effects. As another example, Wright (1989) compared workers in Sweden and the U.S. and found that Swedish workers are much more anticapitalist ideologically, a pattern he links to institutionalized practices and culture, which we might term elite cues, policy cues, and organizational cues. Wright contends in his conclusion that "consciousness is shaped by politics, in so far as the strategies of parties, unions, and other political actors determine the ways in which people interpret those experiences and act on their interests" (p.13). There are three distinct ideological coalitions in Sweden (working class, middle class, and bourgeois), while the U.S. lacks a clear working-class coalition. Historical and structural differences account for these differences in class formation: Sweden's large state employment sector helped a middle class coalition emerge, and Sweden's strong labor movement and division between blue collar and white collar unionism helped solidify the working-class coalition (p.14).

Given these diverse research findings, the question arises whether Costa Rica's policies of demilitarization might spillover all the way down to the interpersonal level? Or, framing the issue in terms of the chicken or egg problem – which came first: were Costa Ricans already more peaceful on the interpersonal level and demilitarization trickled up, or did demilitarization policies trickle down and shape attitudes among the populace, or yet again, was there an "elective affinity," in Weber's phrase, between demilitarization policies and Costa Rican culture?

Cross-Cultural Research: The Salience of Context

How might opinion polls which test peaceful and belligerent attitudes reflect cultural learning or praxis? One possibility is that in the process of answering survey questions, respondents interject the contexts they are most familiar with, contexts they are emotionally or empathetically engaged with through personal familiarity with victims or episodes in their national life. For example, in the 2008 World Gallup poll, Japan ranks near the top in one indicator of peaceful attitudes, a question on whether military attacks on civilians are justifiable. Ninety percent of Japanese responded such attacks are "Never justified," ranking them third in the world, and tied with Iraq. It seems plausible that most Japanese recalled the U.S. atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in answering that question, instinctively taking the side of the victim. Similarly, Iraqis may hear the question as a referendum on the U.S. military bombing of their country, though perhaps some Iraqis also hear in the question their memories of life under a dictator.

METHODS

Unfortunately, individual-level data analysis of the Gallup World Poll is not possible at this time because the data is proprietary. However, nation-level analysis is

possible since the Gallup organization decided to release to the public nation-level means and topline data with two demographic breaks – gender and age cohorts.

Anderson (2004) has called for the measurement of "peace" through both objective and subjective indicators including survey data measuring nonviolent attitudes as they interface various micro and macro levels – self, interpersonal, local community, national, and international. At the level of power politics, some scholars write of a militarism-pacifism ideological continuum (Cohrs and Moschner 2002), but the key points along the spectrum of violent/ nonviolent beliefs might be better summarized as militarism, realism, just war, or nonviolence (Megoran 2008). Following Anderson's (2004) call, the survey designed for this study tests respondent attitudes at multiple levels from interpersonal to international. The survey also tests whether attitudes correspond to Megoran's (2008) ideological categories.

Costa Rica and the U.S.: Maximally Different Cases?

Comparative-historical methodologists have identified the utility of analyzing "maximally different cases within given bounds" (Skocpol and Somers 1994, p.76). This names the analytical task of the "contrast-oriented comparative historian," through the contrast of clearly distinct contexts the scholar seeks to identify how particular nations, for example, "constitute relatively irreducible wholes, each a complex and unique sociohistorical configuration in its own right" (p.75). Yet, the sharp contrasts between contexts, in the words of Clifford Geertz, "form a kind of commentary on one another's character" (p.76).

The survey data (as well as key textbook analyses) in this project draws samples from two nations, Costa Rica and the U.S. Are these cases "maximally different" and

what boundaries do they share? Both nations are established democracies, shaped by histories of indigenous settlement, European settlement, and predominantly Christian religious culture. But even here there are notable differences. Costa Rica's democracy is a multi-party democracy, structured by a party-list proportional representation system, a system that some analysis have argued is more democratic than the winner-take-all two-party U.S. system. Costa Rica is strongly Catholic, while the U.S. has been dominated by Protestants. Historically, Costa Rica had periods of strong anti-clerical movements, but today, Catholic teachings are still taught in public schools.

Costa Rica has been deeply influenced by U.S. culture and it is commonly referred to as the most "pro-Yankee" Latin American nation. It is also frequently observed that school children in each nation believe they live in the greatest country on earth. Both nations have legacies of FDR or FDR-like New Deal policies, but in recent decades have embraced waves of neoliberal policymaking. Both nations have soldiers as national heroes and histories in which foreign armies were repelled through military force – but as we shall see these similarities are quite superficial, and the details of how each particular case are interpreted within the culture are quite complex.

On several factors involving militaristic dynamics these nations would seem to be maximally different: structurally (Costa Rica has no military, the U.S. spends more on its military than the next 29 nations combined; Costa Rica is a small, middle-income nation, the U.S. is a large, wealthy nation) and historically (Costa Rica has had no military for over 60 years, the U.S. has been engaged in warfare for much of that time). Costa Rica has been identified as among a handful of "good Samaritan" nations who have been consistent leaders in human rights initiatives at the U.N. (Brysk 2005). Even tourists to

Costa Rica are likely to observe that the people are proud of having no military, while U.S. culture routinely and ritualistically celebrates its soldiers as heroes.

But even U.S. militarism is the subject to starkly divergent interpretations. Joseph (2007) argues that Americans have become increasingly antiwar, forcing U.S. political and military leaders to invest enormous resources in stirring up support for imperial wars while limiting casualties. Likewise, Page and Bouton (2006) see several stark leader-citizen disagreements, with the public being much more likely to support the U.N. (p.41), joining the International Criminal Court, signing the Landmines Convention (p.215), multilateralism in general, stopping arms sales abroad, and renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons (p.214, p.242, p.113). One issue where U.S. political leaders were more dovish than the public was on the assassination of suspected terrorist leaders (p.214). But in general, like Joseph, Page and Bouton see the public as much more casualty-phobic than elites (p.242). However, the "casualty-phobic" frame itself smacks of an elite orientation. We can assert the same thing by saying that the public seems to value the sanctity of life more than elites.

Conversely, the military analyst Andrew Bacevich (2005) has noted signs of a "new American militarism" pervading U.S. pop culture, policy makers, intellectuals and evangelical Christians. Similarly, Lucas and McCarthy (2005) see evidence that U.S. society increasingly embraces a "warrior ethics" and hegemonic "support the troops" discourse. The result has been the undermining of traditional just war doctrine. Because war becomes an occasion to unite the country, war justifies itself. The support of citizens for soldiers, regardless of the justice of the war, is understood to create social solidarity. It is a "new apolitical blank check" given to soldiers (p.182), and to the power elites who

engage in imperial and diversionary wars of choice. Of course, other political rationales, often feeble or manufactured (i.e., the "weapons of mass destruction" hysteria in the lead-up to the Iraq War) are given by politicians, but they are almost irrelevant. Support the troops discourse has become a "trump card that can put an end to criticisms. Because troops are in Iraq, we betray them by arguing that the war plan is going terribly wrong" (p.185). Thus, "Our relationships to the warrior require our allegiance to war" (p.186). Further, as I have argued elsewhere, the deaths of soldiers requires us to "win" every war. To abandon a war before every objective is achieved (no matter how ill-conceived or costly) is to dishonor the lives already sacrificed. Hence, once a war begins, inertia sets in and justifies further war. In addition, Hedges (2010) makes clear the wider implications of such a state of affairs – it is the ideology, politics and economy of "permanent war" which has played a key role in the collapse of liberalism in the U.S. as well as in various nations in Europe and the Middle East (p.20).

And, one wonders what Joseph (2007) would say about a 2002 survey of the U.S. public which found strong majorities of the U.S. public affirmed that the U.S. should have long-term military bases abroad in the following nations: Cuba – Guantanamo Bay (70% affirmed the U.S. "should have bases"), Germany (69%), South Korea (67%), Philippines (66%), Saudi Arabia (65%), Japan (63%), Turkey (58%), Afghanistan (57%), and Pakistan (52%) (Page and Bouton 2006, p.117). A solid majority (68%) said that "maintaining superior military power worldwide" should be a primary goal of U.S. foreign policy (pp.40-41).

For all these differences, Costa Ricans and U.S. citizens may also share commonalities in their perceptions of war. Most of the U.S. population, like Costa Rican

youth today, is shielded from first-hand knowledge of war. Wars have not taken place on U.S. soil in the 20th or 21st century, and only "about one half of one percent of the U.S. population has been on active military duty at any given time during the past decade of sustained warfare" (Pew 2011, p.2). Meanwhile, some European and Asian nations still have mandatory military service. The degree to which Costa Ricans today feel geographically/ geopolitically vulnerable (given the small size of the country, the lack of a military, the ongoing low-intensity "drug war" and Nicaragua's recent and historical belligerence) has not been quantified, but studies of U.S. citizens reveal they have often reported more "fear of war" and more "willingness to fight" than citizens of European nations (Listhaug 1986). But, U.S. opinions on war are very likely shaped by recent historical experiences. Thus, when U.S. citizens think of war they are likely to think of "limited war at a geographical distance" (p.76). And since "fear of war primarily relates to involvement abroad, with geographical distance to the potential battlefield, [this] weakens the psychological reality of potential participation among the citizens" (p.73). Likewise, Joseph (2007) contends that the U.S. context has been marked by a shift from "mobilized" war with a draft (e.g., WWII) to "conditional" war with a volunteer, professional army. The set of social relationships involved in each type are extremely divergent. This shift helps to account for widely varying perceptions in the pervasiveness of an ethos of militarism in the U.S., but it also relates to U.S. propensities to slip into moral disengagement regarding contemporary wars. The complexities involved in various accounts of U.S. militarism are illustrated by the following:

> ...for many American [Christian] fundamentalists the question of the morality of wartime killing does not arise. Their enculturation toward militarism is as unquestioned as is that of...New Guinea headhunters. In both cases war is fought because of belief in some higher good, and not because of personal

> aggressiveness or anger – in fact local conflict is studiously avoided...there is no moral opposition between peace and war because both are supported by a transcending belief in the need for order, discipline, and faith. (Foster and Rubinstein 1986, p.xiv)

Costa Rica is a middle-income nation and a small nation with a population just under 5 million people. Of the roughly 242 nations and dependent territories (many of which are partially independent in governance) in the world in 2012, 124 (or 51.2%) have a population of less than 5 million. This offers one measure of the significance of the Costa Rica case, over half of the world's states are relatively small.

Costa Rica is one of only seven nations in the world to have undergone a *process of demilitarization*. It is the largest of twenty-seven nations with no military forces, and most of these cases are micro-nations (Cummings 2006). While several scholars have analyzed Costa Rica's demilitarization process (Høivik and Aas 1981, Bird 1984, Aas 1986, Cummings 2006), what remains unexplored is to what degree Costa Rica has cultivated coherent nonviolent ideologies among its citizens, and to what degree it has developed mechanisms of celebrating and memorializing the demilitarization process, and how that might serve to reproduce nonviolent attitudes in the mass public. I will explore the reproduction of violent/ nonviolent ideologies through survey data and collective memory processes through the analysis of national narratives embodied in state-approved secondary school history textbooks.

Survey Methods

Building on three questions from the World Gallup Poll, my surveys seek to probe the breadth and depth of nonviolent attitudes existing in Costa Rica and the U.S. While drawing from several already existing surveys of nonviolent attitudes, the present survey offers an improvement by explicitly building on the theoretical literature. Previous

nonviolent attitude tests have not clearly distinguished between pragmatic vs. principled nonviolent attitudes, nor have they clearly probed for the full spectrum of violent-nonviolent attitudes at the political level: militarism, political realism, just war, and nonviolence. Finally, the present survey also improves on most previous surveys by probing for the presence of nonviolent attitudes at multiple levels: interpersonal, family, community, national, and international. This will test the degree to which the "myth of redemptive violence" (Walter Wink) is embraced at multiple levels. My survey instrument has drawn numerous questions from previous cross-national polls (and will allow comparisons to those findings) as well as several earlier surveys probing nonviolent attitudes including some questions from the following:

1) Scale of Militarism – Pacifism (Droba 1931): 44 questions

2) Gundlach's Attitudes Toward War survey, 1938 (Stagner 1942): 27 questions

3) Elliott's (1980) "pacifism scale" (replicated by Heaven, Rejab, and Bester 1984): 38 questions

It is not surprising that some of these survey tools derive from the period between the World Wars, since this was a time in which pacifist movements were germinating throughout Europe and North America (Cortright 2008).

To help establish survey validity and allow fruitful comparisons and theoretical explanations (e.g., values or personality orientations will be tested as explanatory variables), I will also include in this survey two of the most well-validated and cross-culturally validated survey measures of values and attitude orientations (fortunately, they are short): Schwartz's 21 question value scale (from the European Values Survey), and the 8 question scale for the Social Dominance Orientation.

Cross-National Survey Research

While affirming the value of cross-national research, Allerbeck (1977) details many of the hazards of conducting cross-national surveys including possible sampling errors. Response rates across countries are likely to differ and refusals to participate are probably not random events: "If non-response is related to the variable being compared, significance tests would be grossly misleading" (p.376). Interviewer bias, or the context of survey administration, may operate differently in different countries, and could invalidate comparisons of means or marginals across countries (p.376). In all cases, researchers must be attuned to possible sources of bias. Unpacking these and other issues, Table 3 below highlights key methodological challenges in cross-national research.

Teune (1977) emphasizes the complicated and competing assumptions involved in using the nation as a variable/ unit of analysis. First, it may be assumed that the nation is a "limit to the generality of a relationship or a distribution of properties" (p.102). Of course, this conventional interpretation is challenged by scientists who assume certain types of nations (e.g., categorized by world-systems position, level of development/ industrialization, regime type, geographical/ cultural region, historically predominant religion, etc.) are similar and thus, at least some findings in any given nation might hold "external validity," and findings through "pooled analysis" may be generalizable to nations of a similar class (see the third point below). Secondly, the nation can be assumed to be an unexplained residual "of all other factors," treating the nation as if it is an error term (pp.102-103). The problem here is that "this error term would often explain more than most or many of the variables proper" (p.103). Moreover, any given national context is so complicated, it is impossible to account for the "total variance within or among

systems," and every social research design partitions for study only a small part of the national context (p.103). Third, the nation can be understood as "manifesting some underlying general dimensions which can be translated into variables reflecting some part of the variance of the entire system, the country" (p.103). Here, some social scientists argue that when translating nations into variables, the strongest metric one should use is probably simple ranking, but a simple nominal scale may be preferable (e.g., high developed/ low developed, core/ periphery). Still others argue that stronger metrics like GNP per capita are appropriate.

Table 3. Methodological Issues in Cross-National Survey Research

Methodological issues	**Explanation**	**Methods of the present study**
Translation issues	Translation issues are numerous and vexing (e.g., Harkness 2003). As translators aim for "equivalence of meaning," dilemmas arise in formulating questions as well as Likert-response word choices. Back translation offers the best assessment procedure (p.41).	The present study utilized a professional translator to translate the survey into Spanish. Although pre-tests were conducted in both nations and "back-translation" tests were conducted in sections, a more formal back-translation process would be beneficial.
Response style bias (a form of measurement error): acquiescent or extreme response biases	According to several studies, Latin American cultures tend to exhibit acquiescent or extreme response category biases. This can make cross-cultural comparisons difficult.	Tests were conducted in order to detect acquiescent and extreme response biases.
Response style bias: "don't know" and mid-point answers	Cultural variation in the readiness to admit lack of knowledge (willingness to admit ignorance of facts) or opinion can make cross-cultural comparisons difficult (Sicinski 1970). There is also considerable debate over whether "don't know" or mid-point answers should be offered as response choices in cross-national research or survey research in general (e.g., Gilljam and Granberg 1993, Raaijmakers 2000).	Sicinski (1970) suggests that researchers can compensate for cultural "don't know" proclivities by comparing responses of comparable groups (e.g., university students, as in the present study) rather than marginals for entire nations. Following the practice of most survey researchers (Bradburn, Sudman, and Wansink 2004, p.141; Schutt 2001), forced-choice questions (without middle categories and without an explicit "don't know" option) were utilized. But the instructions stated respondents could always choose not to answer questions and leave them blank. Offering an explicit "don't know" option increases "don't know" responses by about 20% (Schutt 2001, p.218). Similarly, research suggests that on many issues10 to 20% of people tend to be fence-sitters who choose middle, neutral answers (p.218), but some of these actually do lean towards an opinion (Gilljam and Granberg 1993).
Response rates (a form of sample bias)	Differences between countries in response rates can affect the validity of cross-national comparisons (Heath, Martin, and Spreckelsen 2009).	Response rates are comparable: the UO response rate was 85.2%, and the Costa Rica response rate was estimated to be 90%.
Probe generalized attitudes or opinions on specific issues?	Are cross-cultural comparisons better facilitated through generalized questions or probing opinions on specific issues? Some research suggests that generalized attitudes toward war are significantly associated with attitudes towards specific wars (e.g., Cohrs and Moschner 2002).	Questions probed for generalized attitudes since it was assumed that general questions better facilitate cross-national comparison. However, one section probed responses to quotations by specific world leaders and the quotes included both specific and general issues. The UO survey also probed for attitudes on specific wars.

Methodological issues	Explanation	Methods of the present study
Data collection methods/ mode bias (web-based vs. pen and paper), and incentives	Differences in data collection methods (e.g., the use of mail back surveys versus face to face interviews) have been found to affect the validity of cross-national comparisons (Heath, Martin and Spreckelsen 2009). Other variations in survey instrument delivery such as paper and pen surveys versus internet surveys may also affect validity.	UO students were given online computer surveys completed at a time of their own choosing, while Costa Rican students completed paper and pen surveys during or after class. All respondents were promised confidentiality, but given differing perceptions of computer privacy, it is not known whether the computer format gave UO students a greater or lesser sense of anonymity/ privacy of disclosure (which could result in social desirability bias, but this is likely a bigger factor in face to face interviews and with private issues (Braun 2003, p.142), but the present survey did probe attitudes towards domestic violence which could be subject to social desirability bias). It was observed that a much higher number of UO students (though the numbers were still quite small) offered response patterns that strongly suggested they did not read the survey but quickly answered it. Thus, the online computer survey seems to have attracted more meaningless responses, but the Qualtriks computer program aided in identifying these since survey taking times are reported. As explained below, some of these were thrown out. Incentives were considered comparable. Most Costa Rican surveys were completed in class with the cooperation of professors, but about 120 students (over one-third of the sample) were given a moderate incentive of $6. UO students were rewarded with a moderate incentive of 1 point extra credit in the course. Most of the Costa Ricans in class likely felt coerced into completing the survey (with no incentive offered). On the other hand, professors suggested that students were likely to perceive taking the survey as an interesting and pleasant break from lectures.
Instrument bias	The order of questions, the tone and content of questions preceding any given question – all of these factors are likely to influence responses and to introduce forms of bias through priming, cueing, etc.	First, because order of questions can influence responses, the elite quotes section of the survey utilized two forms, each with a different order, randomly assigned. Second, open-ended questions at the end of the survey asked respondents to list national heroes they admired. Heroes relevant to nonviolence and war were considered to be primed in the imaginations of respondents, especially those who were quoted in the elite cues section. To compensate for this, an additional mini-survey on heroes was conducted among UO students. Third, the present study placed the Social Dominance Orientation battery of questions after several dozen questions about violence and nonviolence. This may have impacted the lower (more pro-equality) SDO scores than has been found in other tests of university students. That is, it may be that anti-equality/ pro-dominance responses seemed more "violent" (than would otherwise be the case) given the questions that preceded this section. However, it may also be that the high percentage of social science majors played a significant role here.
Time-dependent context effects and the need for replication	Test-retest studies have demonstrated that attitude/ opinion survey data should be regarded as approximate. "Cross-cultural surveys are especially demanding for the reliability and validity of observations...Only a configuration (a '*Gestalt*') of results can be trusted" (Scheuch 1993, p.178). Of course, opinion survey samples are likely to be affected by highly particular contemporary political developments in each country.	The present study includes some replications of previous cross-national surveys, facilitating somewhat stronger conclusions about the presence of real differences in opinions between people in the U.S. and Costa Rica. Emergent time-dependent context effects in the present study include the rapidly changing perceptions of the border conflict with Nicaragua (in the case of 120 Costa Rican respondents), and rapidly changing perceptions of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (in the case of U.S. respondents).

Methodological issues	Explanation	Methods of the present study
Galton's Problem/ the nation as unit of analysis	This is mostly a theoretical problem, but it is methodological in the sense that it suggests collecting within-nation data across sub-regions is ideal. Galton's problem is "the issue whether a given culture can be thought of as 'causing' something, or whether that something is instead the result of diffusion across cultures" (Scheuch 1993, p.180). To restate it: "when between-country variances are smaller than within-country variations, then it is quite improbable that references to countries can be understood as explanations" (p.182).	Regression analyses in the present study revealed that the nation variable (i.e., Costa Rica versus the U.S.) explained more variance (in attitudes toward violence/ nonviolence) than any other demographic variable. And, when UO students identifying with the Democratic Party (historically more dovish than Republicans) are compared with Costa Rican students, Costa Ricans are more peaceful – in most cases by a wide margin – on all 33 questions of item 9. A sample from the southern region of the U.S. is likely to reveal even larger attitude differences vis a vis Costa Rica's dovish attitudes. The significance of sub-regions in a small nation like Costa Rica is questionable. While the diffusion of ideologies is undeniable (e.g., nonviolence has undergone a very cosmopolitan evolution and cross-national diffusion process), it remains true that ideologies/ values stick and evolve to differing degrees in different cultures. It is likely that U.S. hegemony influences Costa Rican ideologies of violence/ nonviolence, and this will be reflected upon below.
Cross-national comparisons across levels of development	Scheuch (1993) argues: "Comparisons that include both modern and developing countries produce differences that are very hard to interpret – if they make sense at all... [This] points to a need for intensive consideration of intervening and contextual factors before differences between countries can be 'explained'" (p.190). Secondly, "Comparisons between countries with similar levels of modernity are frustrating and stimulating at the same time... One needs theory – and usually middle-level theory – to make sense of data" (p.191).	In the present study, the secondary analysis of cross-national data involves multiple comparisons across levels of development. An attempt is made to stay close to theory in interpreting differences as well as similarities.
Factor analysis and index construction	In creating attitude indexes through factor analysis, should the indexes be based on country-specific data (based on factor loadings in the data from each separate nation) or the aggregated cross-national data? The later option simply treats the nation variable as just another demographic variable, and this strategy facilitates cross-national comparisons of the indexes.	The country-specific form of index construction was utilized in the present study, but also a modified cross-national index was constructed. Because factor loadings revealed several cross-national differences, country-specific indexes were constructed to allow for greater within-country analysis and specification of patterns. Because factor loadings shared numerous commonalities between the datasets, delimited indexes were also constructed for cross-national comparison. Rather than conducting a new factor analysis from an aggregated cross-national dataset, indexes were constructed based on simple commonalities in items loading on similar factors in each nation.

Question Types: Probing General Orientations Versus Specific Issues

Some argue that survey researchers should avoid "hypothetical questions, beyond the experience of the respondent, [which] are likely to attract a less accurate response" (Baxter, Hughes, and Tight 2001, p.182). Others argue that general questions can be more informative. Thus, Cohrs and Moschner (2002) distinguish between the measurement of "generalized political attitudes," as when public opinion polls ask abstract questions or seek to uncover relatively stable worldviews, ethical orientations, or ideological

orientations, versus attitudes on specific wars or conflicts. More abstractly, social action theorists have argued that "generalization is perhaps the most important of the learning mechanisms" (Parsons et al. 1951, p.12, cited in Kohn and Slomczynski 1990, p.7). In this view, asking generalized questions can better probe the depth of learning, that is, the consistency and coherence of attitudes.Moreover, there is some evidence that general attitudes on violence do strongly correlate with attitudes on specific wars (Cohrs and Moschner 2002).

In support of that pattern, in Table 4 below we see that in the UO survey data, attitudes about specific wars are robust predictors of scores on the Attitude indexes which are drawn from more general/ abstract questions. The strongest relationships include the following: views of the Iraq War (Q11_2) is associated with 13.89% of the variance in the realpolitiks index, and view of the Afghanistan War (Q11_3) is associated with 12.85% of the variance in the justwar index. In addition, the militarism and nonviolence indexes were most strongly associated with views on the Iraq War, with over 11% of the

Table 4. Unstandardized OLS Coefficients from the Regression of Specific War Views on Abstract Ideological Orientations (UO Data)

Attitude Index (general questions)	Q11_1 View on Vietnam War		Q11_2 View on Iraq War		Q11_3 View on Afghanistan War	
	B (*t*)	Adj. R^2	B (*t*)	Adj. R^2	B (*t*)	Adj. R^2
militarism	.17*** (5.86)	.0838	.22*** (6.86)	.1106	.16*** (5.57)	.0749
nonviolence	.15*** (4.88)	.0590	.23*** (7.09)	.1184	.16*** (5.24)	.0671
Justwar	.10** (2.94)	.0205	.20*** (5.63)	.0760	.24*** (7.48)	.1285
realpolitiks	.18*** (5.90)	.0828	.25*** (7.89)	.1389	.19*** (6.25)	.0909

Notes: N= 364 to 382, depending on index; Unstandardized regression coefficient; Numbers in parentheses are *t*-statistics; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Responses for each Q11 item were "Yes, a just war" (1), "Somewhat just" (2), and "No, NOT a just war" (3); Attitude indexes consist of the means of related survey items, each with a 4-point Likert scale, and scores closer to 4 represent more peaceful attitudes

variance in each of these indexes associated with views on the Iraq War.Of course, a key strength of general and abstract questions is that they can help to facilitate cross-national comparisons. Nevertheless, future cross-national opinion research should endeavor to increasingly integrate questions which tap violent/ nonviolent attitudes towards specific and ongoing live issue campaigns. For instance, a question could ask, "The human rights organization Amnesty International supports a global ban on the death penalty, do you support or not support such a ban?"

Comparative Historical Methods: Nonviolent Movements Around the World

Comparative historical methods are well-suited for exploring the significance of national history and cultural factors while illuminating the limitations of peace indexes like the GPI and WPI. The present project has the potential to contribute to the comparative historical literature on revolutions by analyzing nations that have experienced salient nonviolent episodes of conflict and identifying trends in state-approved collective memories of nonviolent revolutions/ campaigns. This may aid future projects in identifying some of the mechanisms producing principled and pragmatic nonviolent attitudes. The comparative historical literature on revolutions has tended to assume that, by definition, revolutions involve political violence. For this reason, Fairbanks (2007) contrasts theories of "classical revolution" with "the modern kind of nonviolent revolution."

A mix of comparative historical methods are utilized in this investigation. First, the "contrast of contexts" model of comparative history can be utilized in selecting "maximally different cases within given bounds" (Skocpol and Somers 1994, p.76). Second, the "macro-causal analysis" model of comparative history can be employed in

attempting to specify "configurations favorable and unfavorable" to the development of nonviolent attitudes (p.79), and in developing new causal generalizations. Finally, theories and historical comparative methodologies of "path dependence" will be utilized in the attempt to isolate the importance of historically contingent events which shaped the origins of national institutions and set into motion sequences of "event chains" (e.g., Mahoney 2000, p.507).

Why Analyze Textbooks?

Two of the main research questions driving this project concern why confidence in nonviolent methods varies so greatly around the world, and why nonviolent attitudes are not more robust. Given the great number of relatively successful and recent nonviolent revolutions and movements around the world, might an investigation of collective memory and collective forgetting processes help to explain cross-national variation in nonviolent attitudes? To begin to answer this question, I turn to a strategic sample of state-sponsored national history textbooks. While school textbooks are clearly one source of socialization within the overall curriculum and school context, this project does not simplistically view textbooks as the primary source of socialization. Rather, government-approved textbooks are approached as social outcomes. They arise from complex social and political processes which indicate the boundedness of collective memory, public discourse, and hegemonic ideology. Loewen (1995) has demonstrated that history textbooks in the U.S. clearly reflect hegemonic ideological norms (which shape, structure, and skew historical narratives of the nation), as would be expected since they often pass through numerous committees, the editorial teams of corporate publishers, and public approval processes before final editing and adoption by school

boards. The Ministries of Education in most nations maintain vigorous oversight of textbook content, and its ministers and bureaucrats are often party loyalists re-appointed after each national election.

History and geography textbooks have long been recognized as a key site of contention involving collective memory and militarism over against education for peace. Efforts by the League of Nations and subsequently, UNESCO, have led international efforts to eliminate militarism from textbooks (Marsden 2000). Dozens of articles and books in recent decades have explored public battles over school history textbook content. Some of the primary research streams on textbooks have been devoted to how nationalism, wars and militarized conflicts are portrayed in textbooks in places like Japan (Ienaga 1994), Germany (Puaca 2011), and Israel-Palestine (Bar-Tal 1998, Moughrabi 2001, Podeh 2000). In the U.S., several studies have taken a biographical approach and assessed how Rosa Parks is portrayed in textbooks and children's literature (Kohl 1995, Schudson 2012, Schwartz 2009). Beyond textbooks, collective memory studies have analyzed how collective memories of Dr. King are invoked by politicians in U.S. Congressional debates (Polletta 1998), and how King is presented in a national museum (Inwood 2009). The present study is the first to explore how nonviolent social movements are portrayed in state-approved textbooks around the world.

As one measure of prevailing hegemonic norms, content coding analyses will be conducted of textbook portrayals involving highly salient national episodes of nonviolent movements in two primary case studies, the U.S. and Costa Rica, and in several shadow cases (Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, Ghana, Germany, and Norway). This relatively large number of case studies was necessary to establish how nonviolent campaigns and

nonviolent revolutions are typically reproduced through collective memory processes. The results indicate that they are typically portrayed as conventional action rather than specifically nonviolent action. This suggests that cultures are at risk for failing to learn from successful nonviolent campaigns in their own national histories. In order to remedy this trans-national process of forgetting, I contend the lessons that nonviolence works and why it works – in short, nonviolent ideology and theory, must become more explicitly attached to historical accounts.

We might assume that a sample of international history textbooks would present cases in which local knowledge and local historical memory takes center stage. To the degree that is true, it is a relatively recent phenomenon. Textbooks around the world have long been shaped by Western values and norms (which include the very idea of textbooks and an established curriculum) and the power and reach of multinational publishing firms based in the UK, US, France, Germany, and Russia – who often only loosely adapted textbooks for foreign contexts (Altbach 1991, p.248, p.242). In many places in the world, these dynamics link to cultural and institutionalized legacies of colonial and neocolonial domination (p.243). As late as 1991, Altbach argued that a few large core nations dominate "the world's international knowledge system" (p.244). But with the proliferation of inexpensive computer-assisted design technology in recent decades, publishing has finally become more multinational. Many nations have departed from the Western textbook model of loaning textbooks to students, and printing texts on glossy paper with many illustrations. In nations of the periphery and semi-periphery, textbooks have increasingly been published in-country, and the price of textbooks have been reduced by printing on newsprint paper, utilizing fewer graphics (p.248), and requiring

(or attempting to require) students to buy their own textbooks. But as I found in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, even in urban areas only some families can afford the textbooks, and teachers often photocopy dozens of pages for their students each month.

CHAPTER II

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA AND CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS OF THE EVS AND WVS

Surprisingly, published analyses of most large cross-national datasets have largely neglected to undertake any fine-grained analysis of individual-level correlates of nonviolent/ violent attitudes. A partial exception here is studies of the "willingness to fight" indicator (Inglehart 1990, Listhaug 1986), but even these studies are very limited in the variables analyzed. Thus, as depicted in Table 5, a secondary analysis of European (EVS) and World Values Survey (WVS) data was conducted on three attitudinal indicators, using common demographic variables as predictors/ controls.

Table 5. Analysis of European and World Values Surveys (Individual-Level Data): Regressions of Questions Probing Violent/ Nonviolent Attitudes on Demographic Variables

Question	**Willing to fight for your country in a war?**		**"Using violence to pursue political goals is never justified"**		**"Approval: Disarmament movement"**	
Responses (and codes)	1=yes 2=no		1=strongly agree 2=agree 3=disagree 4=strongly disagree		1=strongly approve 2=somewhat approve 3=somewhat disapprove 4=strongly disapprove	
Data years	1981-2000		1995		1990	
	Coef. (S.E.)	t	Coef. (S.E.)	t	Coef. (S.E.)	t
Male dummy	.111*** (.004)	31.31	.054*** (.011)	4.97	.041*** (.009)	4.43
Town size	-.009*** (.001)	-12.96	.018*** (.002)	7.67	-.006** (.002)	-3.09
Education	.005*** (.001)	6.00	-.010*** (.003)	-3.67	NA	
Left-right ideology	.014*** (.001)	19.37	.001 (.002)	.25	.045*** (.002)	20.41
Income	.002* (.001)	2.15	-.015*** (.002)	-6.59	.013*** (.002)	6.97
N	56115		31309		33157	
Number of nations sampled	73		49		38	
Adj R^2	.0282		.0041		.0153	

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; NA = very little data available on this indicator, so it was omitted from the regression equation; Male dummy (1=male; 0=female); Town size (1=2,000 and less...8=500,000 and more); Education (1= inadequately completed elementary education... 8=University degree); Left-right ideology (1=Left...10=Right); Income (1=Lower income... 10=Wealthiest); The number of nations sampled is approximate as in some cases missing data lowered the number of nations included.

Above, we see that males, ideological conservatives, the wealthy, and rural people are significantly more willing to fight for their country in a war (i.e., females, lower income groups, and urban people are significantly less willing to fight). In addition, it is striking that additional education increases the willingness to fight, exactly as Loewen (2007) would expect. Hence, the idea that education is a cosmopolitan, humanistic enterprise is challenged, as the reproduction of nationalism through education comes into focus – a theme we will return to below.

The item "Using violence to pursue political goals is never justified" presents the absolute pacifist position. Surprisingly, ideology is not a significant predictor – this may be an indication that even the left has few sympathetic to a strict pacifist position. The regression equation shows that males and urban residents are significantly more likely to disagree with this pacifist statement. The urban finding here is somewhat surprising – another theme we will return to below. The two significant negative relationships show that the better educated and the wealthy are more associated with pacifism, controlling for other factors.

On the question of approving or disapproving of the disarmament movement, we see that males, ideological conservatives, and the wealthy were significantly associated with disapproval of the disarmament movement. Urban residents were significantly more likely to approve of the disarmament movement.

Across all three indicators, as expected, males are more hawkish. Both the wealthy and ideological conservatives are significantly associated with hawkish attitudes on two indicators, but ideology was not significant for the pacifist ideal ("Using violence to pursue political goals is never justified"), and the wealthy were surprisingly associated

with the dovish attitude on this item. More urban respondents also performed inconsistently, as they were associated with disagreement with the pacifist ideal, but they are less willing to fight for their country and more likely to approve of the disarmament movement. The education variable also performs inconsistently. Controlling for the other factors, more education is associated with respondents' willingness to fight for their country, but also agreement with the pacifist ideal ("Using violence to pursue political goals is never justified"). Hence, numerous contradictions are evident in these three questions, and it is certainly possible they reflect differences not just tied to sample bias, since the three questions tap somewhat discrete areas. It seems reasonable to assume, for example, that a respondent could both hope for/ approve of disarmament and also be willing to fight for his or her country.

Nevertheless, obvious explanations for how the variables perform differently across the three questions include the fact that the samples are small and different, and peculiarities in the nations sampled (e.g., what education and urbanization means across the world can be quite diverse) might help account for these inconsistencies. All of this suggests the strength of the Gallup World Poll with its large sample size and its three questions on violence/ nonviolence.

Many of the results above corroborate an extensive study of the U.S. public by Page and Bouton (2006). They found that the following personal and group characteristics were most strongly associated with hawkish attitudes: whites, men, evangelical Protestants, older people, the wealthy, conservatives, Republicans, and those with high levels of education (p.101).

These three indicators offer a glimpse into the multidimensionality of nonviolence, as we observe inconsistencies at the individual-level across nonviolent attitudinal domains. Because of this multidimensionality, compiling multiple questions designed to assess adherence to general ideological orientations towards violence and nonviolence may help us make more sense of attitudinal variation at the individual level. This is one of the key aims of the survey designed for the present study and conducted in the U.S. and Costa Rica, to which we now turn.

ANALYSIS OF COSTA RICA AND UO SURVEYS

The surveyportion of this dissertation project was designed with eight objectives in mind. First, samples were drawn from two nations, the U.S. and Costa Rica, selected because they have been subjected to a long history of starkly divergent national security traditions, elite cues and policy cues relevant to ideologies of violence and nonviolence. In short, Costa Rica abolished its army over 60 years ago, while the U.S. maintains over 725 military bases abroad (Johnson 2004, p.24) and spends far more on its military than all of the other major powers combined. For these reasons the two nations were conceptualized as strategic sites and "maximally different" cases suitable for an exploratory mode of investigation.

Second, the surveys began with a replication of the three Gallup World Poll questions on violence and nonviolence (see Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix C for copies of the surveys). Subsequent questions were designed to testwhether these three Gallup World Poll questions hold validity as "keystone" indicators of generalized nonviolent attitudes that hold across a range of dimensions and interpersonal, communal, and international levels. This effort was deemed important since the Gallup World Poll is

the largest cross-national poll ever collected, but it only has three questions probing violent/ nonviolent attitudes.

Third, the survey aims to assess whether university students actually hold coherent opinions regarding the morality of violence/ nonviolence and strategies of conflict resolution. To this end, the survey represents the first attempt to create indexes of four common ideologies of violence and nonviolence and to categorize respondents on a spectrum of militarism, political realism, just war, and nonviolence. In this process, the author created new questions, but also modified or replicated many of the best questions, previously tested and validated, from pre-existing surveys on violent/ nonviolent attitudes (see Appendix D). Factor analyses (see Appendix E for the methodology, and Appendix Ffor the interitem correlations and reliabilities) were conducted since this is widely regarded as the best method for constructing attitude indexes. As we will see below, most respondents answered the battery of questions in a fashion consistent enough to classify them as subscribing to a particular ideology, and this in itself contributes to the larger conversation over the consistency and meaning of public opinions.

Fourth, the pragmatic nonviolence item of the Gallup World Poll (i.e., do you think peaceful means alone will work?) was viewed as *almost* a question of historical knowledge. Thus, the survey was conceived as an attempt to assess whether people learn from historical nonviolent episodes, whether their opinions are shaped by historical knowledge. We will also have occasions to consider whether cultures "learn" from historical experiences. It was theorized that if respondents possessed nonviolent intellectual/ historical capital (i.e., they were aware of successful nonviolent movements in history), especially in their own national or regional contexts, they would be more

likely to affirm that nonviolent means will work. In addition, since many theorists of public opinion have contended that public opinions are often unstable or meaningless, "delusional" or a form of "false consciousness" (e.g., Converse 1964, Bourdieu 1972, Fromm 1965, Adorno 1998a), the surveys probed whether respondents possess enough knowledge to hold opinions about violence/ nonviolence.

For both of these reasons, the surveys probed for intellectual capital and historical knowledge regarding nonviolence and war. The surveys asked respondents to report their historical knowledge on several items including their knowledge of Gandhi's biography (the most iconic exemplar of nonviolence in our time) and their knowledge of nonviolent revolutions. Revolutions were selected because they are the most dramatic form of nonviolent action and perhaps, they are most likely to compete favorably for remembrance in collective memory processes.

Fifth, if historical knowledge and memory of nonviolent campaigns is weak at the individual level, it may be that a more generalized sense of ideals mediated through memories of heroic figures might shape opinions on violence/ nonviolence. Research suggests that collective memories of important historical episodes often become reduced to and distilled in the biographies of charismatic leaders (Eddy 2012, Schwartz 2009). Hence, the key organizations of the U.S. civil rights movement are scarcely remembered by college students today, but activists continue to appeal to perceived precedents in King's biography in order to legitimize strategic choices (Eddy 2012). Schwartz (2009) theorizes this collective memory process as "oneness" - society's need for personified ideals. For this reason, respondents were asked to identify public figures they considered to be the heroes of Costa Rican/ U.S. history that they "admire and respect the most"

(Q42). That is, self-perceived heroes were solicited because, it was theorized, they may influence and reflect deeply internalized ideological leanings.

Sixth, the survey sought to collect data about the experiences of respondents as activists and as victims of interpersonal violence. However, participation in nonviolent political actions (as well as war) was expected to be weak, given that research suggests few university students actually engage in political activism – and that was the case even during the much heralded 1960s cycle of student activism when only about 19% of students actually engaged in a demonstration (Braungart and Braungart 1974, p.227). Nevertheless, it may be that some opinions on violence/ nonviolence are shaped by personal experiences as a nonviolent activist. Similarly, it may be that personal experiences of interpersonal violence may shape opinions on violence/ nonviolence.

Seventh, the surveys sought to test whether respondent views of violence and nonviolence would be influenced by "elite cues." By repeating substantive themes presented earlier in the survey, it was possible to test whether respondents were swayed by the influence of moral or political elites. And, by varying the presentation of quotes in two experimental groups, it was possible to test whether respondents were so highly susceptible to elite cues that the order of presenting elite quotes could influence respondent answers (i.e., in one experimental group, pro-violent quotes appeared first; in the second, pro-nonviolent quotes appeared first). Again, these data collection strategies were deemed important given that many theorists have held that much of the mass public holds inconsistent and contradictory attitudes that are highly unstable over time, but this mass public is susceptible to "policy cues" or "elite cues" (Paul and Brown 2001, Lupia 1994, Mondak 1993, Carmines and Kiklinski 1990, Brady and Sniderman 1985).

Eighth, the surveys include tests of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and the Schwartz Values Survey. As we will see below, numerous studies, including many cross-national studies, have confirmed the validity of the SDO and Schwartz Values and their relevance for violent/ nonviolent attitudes. These tools will also help us identify differences between Costa Rican and U.S. society at the level of enculturated values.

Although the presentation of data will not always follow this order, the thinking guiding the survey methodology was as follows. In order to establish respondent coherence, or lack of coherence, on views of violence and nonviolence, several steps of inquiry can be undertaken. First, do people seem to remember and learn from prominent historical experiences of nonviolent revolution or resistance? Failing that, do people remember and revere nonviolent heroes who distill the historical lessons of nonviolence? Failing that, are people simply led by "elite cues" – which shape opinions over the short-term – and which might even shift opinions in the context of a 30-minute survey? Failing that, is it the case that ideological positions trump all other factors, and that, as Althusser (1971) contended, "ideology has no history"? Of course, all of these factors heavily interact and interpenetrate, but they are conceptually distinct and survey methodology can help us probe and unpack elements of each one.

Sampling Rationale and Characteristics of the Cross-National Samples

Various demographic frequencies of each sample are reported in the tables below (see Appendix G for one methodological note on the sample). There are two sampling issues which must be adjudicated. First, are the samples in the two nations matched? Second, are the samples representative of their respective nations? All things considered, I will argue that the samples from the two nations are relatively matched demographically

(and valid for cross-national comparison), as well as reflective of cross-cultural differences between the nations (e.g., the high percentage of Catholic respondents in Costa Rica). Of course, the samples are convenience samples, and caution should be used in generalizing beyond these samples to the general populations.

Sampling University Students

Some scholars collecting political opinion data have sampled from university students using the rationale that students comprise a relatively educated, politically active group (e.g., Eldar 2006). The present project targeted university students, in part, because they have recently completed their high school education, which in many countries is a major institution of socialization and citizenship training with standardized, state-sanctioned curriculum including state-approved history textbooks.Indeed, Loewen (2007) and Burris (2008) review public opinion data during the Vietnam era and beyond and conclude that U.S. citizens with high school degrees and university degrees have tended to be *more hawkish* on military issues than U.S. citizens with less schooling. That is, in the U.S. it seems that more schooling tends, on average, to socialize students into more patriotic pro-militaristic groupthink.

Are the Cross-National Samples Matched?

Tackling the first issue, note that the UO survey oversampled from females, with a 16% gender gap, as opposed to the 4% gender gap in the Costa Rica sample. World-wide, gender is usually a strong predictor of attitudes with women typically more dovish (Burris 2008; Gat 2006, p.606). In the U.S., studies show that women tend to be more liberal (ANES 2004), and this includes college-aged women (Dey 1997). Hence, the

Table 6. Description of Samples (Percentages)

Demographic category	**Costa Rica (N=312)**	**UO (N=403)**	**Costa Rica population**	**U.S. population**
Age range			(15-29)	(15-29)
18-29	97	98	28.1	20.9
30-39	2	1		
40-49	1	1		
50-59	0	1		
Gender				
men	48	42	50.76	49.26
women	52	58	49.24	50.74
Gender gap in sample	4	16		
Class				
Upper	0	6		
Upper middle	40	54		
Lower middle	40	28		
Working	18	8		
Lower	1	3		

Notes: Source for population statistics: Time (2012).

gender gap, depicted in Table 6, is worth tracking: The total results of the UO survey are likely to be skewed towards dovish attitudes because females were oversampled from.

But the gender gap is likely compensated for and counter-balanced by the much higher (compared with the Costa Rica sample) percentage of respondents at the UO claiming to be very liberal and liberal – groups which lean towards more dovish attitudes. Table 7 below shows that about 20% more UO respondents identified as liberal and about 3% more UO respondents identified as very liberal. Meanwhile, 18% more Costa Rican respondents identified themselves as Moderates than in the UO sample. These sample issues are not surprising given the contexts: the University of Oregon and perhaps especially *sociology* courses on the UO campus are likely to have more liberals than the general population, and female enrollment increasingly outnumbers males at university campuses throughout the U.S. In addition, the Costa Rican population as a whole tends to self-identify as moderate or conservative (Solis 2012).

Table 7. Self-Identified Ideological Orientations of Respondents By Sample Nation

Self-identified ideologicalorientation (Q29 in UO/ Q25 in CR)	**Costa Rica (N=312) %**	**UO (N=403) %**	**Difference between sample means**
Very liberal (1)	3.92	7.12	
Liberal (2)	20.92	39.19	
Moderate (3)	48.69	30.79	
Conservative (4)	8.82	12.72	
Very conservative (5)	1.31	1.53	
Don't know (6)	16.34	8.65	
Sample Means	2.79	2.59	.21**

Note: two-tailed t-test; *= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p<.001; For descriptive and statistical analyses, including the sample means and t-tests (on sample means) reported above, "Don't know" responses were recoded as missing data. The robvar test in STATA revealed that the variances between the samples were significantly different, so the t-test command specified unequal variances.

The survey data was *primarily* collected from students in lower-division sociology courses on three campuses in Costa Rica (though several dozen surveys were also conducted in courses on physics, engineering, journalism, computer science, psychology, and pre-med) and exclusively from a large Introduction to Sociology course at the University of Oregon. In Costa Rica, the surveys were collected from one prestigious public university, UCR, and two private universities. Tests showed that there were some significant attitudinal differences between the three campuses in Costa Rica when analyzing group means on the militarism and nonviolence indexes, with UCR tending to be more dovish on the militarism index and U. Hispanoamericana tending to be more dovish on the nonviolence index (see below).

The Costa Rica survey sampled slightly more heavily from college majors who, according to previous studies, tend to be more hawkish (see below). That is, the Costa Rican sample has more engineering majors, a factor which is likely to result in more hawkish responses among the Costa Ricans. Indeed, results (reported in Table 8) showed that the physics, engineering, and computer science majors were significantly more hawkish in the militarism index. Again, likely counter-balancing this is the higher

Table 8. Comparing Sample Biases in the UO and Costa Rica Data

Difference between the two samples	**Hypothesized effect**	**Results**
1) The UO data oversampled from females (the UO data has 6% more females and 6% less males than the Costa Rica data)	This sample bias is highly likely to result in more dovish responses in the UO data.	As expected, in both the UO data and the Costa Rica data, females are significantly more dovish. T-tests revealed that in the Costa Rica data females were significantly more dovish on all 3 attitude indexes. In the UO data females were more dovish on all 5 indexes, but the differences only obtained significance at the .05 level on the militarism, just war, and interpersonal violence indexes.
2) The UO data oversampled from liberals (the UO data has 20% more self-identified"liberals" and 3% more"very liberal").	This sample bias is highly likely to result in more dovish responses in the UO data.	As expected, in the UO data, regression analyses revealed that self-identified liberals held significantly more dovish attitudes on the nonviolence index and the militarism index. In the Costa Rica data, t-tests revealed that self-identified liberals were significantly more dovish on the militarism index, but there was no significant difference on the nonviolence index.
3) The Costa Rica data oversampled from physics, computer science, and engineering majors.	This sample bias is highly likely to result in more hawkish responses in the Costa Rica data.	As expected, in the Costa Rica data, t-tests revealed that these three majors were significantly more hawkish on the militarism index, but there was no significant difference on the nonviolence index.

percentage of respondents at the UO claiming to be very liberal, liberal, and Democratic party voters – three groups tending towards dovish attitudes in the U.S. Meanwhile, a larger percentage of respondents in Costa Rica identified themselves as moderates and half as many respondents identified themselves as "very liberal" and "liberal" as compared with the UO sample.

Above we see that all three of the main sources of sample bias are likely to skew the data in such a way that the UO data will appear to be more dovish than a better matched sample would reveal. Hence, the actual gap in peaceful attitudes between Costa Ricans and U.S. respondents is likely to be even more pronounced than what this study reveals, and our findings of statistical significance in this study are not likely to be artifacts of demographic variables. While the UO data oversampled from liberals (relative to the U.S. population as well as the Costa Rica sample), we have to recognize that Costa

Ricans in general tend to identify as conservative (Solis 2012). But, given Costa Rica's history and 60+ year long tradition of demilitarization, "moderates" and "conservatives" in Costa Rica are likely to express far more dovish attitudes than moderates and conservatives in the U.S. Nonetheless, as we see above and will revisit again below, Costa Rican *liberals* were significantly more dovish on the militarism index (compared with conservatives and moderates in Costa Rica), but there were no significant differences on the nonviolence index.

Are the Samples Representative of the Respective Nations?

About 30% of the U.S. population held a college degree in 2010 as opposed to about 11% in 1970 (Time 2012, p.623). As a research site, the University of Oregon is likely to be more dovish than the population at large. Joseph (2007) notes that dovish Americans tend to be clustered on the East and West coasts (especially compared to the South and Midwest) as well as in universities, churches, and labor unions (rather than in business; but see below, 16% of the UO sample were business majors, and other typically conservative majors were represented as well). In addition, in recent years, a gender gap has emerged on U.S. university campuses, with females comprising the clear majority student population. A 2008 study of 24 to 29 year olds found that females are 17% more likely to have attended college and 29% more likely to have graduated than similarly aged males (Lindo, Swensen, and Waddell 2012, p.255).

The University of Oregon is representative of public universities in the U.S. with the exception that it has a larger percentage of white students (75%) than the average for U.S. higher education (Lindo, Swensen, and Waddell 2012). The UO is also twice the

size of the average public university, but it ranks very close to the average in enrollment rates, SAT scores, cost of attendance, and financial aid opportunities (p.258).

The reach of higher education has greatly increased in Costa Rica, but still lags behind the U.S. In 1967, about half a percent of the total Costa Rican population were enrolled university students. By 2005, the 166,000 university students comprised 4% of the total Costa Rican population (Molina and Palmer 2009, pp.167-168), and by 2012, 12.7% of Costa Ricans held a post-secondary degree (Time 2012, p.249). Enrollments in private universities have grown rapidly in recent years in Costa Rica. By 2005, students enrolled in private universities comprised nearly half of the total number of university students (Molina and Palmer 2009, p.167) and so it was important to include them in the sample. Above we see that young adults (18-29 years old) comprise 28% of the Costa Rican population versus 21% in the U.S.

Ironically, while Costa Rica has abolished its military and the U.S. maintains the world's second largest force of active military personnel (Time 2012, p.516), each sample had only one respondent who had been in the military. This reminds us that military service is relatively rare among the general U.S. population: "At any given time in the past decade, only about one-half of 1 percent of the public has been on active duty in the military" (NPR 2011). Since the Vietnam War, the U.S. military's shift to an all-volunteer force has meant that many in the middle class are shielded from knowledge of war and military life as well as disinterested in U.S. military actions abroad. But 67 of the UO respondents (or 17.22%) answered "yes" to Q28: "Have either of your parents ever been in the military?" In the Costa Rican sample, it is likely that the single respondent

with military experience may have been in the Nicaraguan or U.S. military, a U.S. military academy, or the Costa Rican Civil Guard.

In terms of religion, Costa Rica is clearly a Catholic nation, and the results in Table 9 support this. And, it is not at all surprising that university students are more likely to claim "none" as a religious identity compared with the general populations of each nation. The tricky part is trying to separate possible cohort/ generational effects from "life cycle" variation in religiosity. That is, there has long been a tendency for U.S. college-aged young adults (not just those who actually attend college) to claim be less religious than older and younger cohorts, but also a pattern in which each generation becomes slightly more secular throughout their life cycle (Putnam 2000, pp.72-73; Roberts and Yamane 2012, p.99). There are also signs that Costa Rica is becoming somewhat more secular (Molina and Palmer 2009, p.171). But Oregon has long been identified as one of the most secular states in the U.S., and similarly, the Pacific Northwest region is often

Table 9. Religious Affiliation of Samples and National Populations (Percentages)

Demographic category	**Costa Rica sample (N=312)**	**Costa Rica – total population**	**UO sample (N=403)**	**U.S. – total population**
Religion Catholic	55%	76.3%	17%	23.9%
Evangelical Protestant	11%	13.7%	15%	51.3% Protestant
Other Protestant	0	0.7%	6%	
Other	6%	4.8%	8%	2.5%
None	28%	3.2%	24%	16.1%
Atheist/ Agnostic	-		13%	-
Spiritual, not religious	-		10%	-
Jewish	0		7%	1.7%
Other groups		1.3% Jehovah's Witnesses		1.7% Mormon
				1.6% Other Christian
				0.7% Buddhist
				0.6% Muslim

Note: percentages; ("-" = was not an option in sample)

called “the none zone” because of the high percentage of respondents identifying their religious preference as “none” (Killen and Silk 2004).

In Table 10 below, we see that some of the racial and ethnic categories in the sampled population are roughly representative of the general populations. The percentage of Costa Rican minorities sampled parallels the minority proportions in the larger population except the 1% Amerindian category is missing from the sample. The UO data had proportionally less African-Americans and Hispanic/ Latino respondents than in the total U.S. population. However, many survey studies find that the White/ Non-White breakdown is the most significant when it comes to racial/ethnic demographic group differences in opinions on national security issues (Burris 2008). Here, we see that the proportion of UO respondents identifying as White (79%) was very close to the total U.S. population (79.96%).

Below in Table 11, we see that 54% of Costa Rican respondents identify with no political party. This was expected, as Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz (1999) have

Table 10. Race/ Ethnicity of Samples and National Populations

Costa Rica sample of college students	**Costa Rica – total population (data: CIA 2012)**	**UO sample of U.S. college students (respondents could check one or more)**	**U.S. – total population (data: CIA 2012)**
63% Mestizo	94% White (including Mestizo)	79 % White	79.96% White
31% White		4% Black	12.85% Black
3% Black/ Afro-Caribbean	3% Black	3% American Indian/ Native (Alaskan/ Hawaiian)	0.97% Amerindian and Alaska Native
			0.18% Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander
0% Amerindian	1% Amerindian	3% Japanese	4.43 Asian%
1% Chinese	1% Chinese	2% Chinese	
1% Other	1% Other	9% Hispanic/ Latino/ Spanish	15.1% Hispanic
		10% Other	1.61% two or more races (July 2007 estimate)

Note: each nation’s population statistics from CIA *World Factbook* (www.cia.gov), retrieved Feb 7, 2012

observed, political parties lack salience for many in Costa Rica, and "Most voters...say that they vote for the candidate rather than the party" (p.71). Observers of Costa Rican politics have noted that the most salient dividing line since 1949 has often been those who are pro-PLN and those who are anti-PLN, with the latter group taking form in a variety of different party configurations over recent decades (Rolbein 1989, p.104). Moreover, the ideological distinctions between the parties have often been fluid (Hoivik and Aas 1981, p.346). In addition, the nation has virtually adopted an uncanny tradition in which the PLN is voted into power for one presidential term, and voted out the next, then the cycle repeats as if informally institutionalizing a check on power (Rolbein 1989, p.111, p.177-178).

Table 12 depicts political affiliations from the UO survey. Itshows that the survey oversampled heavily from respondents identifying with the Democratic party. As will be

Table 11. Political Party Leanings of Costa Rican Sample and National Trends

Party	**Freq.**	**%**	**Presidential Election Results (%)**			**Legislative Assembly Election Results (%)**		
			2010	**2006**	**2002**	**2010**	**2006**	**2002**
National Liberation Party (PLN)	65	20.83	46.9	40.9	31.1	37.3	36.5	27.1
Citizen's Action Party (PAC)	55	17.63	25.1	39.8	26.2	17.6	25.3	22
Libertarian Movement Party (PML)	3	0.96	20.9	8.5	1.7	14.5	9.2	9.3
Social Christian Unity Party (PUS)	3	0.96	3.9	3.6	38.6	8.2	7.8	29.8
Other	16	5.13	3.3	7.1	2.7	22.5	21.1	11.9
No answer	170	54.49						

Notes: N=312; The Costa Rican survey question was Q: Which political party do you tend to vote for?; The high percentage of "Other" parties receiving votes in the Legislative Assembly election is not unusual for a proportional representation system like Costa Rica. Election results from Alvarez-Rivera (2010). The 2010 elections occurred on February 7, about 6 months before the Costa Rican surveys were conducted. The 2002 Presidential results led to a runoff election. In the runoff election the PUS candidate received 58% and the PLN candidate received 42% of votes. The four parties listed by name above have been the dominant parties over this period.

Table 12. Political Party Leanings of UO Sample (2010) and U.S. Population (2011)

Party	Sample Freq.	% Sample	% U.S. population
Republican	83	20.49	45
Democrat	196	48.40	45
Green	4	0.99	
Libertarian	12	2.96	
Other	7	1.73	
I do not vote	49	12.10	
None	43	10.62	
No answer	11	2.72	

Notes: N=405; Source on party leanings in U.S. population: Jones (2012); The UO survey question was Q: Which political party do you tend to vote for?

discussed below, this almost certainly skewed the data towards more peaceful attitudes than exists in the U.S. population at large.

Why Attitudes Exhibited in the Two Samples Are Likely to Be Different in the General Populations of the U.S. and Costa Rica

There are several reasons why the attitudes exhibited in the two samples may be different in the general populations of the two nations. Overall, most of the sample biases suggest that the attitudinal peace gap between the U.S. and Costa Rican populations may be even larger than the gap exhibited in the present samples. First, females around the world typically express more peaceful attitudes than males (Gat 2006, Burris 2008). The UO survey oversampled from females, with a 16% gender gap, as opposed to the 4% gender gap in the Costa Rica sample. For this reason, the UO sample is likely to be significantly more dovish than the general U.S. population.

Second,U.S. respondents with college degrees tend to be more *hawkish* than the general population (Loewen 2007, Burris 2008), but there are signs of a recent shift as college degrees were associated with slightly more dovish attitudes during the Iraq War (Burris 2008). The effect of higher levels of education in Costa Rica is unknown, but the present study can shed some light here. Third, the Costa Rican sample drew

disproportionately from majors in physics and engineering - groups that tend to be more hawkish in their attitudes than the general population according to previous cross-national studies (see below). Fourth, the UO survey clearly oversampled from Democrats (relative to the proportion of Democrats in the U.S. population). Again, this is highly likely to be a factor making the current sample more dovish than the general population. As Burris (2008) has shown, in recent years, political party affiliation often explains more variation in attitudes towards military action than almost any other variable – with Democrats less hawkish than Republicans.

Besides tracking the demographic variables, an analysis of the replicated Gallup World Poll questions offers another route for considering how university students in each nation, and the present cohort of university students in particular, might differ from the general populations. Loewen (2007) argues that university graduates are more likely to be hawkish for two reasons, socialization (i.e., more schooling produces more uncritical patriotism) and "allegiance" (i.e., more success in society, often made possible through education, leads to less critical attitudes towards society including national security policies). But what about university undergraduates who have not yet reaped the rewards of their education through securing lucrative careers? Will they also be more hawkish, or because they have not yet obtained careers and become successful in society, will their "allegiance" be weaker? One thinks here of the widely cited notion that after collecting their first paycheck post-college, young adults become card-carrying Republicans.

Below in Table 13, we see that on the principled objections to terrorism and state terrorism, both UO and Costa Rican university students are at least 10% more peaceful than the general populations of each nation. Costa Rican university students are 14%

Table 13. Comparing Data with Nationally Representative Samples

Question from Gallup World Poll	**Attitude Probed**	**Costa Rica**	**Costa Rica: University students - Gallup sample ($\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$)**	**USA**	**USA: University students – Gallup sample ($\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$)**
Q4	principled stance against state terrorism (is state terrorism justifiable?)	**89%** responded "never justified" (U. students 2010) **75%** responded "never justified" (Gallup World Poll 2008)	**+14%** (In Costa Rica: U. students are ***more*** nonviolent than general pop.)	**81%** responded "never justified" (U. students 2010) **48%** responded "never justified" (Gallup World Poll 2008)	**+33%** (In USA: U. students are ***more*** nonviolent than general pop.)
Q5	principled stance against "terrorism" (is "terrorism" justifiable?)	**90%** responded "never justified" (U. students 2010) **76%** responded "never justified" (Gallup World Poll 2008)	**+14%** (In Costa Rica: U. students are ***more*** nonviolent than general pop.)	**86%** responded "never justified" (U. students 2010) **76%** responded "never justified" (Gallup World Poll 2008)	**+10%** (In USA: U. students are ***more*** nonviolent than general pop.)
Q6	efficacy of nonviolence (pragmatic nonviolence)	**61%** responded "peaceful means" "will work" (U. students 2010) **73%** responded "peaceful means" "will work" (Gallup World Poll 2008)	**-12%** (In Costa Rica: U. students have ***less*** faith in nonviolent methods than general pop.)	**61%** responded "peaceful means" "will work" (U. students 2010) **54%** responded "peaceful means" "will work" (Gallup World Poll 2008)	**+7%** (In USA: U. students have ***more*** confidence in nonviolent methods than general pop.)

more peaceful on both items. But the largest observed gap is found in the state terrorism item, where the UO students are 33% morepeaceful than the general U.S. population on this item. This gap might be an artifact of oversampling from females and Democratic leaning voters. In any case, this finding at least partially refutes Loewen's (2008) theorizing on how higher degrees of education reproduces more hawkish attitudes. Patterns on the nonviolent efficacy item are divergent. UO students are again more peaceful (by 7%) on this item than the general U.S. population, but Costa Rican university students are 12% *less peaceful* than the general population. Thus, there may be something about the Costa Rican educational system or the historical experiences of the young adult cohort, as compared with previous Costa Rican generations, that is not reproducing faith in pragmatic nonviolence. One plausible explanation is the failure of the mass anti-CAFTA mobilizations beginning in 2005 through the national referendum in 2007 which deeply frustrated many progressive civil society sectors. Ultimately, the

organizing efforts and mass street protests did not work, as about 51% of the country voted to approve CAFTA.

Attitudinal Variation Across University Majors

Table 14 depicts the majors of respondents. Numerous studies have found significant attitudinal differences among diverse college majors. During the 1960s, college majors in the humanities, social sciences, and liberal arts were significantly more likely to engage in political activism and protest (Fenton and Gleason 1969, Gamson et al. 1967, Braungart and Braungart 1974). Several studies have found that *economics* majors tend to be less cooperative and more selfish in experimental settings (Stout 2011, p.249). Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1987) concluded these outcomes can be explained through socialization forces associated with studying economics. A body of research has also linked the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) to "hierarchy-enhancing" academic majors including Accounting, Business, Economics, and Marketing. Some majors were theorized as "neutrals," but majors scoring lower on the SDO and theorized as "hierarchy-attenuating" majors included Sociology, Social Work, Women's Studies, Special Education, and Public Health (Sidanius et al. 2003; van Laar et al. 1999; Sidanius, Sinclair, and Pratto 2006).

Diego Gambetta has found evidence that certain personality traits are "slightly more" likely to be prevalent among engineers than other university graduates: "Piecemeal evidence suggests that traits such as a greater lack of tolerance of ambiguity, a belief that society can be made to work like a clock, and a dislike of democratic politics, are more frequent among *engineers*" (Contexts 2008, p.4). One puzzle Gambetta was exploring here is that engineers are overrepresented among Islamic jihadists, yet he found no

evidence they are recruited for their technological knowledge or intelligence. Wajcman (1991) argues that "Of all the major professions, engineering contains the smallest proportion of females...[and] projects a heavily masculine image" (p.145).

But Messerschmidt (1995) contends that engineers construct and "perform" a particular form of masculinity which centers around taking pride in technological expertise, and while managerial masculinity typically glorifies risk-taking, engineers place higher priorities on quality and safety. Given such nuances, we might expect that in a demilitarized nation like Costa Rica, engineers would perform masculinity in context-specific ways, and not necessarily embrace the norms of militarism which are, given Costa Rica's culture and political structures, likely to be relatively less hegemonic than in the U.S. As we will see below, the opposite was true. The Costa Rican engineering, physics, and computer science majors were significantly more hawkish on the militarism index.

Table 14. Majors of the Two Samples (Percentages)

Major	**Costa Rica**	**UO**
sociology	31*	13
psychology	7	12
pre-law	3	2
pre-med	14	7
business	14	16
physics	7	0
engineering	13	0
computer science	8	0
education	0	7
journalism	0	7
other humanities/ social sciences	0	14
natural sciences	0	6
other/ undecided	2	16

Notes: percentages; * An imprecision in the Costa Rica sample should be noted. Unfortunately, the majors of students sitting in Introduction to Sociology as well as other first and second year sociology courses and recruited to take this survey were not tracked. We can assume some of them intend to be sociology majors but otherwise they represent a diverse array of intended majors. Here, they are categorized under "sociology."

Methodological Issues

Recruitment of respondents and response rate. The surveys took students about 25 to 30 minutes to complete.The response rate at the UO was 403 out of 473 (85.2%). Students at the UO were solicited through an Introduction to Sociology course. Participation in the survey was rewarded with a moderate incentive of 1 point extra credit in the course.

The researcher and two research assistants agreed that the response rate in Costa Rica was about 90%. In Costa Rica, respondents were recruited while seated in various courses at three institutions, two private and one public university. Most Costa Rican surveys were completed during class-time with the cooperation of numerous professors and administrators on three separate university campuses in and around San Jose. As professors allowed class time to complete the surveys, the vast majority of students chose to complete the surveys, but a few declined including a few who were too young (under 18 years old). About 120 students at UCR were invited to take the survey in sociology classes. These students completed the survey after class, and were compensated with a moderate incentive of about $6 (USD).

Online survey at the UO. The UO survey was conducted on-line in order to save data entry time. The on-line survey was designed to replicate as close as possible the paper survey-taking experience in Costa Rica. However, there were differences. In Costa Rica, students were either paid for their time, or filled out the survey in a classroom during class time with the cooperation of professors. In both cases, it was almost impossible for Costa Rican students to carelessly complete the survey in 10 minutes, since they were being observed. Under these conditions, most people took about 30

minutes to complete it. One unforeseen problem with the U.S. survey was that by guaranteeing students anonymity in their survey responses and offering them extra credit in their course as an incentive, some chose to attempt to earn the survey extra credit by completing it carelessly in 5 to 15 minutes. In such cases, response patterns were analyzed and it was confirmed that these respondents were answering the questions in highly suspect ways such as always choosing the first response. Qualtrics does allow some quality control checks such as a duration figure for how long it took respondents to complete the survey. Surveys taking between 5 minutes and 16 minutes were treated as suspect and omitted from the sample.

Sampling issues: Surveying university students – a politically engaged subpopulation? Table 15 below depicts respondents' self-reported levels of political interest. It seems likely that university students are less interested and less informed about political issues than is commonly assumed. Putnam (2000) concludes from numerous empirical studies that in recent decades, cohorts of U.S. adults under thirty have been less politically engaged, less likely to read newspapers, to volunteer, and to belong to organizations. Thus, there is a "news and information gap," a generation gap in political knowledge and political interest (p.36). There is some evidence of this phenomenon cross-nationally. For instance, a 2004 study of Israeli university students found that only 37% of Hebrew University students and 26.5% at Bar-Ilan University could draw the West Bank on a map, and when asked about the Green Line, some students even asked, "What is the Green Line?" (Eldar 2006). The results are ironic because the researchers decided to survey university students believing that students comprise a relatively educated, politically active group. This assumption was clearly not supported.

Knowledge of the history and international recognition of the Green Line is essential to understanding the territorial disputes at the center of the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

But other patterns in intellectual and political capital are also worthy of note. A study of 50 U.S. colleges and universities concluded that freshmen often know more about U.S. history and politics than seniors, including at elite schools like Yale and UC Berkeley (Saunders 2006). As the present study sampled largely from freshmen, their proximity to high school education (a major standardized, nation-wide effort in socialization), ironically, can be considered a strength as I probe their historical and political knowledge.

Table 15. Self-Reported Level of Political Interest

Political interest	**Costa Rica (N=312) %**	**UO (N=394) %**
Very interested (1)	21.79	11.93
Somewhat interested (2)	31.73	43.91
Not very interested (3)	31.41	30.96
Not at all interested (4)	15.06	13.20
Sample Means	2.40	2.45

Note: A two-tailed t-test revealed no significant difference between the two sample means at the .05 level, or even the modest .1 level.

One proxy for political knowledge is found in self-reported levels of political interest. Above, we see that the amount of political alienation in the two samples seems to be roughly equal. Though about 10% more Costa Ricans claim to be "very interested," this is counter-balanced by the roughly 12% more UO respondents claiming to be "somewhat interested." T-tests revealed no significant differences between the means.

Emergent shifts in the political context of surveys in Costa Rica. The first round of 229 surveys was conducted in late July of 2010. A few weeks prior to this, the Costa Rican legislature, under pressure from the U.S. government, had authorized U.S. troops

to land at a port on the east coast of Costa Rica. The alleged reason was to help Costa Rica fight narco-trafficking. However, some peace activists in Costa Rica argued that the real reason was to intimidate President Ortega in Nicaragua and President Chavez in Venezuela (fieldnotes 2010). At the time, Ortega was in the midst of a re-election campaign and there were clear and ominous signs that the election would not be transparent, nor supervised by third-parties. Meanwhile, Chavez was embroiled in a tense war of words with Colombia (a key U.S. ally in the region). Still, only a minority of Costa Ricans – mostly leftist peace and justice activists paid much attention to the U.S. militarypresence. For example, a July protest march occupied the street in front of the Legislative Assembly building in San José, shutting down traffic on a vital arterial street for over an hour. The next day, none of the four daily San José newspapers carried a word of the protest, though this is not terribly surprising since the Costa Rican media has long been controlled by wealthy conservative elites who often align with the interests of the U.S. government.

A second round of 83 surveys occurred in the late November of 2010. This time, more significant historical factors intervened to alter the political context of the survey: a heated border conflict developed between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Indeed, several students asked if the survey was being given at this time because of the border conflict and a corresponding spike in interest regarding Costa Rican attitudes towards the military and conflict resolution issues.

In late October and early November of 2010 a crisis developed on the border between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The crisis stemmed from the movement of Nicaragua's military onto an island south of the San Juan River, Isla Calero. The island is

officially a part of Costa Rica, but a Nicaraguan military leader claimed to consult Google maps which had mislabeled the island (Times 2010, November 16).Other than that explanation, the Nicaraguan move is somewhat baffling, though some suspect that Nicaragua was maneuvering to secure offshore oil rights.

The 83 surveys were completed between November 22 and 26. Thus, surveys were completed after Costa Rican police forces were sent to the border with Nicaragua to investigate reports of Nicaraguan troops entering Costa Rica (October 22), and after the Costa Rican government reported that Nicaraguan troops were spotted on Costa Rican soil (November 1), but before December 1st, when the President gave a speech urging Costa Ricans to join the Armed Forces Reserves. Ironically, the occasion for the speech was the 62nd anniversary of Abolishing the Armed Forces.

The border incident led the Costa Rican government to send police forces to the border, but also to redouble diplomatic conflict resolution efforts. Early in November, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) met in Washington D.C. to address the border conflict, and "22 of the 27 OAS representatives voted to request that Nicaragua remove troops from the area." Nicaragua did not attend the meeting and Ortega stonewalled the OAS, calling it a "failure" (Williams Nov.19, 2010). But Ortega did express openness to diplomatic resolution through the United Nations and the international court, rather than the OAS. On Nicaraguan national television he said:

> Let the court say who is right, not guns or threats. The court has the power and the instruments to determine that. The OAS doesn't have anything like that…I want to make clear that Nicaragua does not want to fall into a provocation. (AP Nov.2, 2010)

Moreover, Ortega appealed rationally to recent international rulings which affirm Nicaragua has sovereign rights over the San Juan River. ICJ rulings include the July 2009

ruling that re-affirmed Nicaragua owns the river, but Costa Rica has navigational rights. But Ortega then threw in emotional fire with a caustic interpretation of past history, accusing Costa Rica of being “an expansionist nation that has historically tried to negotiate what it doesn't own” (AP Nov.2, 2010).

In mid-November, the Costa Rican government filed a complaint before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, Netherlands, “alleging that Nicaragua has violated its sovereignty and destroyed parts of a protected wetland” (Williams Nov.19, 2010). These diplomatic moves to engage the OAS and the ICJ were the main responses of the Costa Rican government to the crisis. Shortly after these developments, the second round of surveys was conducted(between November 22-26). At that stage of the border conflict, anxiety about unfolding events may have served to alter downward people’s perceptions of the efficacy of diplomacy, or raised fears of Nicaraguan belligerence and military power, creating a desire for a stronger Costa Rican security force. Or perhaps, the events could strengthen confidence in diplomacy, especially since key government leaders like the Costa Rican Security Minister José Maria Tijerino (who, ironically, was raised in Nicaragua, and with his bi-national biography symbolized the possibility of cooperation) urged diplomatic solutions, saying, “Costa Rica, which doesn't have an army, is looking for a solution to this conflict through diplomatic channels. We are looking for a solution that, if possible, will not further aggravate the situation” (Williams Nov.1, 2010).

Internal validity on the nonviolent/ violent questions. Cronbach’s alpha tests were conducted on the 33 core questions (the 33 items of Question 9) on violent/ nonviolent attitudes.Positively-worded questions (in which “Strongly Agree” or “Agree”

were the peaceful answers) were reverse coded so that the peaceful answers in the whole set of 33 questions assumed the values of "3" and "4." The alpha score for the 33 core questions in the Costa Rica data was .8515. Alpha scores between .9 and .8 are considered indicators of "good" internal validity (Nunnally 1978). However, 33 items is quite a large number, and such large numbers of items tend to raise alpha scores. In the Costa Rica sample on the 33 core questions, low scores (ranging between .1155 and .2285) in "item-rest correlation" (which shows how the item is correlated with a scale computed from the other 32 items) suggest we should consider omitting these questions because including each one drags down the overall alpha score: Q9.3, Q9.10, Q9.13, Q9.19, Q9.31. Next, along with the 33 core questions I added in Questions 4 – 6 (the 3 nonviolent/ violent questions from the Gallup World Poll), and reverse coded them so that the peaceful answer is "2," and standardized the alpha test (because these 3 questions were dichotomous). The result was that alpha was improved slightly to .8664, and analysis showed that the addition of each one of these 3 items improved the overall alpha score. Thus, we can say that the core 33 questions have relatively strong internal reliability with the 3 Gallup World Poll questions in the Costa Rica sample.

Similarly, the alpha score for the 33 core questions in the UO data was .8623. In the UO sample on the 33 core questions, an analysis of the "item-rest correlation" for each item suggest I should consider omitting only one question (with an item-rest correlation of .0456) because it drags down the overall alpha score: Q9.4. Next, along with the 33 core questions I added in Questions 4 – 6 (the 3 nonviolent/ violent questions from the Gallup World Poll), reverse coded them, so that the peaceful answer is "2" and standardized the alpha test. The result was that alpha was improved slightly to .8669,

even though the "item-rest correlation" was low (.1824) on Q5 from the Gallup World Poll – and dropping Q5 would raise alpha to .8675. In any case, we can say that the core 33 questions have relatively strong internal reliability with the 3 Gallup World Poll questions in the UO sample.

Testing the "Elite Cues" Theory of Attitude Formation

Conventional assumptions about democracy hold that democracies are a vibrant, constructive, and healthy mode of governance because citizens are sufficiently interested in the political process, knowledgeable, and capable of engaging in discourse in the public square. In addition, leading sociologists contend that Americans value individualism to a fault (Bellah et al. 1985). Our lionization of individualism pervades public discourse and realms beyond politics as well. A 1978 Gallup survey found that 80% of Americans endorse an ideal of arriving at their religious beliefs independently of churches or synagogues (Roof 2003, p.139). Yet, a substantial body of research by public opinion scholars contends that far from being individualists, people's opinions are heavily influenced by "elite cues."

After respondents completed the 34 questions on forms of violence and nonviolence, they were presented with a section of quotations. The incorporation of quotations from domestic and international political and moral leaders, an innovative aspect of the survey, aimed to test the "elite cues" theory of attitude formation. In this theory, average citizens are viewed as somewhat indifferent to political policies, and somewhat or perhaps largely uninformed about policies and their rationales, all of which makes them likely to adopt the opinions of elites and authority figures – thus following "elite cues" in the formation of their own opinions and legitimation rationales(Paul and

Brown 2001, Lupia 1994, Mondak 1993, Carmines and Kiklinski 1990, Brady and Sniderman 1985). This strategy of adopting elite opinions may be a rational and economic choice, given the context of modernity where time constraints hinder many from becoming informed citizens and many feel powerless to effect change anyway (and in turn, disinterested in the issues), or it may be an expression of a generalized authoritarian personality, political party loyalty, or a genuine trust in particular political or moral leaders.

The results indicate strong support for the "elite cues"theory of opinion formation, in the realm of political violence. For example, the surveys began by presenting respondents with a forced choice question – whether it is "never justified" or "sometimes justified" for "the military to target and kill civilians." The question is quite extreme since the actions named here are against commonly agreed upon international law (e.g., the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949)). But it seems possible that respondents failed to distinguish between targeting civilians and "collateral damage" – and that in itself could be a telling indicator of public acceptance of, or confusion over, standard modes of operation conducted by the U.S. military and their public relations statements. In the UO sample, 19.04% of respondents answered "sometimes justified," while 80.96% of respondents answered "never justified." Among those who answered "sometimes justified," 86.36% of Republicans and 82.14% of Democrats changed their minds on the principle of the acceptability of targeting civilians in military attacks, as they agreed with the quote from former President George W. Bush, who said in a 2002 speech at West Point military academy, "Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong (Applause)" (Bush 2002). As will be discussed below, there was also

a statistically significant difference in rates of change among the first experimental group (where pro-violent elite quotes appeared first) and the second experimental group (where pro-nonviolent elite quotes appeared first). In the entire sample, only 6.06% of respondents "disagreed" with Bush and no one "strongly disagreed."

What about the initial Gallup World Poll question on the efficacy of nonviolence (Q6)? Would respondents who initially affirmed the efficacy of nonviolence maintain consistency in their view when confronted with a quote from President Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech - a quote which might be especially likely to summon agreement by those affiliated with the Democratic party as well as by those who might consider the Nobel Peace Prize a form of authoritative moral capital? The latter is likely to be a mainstream perception, but given the context in our polarized nation and the fact that Obama had done little of great note (in general as well as in the cause of peace) by this point early in his presidency, highlighting his Nobel Peace Prize award would probably not be enough to over-ride a general dislike of Obama by respondents who loyally identify with the Republican party. That is, in the context of our survey, despite receiving the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, it seems reasonable to assume that Obama would not generally be perceived as a "moral leader," but only as a political elite. At the same time, it was expected that the prestige of the Nobel Prize may have pushed *some* respondents towards projecting moral clout/ moral capital onto his quote.

To further test the "elite cues" theory, only respondents who consistently gave peaceful answers (whether agree or disagree, depending on the question) and consistently expressed confidence in the moral superiority of nonviolence and the efficacy of nonviolence were analyzed. The following questions were utilized to determine the

subsample of “hard core” nonviolent adherents. These questions speak to the same issues addressed in the two Obama quotes appearing in the survey. Respondents answered “will work” to the following question:

Q6: “Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can improve their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods). Others do NOT believe that peaceful means alone will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups. Which do you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful means alone will NOT work?”

And, respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the following three questions:

Q9_9: When people suffer under a dictator, a violent revolution is necessary and justified.

Q9_16: When the goal is liberation from tyranny or oppression, war can be necessary and justified.

Q9_18: Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) often fails and war between nations becomes necessary.

And, respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the following five questions:

Q9_10: Using violence to pursue political goals is NEVER justified.

Q9_24: In nations on the verge of civil war, nonviolent movements are likely to be more successful in increasing long-term peace and justice than using violence.

Q9_26: Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) and nonviolent methods can always work to solve international disputes.

Q9_27: If the goal is peace, peaceful methods must be used because we can NOT separate the means (methods) from the ends (goals).

Q9_28: Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow dictators.

Tracking responses to these nine questions gives us a subsample of hard-core, consistent adherents of principled and pragmatic nonviolence, at least in the context of this single survey. And, the survey is fairly robust in that there are multiple checks on the consistency of their views. In fact, based on these selection criteria we are left with only 18 respondents (4.5%) of the UO sample.

Table 16 below helps us analyze how these hard-core nonviolent adherents responded to Obama's arguments. All survey respondents were randomly split into two experimental groups. Each group was exposed to the same elite quotes, but in a different sequence. Q13 is the set in which pro-violent quotes appeared first (Form A), andin Q14 elite quotes favoring nonviolence appeared first (Form B). Two Obama quotes were selected because they closely re-iterate questions that appeared earlier in the survey. That is, these two Obama quotes do not introduce new nuances concerning violent/ nonviolent ideology. The respondents have already weighed in on these same issues. All that is really new is the "elite cue," that is, the perceived authority of the elite attached to the ideological claim. The Obama quote which appears in Q13_1(Form A/ the first experimental group) and Q14_12 (Form B/ the second experimental group)reads: "'There will be times when nations, acting individually or in concert, will find the use of [military] force not only necessary but morally justified.' – President Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech" [Answers: 1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree]. Respondents who answered "strongly agree" (1) or "agree" (2) in effect changed their previously consistent nonviolent view to agree with Obama. The results appear in the table below. We see below that 10 of the 18 (55.6%) changed their

view to agree with Obama's quote which asserts there are times when military force is necessary and justified.

Table 16. Experimental Group Outcomes Among Hard-Core Nonviolent Respondents: Response to Obama's Cue Endorsing Morally Justified Military Force

Form A (Q13_1)	**Frequency**	**%**	**Form B (Q14_12)**	**Frequency**	**%**
Strongly agree (1)	0	0	Strongly agree (1)	1	12.5
Agree (2)	3	30	Agree (2)	6	75
Disagree (3)	6	60	Disagree (3)	1	12.5
Strongly disagree (4)	1	10	Strongly disagree (4)	0	0
Total	10	100	Total	8	100

The second Obama quote, appearing in Q13_2 and Q14_11 read: "'The nonviolence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or possible in every circumstance.' – President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech" [Answers: 1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree]. Again, respondents who answered "strongly agree" (1) or "agree" (2) in effect changed their previously consistent nonviolent view to agree with Obama. The results appear in Table 17 below. Overall, 7 of the 18 (38.9%) principled nonviolent adherents changed their view to agree with Obama's quote which affirmed that nonviolence is not always practical or possible.

Again, these changes in response to elite cues are remarkable, keeping in mind that the respondents in the table above have affirmed earlier in the survey that nonviolence works, even in the difficult context of a despotic regime. They have even affirmed that nonviolent methods and diplomacy can "always work." They have also affirmed that political violence is "neverjustified," and that wars of liberation and violent revolutions are neither necessary nor justified. Yet, in both experimental groups, several respondents changed their view to agree with these two quotes from Obama. These

results suggest that when confronted with elite opinion, attitudes can be quite malleable even among respondents who consistently affirmed principled and pragmatic nonviolent attitudes. On the other hand, as we will see below, there is also some evidence that for many respondents, attitudes on these issues of violence/ nonviolence appear to be relatively stable in the context of a single, complex, multi-item survey.

Table 17. Experimental Group Outcomes Among Hard-Core Nonviolent Respondents: Response to Obama's Cue Rejecting Nonviolent Efficacy

Form A (Q13_2)	**Frequency**	**%**	**Form B (Q14_11)**	**Frequency**	**%**
Strongly agree (1)	0	0	Strongly agree (1)	1	12.5
Agree (2)	3	30	Agree (2)	3	37.5
Disagree (3)	5	50	Disagree (3)	4	50
Strongly disagree (4)	2	20	Strongly disagree (4)	0	0
Total	10	100	Total	8	100

Two Experimental Groups: Varying the Presentation Sequence of Elite Quotes

Again, in both the UO and Costa Rican surveys, respondents were randomly split into two survey forms which are here termed "experimental groups." The quotes include moral and political elites as well as the iconic rebel soldier Che Gueverra. The particular political and moral profiles of the elites (e.g., President Obama's affiliation with the Democratic party could make Republicans less likely to agree with him, regardless of what he says in any given quote) and leaders (e.g., Che Gueverra is likely to only appeal to those with leftist, radical or militant opinions) must be taken into account, such that careful, qualitative interpretations and tentative conclusions are called for.

T-tests were conducted on the two experimental groups to determine if the order of presentation of elite quotes affected propensities to agree or disagree. In the UO data, the results show that there were statistically significant differences between the two

experimental groups on 4 out of the 13 quotes. On all 13 quotes, respondents had four answer choices (1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree), but again, the initial survey instructions suggested they could always leave an answer blank if they did not know or preferred not to answer.

It was expected that the respondents exposed to the violent quotes first would be more likely to answer with pro-violent attitudes, and respondents exposed to the nonviolent quotes first would be more likely to answer with pro-nonviolent attitudes. As seen in the Table below, results show that this was true in two cases, but in two other cases opinion shifted in the opposite direction. Possible interpretations are suggested below, but in general, it may also be that the quotes and the particularity of the elites attached to them stand on their own. Thus, there are limits to the malleability of respondents on questions of violence/ nonviolence, and this is partly because people respond differently to different elites, and the order of presentation is not so important. Hence, a major limitation of the set of quotes is that only one Republican party leader was quoted. In hindsight, the "elites" presented should have been deliberately drawn from a variety of voices from both the Republican and Democratic party. Also, including Che Gueverra as a leader is not very ideal for the mainstream U.S. context, but his inclusion makes possible comparisons with our Central American sample.

As seen in Table 18 below, the two groups exhibited significant differences in their means on four questions. First, the quote appearing in Q13_12 and Q14_1 was: "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicatedones." – Martin Luther King, Jr. in his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize

acceptance speech. This was conceptualized as a pro-nonviolence statement, and so to agree with this is a peaceful answer.

Table 18. T-Tests (Difference Between Group Means) on Two Experimental Groups in UO Survey: Items Where the Order of Elite Quotes Significantly Influenced Responses

Quotes of Moral and Political Elites	(Question # in Form A) $\bar{x}$	(Question # in Form B) $\bar{x}^2$	$\bar{x} - \bar{x}^2$
"The nonviolence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or possible in every circumstance." – President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech	(Q13_2) 2.17	(Q14_11) 2.04	0.13*
"The USA has helped underwrite [support] global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms…So yes, the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace." – President Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech *(See Appendix A for the full quote as it appeared in the survey.)*	(Q13_3) 2.30	(Q14_13) 2.08	0.22**
"Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong." – President George W. Bush (2002)	(Q13_6) 1.54	(Q14_4) 1.40	0.14*
"Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones." – Martin Luther King, Jr. in his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech	(Q13_12) 1.88	(Q14_1) 1.72	0.16*

Note: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; There was no significant difference between group means (Form A vs. Form B) on the other 9 elite quotes. Source: UO survey (Eddy 2010)

The two group means exhibit a significant difference at the .05 level. The Q14 group has a more peaceful mean (1.72 versus the mean of the Q13 group on this item: 1.88). The Q14 group was exposed to pro-nonviolent quotes first. This result confirms the expected direction of influence. It seems that exposing respondents to Dr. King's condemnation of violence *first* made some respondents more likely to agree with Dr. King, as opposed to placing Dr. King's words near the end of the set, after the quotes of pro-violent elites - which it should be noted, included Obama's dismissal of King's nonviolent ideology.

The second quote (Q13_6 and Q14_4) exhibiting a significant difference between the two experimental groups was: "Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong."– President George W. Bush (2002).This was conceptualized as a

pro-nonviolence statement and to agree with this is a peaceful answer. The two group means exhibit a significant difference at the .05 level. The Q14 group has a more peaceful mean (1.40 versus the means of the Q13 group on this item: 1.54). Of course, this is really a principle of international law, and it is telling that U.S. Presidents rarely mention international law as a rationale for their arguments (it seems this would concede too much authority to the international community).The Q14 group was exposed to pro-nonviolent quotes first, so again, this is the expected direction of influence. It had been expected that those first exposed to pro-nonviolent quotes would be more likely to express agreement with nonviolent principles, including the Bush quote affirming the principle that targeting civilians is morally illegitimate. The quote by former President Bush appeared close to the middle of the set of quotes in both survey forms. Respondents in the Q14 form were exposed to three pro-*nonviolent* quotes before reading the Bush quote, while respondents in the Q13 form were exposed to five pro-*violent* quotes before reading the Bush quote.

The next two quotes initially seem to pose challenges to the expected direction of influence resulting from manipulating the order of the items. But a closer analysis of the particularity of the quotes included in the sets suggests nuanced interpretations may be able to reconcile the apparent contradictions. Both quotes at issue here involve President Obama offering rationales for a just-war orientation. Question (Q13_2 and Q14_11) was: "The nonviolence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or possible in every circumstance" – President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech.This was conceptualized as a pro-violent statement (specifically, a pro-just war statement),and so to agree with this was considered a pro-violent answer.

The two group means exhibit a significant difference at the .05 level. The Q13 group has a more peaceful mean (2.17 versus the mean of the Q14 group on this item: 2.04) as they are closer to *disagreeing* with the Obama quote.The Q13 group was exposed to pro-violent quotes first, so this is not the expected direction of influence. In any case, for some reason, it seems respondents were more likely to *disagree* with Obama's pro-just war arguments when his quotes appear first. This may reflect the sharply limited degree of moral authority that respondents projected onto Obama in the late 2010 context, despite having been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Additional reasons for this pattern are offered below.

One obvious explanation rests in the fact that in the Q14 form, Obama's quotes appeared at the end of the entire set of quotes. Thus, for some respondents, the quotes appearing before the Obama quote may have provoked a reaction against nonviolent attitudes or against Dr. King, pushing respondents to agree with Obama against Dr. King's nonviolence. Here, I propose that a likely candidate for a mediating variable is one quote in particular: Q14_8. Item Q14_8 may have provoked a reaction against Dr. King and his nonviolence as he is quoted as saying, "[The USA] is the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today." This dissenting critique of U.S. policy may have made respondents more likely to agree two quotes later with Obama as he claims that Dr. King and Gandhi (and their nonviolence) were not always practical. This is a particularly interesting interpretation because the prophetic King, the radical King with his anti-Vietnam War stance, is the King that many college students today are likely to be unfamiliar with. But it is worth recalling that in the last years of his life, Dr. King's radical and progressive agenda had alienated the majority of Americans, such that "72

percent of whites and 55 percent of blacks disapproved of King's opposition to the Vietnam War and his efforts to eradicate poverty in America" (West 2011).

King's lofty place in American collective memory is indisputable. He is, after all, the only civil society leader to have an official holiday named after him. But there are many signs that collective memory of his radical edge has been watered down. Indeed, Polletta (1998) finds that collective memory processes in the U.S. have heavily favored the "early King" and neglected the "later King." Thus, I suggest that when Dr. King is de-sanitized, when Dr. King's nonviolence is clearly linked to a harsh critique of U.S. policies, a significance percentage of U.S. college students are more likely to react against Dr. King's nonviolent principles. It seems plausible that Dr. King's quote (Q14_8) harshly dissenting from U.S. policies provoked a reaction among patriotic respondents, making them more likely to agree with Obama's critique of King. Because Dr. King's quote would still be visible on the computer screen of survey takers just two quotes above, it could have made respondents more likely to agree with Obama in his critique of King. Thus, when respondents are first exposed to the radical Dr. King, respondents are more likely to agree with Obama's suggestion that King's nonviolence could be unrealistic. As we will see below, subsequent cross-tabs analyses of the patriotic variable and these items offered support for this interpretation.

The fourth and final quote in which statistically different means appeared between the two groups is Question (Q13_3 and Q14_13), which read: "The USA has helped underwrite [support] global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms…So yes, the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace" – President Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize

acceptance speech (see Appendix A for the full quote as it appeared in the survey). This was conceptualized as a pro-violent statement (specifically, a pro-just war statement) and a defense of U.S. military policies, and so to agree with this is a pro-violent answer. The two group means exhibit a significant difference at the .01 level.The Q13 group has a more peaceful mean (2.30 versus the mean of the Q14 group on this item: 2.08) as the Q13 group is closer to *disagreeing* with the Obama quote. Yet the Q13 group was exposed to pro-violent quotes first, so this is not in the expected direction of influence. Again, for some reason, respondents were more likely to *disagree* with Obama's pro-just war arguments when his quotes appear first. To put it another way, respondents were more likely to agree with Obama when quotes by pro-nonviolent leaders and other pro-violent leaders came before Obama's quote. Again, I propose that a plausible interpretation here is that Dr. King's dissenting quote in Q14_8 provoked a reaction among patriotic respondents (conceptualizing, for the moment, patriotism in the very narrow but conventional sense of being reluctant to critique the U.S.). The key issue to adjudicate here is – who are the "patriotic" respondents? Does Q44 ("How patriotic are you? Would you say you are extremely patriotic, very patriotic, somewhat patriotic, or not especially patriotic?") hold sufficient validity?

Obama versus King: Adjudicating patriotism as a mediating variable. Previous studies have shown a link between national pride and confidence in the military as well as willingness to fight for the nation (Listhaug 1986, p.75). Rose's (1985) study of 15 nations found that in all nations except Iceland, self-identified ideological conservatives are 19% more likely to express pride in their country, and while left-wing citizens are less likely to express pride, the majority on the left still do express national pride. Those

lacking patriotism were disproportionately young and well-educated (Rose 1985). In 1998, employing semi-structured qualitative interviews, Wolfe (1998) found evidence of "mature patriotism" among middle-class Americans, such that the jingoistic "blind patriotism" of "America, right or wrong" was largely absent as many voiced critiques of America's wars abroad. However, below I suggest that the percentage of respondents embracing "blind patriotism" is enough to produce significant findings in the shifts against Dr. King and towards Obama, as we analyze responses to elite cues in the two experimental groups.

Subsequent cross-tabs analyses of the patriotism variable (Q44) and the two Obama quotes initially offered only modest support for the interpretation that the dissenting quote of Dr. King was a mediating variable (which might provoke a reaction against King and foster agreement with Obama over King), since differences between the experimental groups cut across almost all levels of self-identified "patriotism."

I will suggest below this only casts doubt on the validity of conceptualizing the "patriotism" variable in terms of "blind patriotism" operating at the individual level. Rather, it can be conceived as operating at the cultural level. In Table 19 below, we see how respondents sorted into self-identified degree of patriotism (Q44) varied between the two experimental groups in their response to the two Obama quotes at issue (which exhibited statistically significant differences between their means).

Table 19. Cross-Tabs on Patriotism Summarized (Differences Between the Two Experimental Groups)

Q44: How patriotic are you? (% of overall sample)	% differences in overall agreement (strongly agree + agree) with Obama as a result of placing Obama quote at end of Form (Q14 – Q13, or the agreements of respondents exposed to Form Q14 *minus* agreements of respondents exposed to Form Q13)	
	(Q13_2 and Q14_11): "The nonviolence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or possible in every circumstance."	(Q13_3 and Q14_13): "The USA has helped underwrite [support] global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms…So yes, the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace."
extremely patriotic (4%)	+18%	+7%
very patriotic (18%)	-4%	+10%
somewhat patriotic (44%)	+10%	+15%
not especially patriotic (32%)	+23%	+16%

Notes: + = presenting Obama's quotes at the end of the set of quotes (in Form B/ Q14) led to higher agreement with Obama as compared to respondents exposed to Obama's quotes first (in Form A/ Q13)

It may be logical to conclude that placing Obama's quotes at the beginning of the sequence are more likely to produce a knee-jerk reaction against Obama regardless of what he says, especially among Republicans. Additional analysis (not illustrated here) revealed this pattern to be present, but it also showed that Democrats followed the same pattern: both Republicans and Democrats were slightly more likely to *disagree* with all three of Obama's pro-violent quotes when they were the first quotes presented in the set. Again, it seems that by placing Obama's quotes after the other quotes in the set, including the critical Dr. King quote, Obama's views are more likely to appear reasonable to respondents.

Because those who claimed to be "not especially patriotic" (and who might be expected to agree with dissenting quotes like that of Dr. King here) exhibited slightly greater differences between the two experimental forms than the "somewhat patriotic," we are left with ex-post facto hypothesizing that even those who see themselves as "not especially patriotic" are actually offended or incredulous by Dr. King's accusation that the U.S. is the "great purveyor of violence," and so they reacted negatively against it.

Thus,they are more likely to agree with Obama against King a few questions later in the set, than they are likely to agree with Obama when his quotes begin the set of quotes. This interpretation actually fits with the broad stream of cross-national theorizing that asserts that nationalist influences are not so much at the individual level, but at the cultural level. In this case, nationalism is so pervasive in the U.S., even those who do not think of themselves as "patriotic," tend to react negatively to harsh or radical critiques of the U.S., and thus are more likely to agree with Obama against King, after they are exposed to King's radical critique of the U.S.

This interpretation of the "patriotism" variable is supported by analysis of how respondents answered Q44 in cross-tabulations (see Table below) with the dissenting Dr. King quote: "[The USA] is the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today." Among those self-identified as "not especially patriotic," 78% agreed, while 22% disagreed with King's quote of radical dissent. But the other respondents (with different levels of self-identified patriotism) also tended to follow this pattern of majority agreement with the King quote. At every level of self-identified patriotism except (and it is an important exception, though the cells were small) for the "extremely patriotic," clear majorities agreed with Dr. King's dissent. But the percentage who disagree would be enough to cause the targeted disparity between the Obama quotes in the two experimental groups.

If we conceptionalize Q44 as operationalizing a form of "blind patriotism" that reacts against harsh criticism of the U.S. – there is some evidence for this kind of patriotism in the data. But self-reported patriotism (whether one thinks of oneself as "patriotic") may also reflect "mature patriotism" as well as tangential issues like the salience of family traditions on the 4th of July holiday, family connections and pride in

military service, one's likelihood of displaying the U.S. flag, or the emotion one might feel during the playing of the National Anthem.

If blind patriotism is the mediating variable creating reaction against Dr. King and support for Obama, it seems to operate at the cultural level more than the individual level. This is why a sizeable minority (see Table 20 below), some 22% to 24%, of those who think of themselves as "not especially patriotic" and "somewhat patriotic" *disagree* with Dr. King's harsh dissent of U.S. foreign policy.

Table 20. Cross-Tabs: Levels of Patriotism Confronting Dr. King's Dissent (Frequency and Row Percentages)

Q44: How patriotic are you?	"[The USA] is the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today." – Dr. King (data on this quote in the two forms merged: Q13_13 and Q14_8)				
	strongly agree	agree	disagree	strongly disagree	Total
extremely patriotic	1 6.25%	6 37.5%	6 37.5%	3 18.75%	16 100%
very patriotic	11 15.71%	32 45.71%	19 27.14%	8 11.43%	70 100%
somewhat patriotic	40 23.81%	87 51.79%	38 22.62%	3 1.79%	168 100%
not especially patriotic	41 32.28%	58 45.67%	28 22.05%	0	127 100%

I suggest that the almost 25% in each level of self-identified patriotism who at least "disagree" (some also "strongly disagree" but the cell sizes are small) with Dr. King's critique of U.S. violence is a likely source of the differences between Forms A and B. When confronted with Dr. King's radical critique of U.S. violence around the world, sizeable minorities, especially those who self-identify as "extremely patriotic" disagree with Dr. King. This sizeable minority would be enough to register a significant difference between the two experimental groups, producing higher agreements with Obama among those exposed to the radical King first. Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising how many respondents did agree with Dr. King. The results are further illuminated in Table 21 below.

Table 21. Cross-Tabulation of Patriotism and Q10: The U.S. Military Acts As.... (UO Data)

	(1) the world's heroic policeman who helps keep the peace, and furthers freedom and democracy.	(2)	(3)	Something in between (4)	(5)	(6)	(7) the armed forces of a self-interested empire that dominates and exploits the world, and mostly serves wealthy and powerful interests in the U.S.	Totals
Extremely patriotic	2 11.76%	4 23.53%	2 11.76%	7 41.18%	1 5.88%	1 5.88%	0 0	17 100%
Very patriotic	6 8.57%	8 11.43%	13 18.57%	27 38.57%	9 12.86%	5 7.14%	2 2.86%	70 100%
Somewhat patriotic	2 1.16%	9 5.23%	18 10.47%	88 51.16%	33 19.19%	15 8.72%	7 4.07%	172 100%
Not especially patriotic	0 0	2 1.59%	3 2.38%	62 49.21%	27 21.43%	22 17.46%	10 7.94%	126 100%
Totals	10 2.60%	23 5.97%	36 9.35%	184 47.79%	70 18.18%	43 11.17%	19 4.94%	385 100%

Above, adding responses 1 – 3, we see that about 19% of respondents are reluctant to mount much of a critique of the U.S. military. Also, we see that in the column total for the most critical response (7), only 5% of the sample subscribed to this position. The next most critical response (6) attracted 11% of respondents, and the next most critical response below that attracted (5) 18% of respondents. In each level of self-identified patriotism, pluralities or majorities preferred the middle position (4). Again, this relatively uncritical stance among the majority, may be the source of the reaction against King and in favor of Obama's elite cue. Nevertheless, comparing Q10 with the cross-tabs of Dr. King's dissenting quote above and self-described level of patriotism, it seems clear that many respondents agreed with Dr. King even though here in Q10 (earlier in the survey), they did not take such a critical view of the U.S. military. This suggests the power of Dr. King's influence as an elite cue, but respondents may lack information to fully embrace a critical view of U.S. foreign policy – as is suggested in Q10.

As a final test of "blind patriotism," consider the results depicted in Table 22. Here, respondents confronted a set of questions (Q12) probing attitudes towards common

U.S. military tactics – aerial bombing and bombing from un-manned drones. This set of questions was designed to identify respondents who simply cannot bring themselves to criticize the U.S. military, even when relatively obvious contradictions exist between military tactics and traditional notions of courage, as well as the somewhat more ambiguous contradictions (given elite cues on these issues) between military tactics and ethical norms. As will be detailed in a section below, the results on Q12 suggest that roughly 15 to 20% of respondents could not bring themselves to criticize the U.S. military for any reason – as they chose to affirm that bombing and using drones was "brave." This is despite the fact that Q12 blatantly specified some of the contradictions, as respondents were asked to consider "...bombing campaigns conducted by predator drones (un-manned aircraft) and dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet (beyond the reach of enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan who lack anti-aircraft technology)."

Table 22. Probing Interpretations of Aerial Bombardment and Predator Drones (UO Sample)

Q12. The U.S. military has used a variety of strategies to attack enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq, including bombing campaigns conducted by predator drones (un-manned aircraft) and dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet (beyond the reach of enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan who lack anti-aircraft technology). Rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

Question	Strongly Agree (1)	Agree (2)	Disagree (3)	Strongly Disagree (4)	Mean
1. Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is a smart strategy.	17.88%	42.32%	24.69%	15.11%	2.37
2. …is morally justified.	4.57%	18.02%	50.25%	27.16%	3.00
3. …is brave.	3.84%	16.88%	47.06%	32.33%	3.08
4. Using predator drones to drop bombs is a smart strategy.	17.6%	45.92%	22.19%	14.29%	2.33
5. …is morally justified.	5.63%	19.95%	47.57%	26.85%	2.96
6. …is brave.	2.28%	13.96%	47.21%	36.55%	3.18

Costa Rica Survey: Elite Cues

In the Costa Rica survey, there were no statistically significant differences between Form A and Form B outcomes in ten of the elite quotes. Where statistically significant differences were found, which Form had the more peaceful answers? The results appear in Table 23. As expected, Form B (where nonviolent quotes appear first) produced more robust nonviolent responses for item 2, the Dr. King quote, and item 3, the Gandhi quote. Against expectations, Form B produced significantly more pro-violent responses on item 1 (i.e., agreement with Obama's dismissal of Gandhian and Kingian nonviolent tactics).

It is difficult to explain why respondents exposed to Form B were more likely to agree with the pro-violent Obama quote in item 1. To state the same issue differently, why were respondents exposed to Form A more likely to disagree with Obama's pro-violent quote? One possibility is that because respondents in Form A were exposed to a pro-violent/ even a pro-hatred quote by Che beforehand, they were more likely to react against the pro-violent quote of Obama. Thus, respondents in Form A were more likely to disagree with the Obama quote.

A relatively strong case can also be made for auto-correlation among both Form A and Form B respondents. To state this differently, it may be possible that some respondents exposed to Form B did not read the Obama quote carefully. They had just been exposed to 8 quotes that were pro-nonviolent (see Appendix A), and in number 9, the Obama quote at issue appears. To maintain peaceful responses, this item 9 is precisely where their responses would have to shift from "Agree" to "Disagree." Thus, this may be a case of auto-correlation in which respondents were in the mode of agreeing with all

items, and may have mis-read the Obama quote in terms of praise for Gandhi and King. Indeed, survey research suggests that when adding "not" to an item (i.e., "not" does appear in the Obama quote), respondents often mis-read it.

Table 23. T-Tests (Difference Between Group Means) on Two Experimental Groups in Costa Rica Survey: Items Where the Order of Elite Quotes Significantly Influenced Responses

Quotes of Moral and Political Elites	(Question # in Form A) $\bar{x}$	(Question # in Form B) $\bar{x}^2$	$\bar{x} - \bar{x}^2$
1. "The non-violence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or possible in every circumstance." - U.S. President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech	(Q12_4) 2.64	(Q11_9) 2.26	0.38***
2. "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones." – Martin Luther King, Jr. (U.S.) in his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech	(Q12_6) 1.54	(Q11_8) 1.32	0.22*
3. "It is a cowardly thought, that of killing others. Whom do you suppose to free by assassination?...Those who will rise to power by murder will certainly not make the nation happy." – Gandhi (1922)	(Q12_7) 1.56	(Q11_7) 1.35	0.21*

Note: * = p< .05; ** = p< .01; *** = p< .001; There was no significant difference between group means (Form A vs. Form B) on the other 10 elite quotes. Possible responses to the quotes were (with codes): Strongly agree (1), Agree (2), Disagree (3), and Strongly disagree (4). In Form A, respondents were presented with pro-violent quotes first. In Form B, respondents were presented with pro-nonviolent quotes first. In #1, Form A respondents were more peaceful (to Disagree was the peaceful response). In #2, Form B respondents were more peaceful (to Agree was the peaceful response). In #3, Form B respondents were more peaceful (to Agree was the peaceful response). In Form A (pro-violent quotes appear first) and Form B (nonviolent quotes appear first).

Similarly (applying the same explanation of an auto-correlation mechanism), in Form A, respondents were exposed to three pro-violent quotes before the Obama quote (item 1 above), and so many Costa Rican respondents were in the mode of disagreeing with all items when the Obama quote (item 1) appeared. This auto-correlation explanation is quite plausible since Costa Rican respondents in this sample are so consistently nonviolent/ peaceful in their attitudes. But a survey researcher never welcomes an explanation like this – positing respondent failure to clearly read and understand the item, especially since the differences between the Forms on this item are statistically significant.

Cross-National Analysis: Testing Elite Cues

We see in Table 24 below that the Costa Rican mean is *clearly* more peaceful/ more nonviolent on all of the elite quote items except on item #4 (discussed below). Hence, compared with U.S. students, Costa Ricans were more likely to *agree* with the pro-nonviolent quotes by Oscar Arias, the Pope, and Dr. King (items 8, 9, and 12 respectively) and more likely to *disagree* with the two pro-violent quotes by President Obama as well as the quote by Che Guevera endorsing hatred of enemies (items 1, 2, and 5 respectively). In item #1, 25% of UO students disagreed, while 65% of Costa Ricans disagreed with Obama's case for necessary and morally justified military force. In item #2, 22% of UO students disagreed, while 48%, almost half, of Costa Ricans disagreed with Obama's case that the nonviolence of Gandhi and King is not always realistic or possible. Notice also that the items locate the source of Obama's quotes: his then recent Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech. For many respondents, the Nobel prize is likely to link Obama to authoritative expertise and moral capital, and citing such credentials is a classic technique of persuasive communication. Yet, a significant number of Costa Ricans disagreed with Obama on both items.

Table 24.Cross-National T-Tests (UO & Costa Rica Surveys): Agreement with Moral and Political Elites - Results from Experimental Group One (Form A) and Two (Form B) Combined (Percentages)

Quote (and # in Form A of UO survey)	Sample (and *n* in Forms A and B)	Strongly Agree (1)	Agree (2)	Disagree (3)	Strongly Disagree (4)	$\bar{x}$	$\bar{x} - \bar{x}^2$
1. "There will be times when nations, acting individually or in concert, will find the use of [military] force not only necessary but morally justified." – President Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech	UO (n= 198(A); n=193 (B))	12.02	63.17	24.04	0.77	2.14	-0.65***
	CR (n= 150 (A); n=157 (B))	11.40	23.13	40.07	25.41	2.79	
2. "The nonviolence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or possible in every circumstance." – President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech	UO (n=196 (A); n= 192 (B))	12.63	65.72	20.10	1.55	2.11	-0.34***
	CR (n= 149 (A); n=153 (B))	18.87	33.44	31.46	16.23	2.45	
4. "Violence is not the monopoly of the exploiters and as such the exploited can use it too and, moreover, ought to use it when the moment arrives." – Che Guevera (1963)	UO (n= 190 (A); n=190 (B))	7.89	46.58	40.79	4.74	2.42	.04
	CR (n= 151 (A); n=156 (B))	23.13	29.97	32.57	14.33	2.38	
5. "Our soldiers must have a relentless hatred of the enemy; a people without hatred cannot vanquish a brutal enemy." – Che Guevera (1967)	UO (n= 195(A); n=197 (B))	8.67	33.42	40.82	17.09	2.66	-0.34***
	CR (n= 150 (A); n=155 (B))	12.79	15.41	31.15	40.66	3.00	
8. "People who dismiss the concepts of dialogue, diplomacy, and negotiation as a waste of time are the biggest challenge to people who work for peace…I do believe that the U.S. tends to resort to military force too quickly." – Oscar Arias Sanchez, Costa Rican President (2005) and Nobel Peace Prize winner	UO (n= 195(A); n=197 (B))	32.14	54.08	13.01	.77	1.82	0.23**
	CR (n= 150 (A); n=157 (B))	56.21	33.66	4.58	5.56	1.59	
9. "When war, as in these days in Iraq, threatens the fate of humanity, it is ever more urgent to proclaim that only peace is the road to follow to construct a more just and united society. Violence and arms can never resolve the problems of man." – Pope John Paul II (2003)	UO (n= 195(A); n=197 (B))	27.81	52.30	18.37	1.53	1.94	0.52***
	CR (n= 152 (A); n=158 (B))	67.64	24.27	6.47	1.62	1.42	
12. "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones." – Martin Luther King, Jr. in his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech	UO (n= 195 (A); n= 198 (B))	35.37	50.89	12.47	1.27	1.8	0.37***
	CR (n= 153 (A); n=157 (B))	69.68	20.00	7.74	2.58	1.43	

Notes: * = p< .01; ** = p< .001; *** = p< .0001; UO = University of Oregon sample; CR = Costa Rica sample; See Appendix A and Appendix B for the official survey format utilized in each nation; unlike other reporting of results in this document, no items in this table were reverse-coded; This table reports overall combined statistics, rather than averaging statistics of Form A respondents with those from Form B respondents. The number of respondents exposed to Form A and Form B was often not a perfect 50%-50% split. In the items above, the difference between the n of Form A and the n of Form B ranged between 0 and 5 in the UO survey, and between 4 and 7 in the Costa Rica survey. As a result, averaged statistics (which are not reported here) are sometimes an inconsequential .01 to .02 different (on both percentages and means) from the numbers reported in the cells above. On items 1,2, and 5: a higher mean was conceived as a more peaceful/ pro-nonviolent answer. On items 8, 9, and 12: a lower mean was conceived as a more peaceful/ pro-nonviolent answer.

Similarly, in item #12, 70% of Costa Ricans "strongly agree" with Dr. King's denunciation of violence as solving no social problem, while only 35% of UO students "strongly agree" with Dr. King. Given the context of competing norms in U.S. culture, where the myth of redemptive violence competes with nonviolent norms partly represented in the image of King as a national hero, the percentage of *extreme responses* (i.e., "strongly agree") on item #12 offers perhaps the single clearest indicator of nonviolent attitudes in the survey. When tabulating both "agree" responses together on item #12, Costa Rica outscores the UO in affirmation of Dr. King's statement by a count of 90% to 86%, only a 4% gap. On the one hand, the fact that less than 2% in each sample "strongly disagree" with King's statement, and less than 13% in each sample "disagree" with King's statement, demonstrates some degree of widespread resonance with nonviolent attitudes in the samples. On the other hand, given the rest of the survey's results, we have reason to question the depth of the nonviolent attitudes expressed by UO respondents on this item. Thus, it may be that UO respondents are largely responding to an "elite cue" here, that is, to the moral capital of Dr. King. Moreover, a case can be made that the 35% gap in "strongly agree" responses best indicates the greater robustness of nonviolent attitudes in the Costa Rican sample.

And on item 8, a double-barreled question (a potential methodological flaw to be sure, though a case can be made for including the two thematically-linked sentences together, if interpretations are appropriately tentative), only 32% of UO students "strongly agreed" with Dr. Arias, while 56% of Costa Ricans "strongly agreed." Hence, Costa Ricans voiced agreement with the notion that the U.S. tends to resort to military force too quickly, neglecting the arts of diplomacy.

Responses to item #4, the complex Che Guevera quote are more difficult to categorize in terms of a nonviolent/ violent dichotomy. The difference between the two nations on this item is not statistically significant, but conceptually, a very strong case can be made that the Costa Rican mean here reflects a slightly stronger concern for justice for the exploited and thus, reflects a stronger valuation of a meaningful peace (peace with justice). Moreover, the item operationalizes an attitude on violence which can be termed a "conservative double-standard" on violence – a standpoint which is objectionable for those who identify with (or sympathize with) the oppressed, since this is a stance in which the violence of the oppressed, but not the violence of the oppressor is condemned (Bell 1968, Eddy 2011). Likewise, the U.S. mean may reflect a slightly greater identification with the exploiters. In this quote Che actually articulates and advocates a "just revolution" orientation. Item #4 is also double-barreled (again, a potential methodological flaw to be sure) in the sense that it begins by pointing out the hypocritical double-standard of the exploiters who claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and concludes by arguing that the exploited "should" use force when a revolutionary situation arrives. The "ought to" use violence argument is the part that clearly rejects nonviolence, but in the context of the framing provided by Che it is difficult to disentangle violence/ nonviolence from a justified revolt against exploitation and violent domination.

Interestingly, Costa Ricans were willing to disagree with Che when he spoke of "hatred," so it seems not to be the case that Costa Ricans were swayed merely by the prestige or cachet or moral capital that Che holds for many Latin Americans. Che is better known for a quote in which he said, "The true revolutionary is guided by feelings

of love." In fact, while analyzing this data, on my way to and from campus I bicycled each day past a parked car with a bumper sticker featuring that quote. However, the hatred quotation not entirely a misrepresentation of Che's praxis. Che's willingness to carry out ruthless executions of enemies and deserters has been highlighted by many of his critics. The quote comes from Che's "Message to the Tricontinental" in 1967, before his final campaign in Bolivia. As Krauze (2011) has written, "Hatred for him was a creative emotion" (p.329). In a fuller version of the quote, Che praises "hate as a factor of the struggle, which drives a man beyond the natural limitations of the human condition and converts him into an effective, selective, cold killing machine. That is how our soldiers have to be" (p.329). This certainly occupies the polar opposite of Gandhians with their emphasis on fallibalism, love (and the importance of overcoming hatred), reconciliation, and human brotherhood and sisterhood. We might also recall Orwell's novel *1984*, in which public hate rituals cultivate the hatred of enemies as a means of social control.

Below, Tables 25 and 26 depict results for elite quotes that were only included in one of the surveys respectively. While the inclusion of these quotes were tailored to resonate with respondents in each of the respective national contexts, and the design sought to balance pro-violent and anti-violent voices in each survey, the presence of these unique quotes and voices makes comparing the rest of the elite quotes in the UO and Costa Rican surveys somewhat more tenuous. Future studies should consider only testing a battery of identical quotes, or test the effects of varying the voices included.

Table 25. Results: Elite Quotes Appearing in UO Survey Only (Percentages)

Quote (and # in Form A)	*n* in Forms A and B	Strongly Agree (1)	Agree (2)	Disagree (3)	Strongly Disagree (4)	x̄
3. "The USA has helped underwrite [support] global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. …So yes, the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace." – President Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech *[see Appendix A for full quote]*	n=194 (A); n=192 B)	12.46	58.57	26.39	2.59	2.19
6. "Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong." – President George W. Bush (2002)	n=197(A); n=198(B)	60.75	32.17	6.33	0.76	1.47
7. "I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its stupidity… There is not glory in battle worth the blood it costs…When people speak to you about a preventive war, you tell them to go fight it. After my experience, I have come to hate war…War settles nothing." – Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. Army General and 34th President of US (from 1953-1961)	n=195(A); n=198(B)	32.83	46.81	19.6	0.76	1.89
10. "It is my conviction that killing under the cloak of war is nothing but an act of murder." – Albert Einstein	n=197(A); n=197(B)	31.98	42.39	22.59	3.05	1.97
11. "Violence is impractical because it is a descending spiral ending in destruction for all. The old law of an eye for an eye leaves everybody blind…Violence is immoral because it thrives on hatred rather than love. It destroys community and makes brotherhood impossible. Violence ends by defaulting itself. It creates bitterness in the survivors and brutality in the destroyers." – Martin Luther King, Jr. (1958)	n=193(A); n=197(B)	37.16	53.34	8.74	0.78	1.74
13. "[The USA] is the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today." – Martin Luther King, Jr. 1967 ["purveyor" means supplier, distributer]	n=195(A); n=196(B)	24.29	48.09	24.05	3.58	2.07

Note: statistics above were calculated as averages of statistics from Form A respondents and Form B respondents.

Table 26. Results: Elite Quotes Appearing in Costa Rica Survey Only (Percentages)

Quote (and # in Form A)	*n* in Forms A and B	Strongly Agree (1)	Agree (2)	Disagree (3)	Strongly Disagree (4)	x̄
5. "War [that involves] the violent destruction of an oppressive and inhuman regime, is more than justified if its aim is the creation of a society where men live in peace with each other." - Father Ernesto Cardenal (Nicaragua, 1981)	n=151(A); n=155(B)	23.21	32.69	24.5	19.61	2.41
7. "It is a cowardly thought, that of killing others. Whom do you suppose to free by assassination?...Those who will rise to power by murder will certainly not make the nation happy." – Gandhi (1922)	n=150(A); n=156(B)	66.27	23.82	7.93	1.99	1.46
10. "Any human order to kill must be subordinate to the law of God which says, 'Thou shalt not kill.' No soldier is obliged to obey an order contrary to the law of God." – Archbishop Oscar Romero (El Salvador, 1980)	n=150(A); n=157(B)	49.45	26.7	19.24	4.62	1.79

Quote (and # in Form A)	*n* in Forms A and B	Strongly Agree (1)	Agree (2)	Disagree (3)	Strongly Disagree (4)	x̄
11. "With popular, non-violent mobilization, always committed to non-violence, that's when lots of good ideas and proposals begin to emerge from below (the people)." – Subcomandante Marcos of the Zapatistas (Chiapas, Mexico, 2006)	n=147(A); n=156(B)	61.06	32.94	4.67	1.34	1.47
12. "We consider it unethical to approve of any measures to secure the victory of a revolution. We do NOT believe that the end (goal) justifies the means (method)." – Subcomandante Marcos (Chiapas 2001)	n=144(A); n=154(B)	42.03	38.33	15.22	4.43	1.82
13. "The first task for any new politics is to recognize that there are differences between us all and that in light of this, we [should] aspire to a politics of tolerance and inclusion." - Subcomandante Marcos	n=146(A); n=152(B)	57.46	36.49	5.05	1.02	1.50

Note: statistics above were calculated as averages of statistics from Form A respondents and Form B respondents.

Constructing Indexes Through Exploratory Factor Analysis

Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the UO survey data and Costa Rica data (see Appendix E) as a method of data reduction, a tool for index construction, and a means of comparing how the two nations might differ in their violent/ nonviolent attitude structures. Factor analysis has been called "*the* way to develop constructs" (Gorsuch 1983, p.351) and composite variables (scales or indexes) from survey questionnaires (p.356). Moreover, the "usual scale development procedures are implicit factory analyses" (p.358).

Because anticipated factors (e.g., militarism, realpolitiks, just war, principled and pragmatic nonviolence) were conceptually and theoretically expected to be correlated, an oblique rotation was performed. An oblique promax rotation allows correlated factors (Hamilton 2003, p.270) and in the present study this allows clearer factors to emerge, rather than performing an orthogonal rotation which would force factors to be uncorrelated. Missing data reduced the number of observations in the Costa Rica data to 231 and the UO data to 312. Since 33 variables were involved, this means that the subjects-to-variables (STV) ratio became 7:1 in the Costa Rica data and 9.45:1 in the UO

data. Numerous scholars including those who have conducted meta-analyses of published articles contend that these sample sizes and ratios are acceptable thresholds for STV ratios and sample sizes in factor analysis, though some would propose these STV ratios and sample sizes are too small (for a review, see Zhao 2009).

Factor analysis is far from a mechanical process of blind empiricism, as investigators must make numerous decisions based on a priori assumptions, theoretical justifications, and careful exploration of numerous statistical options, while allowing theory and empirical results to inform methodological decisions. Indeed, factor analysis could even be called "an almost impressionistic art form" (York 2011). As a result, we rely on face validity and the convergence of theoretical and empirical justifications in making those decisions, even as we seek to track only robust findings. Specifically, the researcher relied on the following in choosing the number of factors to extract. First, apriori theoretical reasons informed the construction of the survey and interpretation of the results. Here we should flag the fact that most of the items in the core 33 questions on nonviolent/ violent attitudes replicate or build upon existing survey research (see Appendix D). Second, maximum likelihood tests were conducted in an attempt to determine the proper number of factors, if any, to extract. Third, scree tests were performed in an attempt to determine the proper number of factors to extract. Fourth, the Kaiser criterion was considered in an attempt to determine the proper number of factors to extract. Fifth, analysis was conducted of the item loading tables after rotation. Here, following Gorsuch (1983, pp.169-170) and Costello and Osborne (2005), the best fit to the data was considered to be the one with the "cleanest" factor structure: "item loadings above .30, no or few item crossloadings, no factors with fewer than three items" (p.3).

Sixth, analysis of the face validity of the variables that loaded together was conducted and the factors were named appropriately (e.g., militarism). Here it was found that conceptually linked items were in fact loading together. Seventh, indexes were manual constructed consisting of variables that load together (with a .3 cut-off as a rule of thumb) and a Cronbach's alpha test (a coefficient of reliability/ a measure of internal consistency) was performed on each index.

Maximum likelihood tests were performed as one possible means of determining the appropriate number of factors to extract (Hamilton 2003, p.274). These tests showed that for both the Costa Rica data and the UO data, when factors 1 through 10 were extracted in successive iterations, all models significantly improved upon a no-factor model because $P< .00005$ in the first LR test (in the Stata output) on all of these models. The second LR tests (in the Stata output) also suggested that extracting 6 (because $P< .00005$), 7 (because $P< .001$), 8 (because $P< .01$), or 9 factors (because $P< .05$) from the Costa Rica data were statistically justifiable. Similarly, the second LR tests suggested that extracting 7 (because $P> .0005$) or 9 factors (because $P> .05$) from the UO data were statistically justifiable. However, when these numbers of factors were extracted for analysis in both data sets, the item loading tables did not result in clean factor structures (see below), and the links between item loadings were far less clear conceptually. For example, when 7 factors were extracted in the UO data, one factor had only two items loading above .3, and another factor had only one item loading above .3. When 9 factors were extracted in the UO data, 3 factors had only two items loading above .3, and another factor had only one item loading above .3. Similarly, in the Costa Rica data, when 6 factors were extracted, four items crossloaded and on one factor only two items loaded

above .3. When 7 factors were extracted, 6 items crossloaded and on one factor only two items loaded above .3. As explained below, when less factors were extracted in each data set, cleaner factor structures were discovered.

Also in an attempt to identify the appropriate number of factors to extract, "scree tests" were performed following Cattell (1966a, 1966b). This test is "reasonably accurate" (Gorsuch 1983, p.171), producing relatively clear visual results, and as Cattell (1966a) argues, "the best rule is evidently to cut at the uppermost point actually on the scree" and it is better to extract one too many factors "since rotation will reduce it to triviality if it is in excess" (p.252). The scree test on the UO data suggested that 5 or 6 factors should be retained. The scree test on the Costa Rica data suggested that 3 or 4 factors should be retained. Following Costello and Osborne (2005), numbers of factors above, equal to, and below the number of factors suggested by the scree tests were extracted, rotated, and analyzed. After rotation, analysis of the item loading tables clearly pointed to the cleanest factor structure: 5 factors should be retained in the UO data and 3 factors should be retained in the Costa Rica data. This is because when 6 factors were extracted from the UO data, three items crossloaded, whereas when 5 factors were extracted only one item crossloaded. Costello and Osborne (2005) maintain that the "cleanest" factor structure and "best fit to the data" is found where there are "no or few item crossloadings" (p.3). When 4 factors were extracted in the Costa Rica data, only two items loaded on the fourth factor, whereas when 3 factors were extracted all factors had five or more items loading above .3 and there were no crossloadings. Costello and Osborne (2005) maintain that at least three items should load on each factor.

The selection of three factors in the Costa Rica data is also supported by the Kaiser criterion which suggests retaining factors with eigenvalues equal or higher than 1 (Torres-Reyna 2011). Only three factors had eigenvalues higher than 1. For the UO data, the Kaiser criterion suggested that four factors should be retained. However, the scree test and analyses reported below suggest that retaining 5 factors can be justified.

Again, in an exploratory mode and following Costello and Osborne (2005), various numbers of factors were commanded in Stata and the output analyzed after performing an oblique rotation. With the UO data, the results suggested that 5 factors were most clearly emerging in the data. During survey construction, theory informed expectations that the data would reveal four or five factors: nonviolence, militarism, realpolitiks, just war (which was operationalized to include "just revolution" items as well), and the researcher entertained the possibility that an additional fifth factor might appear reflecting the distinction between principled and pragmatic nonviolence. Moreover, it was expected that some of the questions on interpersonal violence (including five items on self-defense, domestic violence, and corporal punishment of children) to overlap with the other ideologies (nonviolence, militarism, realpolitiks, and just war). Instead, the empirical results showed that the expected four factors emerged (nonviolence, militarism, realpolitiks, and just war), and a fifth factor was loading on the interpersonal violence items. This may be partly due to the fact that this section of the survey began with the five items on interpersonal violence, and respondents were thus aided in answering these items consistently, a case of "auto-correlation" in the survey design. However, auto-correlation is an issue that is unavoidable and not necessarily a weakness in the design, especially since respondents were asked to confront a series of

difficult questions and it was reasonable to aid their completion of the survey by grouping some conceptually linked items together.

Similarly, through the process of commanding various number of factors in Stata, rotating and analyzing the item loading tables, 3 factors clearly emerged in the Costa Rica data. This fit with the researcher's theoretical hunch, one also based on past opinion surveys, that Costa Ricans would express nonviolent attitudes and thus, I theorized they would also hold less differentiated ideologies of violence. That is, it was expected that Costa Ricans would have less nuanced violent ideologies than U.S. citizens because Costa Rican leaders and political structures are less geared towards violent conflict. Indeed, this was found to be true in the data as, unlike the UO data, no "realpolitiks" factor emerged in the Costa Rica data.

Both traditional factor analysis (principal axis factoring) and principal components factor analysis were conducted. Results were robust in that analyses of the item loading tables in both types of factoring showed that virtually all of the same items were loading on the same factors. The primary difference between the outcomes of these two types of factor analyses was that the items were consistently loading at a lower strength in principle axis factoring. Nevertheless, principal axis factoring analysis was selected as the more theoretically warranted and traditional method.

Again, analysis of the item loading tables revealed that conceptually linked items were loading together. Factors were labeled accordingly. In the UO data, the 5 factors were: nonviolence, militarism, realpolitiks, just war, and interpersonal violence. These 5 factors explain 97% of the total variance. The militarism factor explains 54% of the total variance, the nonviolence factor explains 15%, the interpersonal violence factor explains

12%, the just war factor explains 9%, and the realpolitiks factor explains 7%. In the Costa Rica data, the 3 factors were nonviolence, militarism, and just war. These three factors explain 76% of the total variance. The nonviolence factor explains 49% of the total variance, militarism explains 17%, and just war explains 9%.

Manual indexes were constructed out of each cluster of variables, that is, using the high loading items (above .3) on each factor (see Table 1 and Table 2). Each index score consists of an average score (equal weights) for the items, rather than a weighted score. Wainer (1976) has argued persuasively that there is little to no discernable advantage to employing weighted scores over equal weights.

Cronbach's alpha tests were conducted on the indexes. The higher Cronbach's alpha the better the "internal consistency reliability of a measure – the extent to which the items of a measure assess a common characteristic" (Aron, Aron, and Coups 2005, p.383). A rule of thumb for Cronbach's Alpha is that "a good measure should have a Cronbach's alpha of at least .6 or .7 and preferably closer to .9" (p.383). Cronbach's alphas for the indexes in the UO data were as follows: militarism (.6488), nonviolence (.6851), interpersonal violence (.6230), justwar (.7342), and realpolitiks (.6172). Cronbach's alphas for the Costa Rica data were as follows: nonviolence (.8140), militarism (.7193), and just war (.7083).

Second-order factor analyses. In each data set, second-order/ higher-order factor analyses were conducted on the original correlation matrix (see Appendix H). In the UO data, scree plots of second-order factors showed that the data reduced to one factor (after 9 iterations), and only one factor had an eigenvalue above the 1.0 cut-off, with an

eigenvalue of 2.471. This factor explained 49.42% of the variance. Analysis suggested this factor can be named *violent conflict resolution*.

In the Costa Rica data, scree plots of second-order factors showed that the data is converging on one factor after 25 iterations, but more iterations would be required to extract one factor (convergence = .002), which is not surprising given that there were only three factors in the matrix. Only one factor had an eigenvalue above the 1.0 cut-off, with an eigenvalue of 1.834. This first factor explained 61.14% of the variance, but a second factor explained 24.72% of the variance. Analysis suggested the first factor can be named *militarized conflict resolution.*

Data limitations: Auto-correlation dynamics, etc. Appendix E reports the items loading on factors in the exploratory factor analysis for both data sets. Admittedly, the items loading on the "realpolitiks" factor in the UO data do not capture the distinctive hard-edge of national interest in the Realpolitiks position such as was operationalized in the item: "o. There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources through war because nations should protect their own economic security and interests." As another example of this attitude, consider the words of a U.S. congressional representative responsible for Africa who told a leading Rwandan human rights activist: "The United States has no friends. The United States has interests" (Barker 2004). However, item "o" did load on Factor 3, "Interpersonal Violence" (see Appendix E) – suggesting that attitudes justifying self-defense, domestic violence, and corporal punishment tend to overlap with attitudes affirming national self-interest in the realpolitiks position. Arguably, these attitudes roughly fit with the callousness of the realpolitiks position. Had the items been arranged in a different order, these items may

have been more likely to correlate. For strong theoretical reasons, item o (Q9_15) was added to the criteria for determining realpolitiks adherents. A pro-violent response on this item represents the essence of the realpolitiks position.

Clearly, the order of items matters, and this makes our empirical task difficult. By looking at the question numbers in the far right-hand column of the tables in Appendix E, we can observe potential cases of auto-correlation (i.e., items correlating partly because of their proximity to one another) among the items loading on each of the 5 factors. However, many of the items were grouped by ideological orientation in the survey's format (see Appendix D), and this was deemed justified in order to make the survey-taking experience less taxing and confusing, especially since the subject matter is relatively complex.

Prevalence of the Violent/ Nonviolent Orientations by Nation

Utilizing the violent/ nonviolent indexes (constructed through the factor analyses), variables were created which coded respondents who, based on their survey responses, can be said to subscribe to one of the violent/ nonviolent orientations. In the Costa Rica Data, three factors emerged, and based on theoretical and empirical rationales these were used to construct the militarism index, the just war index, and the nonviolence index. In turn, scores on these indexes were utilized in coding adherents to these orientations: militarism, just war, or nonviolence (see Appendix I for an explanation of the coding formula). The UO data was analyzed following the same procedures with the exception that four orientations were coded: militarism, realpolitiks, just war, and nonviolence. Coding involved a slight bias in that the "militarism adherents" and "just war adherents" variables were constructed so as to capture more respondents who ranged in the middle

ground up to the mid-point of 2.5, whereas the nonviolence adherents variable was more stringent – coding only those whose average score was above "3" on the indexes (see Appendix I). This was done for descriptive and theoretical purposes – under the hypothesis that those in the middle ground who lean even slightly towards a just war or militarism orientation – in the context of a national militarized conflict, are likely to be attitudinally mobilized for war through the well-established "rally round the flag" effect (Burris 2008). In Table 27 we see the prevalence of these orientations in each sample.

Table 27. Ideological Adherents in Costa Rican and UO Samples

Violent/ Nonviolent Orientation	Costa Rica		UO	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Nonviolence	90	28.75%	18	4.43%
Militarism	29	9.27%	113	27.83%
Realpolitiks	-	-	35	8.62%
Just War	104	33.23%	127	31.28%
Unspecified	90	28.75%	113	27.83%
Total	313	100%	406	100%

The notable scarcity of nonviolence adherents (4.43%) in the UO sample contrasts starkly with the 28.75% of nonviolence adherents in the Costa Rican sample. Hence, the Costa Rican sample has over 6 times more nonviolent adherents. These results cast doubt on Joseph's (2007) contention that 15 to 20% of the U.S. population are "solid doves," and comes closer to the low-end of Feaver and Gelpi's (2004) estimate that 10 to 30% of the public are "solid doves" (p.186).

Above, we also see how the UO sample has three times more adherents of militarism. The most prominent orientation in the Costa Rica sample is the just war position (a middle position in the spectrum of violent-nonviolent attitudes). While the most prominent orientation in the UO sample is also the just war position, militarism adherents were almost as numerous, and 8.62% subscribed to realpolitiks, a more

extreme pro-violent ideological position than just war, and one which is lacking in the Costa Rican sample altogether.

Testing the indexes on gender by nation. In the Costa Rica data, it was found that mean scores for females were significantly more peaceful than males on all of the indexes. Keeping in mind that on a 1 to 4 point scale a mean of 2.5 represents the mid-point, we see in Table 28 that both male and female means lean towards peaceful attitudes on the nonviolence index and militarism index. On the just war index, males lean towards pro-violent attitudes, while females lean towards peaceful attitudes.

Table 28. T-Tests on Gender Differences (Costa Rica Data)

Index	**Male Mean**	**Female Mean**	**Difference Between Group Means**
Nonviolence	3.24	3.46	.22**
Militarism	3.02	3.26	.24**
Just War	2.43	2.83	.40***

Notes: * = p < .01; ** = p< .001; *** = p< .0001; On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent.

Likewise, in the UO data depicted in Table 29, tests on the difference between group means were conducted for the variable gender as it interacts with the indexes. It should be remembered that while the indexes in the UO data consists of items have significant overlap with the items in the same named indexes in the Costa Rica data, they are not the same indexes and reflect the discrete outcomes of factor analyses of each data set.

Table 29. T-Tests on Gender Differences (UO Data)

Index	**Male Mean**	**Female Mean**	**Difference Between Group Means**
Militarism	2.75	2.85	.10*
Nonviolence	2.65	2.71	.06
Interpersonal violence	2.50	2.79	.29***
Just war	2.19	2.40	.21**
Realpolitiks	2.35	2.42	.07

Notes: * = p < .05; ** = p< .001; *** = p< .0001; On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent; 2.5 is the midpoint.

As in the Costa Rica data, we see that females are more peaceful than males in all the indexes, but unlike the Costa Rica data, not all of the differences between male and females means attain statistical significance. Keeping in mind that on a 1 to 4 point scale a mean of 2.5 represents the mid-point, we can see in Table 29 that male and female means lean towards peaceful attitudes on the militarism scale and nonviolence index, and there is no significant difference between males and females on the nonviolence index, but the difference does achieve significance on the militarism index. On the interpersonal violence index, the male mean is at the mid-point (2.5), while the female mean leans significantly towards peaceful attitudes. On the just war index and realpolitiks index however, both males and females lean toward pro-violent attitudes, though on the just war index, females are significantly less pro-violent.

National Pride

Koenigsberg (2009) theorizes, with a high degree of abstraction, that the more soldiers die for a nation, the more patriotism is likely to be instilled and reproduced among citizens. That notion is not supported in our data, since Costa Rica has not had any sizeable number of its security forces killed since the 1948 Civil War, yet in our sample, Costa Rican university students report significantly higher levels of national pride than U.S. university students. In a 1981 sample of thirteen European nations, the U.S., and Japan (N=15), two factors accounted for the most variance in national pride: First, nations defeated in WWII or that suffered military occupation rank low in national pride (Rose 1985). Thus, there is a connection between pride and war history, but the data suggests a revision toKoenigsberg's (2009) simplistic theory of a link between patriotism and the sacrifice of soldiers – the motives and outcomes of war also deeply shape

collective memory. Second, national pride tends to be highest among former colonies, "reflecting a legacy of conscious nation-building in post-independence society" (Rose 1985, p.88). Consistent with path dependency models, the "positive effect of having to struggle for national independence appears to have a long-lasting effect, enduring 200 years in the case of America" (p.88). In the case of Costa Rica, national independence came quite easily. The Spanish colonizers had very little interest in Costa Rica, since lacking gold and other prizes, in Spanish eyes it was not the "rich coast" its name implied. But a later struggle provided opportunities for conscious nation-building and the patriotic collective memory project – the struggle to repel William Walker, the American mercenary who sought to conquer Central American and institute Dixeland slavery.

Below, Table 30 depicts the results of a patriotism question asked only in the U.S. In Table 31, a similar question on national pride shows that the difference between sample means is highly significant, with a t-ratio of -10.51 and p=.0000. No doubt, for some observers and theorists this finding of significantly more national pride among Costa Rican respondents is somewhat surprising (e.g., Koenigsberg 2009), while for others not at all. For instance, Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz (1999) argue that "Costa Rican schools succeed in producing patriots through constant celebration of the country's virtues. Schools convince children that Costa Rica is the best country in the world" (p.214). That seems to be supported by the survey finding on national pride. Given that the UO survey oversampled from students affiliated with the Democratic party, we might expect that more critical attitudes of the U.S. prevail. Indeed, t-tests revealed that Republicans were significantly more proud than non-Republicans at the .0001 level. This corroborates Rose's (1985) study of 15 nations in which self-identified conservatives

expressed significantly more national pride in all nations except Iceland. The mean score for Republicans on Q33 was1.55 versus non-Republicans who had a mean of 2.11. The difference between group means was .56, with a t-ratio of 5.73, p= .0000. A similar comparison can be made between Democrats and non-Democrats but the differences are less extreme: the group mean for Democrats was 2.12, and for non-Democrats was 1.87 (i.e., Democrats are less proud); The difference between these group means is -.25, with a t-ratio of -3.06, p=.0024, which is significant at the .01 level.

Table 30. Patriotism, UO Sample (N=385)

Q44 How patriotic are you? Would you say extremely patriotic, very patriotic, somewhat patriotic, or not especially patriotic?	
Extremely patriotic	4.42
Very patriotic	18.18
Somewhat patriotic	44.68
Not especially patriotic	32.73

Note: This question was not asked in Costa Rica.

Table 31. Pride by National Sample

Q33 (UO)/ Q30 (CR) How proud are you to be an American/ Costa Rican?			Difference between means
Answer (code)	UO (N=394)	Costa Rica (N= 308)	
Very proud (1)	30.46	72.73	
Quite proud (2)	42.89	19.81	
Not very proud (3)	23.60	4.55	
Not at all proud (4)	3.05	2.92	
Sample mean	1.99	1.38	-.62****

Note: two-tailed t-test; **** = p<.0001

Costa Rica – a "Pacifist" Nation?

Questions 9.33 and 9.34 offer evidence which partly questionssimplistic notions of Costa Rica as a "pacifist" nation. As we see below, on Q9.33 (an item adapted from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey) respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement or disagreement the following statement: "It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world." The ideology expressed here embraces political realism

but also just war. Arguably, the word choice of “order” offers a slight nuance that shades more closely to political realism, as realpolitiks assumes that without instrumental violence the international arena is ruled by Hobbesian chaos.

Below in Table 32, we see that about 20% of Costa Ricans strongly agree and about 40% agree that military force is sometimes necessary, for a total of 60% expressing some level of agreement.This is not surprising, but it shows that the “pacifist” descriptors that both political elites and average Costa Ricans often use for their nation is not fully accurate. Rather, there is some consensus around the idea that military force is “sometimes necessary” and thus it would seem, morally justified. Second, in Q9.34, respondents were instructed: “Now, please answer the last question (Q9.33) the way you think most people in your nation would answer it.” This question was designed as one test of social desirability bias, but it can be put to use in other ways as well. For example, we should note that a relatively high percentage of students (17%; or 53 out of 312) left Q9.34 blank. Surely, respondents in a robust culture of peace would express confidence in answering this question and affirming that their fellow citizens believe war is not necessary.The other finding here is that about 40% of respondents guessed that their fellow citizens would express some level of agreement (strongly agree of agree) with Q9.33 on the occasional necessity of military force, while 60% guessed that their fellow citizens would express some level of disagreement. This suggests that roughly 20% of university students perceive most Costa Ricans to be more pacifist than they (the respondent) are themselves.

This finding may reflect reality (i.e., it may be that Costa Rican university students are, on average, less pacifist than the general population), but it is somewhat of a

Table 32. Attitudes Towards Military Force and Perception of Majority Attitudes in Nation, Costa Rica Data (n=312)

	Q9.33 "It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world."		Q9.34 "Now, please answer the last question (Q9.33) the way you think most people in your nation would answer it."	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Strongly Agree (1)	51	19.69	23	7.42
Agree (2)	102	39.38	98	31.61
Disagree (3)	60	23.17	110	35.48
Strongly Disagree (4)	46	17.76	79	25.48
Total	259	100	310	100

puzzle. In the U.S. context, Loewen (2007) has argued that more schooling produces more hawkish attitudes such that university graduates are on average, more hawkish. But in the Costa Rican context, where demilitarization is celebrated and relatively revered, one would expect that more schooling would produce more pacifist attitudes. The finding may help to again clarify how complex, multidimensional, and heterogeneous nonviolent attitudes are (Kakkad 2005, p.121, pp.125-126). We observed above that our sample of Costa Rican university students score as more peaceful than the general population on terrorism and state terrorism, but less peaceful on the pragmatic nonviolence item. Here, we have indirect and suggestive evidence that Costa Rican university students tend to think that most of their nation holds pacifist attitudes, but about 20% of these students themselves think military force is something necessary.

Beyond Attitudes: Tracking Self-Reported Behaviors and Experiences

In only a few items did the survey attempt to track violent/ nonviolent *behaviors*and *experiences* with violence (as opposed to mere attitudes). One section that probed for behaviors was the political action section (Q21 in the UO survey). In addition, three questions (Q34, Q35, Q36 in UO survey; Q21, Q21A, Q21B in Costa Rica survey) probed for personal experiences with physical attacks or abuse. Admittedly, the data provided by these questions are only suggestive as the items, though replications of

General Social Survey (2008) questions, are very imprecise. They do not specify the context or the severity of the attack, for example, whether their experience of being hit or punched involved parental spanking or more serious domestic abuse, a playground fight or a more serious attack, whether the respondent was only a victim of the violence or may have thrown the first punch.

It is worth recalling here (as reported above), that Costa Ricans were significantly more opposed to spanking/ parental corporal punishment (Q9.5 in UO survey; Q6e in Costa Rica survey). On that question: "Corporal punishment (spanking) is necessary to bring up children properly," about 86% of Costa Rican students disagreed (adding together the disagree + strongly disagree responses) versus about 72% of UO students. Costa Ricans were also more likely to strongly disagree on that item, as 49% strongly disagreed versus 27% of UO students.This corroborates previous survey research by McAlister, Orpinas, and Velez (1999) in which 16% of Costa Ricans versus 36% of U.S. respondents supported corporal punishment for children (see Table 2 in Appendix J).

Turning to the sequence of questions on experiences with violence, Q34 asked: "Have you ever been punched or beaten by another person?" Unfortunately, in the Costa Rica survey, the translator accidentally rendered the question as (Q21): "¿Ha sido golpeado o ha golpeado a otra persona alguna vez en su vida?" [Have you been beaten or hit, or have you hit someone at some time in your life?] This not only differs from the question in the English survey, but it is a double-barreled question – a format which is usually problematic (since we can not be sure the respondent is answering both questions or just one of them). Hence, the question should be thrown out, or at least, any comparison between the two samples can only be suggestive. Q35 (Q21a in the Costa

Rica survey) attempted to specify whether they were hit in childhood or adulthood or both, and Q36 (Q21b in the Costa Rica survey) the frequency.

The result most deserving of comment is Q34 (Q21 in the Costa Rica survey), as about 32% of UO students answered yes, they have been punched/ beaten, but 55% of Costa Rican studentsanswered yes, they have been punched/ beaten*or* have punched or beaten another person. Two decades ago, research on students at the University of Costa Rica found that 80% reported childhood experiences with spanking, 46% had been hit on other parts of the body (not the head) by the hand, and 30% reported being whipped (Krugman, Mata, and Krugman 1992). We might surmise that less educated members of Costa Rican society would report higher levels of corporal punishment, though the enormous growth in Costa Rican college students means that, in recent decades, many college students are the first person in their family to attend college (Molina and Palmer 2007, pp.167-168), and many UCR students are from the lower-middle class (Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999, p.221; confirmed also in the present survey, in which 43% of UCR students claimed to be from the lower-middle class, 20% from the working class, and 1.45% from the lower class). Moreover, about 80% of the college students considered spanking and 38% considered hitting other parts of the body to be legitimate disciplinary methods (Krugman, Mata, and Krugman 1992). The authors of that study, the first of its kind in Costa Rica, conceded the difficulty of generalizing from college student retrospective memories to the child-rearing practices of the entire population, but tentatively concluded that “the use of physical punishment is at least as widespread as it is in the United States” (p.160).

A decade earlier, Strauss (1983) found that 97% of U.S. children experience physical punishment. But there is strong evidence that the rate of physical abuse of children in the U.S. fell by half between 1990 and 2007, and this has been accompanied by, or perhaps been driven by, sharp declines in attitudinal approval for corporal punishment (Pinker 2011, p.439). These attitudinal shifts likely stem from moral entrepreneurs who publicly advocated for nonviolent parenting beginning in the 1980s (Pinker 2011). Studies find that a majority of U.S. respondents still approve of corporal punishment by parents, but norms have evolved to distinguish between abuse and "mild violence" (p.439). Between 1975 and 1992, mothers admitting to the use of abusive violence halved from 20% to 10% (p.439).

In the UO data, tests showed that Q34 responses were associated with only some of the violent/ nonviolent attitude indexes (constructed from factor analyses of Q9 items). When those who had been punched or beaten were compared with those who had *not* been punched or beaten in t-tests of the attitude indexes, there was no significant difference between the group means for the militarism, realpolitiks, or nonviolence indexes. But, the group that had *not* been punched or beaten were significantly more peaceful in their attitudes on the just war index at the .05 level, and on the interpersonal violence index at the .05 level.

In the Costa Rican data, t-tests showed that respondents who *had not hit othersnor been hit* scored significantly more peaceful at the .05 level on the nonviolence index and on the just war index at the .01 level, but there was no significant difference between the groups on the militarism index. Thus, in both samples there is some indirect

evidence that those who experience interpersonal violence are socialized into accepting some forms of violence as necessary.

The results in Q34 (UO)/ Q21 (Costa Rica), i.e., the higher number of respondents in Costa Rica who claimed to have hit or been hit, throws some doubt on any pervasive "spillover effect" down to the interpersonal level within Costa Rican society stemming from Costa Rica's demilitarization policies. However, as mentioned above, we have to take into account the mistranslation of the question as well as socio-economic factors. Most Costa Rican students are the first generation of their families to attend university, and it is likely that attitudes approving corporal punishment correlates negatively with income. On the other hand, Costa Rican respondents did score significantly more peaceful in their attitudes on most of the interpersonal violence questions: Q9.1, Q9.2, Q9.3, Q9.4, Q9.5, Q7.2, and Q7.3. This leaves two questions where the differences between the samples were not significant at the .05 level (Q7.4 and Q8.1), and one question where the UO respondents were more peaceful (Q7.1).

Do nonviolent adherents practice nonviolent action? Lakey (1973) has argued that it has long been the case that "most pacifists do not practice nonviolent resistance, and most people who do practice nonviolent resistance are not pacifists" (p.57). This was likely to be the case decades and centuries ago, when apolitical religious groups like the Mennonites, Brethren, the Hutterites, and the Amish comprised the bulk of self-identified pacifists. But as Moskos and Chambers (1993) have noted, the conscientious objector movement, especially in Europe, has become secularized. And in the last 50 years, nonviolence in general has also become increasingly secularized, as revolutionary nonviolent movements have experienced success and nonviolent theorists like Gene

Sharp have articulated pragmatic nonviolence – that is, nonviolence as a strategy not grounded in moral principles/ the principled nonviolence that has long been linked to religiously inspired nonviolence.

If nonviolence has become secularized and perceived as a strategy rather than exclusively as a set of moral principles, the question is – are nonviolent adherents today, unlike many of the apolitical religious pacifists of the past, likely to act on their beliefs? The table above supports the broad stream of research which has found that beliefs and attitudes affirmed in a survey context, or in any form of verbal or written communication for that matter, often do not relate to behavior (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004, Wicker 1969).

Given that only three significant associations were found in Table 33 below, it seems that nonviolent adherence does not necessarily translate into nonviolent action – whether we are concerned with actions conducted in the past, or the willingness to engage in nonviolent action in the future. The only significant associations in the table above involved, first, 3.4% more nonviolent adherents had attended an anti-war demonstration, and about 17% more nonviolent adherents said they "might" attend an anti-war demonstration in the future. Second, slightly more nonviolent adherents said they "might" attend a school-related demonstration, but ironically 3.4% less nonviolent adherents had actually already attended such a demonstration in the past.

Third, the relative unwillingness of nonviolent adherents to engage in property destruction was statistically significant. This is somewhat ironic given that many nonviolent adherents have embraced forms of direct action including property destruction, such as Nelson Mandela and the anti-war Plowshares Activists. Some have made much of Mandela's endorsement of violence, but he primarily endorsed sabotage

Table 33. Nonviolent Adherents and Political Actions, UO data (Percentages)

Survey Questions on Political Actions: This is a form of political action that I (have done, might do, would never do):	Nonviolent adherents (n=199)	Other respondents (n=196)	Chi Square (df)	p
Signing a petition			1.78 (2)	.410
Have done	77.9	72.4		
Might do	20.0	24.1		
Would never do	2.1	3.5		
Joining in boycotts (refusing to buy products from unjust corporations or nations)			4.49 (2)	.106
Have done	26.5	20.3		
Might do	63.5	63.4		
Would never do	10.1	16.3		
Attending legal and lawful demonstrations			.17 (2)	.918
Have done	21.1	21.3		
Might do	67.4	65.8		
Would never do	11.6	12.9		
Joining strikes at a workplace			3.85 (2)	.146
Have done	4.7	3.9		
Might do	81.6	74.9		
Would never do	13.7	21.2		
Occupying buildings or factories, or barricading streets			.42 (2)	.811
Have done	4.2	4.5		
Might do	50.8	47.5		
Would never do	45.0	48.0		
Damaging things like breaking windows, removing road signs, etc.			9.76 (2)	.008**
Have done	7.9	10.8		
Might do	12.0	22.7		
Would never do	80.1	66.5		
Use personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police			3.67 (2)	.186
Have done	2.1	1.0		
Might do	13.1	19.2		
Would never do	84.8	79.8		
Attending an anti-war demonstration			20.31 (2)	.000***
Have done	7.3	3.9		
Might do	74.5	57.6		
Would never do	18.2	38.4		
Attending a school related demonstration			6.3 (2)	.043*
Have done	23.6	31.0		
Might do	69.1	57.1		
Would never do	7.3	11.8		

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; "Nonviolent adherents" dummy variable includes all respondents who scored above the mean score on the nonviolence index which was 2.69009 (the mid-point was 2.5 on a 4-point Likert scale)

that strictly avoided harm to people (Presbey 2006, Mandela 1999). While Gandhi tended to view property destruction as violent, Dr. King attached great significance to the distinction between harming people and property in his definition of "violence" (Churchill 1998, pp.144-145). Overall, the results indicate few nonviolent adherents are drawing their attitudes from a praxis (insight gained through a cycle of personal action and reflection leading to revised strategic action) of nonviolent action or activism. That

is, they are not building on a past history of activism. Moreover, their professed willingness to engage in nonviolent action in the future rarely differs from those who do not claim nonviolent beliefs.

Similarly, a chi-square test was run on the nonviolent adherents dummy variable and the political interest question (Q30). There was no significant association between nonviolent adherence and degree of political interest, with a chi-square of 2.06 (3 df), p=.56. Overall, political alienation was fairly high with 31% of UO respondents claiming to be "Not very interested" and 13% claiming to be "Not at all interested." Hence, nonviolent adherents in the UO sample bear little resemblance to a group ripe for political mobilization. In this sense, few of them exemplify the model of early 20th century pacifists who understood the label and movement to involve a "high degree of engagement in activity" to work for peace and justice and to reduce violence (Chickering cited in Cortright 2008, p.9). Similarly, Gandhi understood nonviolence to be "a means by which the *active many* can overcome the ruthless few" (Schell 2003, p.144).

Comparing UO and Costa Rican respondents. While about half of UO respondents (199 out of 395) scored above the mean of the nonviolence index, in the Costa Rican data, over two-thirds of respondents (200 out of 271) scored above the mean of the nonviolence index (M=3.350554). Again, this high proportion scoring above the mean in the Costa Rican sample is another subjective indicator of Costa Rica's culture of peace. Although these indexes shared several items in common, it should be remembered that these nonviolence indexes were nation-specific, as they were formulated through factor analyses of the separate national samples.

Like in the UO data, there was no significant association between nonviolent adherents and political interest. In addition, the overall rate of political alienation was almost identical to the UO sample with 31% of Costa Rican respondents claiming to be "Not very interested" and 15% claiming to be "Not at all interested."

Like in the UO data, only 3 of the 9 political action items were significantly associated with nonviolent adherents (for the sake of brevity, only the significant associations are depicted in Table 34 below). First, as in the UO data, nonviolent adherents were significantly less likely to say they had engaged in property destruction, or might do it. And, in much larger numbers they affirmed that they "would never" engage in property destruction (90% of nonviolent adherents affirmed they "would never" do this versus 65% of the rest of the sample). The association between nonviolent adherents and an aversion to politically-motivated property destruction was significant at the .001 level. Second, nonviolent adherents were significantly less likely to say they had engaged in fighting at demonstrations, or might do it. And, in much larger numbers they affirmed that they "would never" engage in personal violence at a demonstration (83% of nonviolent adherents affirmed they "would never" do this versus 58% of the rest of the sample). The association between nonviolent adherents and an aversion to personal violence at demonstrations was significant at the .001 level. Both of these findings are unsurprising, though, as noted above in the UO data analysis of these items, the aversion to property destruction is not shared by all nonviolent activists, many of whom theorize direct action in ways that can include property destruction.

Third, as expected given post-survey feedback from several survey respondents, it seems there may have been widespread misunderstanding of the term "boycott" in the

Costa Rican sample, and a lack of familiarity with the tactic. Note that the boycott item below lacked the parenthetical definition which was included in the later UO survey version. In the Costa Rican sample, nonviolent adherents were significantly less likely to say they had engaged in a boycott or "might do" it. And, they were much more likely to say they "would never" engage in a boycott. The chi-square was 6.44 with 2(df), and p=.04 (significant at the .05 level). Unfortunately, it can not be known how many respondents misunderstood the boycott term. It may be that a lack of familiarity with the tactic, could mean that respondents could not imagine even a hypothetical situation in which the tactic would be used. Note also that fewer nonviolent adherents claimed to have actually engaged in the tactic, and presumably the respondents in this "Have done" row do in fact know what a boycott means.

If this significant finding is an accurate representation of the attitudes of Costa Rican nonviolent adherents towards boycotts, it could be an expression of the cultural value of *simpatía* (Triandis et al. 1984). That is, the tactic may seem disrespectful or unnecessarily critical, lacking in sympathy, especially in the abstract context of a survey where no scenario of injustice/ oppression/ conflict was conjured up. While the boycott tactic continues to be utilized, with a few exceptions it has not been prominent in recent decades in the U.S. By contrast, a 2005 survey found that 28% of all Swedes between the ages of 16 and 29 claim to have boycotted products while motivated by political or social concerns (Ferris and Stein 2010, p.5). Perhaps the nationwide three-year long Taco Bell boycott, in support of Florida farm workers, which ended in 2005 is the most prominent successful boycott of recent years in the U.S. (Lee 2005). Without organized boycotts,

the consumer responsibility movement's mantra of "voting with your dollars" certainly lacks political force.

Though many seasoned nonviolent activists would likely consider utilizing the boycott tactic under certain circumstances, it may not be a fluke that Costa Ricans might consider it too militant. Gandhi himself undertook boycotts including a boycott of British cloth. But out of compassion for the British textile factory employees, Gandhi raised funds to support these factory workers since the Indian boycott could threaten the livelihood of innocent workers. In this sense, Gandhi's version of the boycott had a strong element of compassion, or what could be called, in the Latin American context, *simpatía.*

Table 34. Cross-tabulations of Nonviolent Adherents and Political Actions, Costa Rica Data (Percentages)

This is a form of political action that I (have done, might do, would never do):	Nonviolent adherents (n=181)	Other respondents (n=102)	Chi Square (df)	P
Damaging things like breaking windows, removing road signs, etc.			28.85 (2)	.000***
Have done	4.1	12.7		
Might do	5.6	21.8		
Would never do	90.3	65.5		
Use personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police			27.04 (2)	.000***
Have done	2.0	12.5		
Might do	14.8	29.5		
Would never do	83.2	58.0		
Joining in boycotts			6.44 (2)	. 04*
Have done	8.3	10.8		
Might do	39.8	52.9		
Would never do	51.9	36.3		

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; "Nonviolent adherents" dummy variable includes all respondents who scored above the mean score on the nonviolence index which was 3.350554 (the mid-point was 2.5 on a 4-point Likert scale)

T-tests confirmed that the two samples revealed numerous significant differences in attitudes towards protest tactics. As can be seen in Table 35, Costa Rican students were significantly more approving of the following tactics: attending an anti-war demonstration, using personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators/ the police, joining strikes, and attending legal and lawful demonstrations. Meanwhile, UO students

were significantly more approving of the following tactics: property destruction, signing a petition, and joining in boycotts.

A large number of Costa Rican students, 46.29%, said they would never participate in a boycott, and it is likely that a large percentage of this is due to misunderstanding the word "boycott." Post-survey debriefing with respondents indicated this was definitely the case with several students – a telling indicator of how little known this tactic is in the contemporary Costa Rican context. For this reason, the UO survey was adjusted, as noted above, in the hope of improving comprehension, but this also undermined the goal of cross-national comparison.

Table 35. Cross-National Comparisons: Prevalence of Political Action (Percentages)

(Q21) This is a form of political action that I (have done, might do, would never do):		Have done (1)	Might do (2)	Would never do (3)	$\bar{x}$	$\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$
1. Signing a petition	UO	75.06	22.14	2.8	1.28	-.21***
	CR	54.49	45.52	2.99	1.49	
2. Joining in boycotts (refusing to buy products from unjust corporations or nations) *[clarification in parentheses added for UO version]*	UO	23.27	63.43	13.3	1.9	-.47***
	CR	9.19	44.52	46.29	2.37	
3. Attending legal and lawful demonstrations	UO	21.17	66.58	12.24	1.91	.22***
	CR	40.13	50.99	8.88	1.69	
4. Joining strikes at a workplace [UO version]/ Joining unofficial strikes [CR version]	UO	4.33	78.12	17.56	2.13	.14**
	CR	25	51.03	23.97	1.99	
5. Occupying buildings or factories, or barricading streets	UO	4.35	49.1	46.55	2.42	.02
	CR	12.83	34.54	52.63	2.4	
6. Damaging things like breaking windows, removing road signs, etc.	UO	9.39	17.51	73.10	2.64	-.10*
	CR	7.19	11.44	81.37	2.74	
7. Use personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police	UO	1.52	16.24	82.23	2.81	.13**
	CR	5.84	20.13	74.03	2.68	
8. Attending an anti-war demonstration	UO	5.57	65.82	28.61	2.23	.32***
	CR	16.23	76.95	6.82	1.91	
9. Attending a school related demonstration	UO	27.41	62.94	9.64	1.82	-.07
	CR	24.51	62.09	13.4	1.89	

Notes: two-tailed t-tests; *= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p<.001; UO = University of Oregon; CR = Costa Rica university students; UO (N=395); CR (N=308); After the Costa Rica survey was conducted, questions 2 and 4 in the UO survey were modified as noted above in brackets; answer codes were: 1=have done, 2=might do, 3=would never do; hence, a score close to 1 indicates a propensity to approve of the tactic, while a score closer to 3 indicates unfavorable attitudes toward the tactic; in the difference between means column, a negative difference indicates that UO students approved of the tactic more than Costa Rican students; a positive difference indicates that Costa Rican students approved of the tactic more than UO students; robvar tests were first conducted in STATA to determine if variances between group means were significantly different

Interestingly, 52.63% of Costa Rican students and 46.55% of UO studentssaid they would never "occupy" a public place. Yet, given the worldwide diffusion of the "occupy" tactic in 2011, from Tahrir Square in Cairo to Occupy Wall Street and beyond, it would be interesting to re-test this item. A prominent linguist named "occupy" the word of the year in 2011 (Nunberg 2011).

Attitudes of U.S. Versus Costa Rican University Students

Two tailed t-tests were performed on the core 34 questions pertaining to violent/ nonviolent attitudes across the two samples. The results show that on all 34 items, Costa Rican University students demonstrate significantly more peaceful attitudes, and on virtually all of these 34 items, the differences were very robust ($p < .001$). Ironically, in the replication of the three Gallup World Poll items which partly sparked this study, Costa Rican students fail to register a more peaceful average than UO students on one of the three questions – on that item, Costa Ricans tied with UO students (running count: Costa Ricans significantly more peaceful on 36 out of 37 questions). Here, the reason Costa Ricans failed to register a more peaceful response is likely related to the fact that the Gallup World Poll items offer two answers, rather than a Likert-type set of answers ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. When four items probing attitudes on interpersonal violence are added, Costa Ricans were more peaceful in three out of four items, but *significantly* more peaceful in two out of the four questions (running count: Costa Ricans significantly more peaceful on 38 out of 41 questions). When five more questions are added replicating survey items probing attitudes on various types of violence, Costa Ricans were more peaceful on all 5 items, but *significantly* more peaceful on four out of five questions (running count: Costa Ricans significantly more peaceful on

42 out of 46 questions). When 6 elite cues questions were added, Costa Ricans were significantly more peaceful in 6 out of 6 items (running count: Costa Ricans were more peaceful on 50 out of 52 items and *significantly* more peaceful on 48 out of 52 questions; one additional item in this section was thrown out due to conceptual problems (see below)). UO respondents are more peaceful than Costa Ricans on only 1 out of 52 items, and on that item the difference between means was significant at the .01 level.

Replicating the Gallup World Poll Items

At the very beginning of the surveys, university student respondents in both nations were asked the Gallup World Poll's forced choice question (see Table 36 below): "Some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion?" Because pre-testing revealed that some university student respondents were not entirely clear on the meaning of "civilians," respondents in both nations were told parenthetically that "civilians" means "unarmed men, women, and children who are NOT participating in a violent conflict." Since this definition adds slightly to the Gallup World Poll question and flags the ethical issue by highlighting "unarmed men, women, and children" we can surmise that the present results are not entirely comparable with Gallup World Poll data on this question. Arguably, adding this explanatory note to the question is likely to skew results towards a nonviolent answer. Of course, an additional test could be conducted by asking the question while presenting visuals of unarmed men, women, and children, and varying their ages, race, ethnicity, and religious and culture-bound clothing (e.g., Arab Islamic clothing versus Western business attire).

Q6 asked respondents about the efficacy of "peaceful means alone" when utilized by oppressed groups. There are numerous complexities with interpreting responses to this question, especially cross-nationally. For instance, in one context, "peaceful means alone" may conjure up voting or democratic processes, perhaps various forms of dialogue and diplomacy will come to mind. In this vein, Article 1.1 of the UN Charter mentions the UN's goal of creating "peace by peaceful means." In another context the phrase "peaceful means alone" may be interpreted as referring to nonviolent protest such as mass street actions. Hence, Martin's (2008) distinction between conventional action and nonviolent action, discussed above, must be kept in mind since depending on their context, some respondents might think of "conventional action" while others might think of "nonviolent action" when reading this question.

Table 36. T-Tests of Mean Scores: University Students in USA and Costa Rica

Question	**Attitude Probed**	**Costa Rica (*n* = 312)**		**USA (*n* = 403)**		**df**	***t***	$\bar{x}^2 - \bar{x}$
		$\bar{x}$	***SD***	$\bar{x}^2$	***SD***			
Q4	principled nonviolent stance against state terrorism (i.e., is it justifiable for the military to target and kill civilians?)	1.11	.32	1.19	.39	709.50	-2.9363	.08**
Q5	principled nonviolent stance against "terrorism" (is "terrorism" justifiable?)	1.10	.30	1.15	.35	705.97	-2.0367	.05*
Q6	efficacy of nonviolence (i.e., does nonviolence "work" for oppressed groups?; consistent with pragmatic and principled nonviolent orientations)	1.39	.49	1.39	.49	702	-0.0150	.00

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; Because the variances in Q4 and Q5 are significantly different in the two samples (robvar tests were run in Stata), the t-test commands run in Stata on these items specified unequal variances (and Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom are reported). The underlined words in the following questions highlight the only differences between the 2010 surveys of university students and the Gallup World Poll questions. Q4: Some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion? (Civilians = unarmed men, women, and children who are NOT participating in a violent conflict) [Answers: 1=Never justified; 2=Sometimes justified]; Q5: Some people think for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion? [Answers: 1=Never justified; 2=Sometimes justified]; Q6: Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can improve their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods). Others do NOT believe that peaceful means alone will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups. Which do you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful means alone will NOT work? [Answers: 1=Will work; 2=Will NOT work]

In Table 36 above, we see that the Costa Rican means are significantly more peaceful than UO means on the state terrorism and the terrorism items. There is no difference between the mean responses on the pragmatic nonviolence item.

Comparing Costa Rican and UO means. In Figure 5 below (which graphically depicts the data in Table 37), keeping in mind the 2.5 midpoint (all means less than 2.5 representthe violent end of the attitude spectrum) we observe that the Costa Rican mean only falls below the 2.5 midpoint on two items. Thus, the Costa Rican mean reflects pro-violent attitudes on only 2 of the 18 items. Meanwhile, the UO mean reflects pro-violent attitudes on 9 of the 18 items (not including the mean for item "ee" which is just barely above the dividing line at 2.51). Hence, even though the means from the two samples

Figure 5. Means of Cross-National Samples, Depicting Table 37 (18 Questions Positively Worded for Agreement by Adherents of Violent Orientations)



Notes: The items a – hh listed above on the horizontal axis are all positively worded for agreement by adherents of violent orientations; On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent; 2.5 is the midpoint (all means less than 2.5 lean towards violent end of spectrum); Values of answers: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4)

largely seem to parallel one another, the UO means fall on the violent side of the violent/ nonviolent divide much more frequently. Moreover, on all means, Costa Rica is more peaceful.

Table 37. T-Tests on Q9 items in the Cross-National Samples: Questions in which "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree" Are the Peaceful Answers (Percentages).

Item (question letter label/ Q9 label) and primary category	**Costa Rica (*n* = 312)**				**USA (*n* = 403)**				$\bar{x} - \bar{x}^2$
	Dis-agree	**Strong-ly Dis-agree**	**Total (Dis-agree)**	$\bar{x}$ / SD	**Dis-agree**	**Strong-ly Dis-agree**	**Total (Dis-agree)**	$\bar{x}^2$ / SD	
(a/1) Self-defense: "A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her family."	19.22	7.82	27.04	2.09 / .87	10.8	1.76	12.56	1.83 / .68	.26****
(b/2) Self-defense: "A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her property."	44.30	28.01	72.31^	2.94 / .86	54.52	15.08	69.60	2.80 / .74	.14*
(c/3) Domestic violence: "There are situations in which a woman is justified in slapping her husband in the face."	34.22	25.25	59.47	2.72 / .98	32.42	11.72	44.14	2.43 / .86	.29****
(d/4) Domestic violence: "There are situations in which a man is justified in slapping his wife in the face."	28.90	61.04	89.94^	3.47 / .77	39.45	48.39	87.84	3.34 / .74	.13*
(e/5) Corporal punishment: "Corporal punishment (spanking) is necessary to bring up children properly."	37.86	48.54	86.40	3.33 / .76	44.64	27.18	71.82	2.95 / .83	.38****
(f/6) Militarism: "Military discipline develops good character in youth."	32.57	45.93	78.50	3.21 / .87	49.75	15.66	65.41	2.78 / .74	.43****
(g/7) Militarism: "War brings out the best qualities in men."	17.10	77.42	94.52^	3.71 / .61	42.36	50.63	92.99	3.43 / .65	.28****
(h/8) Militarism: "Many of our nation's greatest heroes are soldiers."	26.06	66.45	92.51	3.56 / .72	36.82	6.72	43.54	2.38 / .78	1.18****
(i/9) Just war: "When people suffer under a dictator, a violent revolution is necessary and justified."	27.60	24.68	52.28^	2.65 / .98	41.46	3.52	44.98	2.42 / .67	.23***
(o/15) Realpolitiks: "There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources through war because nations should protect their own economic security and interests."	20.00	74.84	94.84	3.67 / .67	55.95	23.54	79.49	3.02 / .69	.65****
(p/16) Just war: "When the goal is liberation from tyranny and oppression, war can be necessary and justified."	25.57	23.62	49.19	2.62 / .96	20.76	2.28	23.04	2.16 / .61	.46****

Item (question letter label/ Q9 label) and primary category	Costa Rica				USA				$\bar{x} - \bar{x}^2$
	Dis-agree	Strong-ly Dis-agree	Total (Dis-agree)	$\bar{x}$ / SD	Dis-agree	Strong-ly Dis-agree	Total (Dis-agree)	$\bar{x}^2$ / SD	
(q/17) Just war: "Because freedom and justice may be more important than peace, war may be necessary and although regrettable, it is the lesser of two evils."	32.66	29.63	62.29	2.85 / .93	27.92	3.55	31.47	2.27 / .66	.58****
(r/18) Realpolitiks: "Diplomacy often fails and war between nations becomes necessary."	45.31	37.54	82.85	3.17 / .79	61.32	4.33	65.65	2.68 / .59	.49****
(s/19) Judeo-Christian sanction: "The Biblical command against killing does NOT apply to warfare."	19.26	48.99	68.25^	2.98 / 1.17	47.24	14.17	61.41	2.70 / .79	.28***
(ee/31) Death penalty (myth of redemptive violence): "The death penalty should be used for a person convicted of murder."	35.28	35.60	70.88	2.93 / 1.02	41.88	10.91	52.79	2.51 / .85	.42****
(ff/32) Realpolitiks: "It is necessary to fight terrorism by military means (methods)."	35.53	24.67	60.20	2.71 / .99	34.61	2.29	36.90	2.28 / .69	.43****
(gg/33) Realpolitiks: "It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world."	35.48	25.48	60.96	2.79 / .91	20.55	1.50	22.05	2.14 / .59	.65****
(hh/34) View of culture's embrace of realpolitiks (and test of social desirability bias): "Now, please answer the last question (gg) the way you think most people in your nation would answer it."	23.17	17.76	40.93	2.39 / 1.00	11.51	2.56	14.07	1.83 / .73	.56****

Notes: These questions are positively worded for agreement by adherents of violent orientations. Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; *** = $p < .001$; **** = $p < .0001$; ^ = items where % "Total (Disagree)" for Costa Rica is less than 10% greater than UO "Total (Disagree)," but % of Costa Rica "Strongly Disagree" notably exceeds % of UO "Strongly Disagree"; "Total (Disagree)" = "Strongly Disagree" + "Disagree"; On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent; 2.5 is the midpoint; Values of answers: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); Using the robvar command in Stata, the samples were found to have significantly different variances on all items except #'s 2, 4, 5, 15, and 31. Hence, on all other items, the "unequal" t-test command was specified in Stata.

While an item by item commentary is prohibited for reasons of space, consider Q9.19 which probes respondent attitudes towards a key Judeo-Christian sanction: "The Biblical command against killing does NOT apply to warfare." This issue was re-iterated again in the elite quotes section (though only in the Costa Rican survey) in item #10: "Any human order to kill must be subordinate to the law of God which says, 'Thou shalt not kill.' No soldier is obliged to obey an order contrary to the law of God" – Archbishop Oscar Romero (El Salvador, 1980). One U.S. respondent left a survey comment which argued that the Bible

says, “Thou shalt not ‘murder,’” not “Thou shalt not ‘kill.’” But this was precisely what the questions probed – how respondents interpret the passage, whether they circumscribe the ethical injunction or adopt strategies of “moral disengagement” (Bandura 1990; McAlister, Bandura, and Owen 2006). The salience of these basic ethical questions for military veterans was recently articulated forcefullyby the U.S. military veteran and novelist Karl Marlantes (2012):

> ...we are raised in a Judeo-Christian culture. I mean, ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ even for the atheists in our culture is a tenet you just do not violate unless you're, you know, crazy or a sociopath or something. And so all your young life, that's drilled into your head. And then suddenly, you know, you're 18 or 19 and they're saying, ‘Go get 'em and kill for your country.’And then you do that. And then you come back. And then it's like, ‘Well, thou shalt not kill’ again. Well, believe me, that is a difficult thing to deal with. And I think what's even more difficult is that the only being that should actually take life is the one that gives life. And that's God. Or the gods. And you take a young man and you put him in the role of a God where he is asked to take a life, that’s something that no 19-year-old is able to handle.

In Table 37 above, we see that the differences between the UO and Costa Rican means are significant on all items, and in 16 out of 18 items, the difference is quite robust ($p < .001$). Similarly, in Table 38 below, we see that the differences between the UO and Costa Rican means are significant on all items, and in 14 out of 16 items, the difference is quite robust ($p < .001$). In Figure 6 below (which graphically depicts the data in Table 38), keeping in mind the 2.5 midpoint (all means greater than 2.5 representthe violent end of the attitude spectrum) we observe that the Costa Rican mean never falls above the 2.5 midpoint. Thus, the Costa Rican mean reflects peaceful attitudes on all 16 items. Meanwhile, the UO mean equals 2.5 or above on only 5 items.

Figure 6. Means of Cross-National Samples, Depicting Table 38 (16 Questions Positively Worded for Agreement by Adherents of Nonviolent Orientations)



Notes: The items j – ddlisted above on the horizontal axis are all positively worded for agreement by adherents of nonviolent orientations; On means: 1 is more peaceful; 4 is more violent; 2.5 is the midpoint (all means greater than 2.5 represent violent end of spectrum); Values of answers: Strongly Agree (1) - Strongly Disagree (4)

Possible sources of bias: Extreme response and acquiescent biases. The striking visual differences between Figure 5 (of items all positively worded for agreement by adherents of *violent* orientations)and Figure 6 (of items all positively worded for agreement by adherents of *nonviolent* orientations)deserves interpretation. In Figure 5, the intensity and direction of responses in the two samples parallel one another almost precisely (the main exception being item H), but with Costa Ricans consistently and slightly more peaceful on all items. In Figure 6, the attitude differences between the two samples mirror one another in a much more varied and extreme pattern. As will be explained below, I believe the most plausible explanation here is that Costa Ricans

revealed a “yea-saying bias” in the Figure 5 items, but in Figure 6, where the items were worded for agreement by nonviolent adherents, the Costa Rican “yea-saying bias” combined with the significantly higher percentage of Costa Rican nonviolent adherents (about 29% as compared with 4.4% of UO respondents) and lower percentage of militarism adherents (about 9.3% as compared with about 28% of UO respondents) produced extreme differences between the two nations on the items in Figure 6.

The visual differences alone between Figure 5 and Figure 6 suggest possible forms of negativity bias, positivity bias/ “yea-saying bias” (Smith 2003, p.81)/ “acquiescent response bias”/ “agreement bias,” and/ or “extreme response bias” in one of the nation samples. Such response patterns are likely to distort group means and limit the validity of cross-cultural comparisons (Marin, Gamba, and Marin 1992). Moreover, research suggests that ethnic differences in these biases do not seem to interact with gender (Bachman and O’Malley 1984; Marin, Gamba, and Marin 1992), and still have significant effects when education is controlled for (Marin, Gamba, and Marin 1992).

Landsberger and Saavedra (1967) found yea-saying to be strong among Spanish speakers in the U.S. and Chile. Similarly, analyzing a national health survey, Aday et al. (1980) found that Hispanics in the U.S. selected acquiescent responses at higher rates (24%) than non-Hispanic Whites (14%). In addition, Marin, Gamba, and Marin (1992) found Hispanics in the U.S. to exhibit both acquiescent response stylesand extreme response styles significantly more than non-Hispanic Whites. While gender effects were inconsistent, the less educated respondents (less than 12 years of formal education) were more likely to prefer extreme response styles, and the less acculturated (i.e., assimilated to U.S. culture) were more likely to prefer both extreme and acquiescent response styles.

It has been theorized that yea-saying is a self-preservation strategy of the powerless (Ross and Mirowsky 1984), and therefore is common among less acculturated U.S. Hispanics who tend to hold lower socioeconomic statuses than acculturated Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites. However, this theory offers less leverage for explaining cross-national differences.

Many survey experts have concluded that the dominance of poor Latin American countries in the very top spots in worldwide surveys, like the Gallup World poll, which attempt to identify the happiest nations in the world can be explained by "a Latin American cultural proclivity to avoid negative statements regardless of how one actually feels" (Weissenstein 2012, p.A3). As Eduardo Lora, a former chief economist of the Inter-American Development Bank, concludes, "What the empirical literature says is that some cultures tend to respond to any type of question in a more positive way" (p.A3).

"Yea-saying bias" is typically assumed to be associated with face-to-face surveys administered by an interviewer (Smith 2003), rather than pencil and paper surveys. However, Marin, Gamba, and Marin (1992) found that in a self-administered written questionnaire (using 5-point Likert-type response scales) in the U.S., Hispanics made significantly more (at the .001 level) acquiescent responses than non-Hispanic Whites. The less educated made significantly more acquiescent responses (at the .001 level), and among Hispanics, the less acculturated Hispanics made significantly more acquiescent responses (at the .001 level). In any case, these forms of bias often differ among cultures, and can be a source of error, or alternatively, a source of insight about cultural communication styles (Smith 2004). The former interpretation pushes us to analyze differences in the "error structure" of cross-national samples (Smith 2003, p.80). But the

latter interpretation may be particularly apropos in the present study, as these patterns may indicate cultural attitudes towards conflict, though in a very limited sense given the artificial context of a survey. If these biases seem to be present and introduce a source of error, we are prompted to ask: which of the two graphs (i.e., the two sets of items) more accurately reflects "real" attitudes? However, we should not yet rule out the possibility that these patterns are meaningful indicators of substantive attitudes.

To reduce acquiescence, survey design norms prescribe that scales be balanced with reversals such that half the items require *affirmation* and half require *negation* in order to obtain high scores on a construct (McCrae and Costa 1997, Smith 2003). In this way, if respondents agree with all of the items, their overall score on the construct will be at the mid-point, indicating a lack of robust attitudes. By contrast, some cross-cultural survey researchers have avoided the balanced reversals method, arguing that translating negations can result in confusing questions and that respondents in some cultures tend to avoid registering disagreements (Segall 1986). As for translation issues, they extend beyond negative question formulations, since cross-linguistic analyses suggest it is difficult to arrive at equivalent translations of adjectives with parallel intensities or magnitudes in survey response terms (Voss et al. 1996).

Several studies have also identified a tendency for respondents from Hispanic cultures to select extreme responses. Tables 37 and 38 point to this tendency among Costa Rican respondents, as is identified by the "^" symbol in each table (see "Notes" section below each table). A Likert survey in the U.S. found that Hispanics exhibited significantly more extreme response stylesthan non-Hispanic Whites (Hui and Triandis 1989). This pattern has also been linked to other minority groups, as Bachman and

O'Malley (1984) found that African-American students in the U.S. have a higher propensity for extreme responses than White students. In the Hui and Triandis (1989) study, Hispanics selected extreme responses more than non-Hispanics, but the ethnic differences only held on a 5-point scale, not on a 10-point scale. However, the Costa Rica data in Graph 1, for the most part hovers around the mid-point of 2.5, the opposite of extreme responses. Moreover, identifying an extreme bias requires that we can track it across a variety of different constructs.

The best section of the survey for tracking these forms of response bias is the 21 Schwartz Values items, since it operationalizes 10 separate value constructs. But there is one caveat: the Schwartz Values section offered a 6-point Likert scale, as opposed to the 4-point Likert scale in the core violent/ nonviolent section (Q9). As discussed above, Hui and Traindis found that extreme response bias diminishes as larger point scales (i.e., a finer gradation/ more response choices) are offered. However, in one of their data sets (dataset 4), Marin, Gamba, and Marin (1992) found the opposite: they found no ethnic group differences in extreme bias in a 4-point Likert-type format, but in a 5-point Likert-type format U.S. Hispanics were significantly (at the .001 level) more likely to choose extreme responses than non-Hispanic Whites. In any case, questions in both the Schwartz Values section and the Q9 section of the present survey meet Bachman and O'Malley's (1984) three criteria for analyzing extreme response sets: these questions (1) have an ordinal response scale with four or more categories, and (2) do not ask for demographic information, nor (3) factual reporting.

A comparative analysis of the UO and Costa Rican data on the Schwartz Values items was conducted. Following Marin, Gamba, and Marin's (1992) procedures for

calculating extreme response bias, the number of times respondents chose a 1 or 6 response (i.e. the extreme responses, also called "anchors" (p.502)) in the 21 items of the Schwartz Values section was counted, averaged to provide response proportions, and used as an index. Note that Marin, Gamba, and Marin's (1992) utilized an additive index instead, but it was decided that an average is intuitively easier to interpret. Indeed, Marin et al. (1992) also report the proportions. The Costa Rican mean for the extreme response index is .39, with a standard deviation of .22 (n=312). The U.S. mean is .26, with a standard deviation of .18 (n=403). Hence, Costa Ricans chose an extreme response (a 1 or a 6) 39% of the time, while UO respondents chose an extreme response 26% of the time. Robvar tests in STATA revealed that the variances between the samples were significantly different, and so the t-test specified unequal variances. The t-test revealed that the two sample means were significantly different at the .0001 level, with a t-ratio of 8.96, and Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 606.8. Thus, compared to UO respondents, Costa Ricans were significantly (at the .0001 level) more likely to choose extreme responses in the Schwartz Values section.

Secondly, two additional indexes were constructed: an extreme yea-saying index and an extreme nay-saying index. The percentage of respondents in the UO sample who answered with the extreme yea-saying response of "Very much like me" (1) was subtracted from the same column of data in the Costa Rican sample on all 21 items. Similarly, the percentage of respondents in the UO sample who answered with the extreme nay-saying response of "Not like me at all" (6) was subtracted from the same column of data in the Costa Rican sample on all 21 items. The results show that mean "Very much like me" response was 10.87% higher in the Costa Rican sample (with a

standard deviation of 10.94), and the mean "Not like me at all" response was 2.48% higher in the Costa Rican sample (with a standard deviation of 4.27).

Hence, there is a slight "extreme bias" in the Costa Rican sample, with the bulk of it linked to an extreme yea-saying bias. However, this does not settle the question of whether the bias is linked to translation issues, Hispanic cultures, national character, personality traits, or interactions among those factors. On this count, Hui and Triandis (1989) theorized that Hispanic cultural values lead respondents to associate extreme responses with the socially desirable virtue of sincerity, and the middle categories of a response scale with hiding one's real feelings. Alternative interpretations include the notion that Hispanic cultural values of "collectivism" (Marin and Triandis 1985, cited in Marin et al. 1992, p.508) help to explain the extreme response pattern. But, this is problematic since Japanese collectivism operates in the opposite way – fostering the avoidance of extreme responses (Smith 2003, p.82).

Perhaps a more plausible and nuanced argument is that Hispanic cultural scripts of "simpatía" lead its members to value conformity, sympathy, dignity, respectful politeness, and avoidance of interpersonal conflict, criticism, and disagreement (Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, and Betancourt 1984). This would help account for why, in the Schwartz Values section, Costa Rican respondents favored the extreme yeah-saying response, much more than the extreme nay-saying response. Applying this interpretation to the Costa Rican yea-saying pattern in the Schwartz Values section could also explain why Costa Ricans seem to be more chameleon-like: due to the cultural script of simpatía, they will more strongly identify with diverse values, which helps them avoid conflict. Thus, it is possible that the Hispanic and Costa Rican cultural value of conflict avoidance,

one not at all uncommon in some "cultures of peace" (Boulding 2000, p.97; Fry 2006, p.79), has manifested itself in our survey instruments themselves.

In naming these differences in response styles or "judgment styles" (Hui and Triandis 1989) across cultural groups we should also consider the interpretation that U.S. respondents, or White U.S. respondents in particular, exhibit a tepid, what I will term –a "middling bias." This interpretation is curiouslyunder-theorized in the literature, as researchers have sought to explain why U.S. minorities prefer extreme responses, rather than why Whites moderate or "qualify" their responses (Bachman and O'Malley 1984, p.506). Whether we see a "middling" bias or an "extreme" bias might reflect our own ethnocentric biases and propensities to consider sincerity/ passion (stereotypically Latin/ Latin American/ Mediterranean) or deference/ modesty/ caution/ moderate affect (stereotypically Northern European and Japanese) as more socially desirable (Hui and Triandis 1989). Similarly, the methodological problem for cross-national researchers has been conceived by researchers in the global north as one of how to limit or "compensate" for extreme response styles (e.g., Smith 2003, p.82), rather than compensating for middling response styles, even though middling responses could be equally disadvantageous for interpretation and theory building.

Assuming that Costa Ricans actually do embrace more peaceful attitudes than U.S. respondents (as the present data and Gallup World Poll data clearly indicate), and building on the finding of a Costa Rican response bias in the Schwartz Values section, I would contend that Figure 5 may reflect a yea-saying/ acquiescent bias in the Costa Rican sample, but that is not all. The main reason for this claim, as pointed out above, is that the Costa Rican data in Figure 5 hovers around the mid-point of 2.5, the opposite of extreme

responses. Thus, in adjudicating between Figures 5 and 6, I believe the data can still ground significant substantive interpretations, rather than only indicating a source of error. For instance, the way in which Costa Rican attitudes largely parallel U.S. attitudes in the pro-violence items in Figure 5, and with only slightly (though often statistically significant) more peaceful means, could indicate the pervasiveness of the "myth of

Table 38. T-tests on the Cross-National Samples: Questions in which "Strongly Agree" (1) or "Agree" (2) Are the Peaceful Answers (Percentages)

Item (question letter label/ Q9 label) and primary category and/ or variable indicator	**Costa Rica (*n* = 312)**				**USA (*n* = 403)**				$\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$
	Strong-ly Agree	**Agree**	**Total (Agree)**	$\bar{x}$ / SD	**Strong-ly Agree**	**Agree**	**Total (Agree)**	$\bar{x}^2$ / SD	
(j/10) Principled nonviolence: "Using violence to pursue political goals is NEVER justified."	51.97	18.42	70.39^	1.89 / 1.08	27.05	40.25	67.30	2.07 / .81	.18*
(k/11)Principled nonviolence: "War breeds disrespect for human life."	71.84	16.83	88.67	1.45 / .83	16.88	49.36	66.24	2.21 / .76	.76****
(l/12) Principled nonviolence: "It is better to forgive your enemies and work for peace with justice than to be a good soldier."	62.90	30.65	93.55	1.46 / .69	14.94	58.73	73.67	2.15 / .70	.69****
(m/13) Against militarism: "It is better to disobey orders and think for yourself than to be a good soldier."	35.20	30.59	65.79	2.10 / 1.01	10.83	33.75	44.58	2.53 / .79	.43****
(n/14) Against militarism: "Military discipline injures self-respect and individuality."	40.40	37.09	77.49	1.87 / .88	6.06	43.18	49.24	2.50 / .70	.63****
(t/20) Principled nonviolence/ against just war: "There is NO conceivable justification for war."	48.06	23.55	71.61	1.87 / .97	6.46	24.03	30.49	2.75 / .75	.88****
(u/21) Principled nonviolence/ against just war: "The evils of war are greater than any possible benefits."	65.48	22.90	88.38	1.49 / .77	11.96	38.42	50.38	2.44 / .78	.95****
(v/22) Principled nonviolence/ against just war: "It is the moral duty…to refuse to participate in any way in any war, no matter what the cause."	46.77	30.00	76.77	1.82 / .91	7.61	32.74	40.35	2.63 / .78	.81****
(w/23) Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: "We should honor the heroes of nonviolence more than those who used violence."	64.52	23.87	88.39	1.50 / .77	16.96	39.49	56.45	2.32 / .82	.82****

Item (question letter label/ Q9 label) and primary category and/ or variable indicator	Costa Rica				USA				$\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$
	Strongly Agree	**Agree**	**Total (Agree)**	$\bar{x}$ *SD*	**Strongly Agree**	**Agree**	**Total (Agree)**	$\bar{x}^2$ *SD*	
(x/24) Nonviolence: "In nations on the verge of civil war, nonviolent movements are likely to be more successful in increasing long-term peace and justice..."				1.84 .77				2.21 .69	.37****
(y/25) Principled nonviolence and against realpolitiks: "…it is possible to outlaw armed conflict between nations – perhaps through the UN and the International Court of Justice."	45.10	39.87	84.97	1.74 .80	8.76	47.68	56.44	2.40 .73	.66****
(z/26) Principled nonviolence and against realpolitiks: "Diplomacy…and nonviolent methods can always work to solve international disputes."	52.09	32.80	84.89	1.66 .80	7.56	35.52	43.08	2.55 .72	.89****
(aa/27) Principled nonviolence: "…peaceful methods must be used because we can NOT separate the means from the ends."	50.17	37.46	87.63	1.65 .76	14.54	58.16	72.70	2.15 .68	.5****
(bb/28) Pragmatic nonviolence: "Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow dictators."	30.69	38.94	69.63^	2.08 .92	11.99	55.10	67.09	2.24 .70	.16*
(cc/29) Against realpolitiks: "We should object to wars when nations try to seize territory or natural resources."	59.67	26.89	86.56	1.59 .84	16.41	55.05	71.46	2.14 .69	.55****
(dd/30) Against realpolitiks: "We should support disarmament efforts…"	73.40	20.51	93.91	1.34 .64	22.59	59.14	81.73	1.98 .70	.64****

Notes: Thesequestions are positively worded for agreement by adherents of nonviolent orientations. This set of questions was reverse coded for statistical analysis, but not in the table above; Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; *** = $p < .001$; **** = $p < .0001$; ^ = items where % "Total (Agree)" for Costa Rica is less than 10% greater than UO "Total (Agree)," but % of Costa Rica "Strongly Agree" notably exceeds % of UO "Strongly Agree"; "Total (Agree)" = "Strongly Agree" + "Agree"; On means: 1 is more peaceful; 4 is more violent; Values of answers: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); 2.5 is the midpoint; Where item category is noted as "against just war" it also implies the item is against ideologies placed further towards the violent pole of the spectrum (i.e., realpolitiks and militarism). Likewise, "against realpolitiks" implies the item is also against militarism. Similarly, on item (bb), pragmatic nonviolence encompasses the more robust principled nonviolence. Using the robvar command in Stata, the samples were found to have significantly different variances on all items except #'s 11, 21, 23, 25, and 30. Hence, on all other items, the "unequal" t-test command was specified in Stata.

redemptive violence" even in Costa Rica's relatively peaceful culture. Walter Wink (1992) has theorized that this myth is world's dominant religion -- it is "the ethos of our times. It is the spirituality of the modern world" (p.13).

Discussing various forms in which the myth surfaces in popular culture, especially television and film, Wink argues:

> ...the myth of redemptive violence has won children's voluntary acquiescence to a regimen of religious indoctrination more exhaustive and effective than any in the history of religions...No other religious system has ever remotely rivaled the myth of redemptive violence in its ability to catechize its young so totally. From the earliest age children are awash in depictions of violence as the ultimate solution in human conflicts. (p.23)

Costa Rican exposure to U.S. television and film is almost as pervasive as U.S. residents (Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999), so it is reasonable to assume that their exposure to this myth is similarly deep and wide. Supporting this claim is the finding, discussed above, that about 60% of Costa Rican university students are not quite "pacifists." But many Costa Rican respondents do embrace diverse forms of nonviolent attitudes, and as we will see below, the Costa Rican culture and educational system do expose Costa Ricans to the pragmatic and principled virtues of demilitarization.

Scanning the UO means in Table 38 above, we observe pro-violent mean attitudes on 4 items, and on item "n" the mean fell on the 2.5 midpoint. As in Figure 5, in Figure 6 we see that Costa Rican means on all of the items are more peaceful than the UO means.

As for an "elective affinity" between Costa Rican culture and demilitarization, consider the evidence from Q9.13: "It is better to disobey orders and think for yourself than to be a good soldier." This was one operationalization of anti-militarism, and 66% of Costa Ricans expressed agreement versus 45% of UO respondents (a 21% gap). This finding of an individualistic, anti-militaristic streak is corroborated by years of ethnographic work by Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz (1999) who argue that

> Ticos [Costa Ricans] stubbornly – though passively – refuse to obey rules and orders that interfere with their own inclinations....[They often embrace] an old practice of 'lowering the floor' under those who presume to tell others what to do.

> Distrust of concentrated authority is reflected in the abolition of the army; in irreverent jokes about the president, even by his supporters; in the common fear that a more professional police force would be, in effect, an army...Other longstanding cultural patterns linked to this antiauthoritarian attitude also shed light on recent social changes...they fear concentrated power... (p.286)

Like U.S. individualism (Bellah et al. 1985, Bellah 2000), Costa Rican individualism also has a dark side – the effects of which have grown as neoliberal policies bring increasing inequality and distrust. Thus, many Ticos "seek expensive private solutions to collective problems...reluctant to cooperate with neighbors to prevent burglaries, they may instead hire private guards and buy guns; rather than work to improve public schools, they may send their children to private ones" (Biesanz et al. 1999, pp.286-287).

Interpersonal Violence

Below we turn to several items which probed attitudes towards interpersonal violence. In Table 39, we see that Costa Ricans were significantly more peaceful in two out of the four questions. On the first item, UO students were significantly more peaceful. Because this item sets up a hypothetical situation in which a man's wife is bumped, it

Table 39. Replications of Items Probing Attitudes Towards Interpersonal Violence

Q7. Below are conflicts in which two adult male strangers might engage in a fist fight. Tell me whether you would approve of the use of punching in each situation. (percentages)	UO (N=406)			Costa Rica (N=312)			
	Yes (1)	No (2)	$\bar{x}$	Yes (1)	No (2)	$\bar{x}^2$	$\bar{x} - \bar{x}^2$
1. Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who was drunk and bumped into the man and his wife on the street?	6.93	93.07	1.93	14.1	85.9	1.86	.07*
2. Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who had hit the man's child after the child accidentally damaged the stranger's car?	80.25	19.75	1.20	39.1	60.9	1.61	-0.41***
3. Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who had broken into the man's house?	90.89	9.11	1.09	69.58	30.42	1.3	-0.21***
4. Would you approve of a policeman punching an adult male citizen who said vulgar and obscene things to the policeman?	7.14	92.86	1.93	5.81	94.19	1.94	-0.01

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: *= p< .01; **= p< .001; *** = p<.0001; a higher mean (closer to 2) is more peaceful

may have elicited Latin American "machismo" attitudes and a concern for protecting the woman. Alternatively, it may be that UO students, who do attend a university known as something of a "party school" (in 2009, the Department of Education ranked the UO No.4 out of over 200 comparably sized schools for student alcohol violations and No.3 for student drug violations (Fox 2011)) are more likely to imagine themselves as being drunk and accidentally and harmlessly bumping into people.

Replicating Previous Studies: Various Dimensions of Violence

The next section of the survey replicated several previous survey items. Table 40 shows that Costa Rica is significantly more peaceful on four of the items, but there was no significant difference on the wife-beating question. While the wife-beating question in the table above might seem to be a classic candidate for skewed data through social desirability bias, in some cultural contexts, violence against women is routinely and publicly approved. For instance, a 2012 survey by UNICEF found that in India, 57% of boys and 53% of girls between the ages of 15 and 19 "think wife-beating is justified" (Washington Post 2012, p.23A).

Table 40. Cross-National Comparison: Probing Attitudes Towards Types of Violence

Q8. Below, several actions are described. Tell me whether you think the action can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. (percentages)	UO (N=406)			Costa Rica (N=312)			
	Never Justifiable (1)	Sometimes Justifiable (7)	$\bar{x}$	Never Justifiable (1)	Sometimes Justifiable (7)	$\bar{x}^2$	$\bar{x} - \bar{x}^2$
1. For a man to beat his wife	89.88	1.23	1.23	94.21	0	1.12	.11
2. Political assassinations	48.51	9.16	2.66	59.29	5.45	2.29	.37*
3. The use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information	21.18	16.26	3.92	42.63	9.94	3.37	.55**
4. For the police to beat a crowd of nonviolent protesters who refuse to leave the streets	70.94	1.00	1.70	85.9	1.6	1.32	.38***
5. Killing in self-defense	1.00	36.05	7.27	4.49	23.72	6.91	.36*

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: *= p< .05; **= p< .01; *** = p<.001; Possible answers appeared as a Likert scale (1-10) including "Never Justifiable" (1), "Rarely Justifiable" (4), "Sometimes Justifiable" (7), and "Always Justifiable" (10); A lower mean (closer to 1) is more peaceful

Testing Intellectual Capital: Knowledge of Nonviolent History

The surveys ended with several open-ended questions in which respondents were asked open-ended questions in an attempt to test their knowledge of recent historical events as well as some key moments in the history of nonviolence around the world. Respondents are asked to name successful nonviolent revolutions, the nations in which Gandhi led movements, questions about recent and significant world events, and asked to name national heroes who they admired the most. Open-ended survey questions such as this are thought to increase the mention of recent events, recent presidents and other recent leaders (Newport 2011). However, as these surveys were conducted in July (Costa Rican Survey)and November of 2010, and before the nonviolent revolutions in early 2011 in Tunisia and Egypt, no major nonviolent revolutions had filled the news in recent years. At the time of the surveys, perhaps the nonviolent revolutions receiving the most news coverage in recent years was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break up of the Soviet Union. In this way, the timing of these surveys is well-situated to help us understand how likely it is that the Tunisian and Egyptian nonviolent revolutions of 2011 will be remembered by students around the world in the years to come.

In Costa Rica and the U.S., most respondents demonstrated little or no knowledge (see Table 41). To put it somewhat crassly, this suggests that many people do not know enough to hold an opinion about the efficacy of nonviolent as opposed to violent means. Loewen (2007) argues that “nonthinking” and “ill-informed opinions,” which lack relevant experience-based insights, are extremely common on important social issues, and educated people in particular are more likely to “somehow imagine they know enough to hold an opinion” (p.353).

Table 41. Knowledge of Nonviolent Revolutions (Percentages)

Q39: Can you name nations that have had successful, or somewhat successful, nonviolent revolutions in the 20th and 21st centuries (from 1900 through to this year in 2010)? (Please name as many as you can remember.)		
Answer	**Costa Rica** (N=312)	**UO** (N=403)
Gave only wrong answer(s)	2.24	1.74
"Don't know" or Left it blank	72.76	83.37
One correct answer	14.42	7.69
Two correct answers	6.73	3.97
Three or more correct answers	3.85	3.23

Notes: Percentages. If respondents gave one or more correct answers but also some incorrect answers, only the correct answers were counted (thus, the only respondents coded as "Gave only wrong answer(s)" were those who only gave wrong answers)

To aid in coding successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolutions, the exhaustive list compiled by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) was the primary reference, but other sources were also consulted. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) exclude a number of cases of nonviolent movements that have received some prominent coverage in pockets of popular culture such as in film documentaries released in years prior to the survey's distribution (in 2010). For example, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) exclude the successful 2000 nonviolent movement against the privatization of Cochabamba, Bolivia's municipal water supply which was featured in the film *The Corporation*(2003), and the largely nonviolent mass protests which successfully resisted a military coup and re-installed Hugo Chavez as President of Venezuela as featured in the film *The Revolution Will Not be Televised*(2003).In the Costa Rican sample, a handful of students listed Bolivia or Venezuela as cases of successful nonviolence, and unfortunately, we cannot be sure which movements they were referring to. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) only list one successful nonviolent campaign in Bolivia, the 1977-1982 nonviolent overthrow of Military juntas, and only one is listed for Venezuela as well, the 1958 movement against

the Jimenez dictatorship. It is possible the respondents were referring to more recent movements, such as those listed in the films above, or in the case of Bolivia, the election of indigenous president Evo Morales and the socialist reforms of his presidency (2006 to present) may be perceived as a nonviolent revolution. Indeed, as Morales rose to political prominence, becoming the leader of a cocoa grower's union as well as an indigenous coalition, he used a variety of nonviolent civil disobedience tactics including road blocks and a 600 km march to the capital city. Morales has called his political reforms including nationalizing the oil and natural gas-industry a "process of decolonization" (BBC 2007).

Similarly, three UO respondents listed Ecuador as a case of nonviolent success. It seems possible that they were thinking of the mass street actions which overthrew the government in Ecuador in 2000 and 2005 (Buono and Lara 2006, p.10). Ecuador does not appear in Stephan and Chenoweth's (2008) list, however in addition to the cases in 2000 and 2005, in 1944 a nonviolent movement in Ecuador overthrew the government (Becker 2003). The events in Ecuador followed a general strike in El Salvador that removed the dictator Maximiliano Hernández Martínez on May 9, only a few weeks earlier, and which quickly inspired nonviolent uprisings in Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and later in Costa Rica. Student strikes in Nicaragua failed to remove the dictator Anastasio Somoza García from power, but a general strike in Guatemala helped to overthrow Jorge Ubico on July 1 (Becker 2003).

Nonviolent movements and tactics such as general strikes have been widely practiced in Latin America, "but are rarely interpreted as examples of nonviolent movements," and the nonviolent component of Latin American resistance has long been neglected (Parkman 1988; Becker 2003, p.1). Obviously, overlooking such examples

serves to delegitimize nonviolent action in collective memory, and it can also remove nonviolent tactics from the "toolbox" of activists and revolutionary strategists who may fall back on a reified/ naturalized myth of the necessity of revolutionary violence promoted by Marxists among many others. Becker argues,

> Few political activists in Latin America would consider themselves to be pacifists. In part, this is due to a lack of the development of a political culture that has valued non-violent strategies, and in part it is because icons of non-violence such as Martin Luther King have been imported as symbols of struggles for social justice rather than as examples of viable strategies. (p.8)

Hence, as I argue in the Jackie Robinson case, even in cases where nonviolent tactics played a significant role, events are not remembered in terms of nonviolence.

Issues that emerged in the coding and interpretation of these open-ended questions included adjudicating which revolutions respondents may be referring to, and how to code answers with a mix of correct and incorrect answers.If respondents gave one or more correct answers but also some incorrect answers, only the correct answers were counted (thus, the only respondents coded as "Gave only wrong answer(s)" were those who only gave a wrong answer or answers). For example, one respondent listed three valid nonviolent revolutions, but was not penalized for also listing Tibet and Burma. Hence, this respondent was coded as listing "3 or more nonviolent revolutions." Nonviolent movements in Tibet and Burma have not achieved nonviolent "success" thus far in their long struggles, but they do currently have prominent nonviolent leaders (the Dalai Lama for Tibetans and Tibetans in exile and Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma). Other answers that were coded as erroneous examples of nonviolent revolutions were: China, Colombia, Cuba, France, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Spain (in the Costa Rica sample); and, Bhutan, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Japan, Italy, Kosovo, Paraguay, Spain,

Sweden, Switzerland, UK/ England, (in the U.S. sample). Unfortunately, some of these may have been miscoded as erroneous examples, because the respondent may have been thinking of particular cases within those nations of nonviolent movements that were successful or somewhat successful. Certainly, every nation has many examples of nonviolent protest and resistance, but less common are successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent movements that could be called "revolutions." It seems some respondents simply named nations that had famous revolutions, and though they were violent revolutions, even these often have major nonviolent components or leaders who articulate constraints on violence.

Several respondents named Costa Rica as an example of a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution. With reservations, this was coded as a correct answer even though the 1948 overthrow of the Calderon regime is coded as violent, and justifiably so, in the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) data. The grounds for justifying Costa Rica in 1948 as a case of a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution can rest upon Costa Rica's demilitarization process, which is, after all, a significant nonviolent achievement undertaken by only a handful of nations in the world – indeed, it is "revolutionary" in that sense. In addition, a case can be made for the nonviolent demonstrations in Costa Rica in 1919: "the decisive mobilization of women teachers against the Tinoco dictatorship in June 1919…accelerated the fall of the regime…" (Molina and Palmer 2009, p.93). A few of the respondents who wrote "Costa Rica" as an example of a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution, offered more specific descriptions: "strikes in Costa Rica," "Costa Rica – movement against ICE combo," and "Costa Rica – ICE combo." The latter two refer to President Miguel Angel

Rodriguez's (1998-2002) effort to privatize state-owned industries including the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) which was nicknamed the "ICE combo." In 2000, mass nonviolent protest erupted: "Spontaneous protests mushroomed into road blockages, work stoppages, and acts of civil disobedience that brought the country to a standstill and finally forced the government to withdraw its privatization plans indefinitely" (Molina and Palmer 2009, p.157).

Other examples of answers that were coded as correct include: Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, "Venezuela (Revolución Bolivariana)," "Movement of the workers in Brazil," Brazil, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Mexico's Zapatistas, Chiapas (Mexico), Guatemala, Poland, Hungary, Philippines, India, South Africa (though some scholars debate the cases of India and South Africa in terms of the significance role of nonviolence), East Germany, "fall of USSR," "all of the Communist bloc nations," "U.S. (Martin Luther King)," the "U.S. civil rights movement," and the "U.S." (assuming they meant the civil rights movement). But, unfortunately, for many of the nations that respondents listed we cannot be sure they were thinking of an historical case agreed upon by scholars as an example of a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution (e.g., Stephan and Chenoweth 2008), or a more recent, less significant victory of nonviolent protest in a particular nation. Probably the coding most worthy of contention is the case of "Venezuela (Revolución Bolivariana)" (in English – the Bolivarian Revolution), which was coded as an acceptable example of a nonviolent movement. We know the respondent was referring to the populist, socialist agenda of Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez. Some may argue that it is difficult to justify categorizing this as a nonviolent movement per se, yet all truly democratic political processes are

quintessentially nonviolent, and Chávez's social justice and wealth re-distribution aims, at least on paper, are quite "revolutionary." It is likely that the mentions of Mexico were partly cued by an earlier section of the survey in which respondents confronted quotations by Subcomandante Marcos, a leader of the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico. The Marcos quotes only appeared in the Costa Rican survey. Accordingly, only one UO respondent listed Mexico, while ten Costa Rican respondents mentioned Mexico. However, we might assume that Costa Ricans would be more familiar with regional/ Latin American issues and the Zapatista struggle.

Aside from the Zapatista's initial and brief takeover of the Chiapas capital building in San Cristobal in an armed battle on January 1, 1994, and their photogenic posing with guns on horseback (reminiscent of Zapata) while deep in the jungle, the Zapatista movement has been entirely nonviolent. In fact, the shooting only lasted ten days; since then the Zapatistas devoted themselves to a nonviolent war of words, they "made a conscious strategic decision to avoid capturing State power," and they prioritized – in Marcos's words "tolerance and inclusion" (Evans 2009, p.87, p.92). Yet, it is difficult to know if the average Latin American perceives the nonviolent character of the Zapatista movement. Marcos himself has even advocated and theorized nonviolence, as the quotations included in the survey demonstrate. In a 2001 interview Marcos explicitly and eloquently endorsed nonviolent means (Marcos 2001), and was widely understood as proposing that "armed resistance was no longer viable" (Krauze 2011, p.447). The Zapatistas engaged in unarmed protest before and after their 1994 armed takeover of the capital and several towns in Chiapas (Muñoz 2006). Muñoz (2006) has argued that the ability of the Zapatistas to gain widespread support from transnational

activist networks and sectors in the Western media may have to do with their tactics of limited violence and nonviolence: “The ‘attractiveness’ of the Zapatistas may also have to do with the fact that they did not violate human rights norms, despite their status as an armed movement” (p.260). Here, Muñozhighlights how Zapatistas did not target civilians, but also the fact that they have never broken the ceasefire negotiated in 1994.

I would contend that the Zapatista’s rapid transition to nonviolent tactics was absolutely critical to mobilizing the thousands of transnational solidarity and human rights activists who came to Chiapas during this period, as well as mobilizing massive numbers of domestic supporters who frequently rallied in Mexico City, pressuring the government for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In the summer of 1998, I traveled as part of a delegation from Princeton Theological Seminary to the Chiapas highlands to engage in nonviolent human rights observation and solidarity activism with Zapatista communities. When local Migration officials discovered our presence, they sought to deport us and did eventually force us to leave Mexico earlier than planned, initially stipulating that we could never return to Mexico, though they finally overturned that stipulation thanks to pressure from sympathetic Mexican legislators and lawyers advocating for us. At the time, the Mexican government was at a loss for how to deal with an enormous influx of transnational human rights activists.

Given the relative scarcity of knowledge about successful nonviolent revolutions, it is worth revisiting Q6 which replicated the Gallup World Poll question on pragmatic nonviolence. In Table 42 below, we see cross-tabs data on how respondents answered this Gallup World Poll question in relationship to their knowledge of nonviolent revolutions reported in the open-ended question.

Table 42. Costa Rica Data: Cross-Tabs of Q39 (Knowledge of Nonviolent History) and Q6 (Opinion of Efficacy of Nonviolence)

Q39 "Can you name nations that had successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolutions….?"(Please name as many as you can remember.)	Q6 "…Which do you believe, peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods) will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups, or peaceful means alone will NOT work?" (replication of the Gallup World Poll)		
	Will work	Will NOT work	Total
Gave only a wrong answer(s)	4 2.14% (66.67%)	2 1.68% (33.33%)	6 1.96% (100%)
"Don't know" or Left it blank	137 73.26% (61.71%)	85 71.43% (38.29%)	222 72.55% (100%)
1 correct answer	26 13.90% (57.78%)	19 15.97% (42.22%)	45 14.71% (100%)
2 correct answers	14 7.49% (66.67%)	7 5.88% (33.33%)	21 6.86% (100%)
3 or more correct answers	6 3.21% (50%)	6 5.04% (50%)	12 3.92% (100%)
Total	187 100% (61.11%)	119 100% (38.89%)	306 100% (100%)

Notes: frequency counts and column %; row % in ( ); N=306; if respondents gave one or more correct answers but also some incorrect answers, only the correct answers were counted (thus, the only respondents coded as "Gave only wrong answer(s)" were those who only gave wrong answers)

Table 42 shows that on this indicator (Q6), those with knowledge of nonviolent history (in Q39) differ very little from the rest of the sample. Although the cell sizes are small, those with the most knowledge of successful nonviolent revolutions are less likely to affirm that nonviolence "will work" (i.e., 50% of those with the most intellectual capital regarding nonviolence (in Q39) affirmed nonviolence "will work" (in Q6), compared with the overall sample total of 61.11% who affirmed nonviolence "will work"). Thus, in the Costa Rican sample, it seems possessing some rudimentary knowledge of nonviolent history makes little impact on how respondents answered Q6. This finding, together with the striking finding below, lends at least some support to Althusser's (1971) notion that "ideology has no history" (p.160).

The most striking finding is that of the 187 respondents who said nonviolence "will work," 73.26% were unable to name (and an additional 1.60% gave an erroneous case or cases) a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution. Of the 119 respondents who said nonviolence "will NOT work," 71.43% were unable to name (and an additional 2.14% gave an erroneous case or cases) a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution. The results should be read with a degree of caution because it is difficult to read too much into the claim that a revolution was "somewhat successful." Hence, we may well imagine someone affirming that many nonviolent revolutions are somewhat successful, while still opting for the negative answer when faced with the dichotomous question: "Do peaceful means (nonviolent methods) alone work or NOT work?" (Q6) It seems a major issue here is the nature of dichotomous questions, such as those which begins the survey (including Q6, a question replicating the Gallup World Poll question on nonviolent efficacy). Many respondents may have wished for more nuance in the answers presented by the Gallup World Poll.

With a larger sample size and larger cell sizes, it could be better determined whether additional intellectual capital regarding nonviolent history can increase faith in the efficacy of nonviolence. Though it is possible that the direction of causation might be the reverse – such that those who "believe in" or are temperamentally open to nonviolence tend to seek out more opportunities to learn nonviolent history and thus possess more intellectual capital regarding nonviolence. And, it should be remembered that this subgroup (who correctly named three or more successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolutions) is only 3.92% of the sample, and 50%of these respondents

accepted and 50% rejected the efficacy of nonviolence when faced with a forced dichotomous choice (i.e., nonviolence alone "will work"/ "will NOT work").

In Table 43, we see that UO respondents who possess significant intellectual capital regarding nonviolent history (i.e., knowledge of three or more cases of successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolutions around the world) are much more likely to affirm nonviolent methods alone "will work," as 84.62% of this subgroup did. The relationship here appears much stronger than in the Costa Rica data (Table 42 above), but if we add up all the respondents who answered with 1, 2, and 3 or more correct answers we are left with 66.67% in these categories affirming that nonviolence "will work." This is only about 6% higher than in the Costa Rica data. And again, as in the Costa Rica data, the subgroup of respondents who correctly listed 3 or more (successful/ somewhat

Table 43. UO Data: Cross-Tabs of Q41 (Knowledge of Nonviolent History) and Q6 (Opinion of Efficacy of Nonviolence)

Q41 "Can you name nations that had successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolutions….?"(Please name as many as you can remember.)	Q6 "…Which do you believe, peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods) will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups, or peaceful means alone will NOT work?" (replication of the Gallup World Poll)		
	Will work	Will NOT work	Total
Gave only a wrong answer(s)	2 0.82% (28.57%)	5 3.23% (71.43%)	7 1.76% (100%)
"Don't know" or Left it blank	203 83.54% (60.78%)	131 84.52% (39.22%)	334 83.92% (100%)
1 correct answer	21 8.64% (72.41%)	8 5.16% (27.59%)	29 7.29% (100%)
2 correct answers	6 2.47% (40%)	9 5.81% (60%)	15 3.77% (100%)
3 or more correct answers	11 4.53% (84.62%)	2 1.29% (15.38%)	13 3.27% (100%)
Total	243 100% (61.06%)	155 100% (38.94%)	398 100% (100%)

Notes: Frequency counts and column %; row % in ( ); N=398; if respondents gave one or more correct answers but also some incorrect answers, only the correct answers were counted (thus, the only respondents coded as "Gave only wrong answer(s)" were those who only gave wrong answers)

successful nonviolent cases) is quite small (and the cell sizes are small), comprising only 3.27% of the sample. Again, as in the Costa Rica data, it is striking that a high percentage of respondents (83.54%) who agreed that nonviolent methods alone "will work," could not successfully name a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent case. This raises serious questions about what respondents are thinking about, bringing to mind or recalling from memory, when they contemplate an abstract and general question such as Q6 (a replication of a Gallup World Poll question) which began the survey. If they cannot think of a case or example on which to base their opinion, what are they basing their opinion on? Do they know enough to hold an opinion?

In Figures 7 and 8 we can see how few historical cases are mentioned by at least three respondents. Of course, three respondents constitutes about 1% of sampled Costa Rican students and a little less than 1% (actually .75%) of sampled UO students. In the UO data, the cases receiving the most mentions are India and the USA, while in the Costa Rica, the cases receiving the most mentions are India, Costa Rica, and the USA. In the Costa Rica sample, 25 (8.17%) of respondents listed Costa Rica as an example of a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution, 32 (10.46%) listed India, 15 (4.9%) listed the USA (with a few clarifying that they meant the U.S. civil rights movement), 10 (3.27%) listed Mexico, and 9 (2.94%) listed Argentina. In the UO sample, 31 (7.79%) respondents listed the U.S. as an example of a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution, 27 (6.78%) listed India, 12 (3.02%) listed South Africa, and 5 (1.26%) listed the USSR.

The salience of historical nonviolent memories attached to India and the USA are worth pondering. U.S. hegemony and the predominance of the English language likely

Figure 7. Costa Rican Student Memories of Successful/ Somewhat Successful Nonviolent Revolutions in the 20th and 21st Centuries. Raw numbers (frequency counts). Only cases with 3 or more mentions are graphed. (N= 306)



Figure 8. UO Student Memories of Successful/ Somewhat Successful Nonviolent Revolutions in the 20th and 21st Centuries. Raw numbers (frequency counts). Only Cases with 3 or More Mentions are Graphed. (N=398)



play a role in cross-national cultural diffusion. And, charismatic leaders were attached to both movements in India and U.S. – a factor which appears to be crucial to earning a

lasting place in collective memory (Eddy 2012, Schwartz 2009). But the fact that Gandhi and King were explicitly and consistently committed to principled nonviolence, the type of nonviolence which resonates so strongly with major world religious traditions, likely plays a significant role in their collective memory successes (Eddy 2012). Through several rounds of surveys in the present study, India and the U.S. civil rights movement consistently receive the most mentions when respondents are asked to list successful nonviolent revolutions or movements. The case of India is somewhat ironic since Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) only code India's nonviolent movement as achieving "limited success." While Gandhi certainly had charisma and the media outlets of the British Empire at his disposal, I believe the frequency of mentions this case receives still lends some support to my contention that principled nonviolence resonates more profoundly with observers and thus, it is most likely to compete well in collective memory (Eddy 2012).

During the course of this dissertation, a major cross-national, nonviolent protest movement emerged first in Tunisia and Egypt, spreading throughout much of the Middle East and to the U.S. in the form of Occupy Wall Street. The movements in Tunisia and Egypt were particularly dramatic, rapidly bringing down the Tunisian dictatorship and leading to tense showdowns in Tahrir Square in Cairo (the occupation of the square began on January 25, 2011), the dissolution of the Mubarak dictatorship (he resigned on February 11) and democratic elections (culminating with the inauguration of the democratically elected President Morsi on June 30, 2012). The Egyptian revolution was no smooth path to democracy, as the military junta often sent mixed signals about the path to civilian leadership, but protesters kept the pressure on for reform. Both the

Tunisian and Egyptian movements received very prominent news media coverage in the U.S., but I was interested to see if college students would remember and interpret these movements as "successful nonviolent revolutions."

Additional Surveys Probing Nonviolent/ Violent Capital

On September 27, 2012, the author surveyed an upper-division sociology class (almost all were seniors) at the UO (N=34), asking them to answer open-ended questions listing their historical and contemporary knowledge of nonviolent revolutions (same question as above) as well as nonviolent movements (see Appendix K). The course was "Systems of War and Peace," but not all students had a particularly strong interest in the topic, and the survey was given in the opening minutes of the first day of class for the term. First, students were asked – in a much more direct follow-up to the Gallup World Poll question on nonviolent efficacy: "Can you name some oppressed groups who were suffering from injustice and who improved their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods)? (Please name as many as you can remember.)" Unlike the question below, this question was not included in the main 2010 surveys in the US and Costa Rica (see Appendices A and B). Students responses were as follows: don't know (19, or 55.9%), U.S. civil rights movement under Dr. King (7, or 20.6%), India (3, or 8.8%) [includes: Gandhi (1), "India's boycott of England" (1), "India's Rebellion from Great Britain" (1)], women's movements (3, or 8.8%) [includes women's suffrage (1), women's movements (2)], the gay and lesbian rights movement (2), labor union movements (2), Asian-Americans (1), and "Islamic-Muslim cultures" (1). Second, their responses to the question asking them to list successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolutions were as follows [again, students were invited to list as many as they could

remember]: Don't know (27, or 79.4%), India under Gandhi (4, or 11.8%), Egypt – including one respondent who wrote "Egypt?" (2, or 5.9%), Syria (1), Libya (1), "Sudan?" (1), and "Canada?" (1). Of course, the Syria and Lybia movements of the last two years quickly became violent movements and so far, only the Lybian movement has overthrown the regime.

Comparing the results from the two questions it is clear that case knowledge of nonviolent revolutions is lower than case knowledge of nonviolent social justice movements/ campaigns of the oppressed. It is also possible that students may be confused by the term "revolution," especially when used in connection with nonviolent movements. This could have led to the under-reporting of knowledge of nonviolent revolutions in the main 2010 survey. Indeed, in the 2012 survey question which asked about oppressed groups using nonviolent methods, rather than "nonviolent revolutions," respondents reported a higher percentage of case knowledge, as the "don't knows" fell to about 56% (as opposed to the 79% who were ignorant of cases of "nonviolent revolution").

The relatively low reporting of the U.S. civil rights movement (20.6%) is remarkable. And, given the widespread media coverage of the "Arab Spring," the absence of Tunisia in student lists and the extremely low reporting of Egypt (5.9%) is very surprising. It suggests students do not follow the news, or for some reason, did not perceive these as nonviolent movements/ revolutions. As of early February 2013, the Egyptian case looks messy and the future uncertain. It may be that even knowledgeable students would hesitate at this point to call the Egypt's nonviolent revolution a "success." Yet, many new democracies undergo such serious strains and conflicts. Snyder (2000)

found that new democracies are at greater risk for civil war, especially ethnic wars. Several studies find that instability, including moves both toward and away from democracy elevate the risk of civil war, but "moves away from democracy are much more strongly associated with civil war onset in the next year than moves toward it" (Hegre et al. 2001, Fearon and Laitin 2003, p.85 n.32). Compared to the ongoing violent civil war in Syria, Egypt since Tahrir Square has been a beacon of hope. Imperfect and struggling - yes, but the loss of life has been minimal. All of this supports the line of questioning begun above.

Why is intellectual capital about nonviolent movements so scarce? Perhaps it is the case, as one expert qualitative interviewer has concluded, that people carry around in their heads "not the stuff of experience but the conclusions they have drawn" (Rabiger 2004, p.340). That is, specific historical knowledge and facts are often lacking, but general opinions and theories of the way the world works are present in some form. Nevertheless, the complete lack of *case knowledge* which the majority of respondents confessed to in the surveys is breathtaking, lending credence to Bourdieu's (1972) contention that "public opinion does not exist." Might students possess equally scarce knowledge of cases of "successful" violence, war, or revolution? Can they name cases where they believe violence "worked," or cases where targeting and killing civilians was justified? The latter question asks for more qualitative data to probe more deeply into the question from the Gallup World Poll: are attitudes on this Gallup World Poll item based on relatively informed opinion? Further, can students name cases where diplomacy "worked"? Do they perceive that international organizations and international treaties have helped to build peace – and can they name some of them?

Building on these observations and questions, and seeking to uncover more fully the attitudes probed by the three key questions on violence/ nonviolence in the Gallup World Poll, a third survey was conducted with a few additional open-ended questions. Students were asked to list examples of cases which indicate their degree of historical and contemporary knowledge of nonviolent movements, nonviolent revolution, and diplomacy, as well as war and revolutionary violence (see Appendix K). An upper-division sociology course (most were seniors or juniors) at the UO was surveyed on the first day of class in the winter term, January 8, 2013. The results, reported in Table 44, suggest patterns in the intellectual and historical capital of students, and provides a basis for theorizing about how student beliefs are linked to knowledge of historical and contemporary cases of nonviolence and violence.

Table 44. Survey of Knowledge of Violent and Nonviolent Historical Episodes (N=61)

Survey question	**Most frequently listed answers (% of respondents listing the case)**	**Don't know (%)**
Can you name oppressed groups who improved their situation by peaceful means alone?	24.6% U.S. civil rights movement 18% India led by Gandhi 13.1% Women's rights/ suffrage 9.8% Gay rights movement	47.5%
Can you name nations with successful/ somewhat successful *non*violent revolutions?	13.1% India 8.2% U.S.[a] 4.9% South Africa 4.9% Egypt 3.3% fall of USSR	77%
Can you name nations with successful/ somewhat successful *violent* revolutions?	44.3% American Revolution[b] 23% French Revolution[b] 18% Russian Revolution[b] 14.8% Egypt[c] 14.8% Germany[b] 4.9% Nazi Germany[b] 9.8% China 9.8% Iran/ 1979 Iranian Revolution[d] 9.8% Vietnam 8.2% Cuba 8.2% Libya 3.3% Tunisia[c]	26.2%
Can you name *specific wars* when violent methods have "worked" in resolving conflicts in world history?	52.5% WWII 6.6% Atomic bombs dropped on Japan to end WWII 21.3% WWI 19.7% US civil war 11.5% American Revolutionary War 8.2% Vietnam	26.2%
Can you name cases where diplomacy "worked" in resolving conflicts in world history?	19.7% Cold War/ US and Russia 3.3% Cuban Missile Crisis 1.6% Northern Ireland	68.9%

Survey question	Most frequently listed answers (% of respondents listing the case)	Don't know (%)
Can you name international treaty (or several treaties) that you think ensures a more peaceful world?	6.6% Geneva Accords 6.6% Treaty of Versailles[e] 3.3% Nuclear arms treaty	70.5%
Can you name international organization (or several organizations) that you think ensures a relatively more peaceful world?	31.1% United Nations 8.2% Peace Corps 6.6% NATO 3.3% Amnesty International 3.3% NAFTA	42.6%
Can you name a case where targeting and killing civilians was justified?	6.6% Atomic bombs dropped on Japan to end WWII 6.6% If civilians aid enemy combatants 1.6% Collateral damage 1.6% If enemy killed your civilians first	31.1% No, I can't think of a specific case 37.7% I don't think that can be justified

Notes: UO Survey conducted by author on Jan 8, 2013; See Appendix K for specific question wording; On each question, students were asked to list as many as they could think of; On each question, some students listed erroneous cases, but in most cases these were mixed with correct answers. [a] = It seems here that some students conceived as the US civil rights movement as a "revolution." [b] = In actuality, the early and definitive stages (according to John Adams, the second U.S. President, among others (Kurlansky 2006, Schell 2003)) of the American Revolutionary War were largely nonviolent, but this recognition is extremely rare among the mass public, and even scholars, at the present time. Similarly, the Russian Revolution (of 1917) was accomplished with nonviolent action. This was not even perceived by many observers at the time because it flew in the face of revolutionary theory which assumed, as an article of faith, that violence was essential, and also because the Bolsheviks used violence to consolidate their regime after gaining power (Schell 2003, pp.175-183). Similarly, during the French Revolution, the stage of overthrow was bloodless, but the stage of foundation was bloody: "The revolutionaries would be more violent toward one another than they had been toward the old regime" (p.167). In the case of Germany, 4.9% of respondents specifically wrote "Nazi Germany," and we cannot be sure how many of those who just wrote "Germany" were actually thinking of the Nazis' rise to power. But in fact, the Nazis rose to power through the creation of parallel hierarchies/ institutions, strategically it was an almost Gandhian "constructive program," and through democratic elections. And, "Hitler even bragged about the nonviolence of his revolution...Hitler claimed that it had been 'the least bloody revolution in history'" (p.184). [c] = The listing of Egypt and Tunisia as violent revolutions indicates a serious misperception of contemporary events, as these cases were nonviolent revolutions with only some outbreaks of limited violence by unarmed demonstrators, in most cases after they were provoked by pro-government thugs. [d] = Similarly, respondents erred by listing Iran here. In actuality, the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 was nonviolent – it was a clear case of an "unarmed insurrection" (Schock 2005, p.3), and of "people power" (p.1). [e] = This treaty ended WWI, but is widely considered as a leading cause of WWII (hence, to list it here was erroneous).

The key finding from the table above is that respondent knowledge of violent events was much higher. By a wide margin, respondents were more likely to list "don't know" on the items asking for knowledge of nonviolent movements, nonviolent revolutions, treaties, diplomacy, and organizations that ensure a more peaceful world. It seems our culture reproduces collective memories of war much more effectively than memories of peaceful events and institutions. The listing of Egypt and Tunisia as violent revolutions by some respondents seems to indicate a failure to perceive these cases as the *non*violent revolutions that they were. This may involve a failure to recognize that limited violence, or minor street skirmishes, are a far cry from a bloody violent revolution.

Knowledge of Gandhi. In the primary survey (conducted 2010), an additional question probed respondent knowledge of some of the broad outlines of Gandhi's biography. Namely, in an open-ended question, would respondents report awareness that he personally led nonviolent movements in both South Africa and India? Again, this question was deemed significant since there is some evidence that collective memory processes tend to reduce and compress memories of historical episodes and social movements to the biographies of leaders (Eddy 2012, Schwartz 2009). As the 20th century's most iconic nonviolent leader, knowledge of Gandhi's biography is an important test of nonviolent capital.

As above, in Q37, respondents who answered with one correct answer and one wrong answer were coded as "1 correct answer." In the Costa Rica data, many respondents in this category did offer one wrong answer as respondent guesses ranged from England (by far the most common wrong answer) to the USA, Germany, Tibet, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and China. Only three respondents offered only "wrong answer(s)." Surprisingly, a few respondents who fell in the "1 correct answer" category, did not name India (the nation Gandhi is most commonly associated with), but did name "Africa." Similarly, some named "Africa and Asia." This only happened in a few cases, but coding was generous here, giving respondents the benefit of the doubt. The question asked them to name nations, but as a hint and a clarifying detail, the question told them that Gandhi led nonviolent movements on two different continents. It seems some respondents may have misread the question and answered with continents, or they may have only known the continent or continents and not known the nations in which Gandhi led movements.

As depicted in Table 45 below, in the UO data for Q40 (Q37 in the Costa Rica data), 13.15% of the sample provided the two correct answers (South Africa and India), whereas in the Costa Rica data only 2.24% of respondents were able to provide the two correct answers. Meanwhile, in the UO data, 28.29% provided one correct answer (in almost all cases "India"), whereas in the Costa Rica data 36.86% provided one correct answer (in almost all cases "India"). The higher percentage of UO respondents who could provide two correct answers is likely due to the fact that a few weeks prior to the administration of this survey, the professor in this sociology course had lectured on Gandhi's theories of power and mentioned some details of Gandhi's biography. Given this coincidence, it is surprising that evidence of knowledge in the UO sample did not rise above the Costa Rican sample more significantly. In both the UO and Costa Rica samples only about 40% in each sample were able to name either one or two of the nations in which Gandhi led nonviolent movements in.Furthermore, the fact that only 27 UO students named India in Q41 above suggests that UO student knowledge of Gandhi's movements and understanding of them as "successful/ somewhat successful" nonviolent movements is quiet tentative and incomplete, even though 114 UO students could name the location of one of Gandhi's movements (usually India) and 53 could name both India and South Africa (as seen in Table 45 below).

In the Costa Rica data, cross tabs with Q37 and Q6 (not depicted here) were similar to the cross tabs of Q41 and Q6 (see above) in the Costa Rica data: rudimentary knowledge of Gandhi's biography (an imperfect proxy measure of respondent familiarity with nonviolent history) had a very weak association with how respondents answered Q6. The only cells large enough to interpret in the Costa Rica cross tabs concerns those who

Table 45. Student Knowledge of Gandhi's Nonviolent Movements

(Q37 in CR/ Q40 in UO data): Gandhi was a leader of nonviolent protest movements that achieved some degree of success in two different nations (on two different continents). Can you name these two nations that he personally lived in and led nonviolent protest movements in?		
Answer	**Costa Rica** (N=312)	**UO** (N=403)
Gave only wrong answer(s)	3 0.96%	7 1.74%
"Don't know" or LB	187 59.94%	229 56.82%
One correct answer	115 36.86%	114 28.29%
Two correct answers	7 2.24%	53 13.15%

Notes: Frequency count and column %; Correct answers: South Africa and India

provided one correct answer (37.58% of the sample) and those who checked "don't know"/ left it blank (59.15% of the sample). The Costa Rican respondents who provided one correct answer were only about 3% higher than the "don't knows" in their affirmation that nonviolence "will work" (in Q6). In the same crosstabs (Q40 and Q6) of the UO data, the impact of rudimentary nonviolent intellectual capital appears larger (see Table 46 below). In the UO data, those who gave one correct answer were 5% higher in

Table 46. UO Data: Cross-Tabulation of Q40 (Knowledge of Gandhi's Nonviolent History) and Q6 (Opinion of Efficacy of Nonviolence)

Q40 "Gandhi was a leader of nonviolent protest movements that achieved some degree of success in two different nations (on two different continents). Can you name these two nations that he personally lived in and led nonviolent protest movements in?	Q6 "…Which do you believe, peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods) will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups, or peaceful means alone will NOT work?" (replication of the Gallup World Poll)		
	Will work	Will NOT work	Total
Gave only a wrong answer(s)	2 0.82% (28.57%)	5 3.23% (71.43%)	7 1.76% (100%)
"Don't know" or LB	129 53.09% (56.33%)	100 64.52% (43.67%)	229 57.54% (100%)
1 correct answer	74 30.45% (66.07%)	38 24.52% (33.93%)	112 28.14% (100%)
2 correct answers	38 15.64% (76%)	12 7.74% (24%)	50 12.56% (100%)
Total	243 100% (61.06%)	155 100% (38.94%)	398 100% (100%)

Notes: Frequency counts, column %, (row %); N=398; if respondents gave one or more correct answers but also some incorrect answers, only the correct answers were counted (thus, the only respondents coded as "Gave only wrong answer(s)" were those who only gave wrong answers); LB = left it blank (No answer)

affirming the efficacy of nonviolence (in Q6) than the overall sample average of 61.06% (and 10% higher than the "don't knows"), while those who gave 2 right answers were 15% higher than the overall sample average (and 20% higher than the "don't knows") in affirming the efficacy of nonviolence (as measured in Q6).

An additional question (Q38) sought to tap knowledge of Gandhian nonviolence as articulated in his concept of satyagraha. Only three respondents in Costa Rica responded to Q38 by writing that satyagraha was an "ideology of nonviolence," but none offered more specifics like truth-force or soul-force. Because of this result, the question was deemed too difficult and dropped in preparation for the UO survey.

It might be assumed that the history of war, especially a putatively "good war" like World War II was for the U.S., would be more thoroughly taught in the school system than the history of nonviolence. And in the case of Latin America, we might assume that the history of an iconic rebel soldier like Che Guevara , would be more thoroughly taught and better remembered by respondents than nonviolent history.

Additional knowledge of history/ current events. UO respondents were also asked a question (Q38) designed to tap student knowledge of some of the context and causes of the September 11th terrorist attack on the United States, perhaps the paradigmatic event of our time, and an event that occurred while the majority of the current cohort of university students were in elementary school. In essence, their knowledge, or lack of knowledge about this event can be credited to or blamed on their high school education and the socialization provided by our public and private school systems in general.

However, current events, partly because of their controversial nature, are notoriously left out of high school curriculum and history textbooks (Loewen 2007). Up until recently, the scarce coverage of the Vietnam War in high school U.S. history classes and textbooks were key evidence of this practice, and to some degree this trend continues because the U.S. was not victorious in Vietnam (Leahey 2010, Loewen 2007). But if the Vietnam War is often given little coverage, we might expect student retention of World War II, the "good war," to be much better. After all, coverage of this war receives pride of place in many U.S. history textbooks, and wars in general are thought to provide the drama and story lines that make for engaging history. One question (Q39) sought to probe student knowledge of World War II, though admittedly, the question is relatively tough since Americans are not accustomed to thinking about their role in the international arena in terms of multilateral alliances. Indeed, remembering World War II in terms of "powerful" U.S. allies seems almost counter-cultural.

Table 47 depicts respondent knowledge about the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks. Since 15 of the 19 hijackers were citizens of Saudi Arabia, the correct answer here is clearly Saudi Arabia. Those who were coded as "don't know" primarily includes respondents who checked the "don't know" box, but also a few respondents who left the question blank, and the following two answers that were counted as incorrect because the question specifically asked for a nation: 11 wrote Al Queda, and 4 wrote Islam/ Muslims. The "Other nation" category included the following frequency counts: USA (8), Pakistan (5), Iran (4), Sudan (2), and Egypt (1). Respondents would have been in about 4th grade when the September 11th, 2001 attacks occurred. Guided by the elite cues of the Bush Administration, public discourse in the weeks and years following the

attacks have ignored the Saudi Arabian connection. For this reason, the question should be considered somewhat difficult, and the results corroborate that assessment, with only 16% providing the correct answer.

Table 47: Proxy Question Probing Knowledge of the Context/ Causes of September 11th

Q38. Can you name the nation that most of the September 11th airplane hijackers were citizens of? (Open-ended question; no answers provided by survey)		
Answer given	**Freq.**	**%**
Saudi Arabia (*the only correct answer to the question as phrased*)	65	16.13
Iraq	45	11.17
Afghanistan	116	28.78
Other nation	23	5.71
Don't know	154	38.21
Total	403	100

Note: "Don't know" includes a few respondents who left the question blank and 15 answers considered incorrect because they did not name a nation as the question asked for.

Since respondents are recent high school graduates and high school history textbooks offer extensive coverage of World War II, the "good" war, it was considered worth probing their memory of the war through one proxy indicator. The results in Table 48 show that the majority of respondents remember *some* of the broad details of World War II.

Table 48. Proxy Question for Knowledge of World War II

Q39. Can you name from 1 to 4 of the biggest (and most powerful) allies of the United States during World War II? (Open-ended question; no answers provided by survey)		
Answer given	**Frequency**	**%**
One correct	76	18.86
Two correct	41	10.17
Three or more correct	86	21.34
Don't know	164	40.69
Some correct, some very wrong	30	7.44
Only wrong answer(s)	6	1.49
Total	403	100

Note: Of course, Britain was counted as correct, but only one additional British Commonwealth nation was counted as valid in addition to the UK/ England/ Britain. Thus, respondents who listed: UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand only received credit for 2 correct answers. The British Commonwealth was one of the four big Allies, but it was decided in coding that listing all of the relatively small commonwealth nations while failing to list Russia and China should not be considered as comprehensive knowledge of the Allies in World War II.

In comparison with the historical questions detailed above, it seems UO students do possess knowledge of issues that interest them and perhaps affect their lives, in at least

superficial ways by binding them together with peers and others in the community. There is little doubt that awareness of the football team's recent games offers knowledge which can be a social lubricant on campus, in the local community, and beyond. In Q51, depicted in Table 49, we see that 281 (72%) respondents could correctly identify the last names of the UO quarterback, star running back, and field goal kicker (in that order). Twenty-three (6%) respondents were tricked by an inability to distinguish between the quarterback and running back positions, but did select the correct set of names. Eleven (3%) respondents were tricked by the list which included last years UO quarterback and two more erroneous names (names of star players from other Pac-10 Conference football teams) for the other positions. Only three more respondents were tricked by other erroneous name lists.

Table 49. Knowledge of the UO Football Team (UO survey)

Q51. Can you select the correct last names for the current UO quarterback, star running back, and field goal kicker (IN THAT ORDER)?		
Answer options	**Freq.**	**%**
Don't know	73	18.67
Polk, Price, Folk	1	0.26
Price, Polk, Folk	0	0
James, Thomas, Beard	23	5.88
Thomas, James, Beard*	281	71.87
Brehaut, Franklin, Forbath	1	0.26
Luck, Taylor, Jones	0	0
Taylor, Luck, Whitaker	1	0.26
Masoli, Jones, Kahut	11	2.81

Note: * = the correct answer

In open-ended questions, Costa Rican respondents were asked to report their broad knowledge of the biography of Che Guevara and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (in 2003). These items, the results of which are depicted in Table 50, were designed to test knowledge of war, one of the traditional emphases of history as taught in schools around the world. Because the Costa Rican government initially signed onto the "Coalition of the Willing" in support of the Iraq War and this sparked a public outcry and rapid exit from

Table 50. Costa Rican Student Knowledge of Salient Historical Events

Answers	Can you name some nations that supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (in 2003) by sending soldiers from their own military forces?	Che Guevara was part of armed revolutionary groups in several nations. Can you name some or all of them?
Don't know/ Left blank/ Wrong answer	67%	78%
1 correct	16%	10%
2 correct	10%	10%
3 or more correct	7%	2%

the Coalition, it was expected that Costa Rican respondents would perform well on the Iraq War question. As can be seen above, the results indicate weak collective memory/ knowledge of the war. Similarly, despite a raft of recent films about Che Guevara, the ubiquitous t-shirt iconography of Che in Latin American and throughout the world (indeed, one photo of Guevara has been ranked "the most famous photograph in the world" (BBC 2001, May 26), few respondent reported knowledge of the broad outlines of Che's biography (as operationalized here). The correct answers here were Cuba, Bolivia, and the Congo, but Guevara was also involved nonviolently in Arbenz's reform movement in Guatemala.

Overall Tally: Costa Rican Versus U.S. University Students

Both samples were exposed to 53 "identical" items testing violent/ nonviolent attitudes. Of course, the items were not strictly identical because of translation into Spanish for the Costa Rican survey, format differences (the UO survey was an internet survey, while the Costa Rican survey was pen and paper), and a few item additions to the UO survey (Q10, Q11, and Q12) which preceded the elite quotes section in the UO survey only. The identical violent/ nonviolent attitude items in the surveys were (using UO survey numbering): Q4, Q5, Q6, Q7 (4 items), Q8 (5 items), Q9 (34 items), Q13 and Q14 (the elite quotes sections, in which 7 of the same quotes were tested in both

samples), and Q34 (1 item). The UO mean was more peaceful on two items (Q7.1 and item #4 of the elite quotes section, though in hindsight, that question was considered very problematic as a test of nonviolent/ violent attitudes, and so was not counted in the overall tally (see above)), and on one item (Q6) the two sample means were the same (a tie). Of the 52 items considered valid, the Costa Rican mean was more peaceful on 50 (96.2%) of the items. The differences were statistically significant in 48 out of the 52 items(92.3%).

Individual-Level Data: Do the Gallup World Poll Questions Provide "Keystone" Indicators of Violent/ Nonviolent Attitudes?

The survey was partly designed to probe whether the three Gallup World Poll questions on nonviolent attitudes hold validity as "keystone" indicators of generalized nonviolent attitudes that hold across a range of dimensions and interpersonal, communal, and international levels. Below, we test that assumption. One reason this inquiry is important is because up until now, the Gallup World Poll offers the largest global sample of violent/ nonviolent attitudes.

It is worth briefly considering the structure and biases of these three questions. First, note that all three questions are dichotomous, and force respondents to take a position (but see Appendix L for a methodological note). Second, the questions were carefully constructed to avoid social desirability bias. By stating that "Some people think...while others think...," respondents are essentially encouraged to view both choices as socially legitimate opinions. Third, Q4 and Q6 are already skewed towards a peaceful end of the spectrum of attitudes. That is, the choices given are "never justified" and "sometimes justified." A full spectrum of attitudes would be better represented by a

continuum of choices between two extremes: “never justified” and “often justified” or even “always justified.” Hence, the survey was constructed with the assumption that very few people would select the extremes of “always justified” or even “often justified.” Clearly, the implicit assumption is that world publics are already heavily tilted towards the peaceful end of the spectrum such that at least some forms of violence (i.e., targeting civilians) tend to be seen as either “sometimes” or “never justified.”

Below in Table 51, we see that when we split the sample into two groups according to their answer on Q4, a dichotomous choice (never/ sometimes justified), these two groups remain significantly different across all five indexes of violent/ nonviolent attitudes. Moreover, the mean scores for the group affirming “never justified” are more peaceful on all five indexes.

Table 51. *T*-Tests of Individual Responses to State Terrorism Question with Violent/ Nonviolent Indexes (UO Sample)

Index	Q4 military attacks on civilians – justified? (n)	$\bar{x}$ / $\bar{x}^2$	*SD*	df	*t*	$\bar{x} - \bar{x}^2$
militarism	Never (n=302)	2.86	.43	373	4.79	.27****
	Sometimes (n=73)	2.59	.42			
nonviolence	Never (n=299)	2.73	.46	368	3.54	.21***
	Sometimes (n=71)	2.52	.38			
interpersonal violence	Never (n=319)	2.72	.47	390	4.09	.25***
	Sometimes (n=73)	2.47	.46			
just war	Never (n=306)	2.35	.50	375	3.21	.20**
	Sometimes (n=71)	2.15	.44			
realpolitiks	Never (n=310)	2.44	.44	381	4.42	.25****
	Sometimes (n=73)	2.19	.44			

Notes: *N*= 392; $\bar{x}$= Mean.Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; Using the robvar command in Stata, the two groups were found to have equal variances on all items. On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent (some items were reverse coded); 2.5 is the midpoint; Values of answers: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); *Data source*: Survey of Attitude Towards Conflict (Eddy 2010), University of Oregon sample

Below in Table 52, we see that when we split the sample into two groups according to their answer on Q5, a dichotomous choice (never/ sometimes justified), these two groups remain significantly different across four of the five indexes of violent/

nonviolent attitudes, but on several items the significance is not as robust as we observed in Table 51. Moreover, the mean scores for the group affirming "never justified" are more peaceful on all five indexes.

Below in Table 53, we see that when we split the sample into two groups

Table52. *T*-Tests of Individual Responses to Terrorism Question with Violent/ Nonviolent Indexes (UO Sample)

Index	Q5 individual attacks on civilians – justified? (n)	*M*	*SD*	df	*t*	$\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$
militarism	Never (n=320)	2.84	.44	373	3.84	.24***
	Sometimes (n=55)	2.6	.39			
nonviolence	Never (n=314)	2.69	.46	368	.31	.02
	Sometimes (n=56)	2.67	.40			
interpersonal violence	Never (n=336)	2.72	.47	390	4.63	.32****
	Sometimes (n=56)	2.40	.44			
just war	Never (n=322)	2.34	.50	375	2.40	.17*
	Sometimes (n=55)	2.17	.48			
realpolitiks	Never (n=327)	2.42	.45	381	2.19	.14*
	Sometimes (n=56)	2.28	.44			

Notes: N= 392; $\bar{x}$= Mean.Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; Using the robvar command in Stata, the two groups were found to have equal variances on all items. On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent (some items were reverse coded); 2.5 is the midpoint; Values of answers: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); *Data source*: Survey of Attitude Towards Conflict (Eddy 2010), University of Oregon sample

Table53. *T*-Tests of Individual Responses to Gallup World Poll Nonviolence Question with Violent/ Nonviolent Indexes (UO Sample)

Index	Q6 peaceful means alone – will work? (n)	*M*	*SD*	df	*t*	$\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$
militarism	Will work (n=229)	2.86	.44	368	2.90	.14**
	Will not work (n=141)	2.72	.43			
nonviolence	Will work (n=224)	2.77	.47	364	4.46	.21****
	Will not work (n=142)	2.56	.40			
interpersonal violence	Will work (n=235)	2.73	.48	386	2.84	.14**
	Will not work (n=153)	2.59	.47			
just war	Will work (n=228)	2.37	.51	372	2.61	.13**
	Will not work (n=146)	2.24	.46			
realpolitiks	Will work (n=234)	2.47	.46	334.26	4.31	.20****
	Will not work (n=146)	2.27	.41			

Notes: N= 388; $\bar{x}$= Mean. Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; Using the robvar command in Stata, the two groups were found to have equal variances on all items, except on realpolitiks (Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom is reported). On this item, the "unequal" t-test command was specified in Stata. On means: 4 is more peaceful; 1 is more violent (some items were reverse coded); 2.5 is the midpoint; Values of answers: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4); *Data source*: Survey of Attitude Towards Conflict (Eddy 2010), UO sample

according to their answer on Q6, a dichotomous choice (will/ will not work), these two groups remain significantly different across all five indexes of violent/ nonviolent attitudes. Moreover, the mean scores for the group affirming "will work" are more peaceful on all five indexes. A further test of the strength of association between the indexes and the Gallup "keystone" questions was conducted through regression analyses.

Each of the indexes were regressed on the binary variable Q4 (i.e., the indexes serve as the dependent variable and the binary as the independent variable), and R-squared was interpreted as a measure of the strength of association. It was found that on average, all of the index scores were significantly associated with Q4 responses at or near the .001 level.

In the UO data, Q4 predicts the most variance in the Militarism Index, with 5.5% (Adjusted R^2 = .0554) of the variance in militarism scores associated with Q4 responses (see Table 54). As expected, Q6 predicts the most variance in the Nonviolence Index.

Table 54. OLS Regression – Testing the Capacity of "Keystone" Gallup World Poll and Pew Global Attitudes Survey Questions to Predict Scores in the Violent/ Nonviolent Indexes (UO Survey Data)

Index	Q4 (military attacks on civilians)		Q5 (individual attacks on civilians)		Q6 (efficacy of peaceful means)		Q9_33 (military force not necessary)	
	B (SE)	Adj R^2	B (SE)	Adj R^2	B (SE)	Adj R^2	B (SE)	Adj R^2
militarism	-.27 (.06)****	.0554	-.24 (.06)**	.0354	-.14 (.05)**	.0197	.26 (.04)****	.1148
nonviolence	-.21 (.06)***	.0303	-.02 (.07)	-.0025	-.21 (.05)****	.0492	.24 (.04)****	.1045
interpersonal violence	-.25 (.06)***	.0387	-.31 (.07)****	.0498	-.14 (.05)**	.0180	.11 (.04)**	.0148
just war	-.21 (.06)**	.0241	-.17 (.07)*	.0125	-.14 (.05)	.0153	.27 (.04)****	.1038
realpolitiks	-.25 (.06)****	.0463	-.14 (.06)*	.0099	-.20 (.05)****	.0443	.47 (.03)****	.3931

Notes: *N*= 392; B=unstandardized regression coefficient; SE= Standard Error; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; Q4, Q5, Q6 are reproduced from Gallup World Poll 2008; Q9_33 is reproduced from Pew Global Attitudes 2007 survey

The relatively low amount of variance accounted for on each item in Table 54 is explained by the dichotomous nature of these questions (Q4, Q5, and Q6) which provides less leverage in accounting for the diversity of opinions that exist on violence/ nonviolence – especially in the UO sample. In other words, the diversity of opinions was better captured by the 4-point Likert scale from which the violent/ nonviolent indexes are drawn, and it is not surprising that the binary variables (Q4, Q5, and Q6) had little power (though in most cases it was statistically significant) in predicting that variation. This is clearly demonstrated by the Q9_33 regressions. Q9_33 reproduced an item from the Pew Global Attitudes 2007 survey which asked respondents their level of agreement/ disagreement with the statement: "It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world." Respondents confronted a 4-point Likert scale (Completely agree, Mostly agree, Mostly disagree, and Completely disagree). With the aim of closely replicating this question, respondents in the UO and Costa Rica surveys confronted a 4-point Likert scale: Strongly Agree (1); Agree (2); Disagree (3); Strongly Disagree (4). Our results show that Q9_33 (the Pew question) is associated with much more of the variance in the violent/ nonviolent indexes than the Gallup World Poll questions, as Q9_33 is associated with 11% of the variance in the Militarism Index, 10% of the Nonviolence Index, and a robust 39% of the variance in the Realpolitiks Index. The latter makes good theoretical sense as maintaining "order" carries a nuance that resonates with the ideology of realpolitiks. Clearly, the Pew item and its 4-point Likert scale helps explain much more variance in violent/ nonviolent attitudes than the dichotomous Gallup World Poll questions. Hence, the Pew item is much closer to being a "keystone" question

on violent/ nonviolent attitudes and this is likely related to the use of a 4-point Likert scale.

Again, in the UO sample, Q4 predicts the most variance in the Militarism Index, with 5.5% (Adjusted $R^2 = .0554$) of the variance in militarism scores associated with Q4 responses. In the Costa Rica sample (not depicted here), Q4 also predicts the most variance in the Militarism Index, with 10.2% (Adjusted $R^2 = .1021$) of the variance in militarism scores associated with Q4 responses. Similarly, in the UO sample, Q6 (the efficacy of peaceful means question) predicts the most variance in the Nonviolence Index, with 4.9% (Adjusted $R^2 = .0492$) of the variance in nonviolence scores associated with Q6 responses. In the Costa Rica sample, Q6 predicts the most variance in the Nonviolence Index, with 7.9% (Adjusted $R^2 = .0786$) of the variance in nonviolence scores associated with Q6 responses.

Additionally, in a regression analysis of the Costa Rica sample, the Pew item achieves significance at the .0001 level on all three violent/ nonviolent indexes. The Pew item is associated with 7.3% of the variance in the Nonviolence Index, 12% of the variance in the Just War Index, and a robust 45.2% of the variance in the Militarism Index. Thus, in the Costa Rica sample, the Pew item is a better "predictor" than the Gallup World Poll questions of scores on the Militarism Index, but not of scores on the Nonviolent Index, where the Pew item (Q9_33) and Q6 explained roughly the same amount of variance in the Nonviolent Index. This is likely because Costa Rican attitudes as a whole lean decisively towards nonviolence and a dichotomous question like Q6 can capture the diversity (or lack thereof) of opinions as effectively as a 4-point Likert scale (e.g., Q9_33).

In the UO sample, when all three independent variables (Q4, Q5, Q6) are added in a multiple regression model, these three questions are associated with 7.5% of the variance in the Militarism Index, 7.5% in the Nonviolence Index, 7.4% in the Interpersonal Violence Index, 3.4% in the Just War Index, and 8.3% in the Realpolitiks Index. In the Costa Rica sample, when all three independent variables (Q4, Q5, Q6) are added in a multiple regression model, these three questions are associated with 14.4% of the variance in the Nonviolence Index, 10.7% of the variance in the Militarism Index, and 12.7% of the variance in the Just War index. It seems the "keystone" questions explain more variance in the Costa Rica sample because, on average, there is less variance in Costa Rican attitudes and peaceful attitudes predominate.

Overall, it is difficult to assert that the Gallup World Poll presents us with three keystone questions on violent/ nonviolent attitudes. While t-tests showed that these three questions were significantly associated with variations in most of the more comprehensive violent/ nonviolent attitude indexes, the three questions do not robustly predict variance in attitudes very robustly, especially in the U.S. sample where attitudes were found to vary more than in Costa Rica. Again, this is likely linked to the dichotomous nature of the Gallup World Poll questions, and as a result, the Pew Global Attitudes question with its 4-point Likert scale explains much more variance in the violent/ nonviolent attitude indexes.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF VALUES, SDO, AND OTHER VARIABLES

Schwartz Values

Numerous psychological studies have concluded that "values are more likely to create than to be created by perceptions" (Aalberg 2003, p.94). A growing body of

research by Schwartz and his colleagues has revitalized the study of values as predictors of numerous attitudes. Values are conceptualized as guiding principles in people's lives. Schwartz (2007) theorizes that values are beliefs tied to emotion, a motivational construct (i.e., abstract goals people strive for), a source of standards or criteria aiding routine evaluations in the social world, and as a system of ordering priorities hierarchically (Schwartz 2007). The core ten values and the survey instrument were refined through 210 samples in 67 nations between 1988 and 2002 (Schwartz 1992, 1994b). The ten Schwartz Values have been further validated or partially validated in several additional cross-national studies (Boehnke and Schwartz 1997; Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz 2008; Schwartz and Boehnke 2004; Spini 2003). Schwartz and Sagiv (1995) conclude, "there is substantial support for the claim that 10 motivationally distinct value types are recognized across cultures and used to express value priorities" (p.113). Table 55 below

Table 55. Core Goals of the Motivational Types in the Schwartz Values Scheme

Motivational Types	Core Goals
POWER	Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources
ACHIEVEMENT	Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards
HEDONISM	Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself
STIMULATION	Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life
SELF-DIRECTION	Independent thought and action – choosing, creating, exploring
UNIVERSALISM	Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature
BENEVOLENCE	Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact
TRADITION	Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self
CONFORMITY	Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms
SECURITY	Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of self

Source: Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz (2008)

details the core goals of the motivational types, while Appendix M details the questions which operationalize each Schwartz value.

Because the ten Schwartz Values are susceptible to multicolinearity, it is advisable to enter only up to eight centered values as predictors in the regression, and thus to exclude at least two values *a priori* on theoretical grounds (Schwartz 2011). Previous research by Mayton, Peters, and Owens (1999) found that five of the Schwartz values significantly correlated with militaristic attitudes (including POWER, ACHIEVEMENT, HEDONISM, SECURITY, and CONFORMITY), while the five remaining values (STIMULATION, SELF-DIRECTION, TRADITION, BENEVOLENCE, and UNIVRSALISM) were not significantly associated with militarism. However, BENEVOLENCE and UNIVERSALISM were the only values negatively associated with militarism, and it was considered theoretically sound to include these variables on tests of the nonviolence index. In an exploratory mode, only two values were excluded from regression analyses, SELF-DIRECTION and STIMULATION. These two values were considered less theoretically salient on issues of violence and nonviolence.

Research by Kakkad (2005) found that nonviolence related negatively with the value types of POWER and HEDONISM as well as SDO (see below). Nonviolence correlated positively with the value types of UNIVERSALISM and BENEVOLENCE. However, Kakkad operationalized nonviolence by utilizing the Nonviolence Test (NVT) (Kool and Sen 1984; Kool 2008).

The present author considered the NVT far too limited and susceptible to social desirability bias. For instance, respondents are likely to give the more mature answer in

the following: Q60: “When I am in a bad mood I...a. feel like smashing things; b. relax and tell myself things will get better.” The NVT ignores international relations and social movements and instead focuses on self-control and anti-punitiveness. Thus, it does not suit the goal of identifying common ideologies of violence/ nonviolence. Many of the NVT items probe whether respondents favor restorative justice over punitive justice. But the survey instrument can be fairly accused of holding a naive faith in restorative justice, while neglecting complexities. For instance, Q57 reads: “A clergyman who is involved in immoral behavior should... a. be allowed to return to his/ her position in the church after he/ she repents and changes his/ her ways; b. never be allowed to return to his/ her position in the church.” The “A” answer was coded nonviolent. A similar question on teachers appears in Q53, but a “sex crime” is specified. Once again, the answer coded as nonviolent is the less punitive option, but highly unrealistic. Consider also Q51: “All citizens should be allowed to carry weapons...a. only when there is a war; b. to defend themselves.” The “A” answer was coded as nonviolent. Of course, this is highly problematic because pacifists would obviously object to coding this as nonviolent. Only a just war adherent, or someone subscribing to militarism or political realism ideology, would be comfortable with this answer. The forced-choice dichotomous questions are also problematic.

The internal reliabilities of the Schwartz values indices were obtained for the merged (UO and Costa Rica) data set, and the separate samples (see Table 56). Testing the separate samples is important because exploratory factor analyses on the data have verified that the structure of attitudes towards violence and nonviolence in the two nations are distinct. On the whole, the relatively low alphas are not particularly surprising

given that all of the indices are composed of only two items, with the exception of the UNIVERSALISM index, which is composed of three items. This 21-item version of the 45-item Schwartz Values Survey has the advantage of economy and efficiency (for survey designers seeking to limit their numbers of questions), but an analysis of data from 20 nations in the European Social Survey suggests that the more economical survey may have trouble discriminating 3 of the 10 values with confidence (Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz 2008, p.440).

Table 56. Cronbach's Alphas (Scale Reliability Coefficients) for Schwartz Values in Merged and Separate Samples

Value Indices	Merged data	UO sample	Costa Rica sample
Conformity	.53	.66	.40
Tradition	.28	.32	.28
Benevolence	.58	.67	.49
Universalism	.56	.52	.57
Self-Direction	.46	.36	.54
Stimulation	.64	.70	.60
Hedonism	.68	.71	.65
Achievement	.72	.69	.74
Power	.56	.50	.56
Security	.55	.47	.61

Notes: alphas above .7 are considered acceptable levels of internal consistency, between .6 and .7 is questionable, between .6 and .5 is poor, and below .5 is considered unacceptable

T-tests were conducted to determine if the group means (UO means versus Costa Rican means) were significantly different on the centered Schwartz values. Robvar tests in STATA revealed that the two samples had unequal variances on six of the centered values (SECURITY, TRADITION, BENEVOLENCE, HEDONISM, ACHIEVEMENT, and POWER), so unequal variances were specified for these t-tests.

In Table 57, we see that the most significant differences (at the .001 level or higher) between the cross-national samples are: UO respondents value POWER and HEDONISM to a higher degree, while Costa Rican respondents value UNIVERSALISM, SECURITY, and SELF-DIRECTION to a higher degree. At the lower .05 level of

significance, UO respondents also value ACHIEVEMENT and BENEVOLENCE to a higher degree. Because values are theorized as capturing a deeper belief structure than the more specific attitudinal-level opinions, these findings suggest that the U.S. and Costa Rica do have some culture-specific differences that may partially drive attitudes on violence and nonviolence. Again, Kakkad (2005) found that nonviolent attitudes related negatively with the value types of POWER and HEDONISM, and correlated positively with the value types of UNIVERSALISM and BENEVOLENCE. This leads us to expect that the UO respondents will score lower on our nonviolent indicators, and Costa Ricans will score higher, but the fact that UO respondents scored higher on BENEVOLENCE makes the picture more complex.

Table 57. T-tests of Centered Schwartz Values (Costa Rica vs. UO Means)

Schwartz value (centered)	Costa Rica (n=312)		UO (n=403)		df	t	$\bar{x}^2 - \bar{x}$
	$\bar{x}$	*SD*	$\bar{x}^2$	*SD*			
Security	.202	.907	-.179	.787	590.9	5.73	.381****
Conformity	-1.157	1.034	-1.105	1.025	669	-0.65	-.052
Tradition	-.243	.951	-.246	.856	604.0	.048	.003
Benevolence	.677	.712	.783	.629	597.7	-2.03	-.107*
Universalism	.828	.712	.375	.701	669	8.27	.454****
Self-Direction	.579	.775	.332	.749	669	4.19	.248****
Stimulation	.071	.922	.176	.873	669	-1.51	-.105
Hedonism	-.045	1.001	.245	.790	555.9	-4.07	-.289***
Achievement	-.001	.896	.155	.822	610.1	-2.32	-.156*
Power	-1.327	1.002	-.722	.872	592.2	-8.22	-.605****

Notes: † = p< .1; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; for each dummy variable, robvar tests were first conducted in STATA to determine if variances were unequal; In cases of unequal variances between groups, t-tests specified "unequal" variances; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate "very much like me," and -2 indicates "not at all like me" (positive scores signify that the value is more important)

Schwartz (2007) contends that conflicts between specific values like POWER vs. UNIVERSALISM and HEDONISM vs. TRADITION are "near-universal" (p.16). Some of the differences between the Costa Rican and UO samples can be readily explained by Schwartz's adoption of Inglehart's (1997) distinction between materialist (SECURITY,

TRADITION, and CONFORMITY) vs. post-materialist values (HEDONISM, STIMULATION, and SELF-DIRECTION) (Schwartz 2007, p.6). Because Costa Rican students are likely to have grown up with less economic security than UO students (given that Costa Rica is a developing country with a lower GDP per capita), it is little wonder Costa Ricans value SECURITY more highly and HEDONISM less. These cross-national differences are particularly interesting because Schwartz (2007) has argued from data on 20 countries that "life stage" effects shape value priorities, such that hedonism, power, stimulation, and achievement values are, on average, likely to be universally valued relatively more by cohorts of young adults (p.7).

In a study of 20 nations, Schwartz (2007) found that UNIVERSALISM values only begin to rise in the last years of secondary school, but they "are substantially higher among those who attend university" (p.10). This may be because a university education broadens the capacity for empathy and global awareness, or because people who prioritize universalism values are likely to seek higher education (p.10). A study in Italy found that UNIVERALISM values best predicted voting center-left rather than center-right, and a study in France found that UNIVERSALISM values best predicted engaging in political activism in the past year (Schwartz 2007). Below we will analyze how these values are associated with indices of militarism and nonviolence. The fact that Costa Ricans scored significantly higher on UNIVERSALISM will be important to revisit as one possible explanatory variable for the more specific attitudes on violence/ nonviolence.

The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale

The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale evolved out of research and theoretical streams developed by Fromm and Adorno et al. (1950) on the "authoritarian personality." The construct delineated a personality type which embraces racism, sexism, homophobia, and conservative politics, while rejecting egalitarianism and empathy for lower-status groups (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p.74). Erich Fromm (1965) argued that for the authoritarian personality "…the concept of equality does not exist…it has no real meaning or weight for him [sic], since it concerns something outside the reach of his emotional experience. For him the world is composed of people with power and those without it, of superior ones and inferior ones" (pp.195-196).

Authoritarian personality theory has been both criticized and redeemed by empirical findings and it informs part of the theoretical stance of the SDO scale. One critique of the attempt to measure authoritarianism was that "agreement bias" in survey measurements could lead researchers to falsely identify respondents as authoritarians (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p.7). Agreement bias, or "yea-saying bias," occurs when respondents tend to agree with survey questions regardless of the content. Over the decades, researchers have moved through various instruments attempting to measure varieties of authoritarianism, the Fascism Scale, Dogmatism Scale, Anti-Egalitarianism Scale, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale. The bottom line is that researchers have developed valid measurements of generalized ethnocentrism and attitudes favoring dominance/ group dominance. In addition, cross-national research has validated that generalized ethnocentrism is positively associated with political conservativism (p.7).

While the SDO overlaps heavily with authoritarianism, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) maintain that the SDO is theoretically and conceptually distinct: "authoritarianism concerns submission to the authority of the ingroup, whereas SDO concerns attitudes toward hierarchical relationships *between* groups" (p.74). But again, these heavily overlap. Wald, Owen, and Hill (1989) conceptualize "authority-mindedness" as an attitudinal predisposition which values authoritative structures and patterns of relating in families and other groups. Ammerman (1987) explains the privileges and paternalistic care involved here: "They come to expect groups to be divided between sheep and shepherds. The shepherds are entitled to deference and rewards, while the sheep are entitled to love and care" (p.128). For conservative Protestant Christians, this worldview has a theological rationale as it mirrors views of the deity, and the violent punishment of the Biblical deity is even understood as legitimating parents' corporal punishment of their children (Ellison and Bartkowki 1997). However, the violent punishment of the deity portrayed in the Bible is largely limited to the Old Testament, an incident in Acts Chapter 5, and a literalist reading of the last book of the New Testament, Revelation. Ironically, this means that the nonviolent God of Jesus is de-emphasized by conservative Protestants.

Pinker (2011) argues that dominance is better termed "tribalism" (p.523). As we will see, tribalism is a psychological tendency that the "sports fan" variable is also theorized to capture by intellectual luminaries like Noam Chomsky. Years of research utilizing the SDO scale has shown that the social dominance orientation:

> ...inclines people to a sweeping array of opinions and values, including patriotism, racism, fate, karma, caste, national destiny, militarism, toughness on crime, and defensiveness of existing arrangements of authority and inequality. An orientation away from social dominance, in contrast, inclines people to humanism, socialism,

> feminism, universal rights, political progressivism, and the egalitarian and pacifist themes in the Christian Bible. (p.523)

The reliability and validity of the SDO scale has been confirmed in cross-national research (e.g., Sidanius and Pratto1999, Sidanius et al. 2000). Nevertheless, a few critiques may be warranted, including the potential for social desirability bias in items 1 through 4 which model approval of dominance, and may strike many respondents as reflecting attitudes that are too harsh or mean-spirited to admit or subscribe to.

After reverse coding items 5 through 8 on the 8-item SDO scale, the means of the SDO scale were calculated at the individual respondent level and averaged for each sample. The mean SDO score for the University of Oregon (USA) sample was 2.09, while the mean SDO score of the Costa Rica sample 2.11. Robvar tests in STATA showed that the variances between the two samples were not significantly different, and t-tests showed that there was no significant differences between sample means. A lower SDO score represents more favorable attitudes toward equality, and a higher SDO score represents more favorable attitudes towards dominance. Thus, the U.S. sample was slightly more favorable toward equality. This could be because the UO data includes 6% more females and 6% fewer males than the Costa Rica data. Many studies have found that females have lower SDOs, and Sidanius, Sinclair, and Pratto (2006) found that the male-female difference in SDO remained essentially constant across students' university careers.

But on the whole, the finding of no significant difference in SDO scores between the two nations is not particularly surprising, since both nations are hierarchical societies with large inequalities. The salience of the Nicaraguan immigrant "other" within Costa Rican society (Sandoval-García 2004) is one explanation for why Costa Rican students'

SDO scores are similar to UO students. And, by some measures, Costa Rica is a more unequal society than the U.S. The ratio of the average income of the richest 10% to the poorest 10% is 23.4 in Costa Rica (ranking as the 22nd most unequal nation in the world) versus 15.9 in the U.S., which ranks as the 41st most unequal nation (UN Human Development Report 2009). Similarly, the ratio of the average income of the richest 20% to the poorest 20% is 15.6 in Costa Rica (ranking as the 20th most unequal nation), versus 8.4 in the U.S. The U.S. ranks as the 48th most unequal nation by this measure (UN Human Development Report 2007-2008). Nevertheless, by these measures, Costa Rica is a more *equal* society than all of the other Central American nations.

The means SDO scores for both the Costa Rica and U.S. samples were markedly lower (i.e., more pro-equality) than for several samples from California: 3 samples of San Jose State University undergraduate students, 1 sample of UC Berkeley undergraduates, and 10 samples of Stanford University undergraduates, all taken in 1990-1992. The means of those samples ranged from a low of 2.31 to a high of 3.13 (Pratto et al. 1994). One possible explanation for the differences between my samples and the samples from California university students in the early 1990s rests in differences in the samples between predominant majors and career interests. Pratto et al. (1994) found that the intended career paths of students influenced their SDO scores, as some careers were theorized to serve elite interests ("hierarchy-enhancing" careers) while other careers, as in the helping professions, serve the oppressed ("hierarchy-attenuating" careers), though many other careers were labeled "middlers" to reflect a relatively neutral affect on hierarchical social structures (pp.747-748). In a study of UCLA undergraduate students during a 4 ½ year period, Sidanius, Sinclair, and Pratto (2006) found that hierarchy-

attenuating majors had a mean SDO score ranging from 1.74 to 1.90 (measured at one year increments), while hierarchy-enhancing majors had a mean SDO score ranging from 2.10 to 2.20 (p.1644).

However, regressions of 10 categories of majors (each tested individually, not controlling for any other factors) revealed that only business majors in the UO sample significantly predicted SDO scores, at the .05 level of significance. With a beta of .12, t-ratio of 2.43, and p=.015, business majors were associated with significantly higher SDO scores (i.e., more favorable towards social dominance). This corroborates previous research on business majors and SDO scores, leading to the classification of business majors as an hierarchy-enhancing major (Sidanius et al. 2003; van Laar et al. 1999; Sidanius, Sinclair, and Pratto 2006). The UO sample targeted students in an introduction to sociology course (though only 13% reported an intention to major in sociology), and my Costa Rica sample oversampled from students in lower-division sociology courses.

Two other plausible explanations for the lower SDO scores in the two samples rests in survey context effects. First, the context of a sociology course may prime pro-equality sentiments in students. Sociology professors tend to implicitly or explicitly assume a variety of human rights and social justice norms that are pro-equality, and in both nations students were exposed to several weeks of lectures before taking the surveys. Studies suggest that the influence of professors (who, on average, are much more liberal than the general population) on student political attitudes is weak or non-existent for about 57% of students, while about 27% move to the left and 16% move to the right between their freshman and senior years (Mariani and Hewitt 2008). But we know less about the short-term consequences of sociology lectures and course readings.

Secondly, the placement of the SDO items in the surveys may have biased answers towards pro-equality sentiments because the survey began with numerous questions which required students to reflect on violence and nonviolence. Since the SDO items were embedded in this context, the pro-dominance SDO items may have appeared more dangerous, radical, mean-spirited, or violent than would be the case if survey questions on violence did not precede the SDO battery of questions. Likewise, the pro-equality items might have appeared more nonviolent, tolerant, or civilized than would be the case if survey questions on nonviolence did not precede the SDO battery of questions.

The Sports Fan Variable

The "sports fan" variable is a dummy variable, based on coding respondents who answered "1" ("great/ excited/ very happy") on Q50: "When the UO football team wins, how do you feel? (1) great/ excited/ very happy; (2) happy; (3) somewhat happy; (4) mostly indifferent; (5) I do NOT care at all if they win or lose." It should be remember that this survey was conducted in November, 2010 when the UO football team was ranked #1 in the nation. They were undefeated. By the end of the season they had a perfect 12-0 record and went on to play in the BCS National Championship game. As will be seen below, almost 72% of respondents could correctly pick out, from a list of name sets, the UO quarterback, star running back, and field goal kicker. As Table 58 depicts, the team clearly generated excitement on campus and the majority of students were following the success of the football team. I would propose that this operationalization of "sports fan" imperfectly but helpfully captures the degree to which a respondent is integrated into mainstream U.S. culture – including a tacit acceptance of forms of U.S. militarism.

Table 58. UO Data: Sports Fan Indicator (N= 393)

Q50. When the UO football team wins, how do you feel?		
Answer options	**Freq.**	**%**
great/ excited/ very happy	249	63.36
happy	97	24.68
somewhat happy	25	6.36
mostly indifferent	15	3.82
I do NOT care at all if they win or lose	7	1.78

The Role of Spectator Sports

In his provocative essay "Education After Auschwitz," Theodor Adorno (1998) argues that the role of sports, and perhaps especially spectator sports, should be studied for its relationship to the cultural and psychological production of violence. In his masterful documentary film on the Vietnam War, *Hearts and Minds* (1974), director Peter Davis's juxtaposition of the Vietnam War and U.S. military discourse about it with high school football games and locker-room pep talks suggested a link between the socialization into aggression and tribalism in U.S. sports settings, and how Americans think about war. This may be worth pondering given that in the present sample of UO students, 63 out of 166 (38%) males actually played football in high school.

Similarly, the leading leftist intellectual Noam Chomsky (1992) has argued that sports and spectator sports in particular may serve the function of inculcating jingoistic attitudes. Chomsky argues that America's obsession with spectator sports, which the mass media heavily promotes, is politically significant, since it functions as a "crucial example of the indoctrination system," and (much like Marx's "opiate of the masses" critique of religion) as an enormous diversion from worrying about or critical thinking about political and social issues that actually affect the quality of people's lives. Such diversional obsessions reduce citizens' "capacity to think." Chomsky guesses this

dynamic operates not only among the “Joe Six Packs” of the country, but also “the eighty percent.”

> You know, I remember in high school, already I was pretty old. I suddenly asked myself at one point, why do I care if my high school team wins the football game? I mean, I don't know anybody on the team, you know? I mean, they have nothing to do with me, I mean, why I am cheering for my team? It doesn't mean any -- it doesn't make sense. But the point is, it does make sense: it's a way of building up irrational attitudes of submission to authority, and group cohesion behind leadership elements -- in fact, it's training in irrational jingoism. That's also a feature of competitive sports. I think if you look closely at these things, I think, typically, they do have functions, and that's why energy is devoted to supporting them and creating a basis for them and advertisers are willing to pay for them and so on. (Chomsky 1992b)

Joan Acker (2012), a sociologist at the University of Oregon, has argued,

> the greatest issue about football, and the reason that I want it to be abolished, is that it glorifies and legitimates a certain form of male violence. Vast crowds spend considerable money to watch young men injure each other. Yes, they also throw and catch balls and run for the goal, but those activities do not mitigate the main message that violence in pursuit of winning is okay. This is also how capitalism operates, as well as the U.S. military, which is always ready to send it troops wherever.

By contrast, in her book *Dancing in the Streets*, Barbara Ehrenreich (2007) argues that sports provide an outlet for collective emotion and carnivalesque celebration that societies repress or suppress at their own peril. Thus, “...football has restored to our culture the experience of collective joy, which elite culture has virtually prohibited for the last three centuries, alas and alack” (Earl 2007). Differing somewhat from Durkheim’s notion of “collective effervescense” and how emotional rituals cement social solidarity, Ehrenreich (2007) suggests that the main consequences of repressing such collective rituals is depression.

But in the case of college football, these rituals of “collective joy” can also involve significant costs, some of them depressing in their own right. Lindo, Swensen,

and Waddell's (2012) study of 29,737 students (non-athlete undergraduate students) over 9 years at the University of Oregon found that when the UO football team had a winning season, the course grades of males during the fall term (the term coinciding with the football season) fell significantly relative to female grades. Survey data confirmed that when the UO football team wins, males report being more likely to decrease studying, increase partying, and increase alcohol consumption. Females also reported these behaviors in response to the football team's success, but at lower levels, suggesting that their academic performance also suffers but this is masked by the common practice of grade curving.

Keep in mind that these findings relate to the *success* of the football team attached to the local tribe. Can we infer that losing leads to better grades and less partying, or is there evidence for other behavior patterns in response to losses? Card and Dahl (2011) found that in cities with professional football teams, police report data exhibits spikes in domestic violence on the day of the game (Sundays), concentrated during a time window near the end of the game, when the home team loses in an upset. Tragically, "upsetlosses (defeats when the home teamwas predicted towin by four ormore points)lead to a 10% increase in the rate of at-home violence bymen against theirwivesand girlfriends" (p.103).Upset wins or losses when the game was expected to be close revealed insignificant effects. Hence, the association between football spectatorship and violent behavior can be very real, and here it appears to be shaped by wins and losses of the local social group/ tribe (i.e., dominance), rather than by the mere violence of the game itself.

The idea that sport is a "sublimation for war" or a "harmless," "rational" and "civilized" outlet – a good candidate for William James's "moral equivalent of war" as

the philosopher George Santayana proposed, is an old idea (Jessup 1940, pp.23ff.). But rather than reifying "sport," we must acknowledge the great diversity in sport and sports traditions. For instance, when missionaries introduced soccer to the Gahuku-Kama people of New Guinea, the indigenous insisted on playing the game with modified rules: "instead of seeking victory for one of the teams, they multiply the number of games until the defeats and victories are equally balanced. The match is ended not when one team is victorious...but when there is no loser" (Levi-Strauss 1976 Vol. 2, p.319).

Research has found that U.S. sports fans – operationalized as those who regularly watch sports on television – are more likely to vote (Franz 2012). This offers some indirect evidence for a Durkheimian theory of sports as cultivating social solidarity, of social bonds cemented through collective, emotional rituals.

But there is also evidence of a darker, tribalistic side. College students who are avid fans of their school's football and men's basketball teams express more homophobic and sexist views than their non-sports fan peers (Smith 2009). Fans of some TV sports offered significantly more support for Iraq War than non-fans (Stempel 2006).And, Stempel even found that the sports fan variable was a better predictor of support for the war than many of the most common correlates of hawkish attitudes: "…televised masculinist sports constitute a central institution in producing and reproducing militaristic nationalism, surpassing social class, religion, age, gender, family structure, and region in explanatory power" (p.102). Stempel's regression model included the following control variables: gender, education, region, race, church attendance, born-again religious identity, age, and married-with-children status. Controlling for these factors, Stempel found thatsupport for the Iraq War was strongest among TV fans of Baseball, the NFL,

college football, NASCAR, and tennis (Stempel 2006). The tennis finding may require some theoretical gymnastics to account for, or the explanation may be simpler – it seems plausible that fans of tennis might tend to be wealthier, and wealth correlates with Republican Party membership.

Much as Stempel found, in the present study, the sports fans variable (i.e., fans of UO football) attains significance in most of our tests, and it is associated with more hawkish/ pro-violent attitudes. Hence, it seems that Chomsky may be onto something in positing a link between spectator sports and tribalism. Additional tests to identify spectator sports fans (Q52) in the mode of Stempel's research on TV fans, produced a few significant findings after controlling for gender. As will be seen below, tests of a socialization thesis in connection with athletics (Q48) or playing specific sports produced some significant findings, but playing specifically violent sports like football (Q49), produced no significant findings after controlling for gender.

Results: Regression Analyses

In the UO data, analysis of various regression models (see Table 59) revealed that gender, political party, and Christian self-identification predicted SDO scores. In short, females and Democrats were significantly more pro-equality, while males, Republicans, and Christians favored social dominance. However, numerous dummy variables (see Appendix N for explanations of the dummy codes) indicating more specific Christian subcultures failed to obtain significance at even the modest .1 level when entered into regressions as sole independent variables including evangelical, catholic, literalist, born again, and attenders. Similarly, other dummy variables also failed to obtain significance

at the .1 level including black, Hispanic, white, and class. In Model 4, several Schwartz values were associated with SDO variance.

Table 59. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for SDO on Independent Variables (UO Data)

Independent variables	SDO				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
male (Male=1; Female=0)	.206*** (.106)	.198*** (.103)	.187*** (.101)		.111* (.094)
white (Yes=1; No=0)	-.001 (.137)	.006 (.129)	.025 (.126)		
class (Upper class=1; Lower class=5)	-.104 (.065)	-.074 (.062)	-.086 (.060)		
left-right ideology (Far left=1; Far right=5)	.200** (.063)				
Christian (Yes=1; No=0)	.050 (.112)	.113* (.107)	.102* (.101)		
Republican (Yes=1; No=0)		.111* (.129)			
Democrat (Yes=1; No=0)			-.221*** (.101)		-.132** (.094)
Security				-.074 (.066)	-.057 (.065)
Conformity				.190** (.057)	.190*** (.057)
Tradition				-.014 (.065)	-.012 (.064)
Benevolence				-.206*** (.083)	-.174*** (.083)
Universalism				-.268*** (.097)	-.221*** (.099)
Achievement				-.015 (.069)	.022 (.069)
Power				.173** (.067)	.152** (.067)
Hedonism				.028 (.076)	.036 (.074)
N	330	362	362	363	363
Adj R^2	.10	.07	.11	.28	.30

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors;* = $p \leq .05$; ** = $p \leq .01$; *** = $p \leq .001$; SDO values 1=favor equality, 7=favor dominance; Schwartz values were reverse coded and centered; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate "very much like me," and -2 indicates "not at all like me" (positive scores signify that the value is more important)

Delimited Indices for Cross-National Comparison

"Militarism" and "Nonviolence" indices were constructed for the complete cross-national dataset as delimited versions of the indices previously created through separate factor analyses of the two national data sets. Only items loading in both national samples were utilized for the purposes of cross-national comparison. Hence, rather than conducting a new factor analysis with the aggregated cross-national dataset, these delimited indices were created through an artificial but justifiable process. The delimited

Nonviolence Index includes 6 items (numbers Q9.23 – 9.28), with a Cronbach's alpha score (scale reliability coefficient) of .77 (acceptable/ good), while the delimited Militarism Index includes 4 items (Q9.6, 9.7, 9.13, and 9.14), with a Cronbach's alpha score (scale reliability coefficient) of .63.

Below in Table 60, we see that in the UO data, as Universalism scores increase (i.e., Universalism is increasingly viewed as a value priority/ as "very much like me") scores on the Nonviolence Index and the Militarism Index become significantly more peaceful.

Table 60. Descriptive Statistics for Schwartz Values (UO Data)

Variable (Value Type)	*M* (raw)	*M* (centered values)	*SD* (centered values)	Correlations with militarism index	Correlations with nonviolence index
Security	4.31	-.18	.79	-.14	-.15
Conformity	3.41	-1.11	1.02	-.17	-.15
Tradition	4.26	-.25	.86	-.18*	-.08
Benevolence	5.26	.78	.63	.12	.02
Universalism	4.87	.37	.70	.31****	.27****
Self-Direction	4.81	.33	.75	.12	.11
Stimulation	4.67	.18	.87	.03	.14
Hedonism	4.73	.24	.79	.0003	.09
Achievement	4.65	.15	.82	-.05	-.10
Power	3.78	-.72	.87	-.04	-.16

Note: N=373; Sidak t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; In the correlations, all Schwartz Values are centered, following Schwartz (2011). The Sidak method was used to avoid Type I errors associated with the "multiple comparison fallacy" (Hamilton 2003, p.136). The "militarism" and "nonviolence" indices were delimited versions of the indices created through separate factor analyses of the two national data sets. Only items loading in both data sets were utilized for the purposes of cross-national comparison; Schwartz values were reverse coded, so that a score of 6= "very much like me" and 1= "not at all like me" (higher scores signify that the value is more important); For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate "very much like me," and -2 indicates "not at all like me" (hence, positive scores signify that the value is more important); For the nonviolence index and militarism index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and score of 1 is least peaceful

Some of the above findings are somewhat surprising, and a degree of post-hoc theorizing is in order. We see that in the Costa Rica sample, as the CONFORMITY value increases, the score on the Militarism Index becomes significantly less peaceful. At first glance, this may be surprising given the Costa Rican context of a demilitarized society.Would not those highly valuing conformity in such a society tend to embrace peaceful attitudes? One possible reading here is that the Costa Rican "culture of peace" is not so deeply engrained that conformists instinctively chose peaceful values in the survey. Of course, the key issue to adjudicate here is how does the Schwartz values

schema operationalize “conformity” (see Appendix M). It seems that the two items operationalizing “conformity” might tap an extreme form of conservativism including authoritarianism (e.g., see especially item #7 (in Appendix M): “She believes that people should do what they’re told. She thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.”), and views of human nature as fundamentally belligerent. A long line of research has confirmed that such personality types tend to prefer a strong military, and it seems that some Costa Ricans also fall into this pattern.

Meanwhile, as SELF-DIRECTIONscores increase, scores on the Militarism Index become significantly more peaceful. Again, a conventional liberal-conservative split may help explain this finding, as on average, liberals/ Democratic party voters tend to oppose militarism (Burris 2008). Psychological research confirms that liberals exhibit more “openness to experience”; they “crave novelty, variety, diversity, new ideas, travel” (Haidt 2012). It seems the operationalization of SELF-DIRECTION (see item #1 in Appendix M: “...new ideas and being creative is important to her...”) taps this trait.

Hence, for both the CONFORMITY and SELF-DIRECTION findings, a conventional liberal-conservative schema offers explanatory insight. Indeed, the Schwartz theory of basic personal values categorizes SELF-DIRECTION and STIMULATION under “openness to change values,” while CONFORMITY, TRADITION, and SECURITY represent “conservation values” (Caprara et al. 2006, p.7).

A particularly provocative finding is that as the SECURITY value increases, the score on the Nonviolence Index becomes significantly (at the .05 level) more peaceful. Hence, this provides indirect evidence that in Costa Rica, those who highly value

SECURITY, and the government's role in providing security (see item #14 in Appendix M) are confident that nonviolent means are sufficient for maintaining national security.

Below in Table 61, in the far right column, *negative* values represent cases where the Costa Rican sample scores lower on the centrality of this value than the UO sample, while *positive* values represent cases where the Costa Rican sample scores higher on the centrality of this value. T-tests on the difference between group means reveal that SECURITY, UNIVERSALISM, AND SELF-DIRECTION are significantly more central to the values structure of Costa Rican respondents. POWER and HEDONISM, and to a lesser degree BENEVOLENCE and ACHIEVEMENT, are significantly more central to the values structure of UO respondents.

Table 61. Descriptive Statistics for Schwartz Values (Costa Rica Data and Cross-National Comparison)

Variable (Value Type)	*M* (raw)	*M* (centered values)	*SD* (centered values)	Correlations with militarism index	Correlations with nonviolence index	*M*(CR) – *M*(UO) [t-tests of mean centered values]
Security	4.69	.20	.91	-.08	.22*	.38****
Conformity	3.36	-1.16	1.03	-.35****	-.04	-.05
Tradition	4.26	-.24	.95	-.05	.05	.003
Benevolence	5.17	.68	.71	.09	.01	-.11*
Universalism	5.33	.83	.71	.21*	.01	.45****
Self-Direction	5.08	.58	.78	.30****	.01	.25****
Stimulation	4.59	.07	.92	.15	-.09	-.105
Hedonism	4.47	-.04	1.00	.02	-.12	-.29***
Achievement	4.51	-.001	.90	-.03	.06	-.16*
Power	3.18	-1.33	1.00	-.16	-.08	-.60****

Note: N=298; The correlations involved Sidak t-tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; In the correlations, all Schwartz Values are centered, following Schwartz (2011). The Sidak method was used to avoid Type I errors associated with the "multiple comparison fallacy" (Hamilton 2003, p.136). The "militarism" and "nonviolence" indices were delimited versions of the indices created through separate factor analyses of the two national data sets. Only items loading in both data sets were utilized for the purposes of cross-national comparison; Schwartz values were reverse coded, so that a score of 6= "very much like me" and 1= "not at all like me" (higher scores signify that the value is more important); For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate "very much like me," and -2 indicates "not at all like me" (hence, positive scores signify that the value is more important); For the nonviolence index and militarism index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and score of 1 is least peaceful

Before looking at the UO and Costa Rican samples separately, a cross-national analysis of the merged data set, depicted in Table 62, will allow us to test the relative influence of nationality upon attitudes towards nonviolence and militarism. The results below show that the nation variable is associated with far more variance than any of the

Table 62. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for Regression of Nonviolence and Militarism Indexes (UO and Costa Rica Data Merged) on Independent Variables

Independent variables	Nonviolence Index		Militarism Index	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Male (Male=1; Female=0)	-.020 (-.44)	-.038 (-.90)	-.090* (-2.14)	-.101* (-2.50)
Class (Upper class=1; Lower class=5)	.024 (.55)	-.013 (-.33)	.006 (.15)	-.030 (-.76)
Left-right ideology (Far left=1; Far right=5)	-.007 (-.14)	-.058 (-1.27)	-.097* (-2.09)	-.139** (-3.12)
Political interest (Very interested=1; Not at all interested=4)	.130** (3.01)	.133** (3.21)	-.018 (-.44)	-.006 (-.14)
Religious (Yes=1; No=0)	.014 (.27)	.031 (.67)	-.086 (-1.79)	-.065 (-1.41)
Religious Attendance (More than once a week=1; Never=5)	-.129* (-2.60)	-.058 (-1.23)	-.090 (-1.90)	-.030 (-.66)
SDO (1=favor equality; 7=favor dominance)	-.051 (-1.03)	-.117* (-2.50)	-.038 (-.80)	-.105* (-2.28)
Security	.135** (2.83)	.070 (1.56)	.008 (.17)	-.051 (-1.15)
Conformity	-.068 (-1.28)	-.049 (-.97)	-.153** (-3.01)	-.147** (-3.03)
Tradition	-.143** (-2.76)	-.068 (-1.41)	-.158** (-3.20)	-.086 (-1.82)
Benevolence	-.129* (-2.56)	-.051 (-1.08)	-.109* (-2.27)	-.052 (-1.14)
Universalism	.194** (2.81)	.086 (1.31)	.180** (2.71)	.091 (1.43)
Achievement	-.063 (-1.22)	-.040 (-.82)	-.061 (-1.22)	-.027 (-.57)
Power	-.160** (-2.81)	-.034 (-.62)	-.126* (-2.31)	-.013 (-.25)
Hedonism	-.058 (-1.02)	-.024 (-.45)	-.032 (-.59)	-.023 (-.44)
USA (Yes=1; No=0)		-.442*** (-8.49)		-.368*** (-7.30)
Major1 (pre-law)		.035 (.78)		.006 (.13)
Major2 (business)		.062 (.96)		.020 (.32)
Major3 (psych)		.068 (1.19)		.042 (.76)
Major4 (natural sciences & tech)		.018 (.30)		-.004 (-.06)
Major5 (humanities & other social sciences)		.065 (.88)		-.003 (-.05)
Major6 (pre-med)		.079 (1.43)		-.033 (-.60)
Major7 (sociology)		.081 (1.21)		.045 (.67)
N	506	505	524	523
Adj R^2	.15	.27	.19	.29

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are *t*-statistics. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Majors are dummy codes (Yes=1; No=0); Major 8 (other/ undecided) is the omitted comparison variable for college majors; Schwartz values were reverse coded and centered; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate "very much like me," and -2 indicates "not at all like me" (positive scores signify that the value is more important); For the nonviolence index and militarism index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and score of 1 is least peaceful

sociodemographic variables or the attitudinal and values orientation variables. The highest t-ratios, by far, are linked to the USA dummy variable. The negative betas show that US respondents had a less peaceful score (than CostaRicans) on the nonviolence

index (-.442 standard deviations lower) and a less peaceful score on the militarism index (-.368 standard deviations lower), and both of these differences were significant at the .001 level. Of course, when a Costa Rican dummy variable is substituted for the USA dummy variable, the t-ratios and betas remain the same except they all become positive, since Costa Rican respondents scored significantly more peacefully on these indexes.

Other significant relationships include the association between declining interest in politics and increases in peaceful scores on the Nonviolence Index. It seems those who value nonviolent methods tend to be somewhat turned off by politics. As for the Schwartz values, the most consistent finding across Models 1 and 2 is that CONFORMITY is associated with lower (less peaceful) scores on the Militarism Index. Many of the Schwartz values which are significant in Model 1 fall to insignificance when controlling for nation in Model 2.

As expected, those scoring high on the SDO scale (i.e., those who favor dominance) score lower (less peaceful) on the nonviolence index and the militarism index. Similarly, as expected, and corroborating numerous previous studies (e.g., Burris 2008; Greeneet al. 1991, p.156; Listhaug 1986, p.75) on indicators of militarism/ hawkish attitudes, males and those who identify themselves as adherents of conservative (right) ideology are more likely to score low (less peaceful) on the militarism index. Somewhat surprisingly, these patterns did not apply to the nonviolence index.

To further delineate cross-national comparisons, the above regression models were repeated with the separate Costa Rican and U.S. samples while still testing the delimited nonviolence and militarism indexes. All of the Schwartz values were tested while entering into the models only eight values at a time (per recommendations, see

Schwartz 2011). Dummy variables for the three Costa Rican university campuses were added to the models, but none of these variables rose to significance.

The Costa Rican sample. When testing the delimited militarism index in the Costa Rican sample, only the centered Conformity value rose to significance at a .05 level or greater, with a beta coefficient of -.23, and a t-ratio of -2.88 which is significant at the .01 level. The negative coefficient indicates that as Conformity scores increase, the nonviolence index scores become less peaceful. As discussed above, this may be because of the way Conformity is operationalized. It seems that the two items operationalizing "conformity" might tap an extreme form of conservativism including authoritarianism (see especially item #7 in Appendix M). In addition, the Self-Direction value is significant but only at the .1 level, with a beta of .14 and t-ratio of 1.73. As expected, the SDO variable was significant and in the predicted direction, with a beta coefficient of -.17 and a t-ratio of -2.16, which is significant at the .05 level. The negative coefficient indicates that as SDO scores increased (i.e., dominance is favored rather than equality) scores on the nonviolence index decreased, becoming less peaceful.

When testing the delimited nonviolence index in the Costa Rican sample, only the centered Security value rose to significance, with a beta coefficient of .20, with a t-ratio of 2.19, significant at the .05 level. The positive coefficient indicates that higher scores on the Security value were associated with more peaceful scores on the nonviolence index. Again, this suggests those who value Security in Costa Rica are confident in the efficacy of nonviolent methods. As expected, the SDO variable was significant and in the predicted direction, with a beta coefficient of -.30, t-ratio of -3.63, significant at the .001 level. The negative coefficient indicates that as SDO scores increased (i.e., dominance is

favored rather than equality) scores on the nonviolence index decreased, becoming less peaceful.

In the Costa Rican sample testing the nonviolence index, the only other significant variable in the models is more surprising. The left-right ideology variable had a beta coefficient of .20, with a t-ratio of 2.46, significant at the .05 level. The positive coefficient indicates that respondents who self-identified with more conservative/ right ideologies are associated with more peaceful scores on the nonviolence index. Hence, self-identifying conservatives in Costa Rica score higher on the nonviolence index. Contrary to our ad-hoc theorizing on the Conformity variable above, this suggests that Costa Rica's peace culture is relatively deeply engrained, such that conservatives in this context favor nonviolent methods, which after all, are the traditional means in the Costa Rican context. In addition, it may be that leftists in the Costa Rican context are more open to forms of revolutionary violence, perhaps following revolutionary Latin American master images embodied by figures like Che Guevara.

The UO sample. When testing the delimited nonviolence index in the UO sample, only two variables rose to significance at the .05 level. First, the self-reported left-right ideology variable (Q29) had a beta of -.23, with a t-ratio of -3.56, significant at the .001 level. The negative coefficient indicates that as conservative ideology increases, the nonviolence index scores become less peaceful. This finding is in the expected direction, especially in the U.S. context, but it is the opposite pattern of the Costa Rican sample. The second variable that rose to significance was the self-reported political interest variable (Q30), with a beta of .12, a t-ratio of 2.06, significant at the .05 level. The

positive coefficient indicates that as self-reported political interest decreases, scores on the nonviolence index become more peaceful.

When testing the delimited militarism index in the UO sample, only one variable rose to significance at the .05 level, the self-reported left-right ideology (Q29). The ideology variable had a beta of -.20, with a t-ratio of -3.09, significant at the .01 level. The negative coefficient indicates that as conservative ideology increases, the militarism index scores become less peaceful. The UNIVERSAISM value almost obtained significance at the .05 level, with a beta of .17, a t-ratio of 1.94, p=.054. The positive coefficient indicates that as the UNIVERSALISM value increased among respondents, the militarism index scores become more peaceful. In addition, the gender dummy variable (Q15) was significant, but only at the .1 level, with a beta of -.10, and a t-ratio of -1.72. The negative coefficient indicates that, as expected, males scored less peaceful on the militarism index.

Testing the Nation-Specific Nonviolence and Militarism Indexes: UO Data

The nation-specific nonviolence and militarism indexes will now be tested, because versions of these appear in both Costa Rica and the U.S., and they represent attitude extremes, whereas the "Just War" and "Realpolitiks" Indexes probe the middle ground of violent/ nonviolent attitudes, and "realpolitiks" did not even emerge as a factor in the Costa Rica data.

Analysis of demographic indicators show that very few robustly predict scores on the nonviolence index. Sex was not a significant predictor at the .05 level, or even the .1 level, when entered into the regression equation as the sole independent variable (not

depicted in the table above). Similarly, race and ethnicity (i.e., Hispanic/ Latino) were not significant predictors at the .05 level , or even the .1 level, as the following dummy variables were entered into the regression equation as the sole independent variables: white, nonwhite, black, and Hispanic. In the same way, class was not a significant predictor at the .05 level, or even the .1 level, when entered into the regression equation as the sole independent variable.

Similarly, most majors (not depicted above) were not significant predictors of nonviolence index scores. Majors were sorted into ten dummy codes: 1 (sociology), 2 (psychology), 3 (pre-med), 4 (business), 5 (education), 6 (journalism), 7 (the arts), 8 (other humanities, other social sciences, and pre-law), 9 (life sciences, natural/ earth sciences, and technology), and 10 (other/ undecided). Only major 4 (business) and major 8 were significant predictors at the .05 level, in each case, they were associated with lower (less peaceful) scores on the nonviolence index. However, it is likely that codes 8 and 9 should have been split up into more specific majors, but the number of dummy variables was already somewhat unwieldy.

As can be seen in Table 63 below, ideology and political party identification were significant predictors of scores on the nonviolence index. Those identifying with the Republican party and conservative ideology tended to have significantly lower (less peaceful) nonviolence index scores, and those identifying with the Democratic party tended to have significantly higher (more peaceful) nonviolence index scores. The political interest variable (Q30), with a t-ratio of 1.71, approached but did not obtain a .05 level of significance. With a positive coefficient of .09, this tells us that as interest in

politics declines, nonviolent scores rise. Hence, it seems that adherents of nonviolence tend to be turned off by politics.

Table 63. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for Regression of Nonviolence Index on Independent Variables (UO Data)

Independent variables	Nonviolence Index								
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Male (Male=1; Female=0)	-.02 (-0.30)	-.06 (-1.07)	-.05 (-.99)	-.08 (-1.44)	-.01 (-.26)	-.02 (-.32)		.004 (.07)	.048 (.05)
White (white=1; nonwhite=0)	.05 (.96)	.03 (.58)	.01 (.28)	.03 (.51)	.03 (.49)	.06 (1.03)			
Class (Upper class=1; Lower class=5)	.02 (.46)	-.02 (-.28)	.01 (.21)	.003 (.05)	-.001 (-.02)	.02 (.30)			
Left-right ideology (Far left=1; Far right=5)	-.32*** (-5.91)					-.31*** (-5.70)		-.19** (-3.29)	-.208*** (.03)
Political interest (Very interested=1; Not at all interested=4)	.09 (1.71)					.09 (1.68)			.134* (.03)
Republican (Yes=1; No=0)		-.23*** (-4.43)							
Democrat (Yes=1; No=0)			.19*** (3.58)						
Christian (Yes=1; No=0)				-.16** (-2.74)					
Religious Attendance (More than once a week=1; Never=5)				-.02 (-.28)					
Attenders (Yes=1; No=0)									.078 (.06)
SDO (1=favor equality; 7=favor dominance)					-.20*** (-3.71)				
UO football fan (Yes=1; No=0)						-.12* (-2.15)		-.13* (-2.45)	-.114* (.05)
baseball fan (Yes=1; No=0)									-.118* (.07)
King/ Parks listed as hero (Yes=1; No=0)									.118* (.05)
Security							-.07 (-1.16)		
Conformity							-.04 (-.62)		
Tradition							-.09 (-1.38)		
Benevolence							-.10 (-1.58)		
Universalism							.18* (2.34)	.18** (2.79)	.17** (.04)
Achievement							-.06 (-.84)		
Power							-.12 (-1.73)	-.06 (-.98)	-.044 (.03)
Hedonism							.04 (.51)		
N	319	349	349	343	343	317	346	313	312
Adj R^2	.09	.05	.03	.02	.03	.10	.08	.12	.16

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are *t*-statistics; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Schwartz values were reverse coded and centered; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate "very much like me," and -2 indicates "not at all like me" (positive scores signify that the value is more important); For the nonviolence index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and the score of 1 is least peaceful; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes

As a whole the religious variables were not significant predictors. The only significant predictor was the dummy variable (Q58) for Christian (see table above). However, “evangelical” almost obtains significance (at the .05 level) when substituting “evangelical” in place of the “Christian” variable in Model 4. In another version of Model 4, the “Christian” variable lost significance at the .05 level once Republican party identification was controlled for. Controlling for sex, race, and class, the following dummy variables did not obtain significance at the .05 level: religious (Q54), catholic (Q55), literalist (Q57), born again (Q60), and attenders (those claiming to attend religious services once a month or more, based on Q56).

Adding the variable “knowledgeable of nonviolent revolutions” (see Appendix N) to Model 8, increased the variance explained (Adj R^2) from .1212 to .1249, but in this model, with a beta of .08, t-ratio of 1.51, and p= .131, the variable approaches the modest .1 level of significance. The positive beta tells us that those who have some knowledge of successful historical nonviolent revolutions, are associated with more peaceful scores on the nonviolence index. Of course, we should not oversimplify the causal connections here. Those who are open to or adhere to nonviolent beliefs and ideology, will probably be more likely to remember cases of successful nonviolent revolutions, and to retrieve them from memory. However, it is plausible that knowledge of successful nonviolent revolutions might push people towards more robust nonviolent beliefs.

As expected, higher SDO scores were associated with significantly lower (less peaceful) nonviolence index scores. Among the Schwartz values, only the Universalism value was a significant predictor, with higher Universalism scores associated with higher (more peaceful) nonviolence index scores.

Interestingly, the “sports fan” dummy variable (those who answered “1” on Q50) was a significant predictor even after controlling for political ideology and political interest, as well as sex, race, and class. The negative beta of -.12 tells us that sports fans were associated with lower (less peaceful) scores on the nonviolence index. When SDO is substituted for the “sports fan” variable in Model 6, SDO performs almost identically as the “sports fan” variable and the overall model performs almost identically.

Also of interest, Model 8 explains the most variance in the nonviolence index. When pro baseball fan (discussed above) is substituted for UO football fan in Model 8, the beta, coefficient, t-score, p-value (level of significance), and Adjusted R-squared are all virtually identical. When SDO is substituted for the “sports fan” (UO football fan) variable in Model 8, SDO is insignificant, and the model explains 2% less variance (Adj R^2 = .10). And, when SDO is added to the set of variables in Model 8 depicted above, sports fan remains significant, while SDO is insignificant, and slightly less variance is explained (Adj R^2 = .11). Hence, when controlling for these particular variables, sports fan (UO football fan) is a more robust predictor than SDO.

In Table 64 below it is striking that Models 6 and 7 offer a greater amount of variance explained (Adj R^2), yet among the 8 selected Schwartz values, again only UNIVERSALISM is a significant predictor. The parsimony of Model 6 also merits comment, as with only two highly significant variables, ideology and UO football fan, a relatively large amount of variance is explained.

Analysis of demographic indicators show that a few robustly predict scores on the Militarism Index. Sex was a significant predictor at the .05 level, when entered into the regression equation as the sole independent variable (not depicted in the table above) as

well asin Model 4. When entered as the sole independent variable, the “male” dummy variable had a beta of -.11, t-ratio of -2.18, p=.03. Hence, males had significantly lower (less peaceful) scores on the Militarism Index.

Analyzing race and ethnicity, the following dummy variables were entered into the regression equation as the sole independent variables in separate tests: white, nonwhite, black, and Hispanic. Of these, only the “white” variable achieved significance at even the modest .1 level. With a beta of .09, t-ratio of 1.66, and p=.097, “white” achieved significance at the .1 level. Of course, it must be kept in mind that the sample drew only from college students. Thus, for example, it may be that uneducated non-whites would exhibit more peaceful attitudes. Burris (2008) found that non-whites have tended to hold more antiwar attitudes over recent decades.

Class was not a significant predictor at the .05 level, or even the .1 level, when entered into the regression equation as the sole independent variable. Similarly, when entered as the sole independent variables, most majors (not depicted above) were not significant predictors of militarism index scores. Only major 4 (business) and major 9 (life/ natural/ earth sciences and technology) were significant predictors at the .05 level (not depicted above). Business majors were associated with lower (less peaceful) scores on the militarism index, significant at the .05 level, with a beta of -.11, t-ratio of -2.15, p=.03. Unexpectedly, major 9 was associated with more peaceful scores on the militarism index with a beta of .12, t-ratio of 2.32, and p=.02. It may be that the sample of major 9 respondents were over-represented by students motivated to enter scientific fields out of ecological concerns (the UO has a strong environmental studies program), or by students planning to enter “helping professions” in various medical fields.

Table 64. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for Regression of Militarism Index on Independent Variables (UO Data)

Independent variables	Militarism Index							
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Male (Male=1; Female=0)	-.07 (-1.35)	-.078 (-1.51)	-.08 (-1.51)	-.10* (-2.00)	-.01 (-.22)	-.07 (-1.37)		-.05 (-.88)
White (white=1; nonwhite=0)	.10 (1.96)	.10 (1.94)	.07 (1.40)	.09 (1.71)	.10 (1.82)	.11* (2.03)		.07 (1.27)
Class (Upper class=1; Lower class=5)	.05 (.86)	.02 (.35)	.04 (.70)	.03 (.65)	.02 (.30)	.04 (.68)		-.03 (-.56)
Left-right ideology (Far left=1; Far right=5)	-.33*** (-6.28)					-.32*** (-6.00)		-.16** (-2.72)
Political interest (Very interested=1; Not at all interested=4)	-.02 (-.46)					-.029 (-.56)		
Republican (Yes=1; No=0)		-.27*** (-5.16)						
Democrat (Yes=1; No=0)			.25*** (4.87)					
Christian (Yes=1; No=0)				-.29*** (-5.08)				-.07 (-1.23)
Religious Attendance (More than once a week=1; Never=5)				-.01 (-.17)				
SDO (1=favor equality; 7=favor dominance)					-.29*** (-5.52)			-.15* (-2.48)
UO football fan (Yes=1; No=0)						-.15** (-2.81)		-.11* (-2.14)
Security							.02 (.34)	
Conformity							-.05 (-.76)	
Tradition							-.12 (-1.90)	-.12* (-2.24)
Benevolence							.01 (.19)	
Universalism							.35*** (4.58)	.17* (2.60)
Achievement							.008 (.12)	
Power							.01 (.19)	
Hedonism							.01 (.17)	
N	318	349	349	344	342	316	348	292
Adj R^2	.12	.08	.07	.08	.09	.14	.14	.21

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are *t*-statistics (t-ratios of 2.0 or greater are generally significant); * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Schwartz values were reverse coded and centered; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate "very much like me," and -2 indicates "not at all like me" (positive scores signify that the value is more important); For the militarism index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and the score of 1 is least peaceful; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes

As can be seen in Table 64 above, ideology and political party identification were significant predictors of scores on the militarism index. Those identifying with the Republican party and conservative ideology tended to have significantly lower (less

peaceful) militarism index scores, and those identifying with the Democratic party tended to have significantly higher (more peaceful) militarism index scores.

As a whole the religious variables were significant predictors of militarism index scores. When substituting various religious dummy variables in place of "Christian" (Q58) in Model 4 (see table above), two are significant at the .05 level: evangelical (beta of -.15, t-ratio of -2.72, p= .007) and literalist (beta of -.135, t-ratio of -2.41, p= .017). Both of these variables indicate forms of conservative Christianity. Like the Christian variable, these two variables are associated with lower (less peaceful) scores on the militarism index. The Catholic, born again, attenders (the attendance variable was omitted in the iteration of Model 4 in which attenders was tested), and "religious" variables were not significant when substituted in Model 4. Also in separate regressions (not depicted above) controlling only for republican party identification, the following dummy variables remained significant predictors of militarism at the .05 level: Christian, evangelical, and literalist. In each case, these variables were associated with significantly lower (less peaceful) militarism index scores. When controlling for republican party identification, the following religious dummy variables were not significant at the .05 level: religious, catholic, attenders (dummy variable of Q56), attendance (Q56), and born again.

Interestingly, in Model 6 the "sports fan" (UO football fan) dummy variable (those who answered "1" on Q50) was a significant predictor even after controlling for political ideology and political interest, as well as sex, race, and class. The negative beta of -.15 tells us that sports fans were associated with lower (less peaceful) scores on the militarism index. When the "athlete" dummy variable (Q48) was substituted for "sports

fan" in Model 6, "athlete" was not a significant predictor. Hence, it seems participation in sports is not associated with pro-militaristic attitudes, but being a sports fan is.

As expected, higher SDO scores were associated with significantly lower (less peaceful) militarism index scores. Among the Schwartz values, only the Universalism value was a significant predictor. The positive beta of .35 tells us that higher Universalism scores are associated with higher (more peaceful) militarism index scores.

Between-group differences in the nation-specific indexes. The most noteworthy differences in Table 65 below include political party and ideological orientations, as well as Christianity and some indicators of conservative Christianity, which were especially significant in militarism index scores. Again, Republicans and conservatives were significantly more pro-violent, Democrats and liberals were significantly more nonviolent in their attitudes. Christians, conservative Christians, sports fans, and business majors were significantly more pro-violent. Males were more pro-violent, but this was significant at the .05 level only on the militarism index. Compared with non-whites, whites were more nonviolent in militarism index scores, but only at the moderately significant .1 level.

Additional tests were conducted on the theories (detailed above) of sports as agents of socialization into tribalism and/ or violence. First, following Stempel's (2006) theories of masculinity and spectator sports, respondents were asked to identify which sports, if any, and how often they *watch* particular sports on television or the internet (Q52). Second, respondents were asked about their *participation* in particular sports.

Stempel (2006) found the most significant effect (at the robust .001 level) of support for the Iraq War among fans of watching baseball. This is ironic because baseball

was not conceptualized as a "violent mimetic sport"/ hypermasculinist sport (p.88), since unlike football, it does not "dramatize direct physical domination" (p.96). Stempel makes sense of this finding by coding sports along racial lines, and baseball is coded as a relatively White sport. He also hypothesizes that baseball is more closely linked to a conservative mindset and what he calls "the strict-father morality" or "masculinist moral

Table 65. Between-Group Differences: T-Tests of Indexes (UO Data)

Dummy variable	Nonviolence Index	Militarism Index
	Difference Between Means (*M*(non-dummy) – *M*(dummy)	Difference Between Means (*M*(non-dummy) – *M*(dummy)
Male (vs. female)	.06	.10**
White (vs. non-white)	-.01	-.09*
Black (vs. non-black)	.11	.09
Hispanic	-.03	-.03
Upper classes	.06	.08*
Moderates and Conservatives	.20****	.27****
Liberal	-.22****	-.28****
Republican	.26****	.28****
Democrat	-.16****	-.24****
Politically interested	-.006	-.07
Knowledgeable of nonviolent revolutions	-.13**	-.16**
Rural	.02	.06
Religious	.06	.11**
Christian	.13***	.24****
Catholic	.09	.09
Evangelical	.14*	.23****
Born again	.03	.11
Literalist	.02	.26***
Attenders	.02	.10*
Military parents	.03	-.03
Athlete (Q48)	.004	.08
High School football player	.06	.14**
High School baseball/ softball player	.10	.16***
Sports fan (UO football fan; Q50)	.12**	.16***
Pro baseball fan	.26****	.16**
NFL football fan	.10*	.13**
Major 1: Sociology	-.08	.03
Major 2: Psych	-.06	-.10
Major 3: Pre-med	.006	.08
Major 4: Business	.15**	.13**
Major 5: Education	-.07	.01
Major 6: Journalism	-.03	.01
Major 7: Arts	-.16*	-.09
Major 8: Other humanities	.12*	.002
Major 9: Natural sciences	.02	-.22**
Major 10: Undecided/ other	-.19	-.03

Notes: * = p< .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p < .001; for each dummy variable, robvar tests were first conducted in STATA to determine if variances were unequal; In cases of unequal variances between groups, t-tests specified "unequal" variances; In the difference between means columns above, a negative difference indicates the dummy variable has a larger mean, and hence, the dummy group (e.g., for the nonviolence index these include: white, Hispanic, liberal, Democrat) scores more peaceful on the index; a positive difference indicates the non-dummy variable has a larger mean, and hence, the non-dummy group (e.g., for the nonviolence index these include: female, non-black, non-Republican, non-Christian) scores more peaceful on the index; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes

capital" (p.99). Stempel also found significant effects (at the .01 level) for supporting the Iraq War among respondents watching NFL, college football, NASCAR (National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing), and tennis. The latter finding could be related to the fact that Stempel did not control for income (i.e., wealthier folks – in addition to being more likely to be hawkish and Republican, are probably bigger fans of tennis). The present survey has a much smaller sample size than Stempel's nationally representative sample, so results are only suggestive. Similarly, the cell sizes for NASCAR andtennis are too small to analyze in the present study. But larger cell sizes make it possible to track the following groups: 48 respondents (12.4% of the sample) claimed to "often" watch Major League Baseball, and 109 respondents (28% of the sample) claimed to "often" watch NFL football.

In the present survey of UO students, NFL fans and pro baseball fans did score significantly (each at the .05 level) less peaceful on the Militarism Index. Interestingly, of all the spectator and participation sports variables, baseball fans have the largest effect on the Nonviolence Index, with baseball fans scoring significantly less peaceful (at the robust .001 level) on this index. This finding corroborates what Stempel (2006) found on baseball fans and support for the Iraq War. Again, baseball fandom seems to be a proxy indicator conservative political leanings.

When females are dropped from the sample and only males are compared, baseball fans remain significantly less peaceful (at the .05 level) on the Nonviolence Index (p=.0366), but there was no significant difference for NFL fans versus non-fans on the Nonviolence Index. When the sample is limited to males, baseball fan is not significantly associated with Militarism Index scores (at the .05 level), but NFL fans are

less peaceful on the Militarism Index and the difference (.13) with non-fans approaches significance at the .05 level (p=.0552). Also just comparing males, there was no significant difference between fans of baseball or the NFL on the Interpersonal Violence Index, respectively.

Hence, some of Stempel's results were supported in the present study. The significant associations between violent ideological leanings and baseball fandom as well as the UO football fan variable offers some support for Stempel's (2006) findings as well as Chomsky's theories of a spectator sport-tribalism link. The differences between the Stempel study and the present one merit comment. Stempel tracked a nationwide sample and probed for degree of involvement in watching sports on TV. The present sample replicated Stempel's sports fan indicators but also tested the relatively unique experience of being a football fan for the number one college team in the nation, while attending the school. If any spectator sport experience could generate "tribalism," this may be one of the best candidates. The sporting rituals ("collective effervescence" in Durkheim's phrase) occur each week throughout the fall term. If students are unable to obtain free tickets to the games, many of them are still likely to watch the games on TV, in bars, dorms, or apartments. In fact, Lindo, Swensen, and Waddell (2012) found that during the 2010 UO football season, only 10 percent of female UO students and an even lower percentage of males reported watching zero UO football games. Moreover, "Some 40 percent of females watched 10 or more games out of 12, while over 50 percent of males watched 10 or more games" (p.257).

Of course, it is difficult to disentangle causes and effects, and to discern to what degree particular personality types are drawn to the football fan experience, to what

degree the experience of being/ becoming a football fan cultivates tribal or aggressive impulses, and to what degree this might "spillover" into other attitudes at least tangentially related to aggression and in-group/ out-group issues such as nonviolence/ militarism, and the hawk-dove continuum on foreign policy.

If spectatorship of sports, or certain kinds of sports, can cultivate forms of tribalism, it seems that participation in certain sports might socialize people in similar ways. Q48 asked respondents if they were an athlete in high school. Q49 asked them to specify which sports they played. Above, we see that athletes did not score significantly different on the Nonviolence Index or the Militarism Index. Sixty-five respondents (19% of the sample) said they played football in high school. This group scored less peaceful on the Militarism Index, and it was significant at the .05 level. An additional test (not depicted above) showed that football players were much less peaceful on the Interpersonal Violence Index, and the .23 difference between means was significant at the robust .0001 level.

However, when females are dropped from the sample and males who played football are compared with other males, there are no significant differences on the Militarism, Nonviolence, or Interpersonal Violence indexes at the .05 level. Thus, controlling for gender, the experience of playing football in high school was certainly not significant in the sample. But the sample size is relatively small and the effect of playing football among non-college attendees, or even other majors on campus, could be different.

Testing the Nation-Specific Nonviolence and Militarism Indexes: Costa Rica Data

Below in Table 66, the results for ULatina are not surprising since the primary majors sampled from there were physics, engineering, and computer science. Similarly, the primary major sampled from at UCR was sociology. The primary majors sampled from at U Hispanoamericana were pre-med and psychology.

Table 66. Between-Group Differences: T-Tests of Indexes (Costa Rica Data)

Dummy variable	Nonviolence Index	Militarism Index
	Difference Between Means (*M*(non-dummy) – *M*(dummy)	Difference Between Means (*M*(non-dummy) – *M*(dummy)
Male (vs. female)	.22****	.24****
White (vs. non-white)	-.01	.08
Mestizo (vs. white)	.0007	-.10
Upper classes	.07	.14**
Liberal	.11	-.31****
Politically interested	.10*	-.13**
Knowledgeable of nonviolent revolutions	.05	-.07
PLN party	-.02	.12
PAC party	-.07	-.17**
Religious	-.15**	.20***
Catholic	-.13**	.06
Evangelical	.14*	.36****
Attenders	-.16***	.09
UCR	.08	-.31****
U Latina	.008	.30****
U Hispanoamericana	-.18***	.03
Major 1: law	-.19	-.008
Major 2: business	-.11	-.02
Major 3: psych	-.06	-.02
Major 4: physics	.23	.34**
Major 5: engineer	.03	.24**
Major 6: comp sci	.04	.32***
Major 7: pre-med	-.15**	.05
Major 8: sociology	.07	-.38****
Major 9: other/ undecided	.20	.29

Notes: * = p< .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p < .001; for each dummy variable, robvar tests were first conducted in STATA to determine if variances were unequal; In cases of unequal variances between groups, t-tests specified "unequal" variances; In the difference between means columns above, a negative difference indicates the dummy variable has a larger mean, and hence, the dummy group (e.g., for the nonviolence index these include: the religious, Catholic, attenders, pre-med majors, etc.) scores more peaceful on the index; a positive difference indicates the non-dummy variable has a larger mean, and hence, the non-dummy group (e.g., for the nonviolence index these include: females, non-liberals, the politically uninterested, and non-evangelicals) scores more peaceful on the index; for the Mestizo variable the non-dummy category was whites (racial minorities were coded as "missing" on this variable only); see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes

It is interesting that there is no significant left-right/ liberal-conservative gap in the Nonviolence Index, but in the Militarism Index a significant gap emerges with liberals scoring more peacefully on the Militarism Index. Another surprising flip-flop is that the non-religious are significantly more peaceful on the Militarism Index, but the

Religious are significantly more peaceful in the Nonviolence Index. Similarly, the "politically interested" score significantly more peaceful on the Militarism Index, but on the Nonviolence Index they score marginally lesspeaceful (with a difference that is significant at only the .1 level). Hence, it seems those inclined to adhere to nonviolence tend to be politically uninterested and religious. But the politically interested and non-religious in Costa Rica are more suspicious of militarism.

Below in Table 67, the most significant negative predictors of Nonviolence Index scores are gender (with males scoring less peacefully) and SDO scores (with high SDO scores associated with less peaceful Nonviolence Index scores). The most significant positive predictors of Nonviolence Index scores were the SECURITY value type. The "religious" variable was not significant at even the modest .1 level when substituted for Catholic in Model 2. The political party dummy variables, PLN and PAC, were not significant predictors at the .05 level, or even the .1 level, when entered into the regression equation as the sole independent variable (not depicted in the table above).

Below in Table 68, we see that the most significant negative predictors of Militarism Index scores are gender (with males scoring less peacefully) , SDO scores (with high SDO scores associated with less peaceful Nonviolence Index scores), left-right ideology (with conservatives/ right-wingers scoring less peacefully), and the CONFORMITY value type (with conformists scoring less peacefully). The most significant positive predictors of Militarism Index scores are the value types of UNIVERSALISM and SELF-DIRECTION.

Table 67. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for Regression of Nonviolence Index on Independent Variables (Costa Rica Data)

Independent variables	Nonviolence Index							
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Male (Male=1; Female=0)	-.25*** (-3.62)	-.23** (-3.16)	-.22** (-3.14)	-.16* (-2.33)			-.14* (-2.37)	-.12 (-1.82)
White (white=1; non-white=0)	.01 (.15)	.03 (.37)	.04 (.50)	.04 (.54)				
Class (Upper class=1; Lower class=5)	-.01 (-.16)	-.03 (-.47)	-.03 (-.40)	-.03 (-.41)				
Left-right ideology (Far left=1; Far right=5)	.10 (1.36)	.003 (.04)	.01 (.15)	.18* (2.58)				.19** (2.63)
Political interest (Very interested=1; Not at all interested=4)	.08 (1.11)	.05 (.64)	.06 (.78)	.05 (.74)				
Catholic (Yes=1; No=0)		.07 (.94)						
Religious Attendance (More than once a week=1; Never=5)		-.08 (-.99)	-.13 (-1.64)					
Evangelical (Yes=1; No=0)			-.12 (-1.56)					
SDO (1=favor equality; 7=favor dominance)				-.33*** (-4.68)			-.31*** (-4.61)	-.33*** (-4.38)
Security					.20** (2.93)	.24*** (3.53)	.19** (3.24)	.18** (2.79)
Conformity					-.07 (-.91)			
Tradition					.12 (1.72)	.17* (2.44)	.13* (2.19)	.11 (1.56)
Benevolence					-.003 (-.04)			
Universalism					.13 (1.45)	.19** (2.89)	.03 (.36)	.05 (.61)
Achievement					.12 (1.56)	.15* (2.27)	.09 (1.49)	.09 (1.32)
Power					-.08 (-1.00)			
Hedonism					-.02 (-.30)			
Self-Direction						.10 (1.54)		.11 (1.63)
Stimulation						.007 (.10)		
N	207	194	194	206	261	261	259	213
Adj R^2	.06	.04	.05	.15	.08	.08	.19	.20

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are *t*-statistics; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Schwartz values were reverse coded and centered; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate "very much like me," and -2 indicates "not at all like me" (positive scores signify that the value is more important); For the nonviolence index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and the score of 1 is least peaceful; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes

Table 68. OLS Standardized Coefficients (betas) for Regression of Militarism Index on Independent Variables (Costa Rica Data)

Independent variables	Militarism Index							
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Male (Male=1; Female=0)	-.25*** (-4.02)	-.28*** (-4.25)	-.27*** (-4.05)	-.16* (-2.55)			-.12* (-2.14)	-.13* (-2.23)
White (white=1; non-white=0)	-.08 (-1.21)	-.08 (-1.28)	-.07 (-1.13)	-.06 (-.95)				
Class (Upper class=1; Lower class=5)	-.02 (-.27)	-.05 (-.68)	-.03 (-.53)	-.06 (-.94)				
Left-right ideology (Far left=1; Far right=5)	-.27*** (-4.07)	-.21** (-2.91)	-.20** (-2.90)	-.18** (-2.91)				-.06 (-.88)
Political interest (Very interested=1; Not at all interested=4)	-.07 (-1.11)	-.07 (-1.07)	-.07 (-1.07)	-.09 (-1.51)				
Catholic (Yes=1; No=0)		.01 (.14)						
Religious Attendance (More than once a week=1; Never=5)		.11 (1.49)	.06 (.88)					
Evangelical (Yes=1; No=0)			-.15* (-2.19)					-.16** (-2.77)
SDO (1=favor equality; 7=favor dominance)				-.36*** (-5.57)			-.33*** (-5.31)	-.37*** (-5.34)
Security					-.10 (-1.49)	-.03 (-.44)	-.07 (-1.31)	-.09 (-1.42)
Conformity					-.33*** (-4.91)	-.23** (-3.41)	-.20** (-3.24)	-.19** (-2.94)
Tradition					-.067 (-1.02)			
Benevolence					.057 (-.82)			
Universalism					.11 (1.23)	.17* (2.37)	.04 (.57)	-.05 (-.58)
Achievement					-.05 (-.76)			
Power					-.12 (-1.51)	-.04 (-.64)	.03 (.54)	.02 (.34)
Hedonism					-.10 (-1.27)			
Self-Direction						.14* (2.20)	.15* (2.48)	.17* (2.42)
Stimulation						-.006 (-.09)		
N	219	205	205	218	275	275	272	209
Adj R^2	.14	.13	.16	.24	.15	.17	.29	.34

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are *t*-statistics; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Schwartz values were reverse coded and centered; For the centered Schwartz values, scores of 3 indicate "very much like me," and -2 indicates "not at all like me" (positive scores signify that the value is more important); For the militarism index, the score of 4 is most peaceful, and the score of 1 is least peaceful; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes

RESPONDENT HEROES AND VIOLENT/ NONVIOLENT IDEOLOGY

Psycho-social theorists Otto Rank and Ernest Becker conceived of societies as "codified hero-systems or as symbolic action systems that produce, distribute and circulate statuses and customs in order to cope with human fears of death or extreme otherness" (West 1999, p.264). Rank, who builds on and transcends Freudian

psychology, understood myth as "wish fulfillment," and in and through myths entire cultures sought to "create a second womb" or "womblike ideal," i.e., a future paradise or the recreation of a primal paradise (Segal 2004, p.xxiii). For Rank, the true cultural hero is the artist, "the one who in religion, art, or philosophy creates 'sublime wish compensations' for the lingering frustrations of life..." (p.xxiv). Here, it is worth noting that artists were scarcely mentioned as admired heroes from U.S. history in the open-ended survey question, though this likely reflects conventional associations of "history" with political figures, a notion strongly fostered by history textbooks. Building on Rank, it seems that cultural myths, whether religious or quasi-religious, and historical narratives can at least approach functional equivalence, as in Bellah's (1967) concept of the "civil religions" of nation-states. In order to explore U.S. and Costa Rican cultures as "codified hero-systems," we will analyze the lists of national heroes provided by respondents.

While the Gallup Poll has long conducted regular surveys of who the most admired Americans are, the present survey allows us to analyze how the personal heroes listed by respondents relates to other values and attitudes. I will argue that the listing of some heroes clearly reflects hegemonic U.S. public school socialization with its laudatory, superficial and one-dimensional portraits of presidents and non-controversial figures. Of course, given that the elite quotes section preceded this hero question, we must consider that the U.S. moral and political elites quoted (President Obama, Dr. King, Dwight Eisenhower, George W. Bush, and Einstein) were certainly "cued" for mention in this later section.

In the U.S. school system, racial issues are discussed, but labor and class struggles are systematically omitted or glossed over (Loewen 1995, Shanker Institute 2010).

Hence, heroes of the struggle for racial justice readily appear in the lists of respondents – Dr. King, Rosa Parks, Harriet Tubman, and Malcolm X. But respondents did not list figures from the U.S. labor movement struggles or class conflict struggles, though a handful of respondents listed wealthy tycoons like Andrew Carnegie, Phil Knight, and Warren Buffet who each received one vote.

As we will see below, the frequency with which Rosa Parks is mentioned prompts reflection. Martin Luther King, Jr., who was well grounded in Hegel's philosophy of history, seems to have viewed Rosa Parks, as well as himself as filling the roles of "world-Historical Individuals" who have been "caught up by the Zeitgeist" and move history through a new dialectical development (Baker-Fletcher 1993, p.92). It is worth considering the relatively small, in some ways symbolic, role Parks played in the Civil Rights movement. Parks was in many ways a wise and gracious figure, deeply religious, but she is almost never given voice in textbooks (i.e., she is almost never quoted). Her rise to vaulted status as a major heroine almost calls for a Jungian analysis (e.g., Ulanov 1971), as if the collective conscience was yearning for an archetypal feminine figure. Her more frequent listing by female respondents might push us towards similar interpretations.

Like Gandhi's movements in South Africa and India (e.g., Chabot and Vinthagen 2007), many lessons from the U.S. civil rights movement can cautiously inform theoretical generalizations about nonviolent action (e.g., Andrews 2002, McAdam and Tarrow 2000, McAdam 1999, McAdam 1983, Morris 1993). But as Eddy (2012) has argued, the universe of possible lessons becomes sharply reduced through the playing out

of collective memory processes. With the single exception of Dr. King, few U.S. civil rights leaders are referenced in public discourse (Polletta 1998).

Thus, it seems that social movement templates often obtain "stickiness" in the collective memory by virtue of their attachment to charismatic leaders (Eddy 2012). This is not surprising given that memory templates need "sponsors" to live on in collective memory (Fine and McDonnell 2007, p.176), and charismatic and influential leaders often attract such sponsors long after they have passed from the scene. Schwartz (2009) argues that this process illustrates "oneness," society's need for personified ideals. A case in point is the following quote by a scholar who has written, "Three principles of civil disobedience: Thoreau, Gandhi, and King" (Gier 2013).

Whether discussed in terms of a persistent "great man/ woman" view of history or the cultural resonance achieved by cults of personality, it is unclear if social movements lacking a clear moral and ideological leader with almost messianic expectations attached to them can be long preserved in collective memory (Eddy 2012). It seems we may be "stuck" with memory templates attached to charismatic leaders.

Indeed, a recent sample of U.S. college students today can come up with organizational names, even if we spot them some of the key acronyms of the civil rights movement: CORE, SCLC, and SNCC. Of course, these are the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In October of 2011, the author conducted a survey utilizing a convenience sample of UO students enrolled in a lower division sociology course (all of whom attended high school in the U.S., mostly in Oregon and California). At the end of a class period, students (n=118) were given the 3 acronyms

above and asked to identify the full names of these organizations and their significance in U.S. history. Eleven students (9.3% of the sample) could place the organizations in the civil rights era, but only 5 (4.2% of the sample) could identify one or more of the organizational names (Eddy 2012).

Below we will see that 32.5% of the same sample (the same class, surveyed a few weeks earlier) had claimed Dr. King as a hero. Yet the vast majority were unable to provide the name of Dr. King's SCLC organization, suggesting that most students actually know very little about Dr. King's biography. In addition, the survey suggests that history is not taught or remembered in terms of organizations. We should recall that SNCC also had notable leaders like Stokely Carmichael and Diane Nash, though SNCC's slogan was "We are all leaders."

Perhaps, to some degree, we are hardwired to organize and remember narratives attached to personalities – suggesting a provocative link to the Boston Personalism that deeply influenced Dr. King (Baker-Fletcher 1993). In the late 1950s King (1958) wrote, Boston Personalism's theory that "the clue to the meaning of ultimate reality is found in personality…remains today my basic philosophical position" (p.100). In Boston Personalism, a theological position developed by several scholars at the University of Boston while Dr. King was a doctoral student there, God was conceptualized as "Infinite or 'Absolute' Personality," or "the complete and perfect personality" (Baker-Fletcher 1993, p.63). For Dr. King, this grounded a robust notion of human dignity.

But the disappearance of organizations from collective memory leaves us with memory templates that distort how it is social movements, organizations and traditions, not individuals alone, who create social change. Consider for example that even where

Dr. King seems to act alone – as in giving speeches, a network of activists collaborated with him and supported him. Dr. King's important speech "Beyond Vietnam" (also called "A Time to Break Silence") was written by a team of writers including Vincent Harding, an African-American and member of the Mennonite Church, a traditional peace church (Smiley 2011).

Preoccupations with celebrity are routinely scorned by many intellectuals. Consider this quote by Admiral Hyman Rickover ("father" of America's nuclear navy): "Great minds discuss ideas, average minds discuss events, small minds discuss people." Chris Hedges (2009) is particularly trenchant in his critique of the modern cult of celebrity as he writes, "Celebrity worship banishes reality" (p.22); "Human beings become a commodity in celebrity culture" (p.29); "This cult of distraction...masks the real disintegration of culture" (p.38); "Celebrity culture has bequethed to us... 'junk politics.' Junk politics does not demand justice...It personalizes and moralizes issues rather than clarifying them" (p.47).

Yet, Hedges' analysis of the dark side of this obsession with personality helps to illuminate the sharp distinctions which can be drawn between celebrities and moral exemplars. The early 20th century sociologist Jane Addams argued that exposure to moral exemplars, like Tolstoy and Gandhi, should be a basic element of education, a way to cultivate what Alexis de Tocqueville termed the pro-social "habits of the heart" (Elshtain 2002b, p.377).

It is inevitable that heroes become used and even co-opted as they are interpreted through the lenses of group-based agenda in the present (Inwood 2009).For example, nonviolent adherents like Tolstoy, Gandhi, and King interpreted Jesus's message in the

terms of nonviolence and liberation, while the Protestant Reformation leader Martin Luther saw in Jesus grounds for "just war" doctrine, but no grounds for a "just revolution" (Pelikan, 1985, p.171; see also chapters 14 and 17). Polletta (1998) found that U.S. politicians invoke King on both sides of contested issues, but all tend to invoke only the "early King."

Contradictions abound in our highly selective use of heroes. Consider that a portrait of Dr. King hangs in a dining hall of the infamous U.S. military prison in Guantanamo, Cuba (Sims 2012, p.61). In January of 2013, the U.S. Marine Corps posted a tweet on their official site: "A man who won't die for something is not fit to live. - Martin Luther King Jr." (Greenwald 2013). Similarly, a top Pentagon lawyer, at a 2011 ceremony commemorating the King holiday, argued that King would support the U.S. wars on terror (Greenwald 2013). A 2013 web posting from the US Air Force's Global Strike Team claimed Dr. King would be "proud" of the team's possession of the"most powerful weapons in the US arsenal" and the multiracial, multicultural composition of the team (Greenwald 2013). By contrast, during his life King said, "When scientific power outruns moral power, we end up with guided missiles and misguided men. ... the destructive power of modern weapons eliminates even the possibility that war may serve any good at all" (cited in Maynard and Carrigan 2013, p.A7).

In all of these example, we see once again that "ideology has no history," and ideology leads social claims makers to drop famous names without wrestling with their biographies. In the same way, Eddy (2012) found that transnational human rights activists in Israel-Palestine drew upon distinct memory templates of Gandhi and King depending on whether they adhered to principled or pragmatic nonviolent ideological orientations.

In keeping with their ideological convictions, the latter were likely to gloss over Gandhi and King's emphasis on strict nonviolent discipline, overcoming hatred, seeking trust and reconciliation (Eddy 2012, Eddy forthcoming).

Parks is not history reduced to biography (i.e., the great man/ woman view of history), or a speech (as King is so often reduced to his "I Have a Dream" speech), she is history reduced to a gesture – her refusal to move to the back of the bus. She is almost never given voice in high school history textbooks, almost never quoted. As a narrative device, shining a light on her initial single act of refusal, enables historians to neglect the 381 days of the bus boycott in which all of Montgomery's black citizens made enormous sacrifices. And, it is just too much that, among American students today, the most frequently cited female hero is silent, reduced to a gesture, not given voice. It is shocking how few females were listed as admired heroes of U.S. history. Predictably, U.S. presidents dominated student lists.

When Cornel West, a leading African-American intellectual and populist of our time, limits his list of heroes to two, he typically says Dr. King and Fannie Lou Hamer. It is telling that other black female civil rights leaders who were trailblazing activists, and who arguably took more risks than Parks, and who, as spokespeople for the cause articulated the salient issues of the day more completely like Ella Baker, Fannie Lou Hamer, or Diane Nash are not remembered by students. In this sense, and with incredible irony, it seems listing Parks as a hero, since it likely stems from superficial textbook portraits of her (in which she is reduced to a gesture), is a very unParks-like thing to do, because Parks was about civil disobedience, about saying "No!" to the system in the name of a higher morality and higher ideals. Hence, as a hero she becomes the opposite

of what she stood for in life. She is co-opted, praised in the process of not questioning, not asking, who are the heroes who are too controversial to be included?Or, asking, what about the real Parks might be too controversial to be included in mainstream textbooks today – why is she almost never given voice (never quoted) in the texts? In some ways, she is the ideal symbol because she can be reduced to an uncomplicated gesture.

Lifting her up as a hero hides the organizations that she worked in and through. The textbooks do not tell us she was one of the first women in Montgomery to join the NAACP and served as its secretary for many years (Kohl 1995). Listing Parks as a hero (or Dr. King or any other number of other figures as well), at least, if it is done without richer knowledge of her biography than that provided in textbooks, risks becoming an act of deep conformity rather than any challenge to injustice.

Which brings us to an important issue regarding nonviolent action and collective memory. A bronze statue of Rosa Parks placed outside the downtown Eugene, Oregon city bus station well illustrates some of the challenges nonviolent action faces in competing for space in collective memory. For centuries, Western cultures have commemorated their heroes, very often soldiers holding sabers or guns, in statues placed up on high pedestals. As viewers had to look up, the symbolism was clear – these figures represented “lofty” virtues and “high” ideals. The Parks statue in Eugene is flat on the sidewalk. She is seated, as she was on the bus in Montgomery, Alabama. Children can look her in the eye or sit in her lap. Adult passersby look down upon her statue. Kohl (1995) sounds a relevant note here as he questions the tendency for textbooks and school children to refer to her, unlike other heroes and historical figures, by first name: Rosa (p.34, p.40). In the context of white supremacy’s legacy (in which black adults were often

called by their first names as a mark of their inferior status (pp.40-41), Kohl is right to express ambivalence about this. Yet, we must recognize too that heroes are the target of psychological projections even as they meet human needs – and Parks as a female heroine, may take on motherly projections in the patriarchal context of stern, hegemonic masculinist fathers.

From another but related angle, Parks' statue may embody the utterly ordinary nature of nonviolence – and in this sense is nonviolence well represented, though problematic. Because at the very historical juncture when it first becomes possible to celebrate and commemorate a black woman in a public statue in the United States, why this sudden transition to eye-level heroes? If our official national heroes are finally now allowed to come from the ranks of the cultural underdogs (and moral giants) from the margins, perhaps we should put our heroes up on high pedestals for a few more centuries. The danger in viewing nonviolence as so mundane is that it fosters ignorance of its power and fosters the forgetting of its role. Rather than framing nonviolence as an alternative, more fully human, more ethical, more cosmopolitan means of conflict resolution which addresses our deep needs for security without harming others, nonviolence becomes unremarkable, unexplained conventional action (i.e., she simply refused to move to the back of the bus), and since it is under-theorized its power and potential is neglected or misunderstood.

Critical analysts of school textbooks have detected structural biases which seem to shape the selection and presentation of historical narratives. The selection and framing of the Montgomery Bus Boycott may be partly linked to the "happy ending" and the ready-made assertion that progress was made (this seems to be a requirement before

delving into the history of racism (Loewen (1995) also notes this pattern that U.S. history is a march of progress in the presentation of, and omissions in, textbook narratives of Jackie Robinson) and the narrative is also assumed to be more compelling because credit can be given to two individuals, Rosa Parks and Dr. King, rather than social movement organizations (Kohl 1995).

Since female respondents comprise over half (58%) of the sample (which was 58% female, 42% male), an analysis of the proportions of listed heroes by respondent gender is helpful. When broken down by gender, the listing of Rosa Parks as a hero takes on additional significance. Parks was primarily listed by female respondents as seen in Table 69 below. But Dr. King also was more likely to be listed by females. Overall, 52.76% (210 out of 398) of thesample listed Dr. King as a hero, while 12.56% (50 out of 398) listed Rosa Parks as a hero. We can see in Table 69 above that only 6 (or 12%) of the 50 people who listed Rosa Parks as a hero were male respondents. Thus, the vast

Table 69. Crosstabs: Heroes of U.S. History by Respondent Gender

Q42 Heroes	Males	Females	Total
Other heroes listed	40 67.80 (24.10)	19 32.20 (8.19)	59 100.00 (14.82)
"Don't Know"	55 44.72 (33.13)	68 55.28 (29.31)	123 100.00 (30.90)
Martin Luther King, Jr. listed	65 39.16 (39.16)	101 60.84 (43.53)	166 100.00 (41.71)
Rosa Parks listed	0 0 (0)	6 100.00 (2.59)	6 100.00 (1.51)
King & Parks listed	6 13.64 (3.61)	38 86.36 (16.38)	44 100.00 (11.06)
Total	166 41.71 (100.00)	232 58.29 (100.00)	398 100.00 (100.00)

Notes: Frequency count, Row %, (Column %); Q42 was open-ended. "Other heroes listed" represents respondents who listed heroes that did not include King or Parks. "King & Parks listed" represents respondents who included both King and Parks in their list of heroes.

majority, 44 (or 88%) of the 50people listing Rosa Parks as a hero were female respondents. Meanwhile, of the 210 people listing King as a hero, 139 (or 66.19%) were females, and 71 (or 33.81%) were males. Among female respondents, 139 (or 59.91%) of 232 females listed King as a hero, and 44(or 18.97%) of 232 females listed Rosa Parks as a hero. Among male respondents, 71 (42.77%) of 166 males listed King as a hero, and 6 (or 3.61%) of 166 males listed Rosa Parks as a hero. In addition, of the people who listed "other heroes" (not including King or Parks), 67.8% were males, and 32.20% were females. Hence, Dr. King and especially Rosa Parks were listed as heroes much more frequently by female respondents, while males tended to list other heroes.

Another surprising insight is that only about 15% of respondents listed heroes without including King or Rosa Parks in their list, though about 31% answered "don't know." Overall, about 53% of respondents included King in their list. However, it must be kept in mind that the survey heavily "cued" respondents to think of nonviolent heroes, since this question came near the very end of the survey and respondents had not only been forced to answer many questions on nonviolence/ violence, but also read three quotations by Dr. King. On the other hand, they were also exposed to one quote by President Obama questioning the feasibility of King's nonviolence in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize speech.

Although some respondents listed several heroes, the most common response to the question was listing two heroes – and the most frequent response was "Lincoln and MLK" and "MLK and Rosa Parks" was second.

Above we discussed the lack of consistent and coherent ideologies in the U.S. populace. It is also evident that many respondents listed a set of heroes that reflect

contradictions, depending on how the hero is interpreted. For example, among respondents who listed only two heroes we find the following combinations: “Rosa Parks and all the U.S. soldiers,” “Martin Luther King and Mr. Bush,” “Firefighters of September 11th and Rosa Parks,” “Ronald Reagan and Dr. MLK,” “George Washington and Rosa Parks” – the latter is perhaps the quintessential distillation of U.S. hegemonic public education. As another example, one respondent listed two heroes: “Rosa Parks and Crazy Horse.” Following well-known principles of art, we can say that the unlikely juxtaposition of these two icons is itself poetic, and almost media-savvy as one might expect of a generation accustomed to marketing themselves in social media like Facebook. Yet, we cannot help wondering if the respondent could even quote one sentence that either one of these figures ever said. It might be contended that exercises in name-dropping like this may mean very little as indicators of individual personality, yet on the face of it, the very superficiality and contradictions in a given set of listed heroes may speak volumes about our cultural moment. Heroes may simply be chosen because they sound exotic, or evoke a spirit of nonconformity. In the case of Rosa Parks and Crazy Horse, there is a logical tie of outsider/ underdog resistance to oppression and domination. The two biggest heroes of my own childhood were Dr. King and Geronimo, and a mix of contingencies (i.e., a family vacation stop at a fort where Geronimo was held) and family influences (i.e., my Father marched with Dr. King and was very proud of that fact) played a role. But the contradictions in a given list of heroes may reflect the fragmentation of the self in modernity which some theorists have emphasized (Habermas 1987).

Nonviolent heroes like Dr. King and Rosa Parks are not necessarily remembered for their nonviolent tactics and values. Analyses of crosstabs between Q42 and the three King quotes in the elite cues section found little difference between the respondents listing Dr. King as a hero and their responses to Dr. King quotes. As another example, crosstabs were run on Q42 and Q6.

We see in Table 70 below that over 1/3rd of those who listed Dr. King and Rosa Parks as heroes, responded to Q6 by answering that peaceful means alone "will NOT work." This disconnect between admiring King and Parks as heroes, while disavowing or failing to recognize the strategic efficacy of nonviolence is difficult to reconcile without positing a degree of ignorance about their biographies. Arguably, nonviolence is the very core of the examples of Dr. King and Rosa Parks.

Table 70. Crosstabs: Heroes of U.S. History by Belief in Efficacy of Nonviolence

Q42 Heroes	Q6. …Which do you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful means alone will NOT work?		Total
	"will work"	"will NOT work"	
Other heroes listed	38 65.52 (15.64)	20 34.48 (12.90)	58 100.00 (14.57)
"Don't Know"	68 53.13 (27.98)	60 46.88 (38.71)	128 100.00 (32.16)
Martin Luther King, Jr. listed	108 66.26 (44.44)	55 33.74 (35.48)	163 100.00 (40.95)
Rosa Parks listed	3 50.00 (1.23)	3 50.00 (1.94)	6 100.00 (1.51)
King & Parks listed	26 60.47 (10.70)	17 39.53 (10.97)	43 100.00 (10.80)
Total	243 61.06 (100.00)	155 38.94 (100.00)	398 100.00 (100.00)

Notes: Frequency count, Row %, (Column %);

However, given the relative lack of association found above between knowledge of nonviolent revolutions and being more likely to affirm pragmatic nonviolence, the

more surprising finding is that almost 2/3^{rds} of those listing King and Parks as heroes *did* affirm nonviolence "will work."

It has been noted that in Latin America, even though nonviolent tactics have long been central to many social movements in the region, these tactics are not named and theorized as nonviolence, and lacking a political culture that theorizes nonviolence, "icons of non-violence such as Martin Luther King have been imported as symbols of struggles for social justice rather than as examples of viable strategies" (Becker 2003, p.8). But such malleability is not unique to heroes of nonviolence. In the same way, Che Guevera is often reduced to an icon of youth rebellion, and his strategies of armed revolution discarded by those who invoke his image. And there are empirical reasons to seriously doubt the depth of biographical knowledge held by respondents who claim a given hero. As discussed below, a second survey of UO students found that very few students could either recognize or provide the name of Dr. King's organization, the SCLC, even when spotted the acronym (Eddy 2012).

In Figure 9 below we see several names that were well-known for both their military service and political careers as U.S. president (Washington, Ulysses S. Grant, Theodore Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and JKF). And, Lincoln, of course, was a notable advocate for the justwar tradition, conceived broadly. But, given the long tradition of U.S. militarism, it is strikinghow few soldiers were named by respondents. Other soldiers listed (and their frequency counts) were: Pat Tillman (2), George S. Patton (2), Douglas MacArthur (1), Andrew Jackson (1), Colin Powell (1), and three vague references as follows: "any soldier who died to protect us," "all the U.S. soldiers," and "the U.S. military." These generalized forms of admiration are illuminating, as it suggests

Figure 9. Frequency Counts of Heroes Listed (Open-Ended Question)



Notes: 31.51% of respondents checked "don't know" (a high level of attrition readily explained by the fact that this question came near the end of a 30 minute survey and was preceded by difficult historical questions that many respondents did not know the answer to), while 68.49% of respondents listed one or more hero

that knowledge of any one soldier's accomplishments is lacking (and that education has not equipped them with such knowledge) and/ or that our cultural "hero system" confers on all soldiers in the abstract an heroic status. The Native American warriors Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull each received one vote. Two Confederate generals also received votes: Stonewall Jackson (1) and Robert E. Lee (1). The listing of Pat Tillman as a hero by two respondents is likely linked, in part, to the release of the film documentary, *The Tillman*

Story (2010) which played in local movie theaters a few months before this survey was given. This data corroborates the ngram searches reported on below. Just as Dr. King exceeds mentions of soldier heroes and Generals in books in American English, he exceeds heroes of war even more dramatically in the self-reported lists of heroes by our respondents.

The relatively high ranking of Amelia Earhart is likely explained by two factors. First, *Amelia*, a big-budget Hollywood biopic was released in 2009, and secondly, Earhart died young and tragically. The latter is a clear pattern emergent in the data – historical figures who died or were killed relatively young and tragically are given a clear boost in heroic status. The liminal terrain of death, and the role of sacrifice or martyrdom, of giving one's life for a cause, so central to Judeo-Christian tradition, seems to set people's minds towards mythic domains. The two largest vote getters, Dr. King and Lincoln fit this model, but so do other top vote getters including JFK, Malcolm X, and Amelia Earhart. This pattern may also explain why Robert Kennedy received two votes and John Lennon received one.

In the Costa Rica sample, the high percentage of students listing Juan Santamaria also illustrates this pattern (as well as the power of socialization via Costa Rica's school system). Santamaria, the official national hero of Costa Rica, was a "drummer boy" who died in a battle defending Costa Rica sovereignty against the American William Walker and his mercenaries in 1856 (Creedman 1977). Incidentally, early on, Walker's adventurism was funded by the U.S. industrialist Cornelius Vanderbilt. Santamaria had volunteered for the heroic task of setting fire to Walker's fort in Rivas, Nicaragua, on the condition that his fellow soldiers promised to take care of his mother if he was killed

(JSHCM 2012). His mother was granted a pension by the government in 1857, and in 1864, just as Santamaria's memory was being promoted to hero status by government officials, her pension was tripled (Palmer 2004, p.92). As a mulatto from the lower classes and a bastard child of a poor woman, Santamaria's race was awkward for white elites who preferred to view Costa Ricans as homogenously white (Palmer 2004, p.95, p.92), but his class position as a common man and his lack of "voice" as a complete unknown was "convenient" for the elites who promoted him as a national hero during a mass conscription campaign (p.93, p.95). Hence, Santamaria was the shrewd public relations campaign of elites who sought to encourage nationalist sentiments as well as more foot soldiers for the army. In fact, when President Barrios of Guatemala declared the Union of Central America in late February of 1885, the Costa Rican government soon issued an emergency call to arms, and in this context, Santamaria was again resurrected as a "popular military hero who the lower classes could identify with" (p.93). It seems Santamaria's promotion to hero status was also partly linked to the fact that President Juan Rafael Mora, the "great hero" of the Costa Rican campaign against Walker had become delegitimized in collective memory, as Mora had been overthrown in the 1859 coup and killed in 1860 while trying to regain power through a military invasion (p.92).

Von Hahn, a 19th century scholar of hero myths found 14 cases of "Aryan" hero tales which all included, among other common features, a hero who is abandoned by his father, fights wars, frees his mother, becomes king, founds a city, and *dies young* (Segal 2004, p.vii). Santamaria clearly matches four of these patterns – he was abandoned by his father, he fights a war, provides for his mother (freeing her from poverty), and dies young. He does not become king or found a city, but he helps to defend Costa Rica's

independence and in a sense, becomes king of the collective memory as his heroism is viewed as trumping that of all other Costa Rican leaders. We will see below how peace advocates in Costa Rica have re-envisioned Santamaria's myth to exemplify more peaceful values.

Second U.S. Survey on Heroes

In October of 2011, the author conducted another survey using a convenience sample of 126 University of Oregon students enrolled in a lower division sociology course. Additional data is desirable because in the 2010 survey (the primary survey in the present study), the survey context likely primed responses influenced by the questions on violence and nonviolence that preceded it, as well as the elite quotes. In the second sample of college student, the context was shaped by a professor and course materials which undoubtedly led some students to list John Brown and Hugh Thompson as heroes. Prior to the survey, students sat through a short lecture in which the professor, building on course readings in Loewen (1995), argued that the abolitionist John Brown was an important American hero. Students were then shown a film on John Brown, by Kenner (2000), which both questioned and reaffirmed the traditional portrait of Brown as mentally unbalanced – a highly doubtful notion which is nonetheless in keeping with most U.S. textbook accounts of Brown (Loewen 1995). In a single open-ended question at the end of the class period, students were asked to list their hero or heroes from U.S. history and explain why they had made that selection. The students (n=126), at least 116 of them, cast 136 votes for heroes, while 10 students claimed "None" (i.e., they had no heroes).

The most frequently cited hero, by far, was Martin Luther King, Jr. with 41 votes (32.5% of students listed Dr. King). The next most frequently cited was John Brown, who received 14 votes (11.1%). Of course, the listing of Brown reflects the course context, but perhaps also the malleability of student attitudes and their lack of meaningful pre-existing attachment to other heroes (as well as the ever-present data collection problem of surveys: nothing is at stake, so respondents may invest little mental energy in their responses). The next most cited figure was President Lincoln who received 12 votes (9.5%). Ten people who cited King as a hero specifically mentioned King's nonviolent methods as a reason for listing him as a hero. Despite all of the militaristic history of the U.S., only eight students (6.3%) listed soldiers or generals as heroes – one listed George Washington, two listed Confederate Generals in the Civil War, and five respondents listed soldiers who were famous for acting *nonviolently* – as one listed Bradley Manning (the U.S. soldier allegedly linked to the release of classified documents to the website WikiLeaks), and four listed Hugh Thompson. Buttwo students voting for Thompson could not remember his name, a clear indicator of superficial attachment to their "hero" (these students simply named the context in which Thompson acted - describing"the helicopter pilot" in Vietnam who intervened to stop the Mai Li massacre). Their answers were no heavily doubt influenced by class discussion and assigned course reading (Zinn, Konopacki, and Buhle 2008) which praised Thompson. Malcolm X received 8 votes (6.3%) and Huey P. Newton of the Black Panthers one vote. This is perhaps indirect evidence that the counter-arguments against nonviolence during the U.S. civil rights era still attractive in some niches. Other nonviolent or peace activists receiving votes included Rosa Parks (5 votes or 4%), Cesar Chavez (1 vote), Daniel Ellsberg (1 vote),

Jackie Robinson (1 vote), Ida B. Wells (1 vote), and the "Iron Jawed Angels" (1 vote) who sacrificed for women's suffrage through nonviolent resistance including fasting in prison. The single reference to the "Iron Jawed Angels" may be linked to a 2004 Hollywood film about them of the same name, starring the celebrity actress Hillary Swank. Thus, "memory entrepreneurs" in Hollywood may have some effect on the collective memory, though in this case the effect was extremely limited.

Importantly, the 32.5% listing Dr. King and the 4% listing Rosa Parks are far lower percentages than were found in the main 2010 survey in which 52.76% listed Dr. King and 12.56% listed Rosa Parks. It seems clear that the format of the 2010 survey cued/ primed nonviolent heroes in the open-ended responses, leading to three times more respondents listing Rosa Parks and 20% more respondents listing Dr. King. Clearly, because Dr. King was quoted in the survey, respondents, especially females, were primed to think of Rosa Parks in this open-ended response.

Heroes of Costa Rican Respondents

In Table 71 below we see when Costa Rican respondents were asked to list national heroes, the top 3 vote getters were soldiers. The only indigenous person in these top 15 heroes is a rebel leader who employed revolutionary violence. Four of the top 6 vote getters were soldiers, and the top female vote getter was a soldier. The top 2 Presidential vote getters were war leaders as well, which fits with popularity trends among U.S. Presidents as well (Henderson and Gochenour 2012).

What is the significance of listing a soldier as a hero? Does it predict attitudinal orientations towards violence or nonviolence? To probe this question, the following t-tests were run. In the Costa Rican data, a dummy variable was created in which every

respondent who listed a soldier or warrior was coded as "1." These included respondents who listed the following as national heroes: Juan Santamaria (87 votes), Pancha Carrasco (17 votes), Juan Rafael Mora Poras (45 votes), General Jose Maria Canas Escamilla (1 vote), General Tomas Guardia (1 vote), and Joaquin Mora Poras (1 vote). Note that all 6 of these military leader heroes were involved in the War with William Walker – clearly a watershed event for the pantheon of Costa Rican heroes. Joaquin Mora Poraswas in

Table 71. Costa Rican Heroes Listed by Respondents in Open-Ended Question (N=313)

Name	**Description**	**Freq.**	**% Listing**
Juan Santamaria	Soldier, martyr, national hero of the war against the filibustering William Walker (1856-1857). Killed while setting fire to Walker's fort.	87	27.80
Juan Rafael Mora Porras (referred to as President Mora, or President Mora Porras)	President (1849-1859), mobilized the nation for the war against William Walker (1856-1857), with his brother, General Jose Joaquin Mora Porras (General Mora) leading the troops in the field. After the war, the politically powerful Mora family "tried to manipulate the ensuing election to assure their stay in power" but Mora was overthrown in 1859 (Rolbein 1989, p.35). A year later, after invading unsuccessfully with an armed force, he was executed by firing squad. After this ignoble end, Rolbein (1989) notes, "It would be almost a century before the Mora name was resurrected to hero status, celebrating the opposition to armed imperialism" (p.35), i.e., embodied in the symbol of William Walker, the private U.S. imperialist.	45	14.38
Jose Figueres Ferrer	The "grandfather of modern Costa Rica" (Foley and Cooke 1996, p.33). Leader of the "Army of National Liberation" in the 1948 Civil War and head of the ruling Junta (1948-1949). Elected President twice (1952-1958, 1970-1974). Social democrat, a founder of the PLN party. The Junta abolished the army, outlawed the Communist party, nationalized the banks, granted women the right to vote, gave citizenship rights to all native-born residents (Blacks, Chinese, and the indigenous were no longer 2nd class citizens), instituted an independent election tribunal, a tax on the wealthy, bolstered social services and a Social Security system (e.g., a minimum wage, low-cost health care, child support, and education funding increased) -- reforms which became embedded in the 1949 Constitution (Helmuth 2000, p.24).	38	12.14

Name	Description	Freq.	% Listing
Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia	President (1940-1944), through a broad alliance including Catholic leaders, labor unions, and the Communist Party, he instituted very progressive reforms which established social security and national healthcare systems as well as a minimum wage and other labor protections. Many elites soon opposed him. He ran for President again in 1948, but though electoral irregularities clouded the outcome, the widespread perception at the time and for many decades following, was that Calderon had lost by 10,000 votes (recent studies suggest Calderon actually won the election (Molina and Palmer 2007, p.113)). Calderon seized power with the help of Congress, which his party controlled. This sparked the Revolution of 1948 in which at least 2,000 Costa Ricans died (some sources over 4,000 died (p.114)), and Calderon was ousted by Figueres. From Nicaragua, Calderon led failed invasions of Costa Rica in 1948 and 1955 (Hoivik and Solveig 1981, p.346). Unlike Figueres who relinquished power to a revitalized democracy in 1949, Calderon's three attempts to seize power deeply undercut his progressive legacy. He eventually returned to Costa Rican and ran unsuccessfully for the presidency in 1962, but his son was elected President in 1990.	26	8.31
Oscar Arias	President (1986-1990, 2006-2010), winner of Nobel Peace Prize in 1987	24	7.67
Pancha Carrasco	Female soldier heroine of the war against William Walker (1856-1857)	17	5.43
Franklin Chang Diaz	NASA astronaut, born and grew up in Costa Rica. Attended college and earned a doctorate in physics at MIT in the U.S. He is a naturalized U.S. citizen, veteran of 7 Space Shuttle missions.	14	4.47
Manuel Mora Valverde	Lawyer and politician, candidate for President in 1940 and 1974, one of the founders of the Costa Rican Communist Party (1929)	11	3.51
Braulio Carrillo	Lawyer and politician, President (1835-1842), worked to separate church and state, in 1838 he declared Costa Rica a "free state" and abandoned the Central American Federation. In 1841, he turned dictatorial, dissolved Congress and suspended personal freedoms, was soon overthrown and murdered in exile.	10	3.19
Clodomiro Picado	Scientist, born in Nicaragua, received doctorate in Paris, research was a precursor to discovery of penicillin	8	2.56
Carmen Lyra	Novelist, children's author, women's political leader, teacher, opened Costa Rica's first kindergarten, joined Communist Party, died in exile in Mexico after the 1948 civil war	8	2.56
Alfredo Gonzalez Flores	President (1914-1917), instituted reforms including a progressive income tax. He was overthrown by General Tinoco in 1917. Later served as the first president of the National Bank of Costa Rica (1936-1940).	8	2.56
Juan Mora Fernandez	Chief of state (1824-1833), modernized the nation through establishing a printing press, newspaper, mint, and new gold mining technology. He declared the Virgin of the Angels patron saint of Costa Rica.	6	1.92
Emma Gamboa Alvarado	A leading educator in the 20th century, dean of the Education department at UCR and president of the National Association of Educators. In 1947, she helped lead a nonviolent march of over 6,000 women for electoral reform, during a protest cycle in which many protesters had been killed (Hillerbrand 2012).	5	1.60

Name	Description	Freq.	% Listing
Pablo Presbere	An Indian chief who violently rebelled against missionary priests and Spanish colonial soldiers in the Talamanca uprisings of 1710. The Governor's forces executed the "freedom fighter" by bow and arrow.	5	1.60

Note: Many descriptions drew from Creedman's (1977) *Historical Dictionary of Costa Rica*.

charge of the Costa Rican army and rose to the rank of general during the war. General Canas was general of the Costa Rican forces during the war and later commander in chief of all the Central American allied forces. General Tomas Guardia "distinguished himself in the war against William Walker" (Creedman 1977, p.93). Later, he served as a dictatorial President, though "at the behest of his wife the death penalty was abolished" (p.93). Juan Rafael Mora Poras was the war President who mobilized the country against William Walker's forces. He was overthrown in 1859. A year later he invaded Costa Rica leading an armed force, intent on regaining power, but he failed and was executed (Creedman 1977). Additional listed fighters coded as "1" for this dummy variable included: Pablo Presbere (5 votes) and General Frederico Tinoco (2 votes) who led a coup and briefly became President in 1917. It was decided to not include Figueres (38 votes) in this code. Although he was the key military leader of the 1948 civil war, his role in disbanding the army and his very prominent political leadership make him much more than just a soldier hero. The dummy variable "soldier hero" (i.e., respondents listing a soldier or fighter/ warrior as a hero) included 125 respondents out of the sample of 312.

T-tests on the dummy variable "soldier hero" revealed that there was no significant difference in attitudes between this group and the rest of the sample, on the Nonviolence Index or the Militarism Index, not even at the modest .1 level. Thus, at least in the case of Costa Rica, embracing soldiers as national historical heroes is not associated with pro-military attitudes. This underscores the enormous capacity for people,

as they confront cultural symbol systems and myths, to compartmentalize ideals and embrace contradictions. It is likely that contradictions and inconsistencies are not even perceived by respondents. Rather, the commonsense thinking here may be that different times call for different heroes. In any case, it seems that upholding soldiers of the past as heroes in collective memory carries few implications for attitudes on violence/ nonviolence. This may be one sign of Costa Rica's solidified peace culture.

Some in Costa Rica do perceive the contradictions in celebrating Juan Santamaria as the nation's only state-sanctioned hero. The interpretations of Francisco Cordero Gené, a former government bureaucrat and prominent activist affiliated with the Friends (Quaker) Peace Center in San José, offers fascinating insights. In his explanation of the Santamaria narrative, Cordero emphasizes that Santamaria was a drummer boy, "he didn't even carry a gun." Many of the statues around the nation get this detail wrong – as he is often shown carrying a rifle. And, Francisco points out that Santamaria's battlefield heroics were relatively nonviolent as well. Santamaria set William Walker's fort on fire, an attempt to flush out and force Walker and his soldiers to surrender. Cordero's conclusion is that Santamaria's heroism is found in how "he went to war, not because he was willing to kill, but because he was willing to die." And, the cause was just. After all, Walker's agenda included establishing slavery in Central America, extending Dixie plantations all the way to Panama. Santamaria symbolizes the objection to slavery, the fight for freedom and human rights.

U.S.–SPECIFIC SURVEY QUESTIONS

A few questions were asked only in the UO survey. These probed generalized views of the U.S. military's role in international affairs, views of specific U.S. wars, and

building on previous research on militaristic attitudes the UO survey also collected indicators of respondent affiliations with sports. In Table 72 below, we see that about 5% of respondents assented to the most critical view of the U.S. military's international role, but the highest percentage of respondents selected the middle answer, between critical and laudatory. Because so many selected the middle position, further analysis is somewhat hampered by small cell sizes outside the middle position. It is worth noting that Joseph (2007) estimates that the "doves," those with a principled objection to U.S. militarism and who embrace an "alternative approach to the problems of global violence and security," comprise about 15-20% of the population (p.3). That is roughly what we see here if we accept both 6 as well as 7 indicating this set of attitudes. But based on previous studies, we would expect that a university campus would have a higher percentage of doves than the rest of the U.S. population.

Table 72. On the Role of the U.S. Military in World Affairs (N=426)
Q10 People vary in their opinion of how the U.S. military impacts the rest of the world. In your opinion, does the U.S. military act as the world's heroic policeman, or as the armed forces of a self-interested empire, or something in between? The U.S. military acts as…

(1) the world's heroic policeman who helps keep the peace, and furthers freedom and democracy.	(2)	(3)	(4) Something in between	(5)	(6)	(7) the armed forces of a self-interested empire that dominates and exploits the world, and mostly serves wealthy and powerful interests in the U.S.
17 3.99%	28 6.57%	38 8.92%	198 46.48%	75 17.61%	49 11.50%	21 4.93%

On Support for Recent and Ongoing U.S. Wars

Just a few weeks after the UO survey was conducted (in November of 2010), a CNN/Opinion Research Corporation survey of a nationally representative sample (conducted December 17 – 19), found that 63% of the public was opposed to the war in

Afghanistan – an all-time high up to that point. As we can see below, this is about 20% higher than the numbers of UO students who claimed that the Afghanistan war is "not a just war." Only 35% of respondents said they still support U.S. involvement (Terkel 2010). Notable group variation in opposition to the war included Republicans (44% oppose) versus Democrats (74% oppose), and income level with those making over $50,000 per year (54% oppose) more favorable towards the war versus those making under $50,000 per year (70% oppose). Of course, support/ opposition to a war is a slightly different question than asking whether a war was/ is a "just war." Yet, it is difficult to imagine too many people affirming a war as "just" while opposing it, and still fewer numbers – if any at all - would be likely to say a particular war is "not a just war" while supporting it.

Before addressing Table 73 below, consider that a nationally representative Gallup poll in mid-2010 found that 55% of Americans said that the Iraq War was a "mistake" when presented with a dichotomous answer choice: "Yes, a mistake"/ "No, not a mistake" (Dugan 2013). This is down from April of 2008, when 63% claimed the Iraq War was a mistake. And, in a March 2013 survey, 57% of Americans said the Vietnam War was a mistake, but this is down from 69% in a 2000 survey. In the 2013 survey, the youngest age cohort (18 to 29 years old) was by far the least likely of all the age cohorts

Table 73. Respondent Views of U.S. Wars

Q11 People vary in their opinions about U.S. involvement in recent wars. In your opinion, were the following wars just and worthy causes deserving of U.S. military involvement?

	Yes, a just war (1)	Somewhat just (2)	No, NOT a just war (3)	$\bar{x}$
1. Vietnam War (1955 – 1975)	17.69%	36.67%	45.64%	2.28
2. Iraq War (2003 to present)	10.83%	34.26%	54.91%	2.44
3. Afghanistan War (2001 to present)	17.38%	39.04%	43.58%	2.26

to say that the Vietnam War was a mistake with 43% answering "Yes, a mistake" (compared with 52% (30 to 49 years old), 69% (50 to 64 years old), and 70% (65 and older). Hence, the youngest age cohort, who hold no personal memory of the Vietnam War (i.e, the young who have only been exposed to collective memory of the Vietnam War filtered through educational institutions, the media, etc.), are the least likely to say the Vietnam War was a mistake. Moreover, it seems collective memory processes have failed to communicate the antiwar knowledge which those who lived through the Vietnam War possess. This suggests that generational replacement and socialization processes fails to reproduce the antiwar lessons of the Vietnam War.

In the same 2013 Gallup survey, among 18 to 29 years olds, 50% said the Iraq War was a mistake and 43% said the Afghanistan War was a mistake. For each war, these percentages come very close to the figures claiming "No, NOT a just war" in Table 73 above. Thus, we have some basis for asserting that the "mistake" question and the ethical orientation (i.e., just war/ somewhat just/ not just) of the questions above elicit similar responses – more on this below.

In the table above, if we combine the respondents who said the Vietnam War was a "just war" or "somewhat just" we are left with 54.36% of respondents affirming some degree of legitimation for the Vietnam War. Ironically, this makes the war more popular among U.S. youth today than it ever was with the American public that lived through it. It is higher than the percentage of Americans who approved of President Johnson's handling of the war in Vietnam (a proxy measure of support for the war) between April 1966 through April 1968 (Leahey 2010). The only time approval of Johnson's handling of the war topped 50% occurred in three polls between July 1965 and January 1966 and

after the Gulf of Tonkin crisis when a "rally round the flag" effect produced 85% support for Johnson's handling of the war, though this diminished to 38% four months later (pp.76-78). After the Tet Offensive in early 1968, and onward through May 1971, the percentage of Americans claiming the Vietnam War was a "mistake" hovered between 50 and 60% (p.77). It seems history has effectively "whitewashed" the war for subsequent generations. Leahey's (2010) analysis of U.S. high school history textbook coverage of the Vietnam war strongly supports that inference.

On the other hand, while it is striking that only about 46% of students claimed the Vietnam War was not a just war, the "mistake"question is different from the "just war" question in this survey. During the Vietnam War era, most surveys asked respondents whether they support the war or favor the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. The above question is a different question, as it probes ethical views of the war. Research has shown that a major source of antiwar sentiment in the U.S. is pragmatic rather than moral (Feaver and Gelpi 2004, Joseph 2007). For instance, many respondents during the Vietnam War era favored withdrawal for pragmatic reasons (e.g., the war can not be won, or the casualties and costs are too high) rather than moral reasons (Schuman 1972). But, analyzing this data, questions about collective memory issues still rise to the fore, especially since scholars like Loewen (2007) argue that consensus has emerged in the culture at large that the Vietnam War was "a mistake, politically and morally" (p.348). Political elites who led and directed the war effort including Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford, have admitted as much.

We might well surmise with the benefit of hindsight, that students today would be more likely to condemn the war on moral grounds, even if they generally tend to evaluate

wars on pragmatic rather than moral grounds. Since the U.S. lost the war, and today the war is largely viewed as having been unwinnable, respondents are more likely to perceive the war as immoral. This explanation follows Kaplowitz (1973), who theorizes that evaluations of strategic effectiveness and moral legitimacy reciprocally influence one another. Since a majority of our respondents did not condemn the war as unjust, we are led to different conclusions. College students today may lack antiwar knowledge, an important source of antiwar attitudes (Cohrs and Moschner 2002). Related to this, those who are inclined towards pragmatic (rather than moral) judgments about war, may lack accurate information about the Vietnam War's costs in blood and treasure. It makes sense that the visceral sense of costs would decline over time through collective memory processes of the "ideological state apparatuses" (Althusser 1971). In addition, Leahey (2010) argues that high school history textbooks (which I take to be one indicator of hegemonic attitudes, rather than merely propaganda passively absorbed by all students or teachers) today do not mount a moral critique of the Vietnam War, but instead focus on noncontroversial issues. Thus, concerning the Vietnam War, both moral and especially pragmatic sources of antiwar sentiment seem to have weakened through collective memory processes. In the documentary film*Two Days in October*, the Vietnam War veteranJim Shelton expressed critical perspectives including disgust with the U.S. military's deception of the media which he personally witnessed, but he nevertheless maintained: "I'm not ready to give up on Vietnam [the Vietnam War] as a force for good, okay? I'm not ready to admit that was an evil thing that happened to the United States of America, that never should have happened, or even that it wasn't worth it. *Now, part of*

that is because I can't accept the deaths of my buddies as not being worth something" (Kenner 2005; emphasis added).

Shelton's reflexive insight is often articulated by soldiers, though often with less awareness of the dynamics in play. A U.S. Marine Jake Romo has recently said in response to a Pew survey which found that 52% of Americans think the Afghanistan War was not worth it: "I don't think it's anybody's right who didn't fight to say that it wasn't worth going over there [Afghanistan] and fighting. If nothing else, that spits in the face of everyone who willingly, and continues to willingly, sacrifice" (Conan 2011). Thus, the sacrifices and losses of soldiers justify a continuance of the status quo (Koenigsberg 2009). Hence, we observe ideological "strategies of containment" (Jameson 1981) which include the idea that U.S. soldier deaths somehow make a war sacred and the purposes of the war unquestionable, and the idea that only soldiers have a "right" to criticize a war.

Burris (2008) analyzed between-group differences in over 200 U.S. surveys conducted between 1964 to 2006 (i.e., the Vietnam and post-Vietnam eras), which probed support for military action. During the Vietnam era, support for military action was stronger among men, whites, and the more affluent, as well as among the more educated and younger persons (note – the latter two groups are sampled from in the present study). In the post-Vietnam era, only a few changes have emerged in these between-group differences. Males, whites, and the more affluent remain more pro-war. However, political party loyalties have tended to serve as key drivers of these between-group gaps, especially when military events have provoked a "rally-'round-the-flag" response. The Vietnam War was very much a bi-partisan war (Loewen 2007). Burris (2008) found some signs that the more educated and younger persons had become relatively more antiwar

with the outbreak of the Iraq War in 2003, but as for age cohorts, the latest Gallup Poll data suggests a return to the dominant historical pattern – the young are more hawkish and the old more dovish (Burris 2008, Dugan 2013

Let us briefly consider whether these between-group differences hold in our sample, concerning views of the justifiability of past and current wars. Concerning respondent views of the Vietnam War, we are given a glimpse into how socialization into collective memories (i.e., through the school system) and the filter or lens provided by current military actions, might alter average opinions of a past war. However it must be kept in mind that unlike the representative national surveys Burris (2008) analyzed, the present survey only sampled from college students (i.e., educated young people).

The data in Table 74 is displayed with gender breakdowns in Table 75. Interestingly, we see in Table 75 that males are significantly more likely than females to view the Vietnam War as an unjust war. Hence, the Vietnam era gender gap disappears

Table 74. T-Tests of Between-Group Differences in Views of Vietnam War (UO Data)

Dummy Variable (n of dummy/ n of non-dummy)	$\bar{x}$	$\bar{x}^2$	df	*t*	$\bar{x}^2 - \bar{x}$
male (n=165/221)	2.36 (males)	2.23 (females)	384	-1.72	-.13*
white (n=299/ 91)	2.24 (whites)	2.42 (non-whites)	376	1.83	.17*
Republicans (n=81/ 301)	1.94 (Republicans)	2.37 (non-Repub.)	380	4.77	.43****
Democrats (n=188/194)	2.43 (Dem.)	2.14 (non-Dem.)	380	-3.81	-.29****
moderates and conservatives (n=175/207)	2.15 (mod-conserv)	2.39 (liberals)	380	3.06	.23***
Christians (n=198/180)	2.15 (Christians)	2.44 (non-Chr.)	376	3.95	.30****
Catholic (n=64/ 307)	1.98 (Catholic)	2.34 (non-Cath.)	369	3.49	.35****
UO football fan (n=244/ 137)	2.19 (fan)	2.45 (non-fan)	379	3.25	.26***

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; **= p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p<.001; Q11 codes are 1 ("just war"), 2 ("somewhat just"), 3 ("not a just war"); hence, higher means ($\bar{x}$) are more peaceful/ antiwar; T-tests showed no significant differences (at even the .1 level) on other dummy variables including: Hispanic, black, upper classes, religious, evangelical, born again, attenders, Biblical literalist, rural, military parents, and athletes; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes; Survey conducted November, 2010

and even reverses to a significant degree through socialization into collective memory of the war. Yet, consider that in a 1964 nationally representative survey, the gender gap was quite significant: 61% of women opposed escalationin Vietnam, as opposed to 42% of men (Burris 2008, p.444).

Table 75. View of Vietnam War, UO Survey (Fall 2010)

Response	Female	Male	Total
Yes, a just war	18.55%	16.36%	17.62%
Somewhat just	40.27%	31.52%	36.53%
Not a just war	41.18%	52.12%	45.85%
Total	221 100%	165 100%	386 100%

At the time of the 2010 survey, the last U.S. combat troops had withdrawn from Vietnam about 38 years before. University students taking the survey would of course, not have been shaped by living through the Vietnam War era, i.e., they would not be directly shaped by the media coverage or political speeches of that day. Rather, their memories of the war are mediated and filtered through history textbooks, Hollywood films, family discussions, and other retrospective accounts.

Following Burris (2008), it could be that the reason young males are more dovish in their attitudes in the survey is because young men may be more likely to have seen or taken an interest in Hollywood films about the Vietnam War, and thereby learned some of the problems with the war – which school textbooks usually "whitewash" (Leahey 2010). However, many Hollywood Vietnam War films also serve to obscure the moral issues of the war. The war is framed as apolitical as the narrative focuses on the trials of a single platoon, a "band of brothers"/ "band of warriors" who are just doing their duty. In fact, Lucas and McCarthy (2005) show how four of Hollywood's Vietnam War films (*Green Berets* (1968), *Apocalypse Now* (1979), *Platoon* (1986), *We Were Soldiers*

(2002)) justify the war because democracy is superior to the primitive, brutal enemy. In addition, in the middle two films a cynical soldier "redeems the war for the warrior and the American people," as the soldier escapes cynicism, the chaos and violence of the war through embracing violence (p.181). Through this violence the soldier not only survives but arrives at "self-discovery" (p.181). Hence, although *Apocalypse Now* and *Platoon* could be called "anti-war," there is a sense in which the War is redeemed as the battlefield becomes apolitical. This frame of the Vietnam War also resonates strongly with the "support the troops" discourse and ethic which serve to depoliticize the recent and ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

However, since we oversampled from females, the sample characteristics might partly explain the surprising direction of the gender gap as well. Perhaps if our sample included more males and more male majors from business or the natural sciences, the gender gap would disappear or reverse.

Racial gaps in views of the war also disappear or are muted. Blacks and Hispanics are not significantly different in their views of the war, even at the .1 level. Hence, although nonwhites were more likely to oppose the war during the decades of the Vietnam War, collective memory processes have somehow prevented the reproduction of many of these racial gaps in views of the war. Consider that 1964, nationally representative survey 75% of Nonwhites opposed escalationin Vietnam as opposed to 51% of Whites (Burris 2008, p.444).

However, just comparing Whites and Nonwhites, we see in the Table above that White respondents were slightly more favorable towards the war's justifiability. Hence, it seems that the other racial minority groups (numerically, Native Americans, Hawaiians,

and Asian Americans are the best represented groups in the sample) drive the White/ Nonwhite racial gap in views of the Vietnam War.

For the Vietnam War, of all the group means reported in the table above, the most robust antiwar mean scores belong to non-sports fans (2.45), non-Christians (2.44), Democrats (2.43), and non-whites (2.42). The most robust prowar mean scores belong to Republicans (1.94) and Catholics (1.98). Other relatively prowar mean scores include Christians (2.15), moderates and conservatives (2.15), and sports fans (2.19). Nevertheless, even these relatively prowar group mean scores hover decisively around only a "somewhat justified" code of 2 – far from a ringing endorsement of the war. For

Table 76. T-Tests of Between-Group Differences in Views of Iraq War (UO Data)

Dummy Variable (n of dummy/ n of non-dummy)	$\bar{x}$	$\bar{x}^2$	df	*t*	$\bar{x}^2 - \bar{x}$
male (n=164/ 228)	2.44 (male)	2.45 (female)	390	.12	.008
white (n=304/ 80)	2.41 (whites)	2.52 (non-whites)	382	1.29	.11
Hispanic (n=46/ 351)	2.63 (Hispanic)	2.42 (non-Hisp.)	63.6	-2.33	-.21**
black (n=15/ 382)	2.73 (black)	2.43 (non-black)	16.6	-2.47	-.30**
upper classes (n=227/ 150)	2.37 (upper class)	2.54 (lower classes)	340.1	2.35	.17**
Republicans (n=82/ 307)	2 (Republicans)	2.56 (non-Repub.)	106.4	5.87	.56****
Democrats (n= 193/196)	2.63 (Democrats)	2.26 (non-Dem.)	363.9	-5.57	-.37****
moderates and conservatives (n=176/213)	2.24 (mod-conserv)	2.60 (liberals)	334.9	5.19	.36****
religious (n=221/168)	2.38 (religious)	2.52 (non-rel.)	387	2.13	.15**
Christians (n=200/185)	2.3 (Christians)	2.6 (non-Chr.)	377.5	4.47	.3****
Catholic (n=64/ 313)	2.22 (Catholic)	2.48 (non-Cath.)	375	2.81	.26***
Biblical literalist (n=25/ 359)	2.16 (literalist)	2.46 (non-lit.)	382	2.16	.30**
attenders (n= 79/ 318)	2.32 (attenders)	2.47 (non-attend.)	108.8	1.67	.16*
athletes (n= 330/ 56)	2.42 (athletes)	2.61 (non-athletes)	79.6	2.10	.19**
UO football fan (n= 248/140)	2.40 (fan)	2.52 (non-fan)	386	1.75	.13*

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; **= p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p<.001; Q11 codes are 1 ("just war"), 2 ("somewhat just"), 3 ("not a just war"); hence, higher means ($\bar{x}$) are more peaceful/ antiwar; T-tests showed no significant differences (at even the .1 level) on dummy variables including: male, white, nonwhite, rural, military parents, evangelical, and born again; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes

the Iraq War, of all the group means reported in Table 76, the most robust antiwar mean scores belong to blacks (2.73), Hispanics (2.63), Democrats (2.63), non-athletes (2.61), liberals (2.6), and non-Christians (2.6). The most robust prowar mean scores belong to Republicans (2), but note that this mean only represents an affirmation that the war is "somewhat just." Other relatively prowar groups include literalists (2.16), Catholics (2.22), and attenders (2.23).

In Table 77, we see that a "rally-'round-the-flag" effect for the Afghanistan War diminished between-group gaps among Hispanics and the classes. But consistent with Burris's (2008) identification of long-term attitude trends, blacks were slightly

Table 77. T-Tests of Between-Group Differences in Views of Afghanistan War (UO Data)

Dummy Variable (n of dummy/ n of non-dummy)	$\bar{x}$	$\bar{x}^2$	df	*t*	$\bar{x}^2 - \bar{x}$
male (n=165/ 227)	2.15 (males)	2.34 (females)	390	2.57	.19*
white (n= 303/ 80)	2.26 (whites)	2.23 (non-whites)	381	-.29	-.03
black (n= 15/ 382)	2.6 (blacks)	2.25 (non-blacks)	395	-1.82	-.35*
upper classes (n= 227/ 149)	2.21 (upper class)	2.32 (lower classes)	374	1.48	.12
Republicans (n=81/ 307)	1.90 (Republicans)	2.36 (non-Repub.)	386	5.14	.46****
Democrats (n=193/195)	2.39 (Dem.)	2.14 (non-Dem.)	386	-3.40	-.25****
moderates and conservatives (n=175/213)	2.09 (mod-conserv)	2.40 (liberals)	386	4.25	.31****
Christians (n=199/185)	2.14 (Christians)	2.38 (non-Chr.)	382	3.33	.25****
catholic (n= 64/ 312)	2.14 (Catholic)	2.28 (non-Cath.)	374	1.37	.14
Biblical literalist (n= 25/ 358)	1.96 (literalist)	2.28 (non-lit.)	381	2.10	.32**
evangelical (n= 54/322)	2.06 (evangelical)	2.29 (non-evan.)	374	2.16	.23**
attenders (n= 78/ 319)	2.13 (attenders)	2.29 (non-attend.)	395	1.79	.17*
UO football fan (n= 248/ 139)	2.19 (fan)	2.37 (non-fan)	385	2.23	.17**

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; **= p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p<.001; Q11 codes are 1 ("just war"), 2 ("somewhat just"), 3 ("not a just war"); hence, higher means ($\bar{x}$) are more peaceful/ antiwar; T-tests showed no significant differences (at even the .1 level) on dummy variables including: white, nonwhite, Hispanic, upper classes, rural, military parents, religious, catholic, born again, and athletes; see Appendix N for descriptions of dummy codes

(significant at only the .1 level) less supportive of the Afghanistan War's justifiability. For the Afghanistan War, of all the group means reported in Table 77, the most robust antiwar mean scores belong to liberals (2.40), Democrats (2.39), non-Christians (2.38), and non-sports fans (2.37) followed by females (2.34). The most robust prowar mean scores belong to Republicans (1.90), literalists (1.96), and evangelicals (2.06). Other groups ranking as relatively prowar are moderates and conservatives (2.09), attenders (2.13), Christians (2.14), Catholics (2.14), males (2.15), and sports fans (2.19).

Questioning Means and Ends: Aerial Bombing and Predator Drones

By 2010, fifty-six nations were developing robotic weapons (Markoff 2010). A few years ago, the US Department of Defense even predicted that a third of US fighting strength would consist of robots by 2015, though such a rapid shift has been doubted by experts (Hudson 2011). For the U.S. government, the obvious advantage of utilizing robots and remote-controlled drones is that it limits soldier casualties. Since the Vietnam War, U.S. military leaders have actively sought to "manage casualties" to maintain support of the U.S. public (Joseph 2007). Similarly, some scholars use polling data to divide the U.S. public into four categories including "solid doves," "solid hawks," a "casualty-phobic" group which reacts to war-inflicted American military deaths, and a "defeat-phobic" group which reacts to perceived war success and failure (Feaver and Gelpi 2004). Joseph (2007) believes the latter two categories comprise some 50 to 60% of the U.S. population that function as an actual and potential opposition to war, combined with the 15 to 20% of the population who are "solid doves." Clearly, the implication here is that the effective use of robots and drones (i.e., serving to avoid U.S.

military casualties and help the military "succeed") can potentially manage to hold off the majority of the U.S. public's potential opposition to war.

Collins (1974) theorized that "callous cruelty is especially characteristic of large-scale, bureaucratic organization, the violence of the modern army and state" (p.432). In their forms of organization, impersonal routinized interactions, democratic bureaucracies and modern armies are highly susceptible to callous cruelty. Of U.S. bombing campaigns in Vietnam, Collins writes,

> it is not surprising that the use of long-distance, bureaucratically administered weapons should produce appalling atrocities. The long chain of information reporting and the very impersonality of communications categories served to keep much of the human consequences from the awareness of not only the American public, but of the soldiers themselves; but enough leaked through to create the most extreme sense of schizophrenia between the low-key personal relationships within the modern military and their vicious consequences for its victims. (p.434)

Little has changed in the bureaucratic organization and attitudes in the decades since. A poll conducted in October of 2001 found that almost 80% of American college students supported the U.S. bombing strategy in Afghanistan (Over 2004, p.121). A Gallup survey conducted in March of 2013 found that 65% of Americans (79% of Republicans versus 55% of Democrats and 61% of Independents) support drone attacks on terrorists abroad (Brown and Newport 2013).

Gallup also found that Americans are split between those who are following news about the government's use of drones and those who are not:

> 49% are following news about the drones very or somewhat closely, while the same percentage is following the news not too closely or not at all. The 49% 'closely following' number is below the 61% average across more than 200 news events that Gallup has measured in this way... Republicans (59%) are more likely than Democrats (45%) or independents (48%) to say they are following the news about drones very or somewhat closely. (Brown and Newport 2013)

Hence, those who are engaged with media coverage of drones are more likely to support their use. In support of the obvious notion that knowledge is needed to hold opinions, Gallup found that "those not following the news closely are less likely to have an opinion in either direction" on several potential uses of drones (Brown and Newport 2013).

The U.S. survey includes a section (see Appendix A, Q12) testing attitudes towards aerial bombing campaigns and attacks by predator drones. This section probes whether respondents consider such military strategies to be 1) "smart strategy," 2) "morally justified," 3) "brave." This section was designed to test hypotheses articulated by Kaplowitz (1973), which assert that we all (social scientists and the average person) tend to "allow our moral judgments to influence our strategic judgments and vice versa" (Gamson 1975, p.72). More precisely, if there is a lack of clarity on the strategically rational course of action, then "people will tend to believe that the normatively desirable course of action is also strategically rational" (p.73). Likewise, if there is a lack of clarity on the moral or normative criteria for a given course of action, then "people will tend to believe that the strategically rational choice is the normative one" (p.73), i.e., the choice of action that *should be* taken on account of moral and ethical considerations.

This would seem to explain many areas of interaction between strategic and ethical orientations, including some of the differences between principled and pragmatic nonviolence. Pragmatic nonviolent adherents are those who believe nonviolence is not always sufficient strategically, thus violence is permissible morally, and to insist on nonviolent strategy when it is ineffective is immoral and irresponsible. Conversely, principled/ Gandhian nonviolent adherents, at least ideal typically, believe nonviolence is always sufficient, always moral, always responsible (see Eddy 2012).

Given that the U.S. has the technological capacity for these two strategies (aerial bombardment and drone attacks), and the U.S. policy goal of limiting U.S. casualties has become a normative criterion, following Kaplowitz, I hypothesized that respondents who say each action is smart strategy will also affirm they are morally justified in the next question. Likewise, those who said they were not smart strategies would also claim they were not morally justified. That is, I expected the first two questions to be highly correlated.

In the introduction to this set of three questions, I explain that the U.S. military leadership has employed these two strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, so there is an element of testing susceptibility to "elite cues" in these questions as well. There may be a tendency to conclude if U.S. military leaders are already employing these strategies they must be smart strategy, they must be morally justified. Similarly, the question on bravery was meant to probe whether respondents were capable of any critique at all of the U.S. military. Clearly, aerial bombing strategies where enemies do not possess anti-aircraft technologies (as detailed in the question) and the use of drones are not brave or courageous by any definition.

The category of bravery encompasses cultural "honor codes" (Appiah 2010), or the norms of "honor cultures" (Felson and Pare 2010), and approaches the realm of moral ideals. Gandhi was one who consistently emphasized a connection between courage and morality, as he believed that "courage is a major index of moral stature" (Horsburgh 1968, p.64n). This view led him to often praise soldiers, but these statements have often been taken out of context, misunderstood, and co-opted by those who wish to make Gandhi over into an advocate of political violence and just wars in some situations (Eddy

2012). Nevertheless, it seems clear that Gandhi often romanticized the courage of soldiers, and neglected how the "courage" of soldiers is created through methods of social control (Collins 2008). For instance, the "firing ratios" of soldiers have often been quite low historically, but depending on the social organization of the military, firing ratios can and have been raised (Collins 2008). Hence, in a sense, Gandhi was right to admire the average soldier of his time – it seems many of them were bravely willing to die, but not to kill.

At a July 4th celebration parade in the small town of Harrisburg, Oregon in 2008, I saw a Veterans of Foreign Wars float featuring numerous military posters on the side including a picture of a predator drone and the incredible tag line below: "Unmanned and Unafraid." To be sure, the glorification of military technology is nothing new, but attributing bravery to robots, or robots operated by humans working thousands of miles from the battlefield is a peculiar development.

Appiah (2010) argues that honor and morality can be distinctive spheres, and demonstrates the strong links between honor and respect, dignity, and shame. Appiah suggests that shifts in conceptions of honor can bring about moral revolutions. For this reason, there is a great deal at stake in the military's attempt to co-opt notions of courage.

The use of aerial bombardment and drones flags one of the contradictions at the heart of warfare (another key contradiction is the central role of almost child-like obedience to superiors in soldiering as opposed to traditional notions of bravery aswillful, "masculine" independence (Koenigsberg 2009)) since the relative disappearance of hand-to-hand combat and the invention of forms of long-range missile firing including slingshots, catapults, guns, canons, and technologically-directed bombs. Conceivably,

such technologies could have been understood as un-masculine or cowardly, and with drones operated by soldiers thousands of miles from the battlefield we observe the technician/ the computer nerd's full eclipse of the traditionally masculine and courageous soldier. Indeed, one wonders if these tensions with traditional martial virtues may contribute to the "stress" said to be felt by military personnel charged with flying the drones from the safety of 7,000 miles away. Yet, two of the main media investigations of drone operators to date made no mention of any possible sense of shame about the work. Rather, soldiers spoke of feeling proud about being able to protect and save the lives of U.S. soldiers on the ground (Logan 2009, Lindlaw 2008).

Seemingly aware of these deep contradictions between technology and traditional notions of courage, but also seeking to accommodate their bureaucracy to the changing nature of warfare, the Pentagon sought to create a new definition of the situation, giving in it seems to hubris and over-confidence in their abilities to unleash successful propaganda campaigns that deny tradition if not basic realities. In early 2013, the U.S. Defense Department announced a new military medal, the "Distinguished Warfare Medal," for cyber warriors and remotely-piloted aircraft operators. The incredible mis-step was that the Defense Department ranked this medal *above* combat medals for bravery such as the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart. A backlash followed, including a letter signed by 22 Senators which argued that assigning the new medal this high ranking in the hierarchy of medals "...diminishes the significance of awards earned by risking one's life in direct combat or through acts of heroism" (Terkel 2013).

Another side to this debate is that masculinity is not homogeneous, and so we must speak of masculinities which are segmented along occupational lines. Men in blue-

collar jobs often “perform” masculinity through brute strength, men in white collar managerial positions often perform masculinity through aggressive risk-taking in pursuit of corporate profits, and men in engineering professions perform masculinity by mastering cutting-edge technology (Messerschmidt 1995). Of course, these insights suggest there is no inherent contradiction between masculinity, courage, and technology. Indeed, to suggest this would be to reify all three concepts. But there remains a potential and at least dimly perceived contradiction between all three concepts, and this may be linked to the male division of labor in society and the different class-based performances of masculinity identified by Messerschmidt (1995). Nevertheless, it seems that technology has evolved within Western culture and militaries in such a way that the use of military technologies is very often perceived as masculine and brave.

Table 78 below shows that the overall sample means had the highest level of agreement for interpreting these tactics as “smart strategy,” while the means on the issue of “morally justified” approached disagreement and the issue of “brave” leaned slightly towards disagreement. We can see that respondents tended to cluster around the mid-points and avoid the extremes of “Strongly” Agree/ Disagree on all questions. Overall, 60.2% of respondents agreed (whether checking “Strongly Agree” or “Agree”) that dropping bombs from 40,000 feet was “smart strategy,” but only 22.59% called it “morally justified,” and 20.72% called it “brave.” Overall, 63.52% of respondents agreed (whether checking “Strongly Agree” or “Agree”) that using predator drones to drop bombs was “smart strategy,” but only 25.58% called it “morally justified,” and 16.24% called it “brave.” One conclusion here is that in the controlled and structured setting of an anonymous survey, strong majorities of respondents were able to marshal a negative

critique of military policy in the form of disagreeing with the statements that predator drones and dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet (where enemies have no anti-aircraft technologies) are "morally justified" or "brave" tactics. Yet, majorities affirmed both tactics were "smart strategy." Thus, it would seem in the minds of most respondents there is a disconnect between smart strategy, ethics, and the traditional military virtue of courage. Moreover, this disconnect is partly created by technological capabilities and in particular, technological advantages over enemies.

Table 78. UO Data: Probing Interpretations of Aerial Bombardment and Drones (N=397)
Q12. The U.S. military has used a variety of strategies to attack enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq, including bombing campaigns conducted by predator drones (un-manned aircraft) and dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet (beyond the reach of enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan who lack anti-aircraft technology). Rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

Question	Strongly Agree (1)	Agree (2)	Disagree (3)	Strongly Disagree (4)	Mean
1. Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is a smart strategy.	17.88%	42.32%	24.69%	15.11%	2.37
2. …is morally justified.	4.57%	18.02%	50.25%	27.16%	3.00
3. …is brave.	3.84%	16.88%	47.06%	32.33%	3.08
4. Using predator drones to drop bombs is a smart strategy.	17.6%	45.92%	22.19%	14.29%	2.33
5. …is morally justified.	5.63%	19.95%	47.57%	26.85%	2.96
6. …is brave.	2.28%	13.96%	47.21%	36.55%	3.18

Randall Collins (2008) has argued that most forms of violence and interpersonal violence involve lopsided power relations. Collins persuasively refutes crucial components of the widespread mythology of violence as he debunks the "formula that the fighters are brave, competent, and evenly matched…The reality is almost entirely the opposite" (pp.39-40). For example, vendettas are one category of "honor confrontations," but they are "not fair fights…Instead, the aim is to apply overwhelming superiority when it is one's turn to dominate (pp.223-224). Of course, asymmetric warfare has been the

norm in imperial adventures. Collins also argues that humans are genetically hard-wired for cooperation and killing is very difficult, thus very few are "competent" in their use of violence. Rather than bravery, soldiers are surrounded by an emotional field of fear precisely because they do not want to kill. This biological/ evolutionary argument may strike some sociologists as too essentialist, however Collins builds a thoroughly sociological argument that killing becomes much easier with changes in the social organization of military troops (e.g., group-operated weapons raise firing ratios in war), training (e.g., training which makes shooting guns a reflex), and technology which makes killing from long-distance the norm.

A closer analysis of the data offers partial support for the Kaplowitz (1973) hypothesis – those who affirmed aerial bombardment from planes and drones as "smart strategy," were much more likely to affirm these strategies are "morally justified" and even "brave" than those respondents who rejected their strategic value. Likewise, those who initially disagreed that these were smart strategies, almost unanimously condemned them as morally unjustified and also believe these strategies are not brave. The results reported below demonstrate these findings.

While the data is suggestive, it is somewhat crude in that it may simply test respondent willingness/ tolerance or aversion/ intolerance for answering closely related questions inconsistently. On the other hand, this is precisely what we aimed to test – how respondents deal with contradictions when it comes to drones and aerial bombing. Nevertheless, perhaps a slightly more robust test would have spaced out the questions within the survey form or utilized computer screen changes after each question, to prevent answer alterations or highly conscious efforts to make answers consistent. Table

79 below shows that, of those who "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree" that bombing from airplanes is "smart strategy" in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, only 2.52% agree that it is "morally justified," and the vast majority (97.49%) believe it cannot be "morally justified." Table 80 below shows that, of those who "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree" that bombing from airplanes is "smart strategy," only 7.01% agree that it is "brave," and the vast majority (92.99%) believe it is not "brave" in the cases of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars where the enemy does not possess anti-aircraft technology.

Table 79. Sub-Sample of Q12_2: Respondents Who *Disagree* that Bombing from Airplanes is "Smart Strategy" in Q12_1

Q12_2	Freq.	%
Strongly Agree (1)	2	1.26
Agree (2)	2	1.26
Disagree (3)	77	48.43
Strongly Disagree (4)	78	49.06
Total	159	100.00

Notes: Question 12_2 = "Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is morally justified." Answer values: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tabulate Q12_2 if (Q12_1>2)

Table 80. Sub-Sample of Q12_3: Respondents Who *Disagree* that Bombing From Airplanes is "Smart Strategy" in Q12_1

Q12_3	Freq.	%
Strongly Agree (1)	1	0.64
Agree (2)	10	6.37
Disagree (3)	68	43.31
Strongly Disagree (4)	78	49.68
Total	157	100.00

Notes: Question 12_3 = "Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is brave." Answer values: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tabulate Q12_3 if (Q12_1>2)

Of those who "Strongly agree" or "Agree" that dropping bombs from airplanes is "smart strategy," we see their responses in Table 81. Of those who "Strongly agree" or "Agree" that dropping bombs from airplanes is "smart strategy," 36.17% agree that it is "morally justified," but the majority (63.83%) believe it is not morally justified.

Nevertheless, we see that respondents who affirm aerial bombardment as "smart strategy," are much more likely to claim it is also "morally justified" than those respondents who initially rejected its strategic value (in Table 80).

In Table 82 below we see that of those who "Strongly agree" or "Agree" that dropping bombs from airplanes is "smart strategy," 29.91% agree that it is "brave," but the majority (70.08%) believe it is not brave. Nevertheless, we see that respondents who affirm aerial bombardment from airplanes as "smart strategy," are much more likely to claim it is also "brave"than those respondents who initially rejected its strategic value (in Table 80).

Table 81. Sub-Sample of Q12_2: Respondents who Agree that Bombing from Airplanes is "Smart Strategy" in Q12_1

Q12_2	Freq.	%
Strongly Agree (1)	16	6.81
Agree (2)	69	29.36
Disagree (3)	121	51.49
Strongly Disagree (4)	29	12.34
Total	235	100.00

Notes: Question 12_2 = "Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is morally justified." Answer values: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tabulate Q12_2 if (Q12_1<3)

Table 82. Sub-Sample: Respondents Who Agree that Bombing from Airplanes is "Smart Strategy" in Q12_1

Q12_3	Freq.	%
Strongly Agree (1)	14	5.98
Agree (2)	56	23.93
Disagree (3)	116	49.57
Strongly Disagree (4)	48	20.51
Total	234	100.00

Notes: Question 12_3 = "Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is brave." Answer values: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tab Q12_3 if (Q12_1<3)

Similar results were found on the questions concerning drone use. Table 83 showsthat, of those who "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree" that bombing from drones is "smart strategy" in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, only 4.11% agree that it is "morally

justified," and the vast majority (95.9%) feel that it cannot be "morally justified." Table 84 shows that, of those who "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree" that dropping bombs from drones is "smart strategy," only 6.12% agree that it is "brave," and the vast majority (93.88%) feel that it is not "brave."

Table 85 shows that, of those who "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" that bombing from drones is "smart strategy," 38.37% agree that it is "morally justified," but the majority (61.63%) believe that it is not "morally justified." Nevertheless, we see that respondents who affirm drones as "smart strategy" are much more likely to claim it is also "morally justified," than those respondents who initially rejected its strategic value.

Table 86 below shows that, of those who "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" that bombing from drones is "smart strategy," only 22.27% agree that it is "brave," and the majority (77.73%) believe that it is not "brave." Nevertheless, we see that respondents who affirm drones as "smart strategy" are much more likely to claim it is also "brave," than those respondents who initially rejected its strategic value.

Similar to Bandura's (1990, 1996) theories of moral disengagement, Zygmunt Bauman (1995) theorizes that "there is more than a casual connection between the ability to commit cruel deeds and moral insensitivity. To make massive participation in cruel

Table 83. Sub-Sample: Respondents who Disagree that Bombing from Drones is "Smart Strategy" in Q12_4

Q12_5	Freq.	%
Strongly Agree (1)	2	1.37
Agree (2)	4	2.74
Disagree (3)	68	46.58
Strongly Disagree (4)	72	49.32
Total	146	100.00

Notes: Question 12_5 = "Using predator drones to drop bombs is morally justified." Answer values: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tabulate Q12_5 if (Q12_4>2)

Table 84. Sub-Sample: Respondents Who Disagree that Bombing from Drones is "Smart Strategy" in Q12_4

Q12_6	Freq.	%
Strongly Agree (1)	1	0.68
Agree (2)	8	5.44
Disagree (3)	64	43.54
Strongly Disagree (4)	74	50.34
Total	147	100.00

Notes: Question 12_6 = "Using predator drones to drop bombs is brave." Answer values: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tabulate Q12_6 if (Q12_4 > 2)

Table 85. Sub-Sample: Respondents Who Agree that Bombing from Drones is "Smart Strategy" in Q12_4

Q12_5	Freq.	%
Strongly Agree (1)	20	8.16
Agree (2)	74	30.20
Disagree (3)	118	48.16
Strongly Disagree (4)	33	13.47
Total	245	100.00

Notes: Question 12_5 = "Using predator drones to drop bombs is morally justified." Answer values: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tab Q12_5 if (Q12_4<3)

Table 86. Sub-Sample: Respondents Who Agree that Bombing from Drones is "Smart Strategy" in Q12_4

Q12_6	Freq.	%
Strongly Agree (1)	8	3.24
Agree (2)	47	19.03
Disagree (3)	122	49.39
Strongly Disagree (4)	70	28.34
Total	247	100.00

Notes: Question 12_6 = "Using predator drones to drop bombs is brave." Answer values: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; STATA command: tab Q12_6 if (Q12_4<3)

deeds possible, the link between moral guilt and the act which the participation entails must be severed" (p.148).

Gamson (1975) deftly condenses Kaplowitz's two hypotheses as follows. First, "[if] strategic rationality does not clearly specify a course of action as desirable but normative criteria do, people will tend to believe that the normatively desirable course of action is also strategically rational" (pp.72-73). Second, "[if] normative criteria do not clearly specify a course of action while strategic criteria do, people will tend to believe

that the strategically rational choice is the more normative one" (p.73). In other words, behavior can be framed by two interacting tendencies: "people behave strategically within the limits of certain norms….[and] people think in normative terms within certain strategic limits" (Kaplowitz 1973, p.572).

In a chapter-length treatment, the community organizer and grassroots political strategies Saul Alinsky (1971) has indirectly attempted to answer that question. Alinsky's significance rests in the fact that he has influenced how both liberals and conservatives in the U.S. think about community organizing, political strategy and tactics (Williamson 2012). Alinsky theorizes that the thinking of social actors regarding means and ends can be summarized in the following eleven propositions. Alinsky insists that we must place issues in their historical context and understand the interrelationality of means and ends. To contemplate whether the end justifies the means is too abstract. Alinsky argues that the real question has always been "Does this *particular* end justify this *particular* means?" (p.47). Below I analyze and critique Alinsky's eleven propositions on "the ethics of means and ends." These propositions are as follows:

1. "One's concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with one's personal interest in the issue....[and] one's distance from the scene of conflict" (p.26). The statement can be taken as a critique of principled nonviolent activists. It verges on the punt of a moral relativist which seeks to separate the unity of means and ends (which principled/ Gandhian nonviolent activists adhere to) and which neglects the strategic efficacy of moral means like nonviolence. It seems to imply that when one is closely linked to grievances and injustices (e.g., if one is a victim of terrorism), one has no moral reservations about using drones, violence or other questionable means. Perhaps more

precisely,it is a critique of inactive pacifists or non-militant nonviolent activists that is time and culture/ organization-bound rather than universal. Certainly, King and the SCLC had great personal interest in achieving civil rights reforms and they held to the importance of ethical means because of their moral and strategic value.

On the whole, this principle strikes a false note: U.S. and world citizens concerned about terrorism have advocated a strategy that rejects the use of drone attacks, and which embraces a police model of finding the terrorists, apprehending them and prosecuting them in legal trials. Rather than bomb the neighborhood where suspected terrorists live, an act likely to create more terrorists, this view promotes international law and rejects the mimetic violence (i.e., imitating the violent terrorism of terrorists) of drone attacks.

2. "The judgment of the ethics of means is dependent on the political position of those sitting in judgment" (p.26). Here we have a basic standpoint theory of the sociology of knowledge. Few pieces of evidence could be more startling here than Alinsky's observation that "Eight months after securing independence, the Indian National Congress outlawed passive resistance and made it a crime" (p.43). Also after India's independence, when India still lacked nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Nehru called the world to abandon the cold war's "fear complex," and to abandon nuclear weapons. Citing Mohandas Gandhi's nonviolent victory through the conquest of fear, Nehru argued that Gandhi's teachings could end fear and the cold war. Further, he added that India is unafraid, "not only have we not got an atom bomb, we rejoice in not having an atom bomb" (AP 1954?). But by 1974 India was testing nuclear weapons, and in 2012 India celebrated its 63rd Republic Day with a military parade in which the Agni-IV missile,

which delivers a one-ton nuclear warhead, rolled through the streets of New Delhi as a symbol of national pride (Bhattacharya 2012). Or consider Chomsky's contention two decades ago, hardly in need of revision today, that "If the Nuremberg laws were applied, then every post-war American president would have been hanged" (Chomsky 1990). In other words, U.S. hegemonic power prevents ethical judgments against itself, much as Alinsky theorizes here.

3. "In war, the end justifies almost any means" (p.29). Even if we accept this proposition as accurate phenomenologically, we still have to account for how social actors define the "almost" – whether by referencing international law or other ethical norms.

4. "Judgment must be made in the context of the times in which the action occurred and not from any other chronological vantage point...Ethical standards must be elastic to stretch with the times" (pp.30-31). This is a basic claim of situational ethicists over against those who claim to adhere to universal, trans-historical ethical norms.

5. "Concern with ethics increases with the number of means available and vice versa" (p.32). Alinsky's "realism" and pragmatic utilitarianism emerges very clearly here as he writes, "To the man [sic] of action...Reviewing and selecting available means is done on a straight utilitarian basis – will it work? Moral questions may enter when one chooses among equally effective alternate means. But if one lacks the luxury of choice and is possessed of only one means, then the ethical question will never arise; automatically the lone means becomes endowed with a moral spirit. Its defense lies in the cry, 'What else could I do?'" (p.32). Again, Alinsky's utilitarianism is transparently clear: "To me ethics is doing what is best for the most" (p.33).

6. “The less important the end to be desired, the more one can afford to engage in ethical evaluations of means” (p.34). This principle can supply a “realpolitiks”or a “Machiavelian” (Bharadwaj, 1998) critique of nonviolence. It implies that principled nonviolent adherents are privileged actors, not really committed to social change.

7. “Generally, success or failure is a mighty determinant of ethics” (p.34). This restates the Kaplowitz hypothesis above. As one example, I would point to Robert McNamara who recounts that his superior, General Curtis E. LeMay argued that if the U.S. lost the war, they would be prosecuted as war criminals for their role in the firebombing of Japanese cities. In retrospect McNamara concurred – they were “behaving as war criminals,” and he confessed the only reason such American actions were not categorized as “immoral” was because the U.S. won the war (Wiener 2009).

8. “The morality of a means depends upon whether the means is being employed at a time of imminent defeat or imminent victory” (p.34). Alinsky here uses the example of the U.S.’s decision to drop the atomic bomb which sparked a universal moral debate because “Defeat for Japan was an absolute certainty...” (p.35). By contrast, Alinsky suggests that if the atomic bomb had been developed and dropped shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, when Japan’s defeat was not at all certain, then “the use of the bomb at that time on Japan would have been universally heralded as a just retribution...The question of the ethics of the use of the bomb would never have arisen...” (p.35).

9. “Any effective means is automatically judged by the opposition as being unethical” (p.35). Here, Alinsky comes very close to asserting that war is only anarchy and chaos, an assumption that resonates with realpolitik’s view of the international arena. However, a critique is in order here - those who insist on ethical norms are not merely

sore losers among the opposition. Rather, there are third-parties who also judge the morality of means and ends, and in our globalized world, their views expressed through institutional means like the United Nations can matter a great deal.

10. “You do what you can with what you have and clothe it with moral arguments” (p.36). “All effective actions require the passport of morality” (p.44).Similarly, 11. “Goals must be phrased in general terms like ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,’ ‘Of the Common Welfare,’ ‘Pursuit of Happiness,’ or ‘Bread and Peace’” (p.45). There is little doubt that U.S. Presidents have long adhered to this rule in their tactical playbook.

In many of these rules, Alinsky’s realism stands starkly opposed to principled/ Gandhian nonviolence. For Alinsky, guiding ethical ideals within a political/ resistance campaign are conceived as a frill and a luxury, rather than as crucially important in mobilizing resistance/ activists, attracting allies, or converting opponents as Gandhian nonviolence aims for. From a Gandhian point of view, Alinsky is misguided in his consistent separation of means and ends. While Alinsky does recognize that activists/ revolutionaries/ campaigners and their opponents all seek to cloak their strategies in moral legitimation, he neglects complexities in the social construction of reality. Namely, he misses the fact that only a purely tribalistic perspective would utterly neglect strategic and ethical norms outside the group/ campaign leadership. I would also contend that many of Alinsky rules are ahistorical, since research shows that the resistance campaigns which attract the largest numbers of participants have almost always been nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

CHAPTER III

SEARCHING FOR CORRELATES OF NONVIOLENT ATTITUDES

ANALYSIS OF THE CROSS-NATIONAL DATA SET

Which nations express the most peaceful attitudes? To what degree do democratic governance, religious traditions, and historical experiences of war or nonviolent revolutions shape attitudes towards nonviolence and violence? Among other questions we will considerwhat role the following might play in shaping cross-national opinions about violence and nonviolence: 1) Structural peace; 2) Modernization, industrialization, and democracy; 3) Education; 4) History/ collective memory.

In recent years, there has been a surge in optimistic assertions that over the course of several centuries the world has become more peaceful. Many of these claims are based on strong empirical data from interdisciplinary work blending archaeology, anthropology, history, sociology, psychology, and criminology. The bottom line is that scholars have charted significant declines in war deaths, murders, and other forms of violence over the centuries, and in many regions of the world these trends have continued even in recent decades (Pinker 2011, Goldstein 2011).

But, with these clear downward trends in multiple forms of physical violence (laying aside, for the moment, the notion that poverty is a deadly form of structural violence), have attitudes around the world also become more peaceful? If so, are these attitudes grounded in increasing rationality/ cosmopolitanism/ moral sensibilities through education, through the spread of democracy or the transnational market links of global capitalism, through increasing respect for and transnational networks supporting human

rights and international law, or through forms of social control and law enforcement via a strong government (i.e., a Leviathan)?

In the contemporary period, contradictory perceptions of the historical, cultural and biological underpinnings of violence and nonviolence are commonplace, whether analysts make philosophical assumptions about "human nature" or aim to interpret religious-mythological narratives (e.g., what Jesus meant by "turn the other cheek") or trace evidence of humanity's evolutionary hard-wiring (e.g., Collins 2008). For instance, just 15 years ago, the seminal scholar of religion Walter Wink (1998) called the "myth of redemptive violence" the "real myth" and "dominant religion" in the world today (p.42). Similarly, Wink (1992) has claimed, "No other religious system has ever remotely rivaled the myth of redemptive violence in its ability to catechize its young so totally" (p.23). Such claims ring a profoundly discordant note, contradicting the new global peace trumpeted by Pinker (2011).

Optimistic assessments of modernity as a progressive, peaceful force have a long history among social theorists. Kant's theory of the "democratic peace" is only one example of this. Comte, Schumpeter (1919) and Veblen (1919) agreed that industrialized societies were "more pacific social formations" than preindustrial societies (Cohen 1986, p.256). Schumpeter (1919) described imperialism and militaristic belligerence as "essentially noncapitalist. Indeed [such modes of thought] vanish most quickly wherever capitalism fully prevails" (p.124). Nevertheless, Schumpeter saw that in many places, the ideology and economy of the modern bourgeoisie was still held captive by preindustrial, aristocratic/ autocratic "imperialist absolutism" (p.124). More recently, Pinker (2011)

extends Norbert Elias's theory of a "civilizing process" at the heart of various forces within modernity.

While Marx had a very different vision of industrialization as a force precipitating inevitable class conflict and revolutionary violence, Dwight Macdonald (1946) argued that Marx missed the significance of the economy and ideology of perpetual war. Macdonald suggested that without "an adequate theory of the political significance of war...modern socialism will continue to have a somewhat academic flavor" (cited in Hedges 2010, p.20). Against the view that the modern masses were essentially peaceful, Max Weber contended that "the citizens of the emerging democracies and industrial states could be easily swayed by appeals to patriotism and class interest" (Cortright 2008, p.305). And, theorists like Randall Collins (1974) have argued that modern bureaucratic forms of governance, social organization and rationality – including those embodied in democratic bureaucracies, have demonstrated an historically unique capacity to foster and reproduce a modern form of cruelty he terms "callous cruelty." Similarly, numerous scholars have argued that "moral disengagement" from violence is easily orchestrated by shrewd military and political leaders (Bandura 1990, 1996). And Zygmunt Bauman and Leonidas Donskis (2013) argue that "moral blindness" and everyday insensitivity are distinctive characteristics of what they call "liquid modernity."

The social relations of capitalist societies have also been theorized as distinctively impersonal, as Marx identified the "callousness of the wage system in an impersonal market economy" (Collins 1974, p.432). And, modern capitalism has widened inequality and, like premodern inequality regimes of caste, legitimated it as utterly natural, denying the reality that inequality is "literally a killing field" (Therborn 2013). Toqueville, among

others, theorized that social inequality reproduces deep divides that serve to cultivate forms of belligerence and make it difficult for us to recognize our common humanity (Zeitlin 2001, p.95). Addressing contemporary capitalist societies, Bauman (2008) argues that "the consumer is the enemy of the citizen" (p.190), and so the modern trend toward consumer identities threatens informed democratic decision-making and humane politics.

Still others see modern multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism as carrying immense potentials for radical democracy, social justice, human rights, and individual emancipation. And, numerous urban theorists tie this liberatory potential explicitly to the "complex modern city," as perhaps "the only kind of environment in which modern values can be realized" (Marshall Berman cited in Tajbakhsh 2001, p.162).

Pinker (2011) and Goldstein (2011) lead us to expect thatworldwide,peaceful and nonviolent attitudes should be growing and more prevalent in modern, developed nations. Pinker's (2011) meta-analysis of the vast inter-disciplinary literature on violence, war, and peace suggests that five historical forces have driven declines in multiple forms of violence and reinforced peaceful attitudes:

1) The "Leviathan": a strong state with a strong judicial system and a monopoly on the use of legitimate force can deter various forms of violence from murder to civil war. There is also the potential for strengthening forms of an "international Leviathan" (p.166), such as the International Criminal Court, International Court of Justice, and the U.N.

2) Commerce: the theory of "gentle commerce" or the market as a pacifying force is very old, but only recently has cross-national research by Russett and Oneal (2001) demonstrated that it explains even more of the variance in peace than democracy:

countries open to the global economy were less likely to engage in militarized conflicts.

3) The increasing "feminization of cultures": where women are empowered, cultures tend to move away from the glorification of violence.

4) Increasing cognitive and relational cosmopolitanism which can be related to increasing literacy, mobility, urbanization, and the mass media – all of which can enlarge circles of sympathy.

5) Growth in rationality/ reason (increasing education can be taken as one proxy for this).

Of course, declines in violence need not necessarily be predictive of declines in every form or level of violent attitudes, since traditions, norms, and metanarratives like the "myth of redemptive violence" (Wink 1998) are likely to have significant staying power. And, in tension with the sweeping, bird's eye view of Pinker, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) argue that the literature on the causes of civil war has produced only two robust findings – the risk of civil war is more likely:1) the lower a nation's average income (GDP per capita); 2) as a nation's population increases (i.e., the risk of civil war is greater among larger nations). The authors of the GPI argue that one more factor with widespread consensus should be added to this list: if a nation has a history of war, and especially if there has been a *recent* war, civil war is more likely (GPI 2012, p.70). It seems this identification of a recent conflict furnishes the rationale for measuring a limited time span in the GPI's only historical/ longitudinal variable (i.e., the only variable whose data spans across several years): Number of external and internal conflicts fought: 2002-07 (GPI 2009)/ 2003-08 (GPI 2011)/ 2004-09 (GPI 2012) (see Appendix O). Thus, presently, the scientific consensus is that large nations, nations in poverty, and with a

history of conflict appear to have the greatest risk factors for civil war. But what about nonviolent and belligerent attitudes, do the above factors also predict attitudes?

Possible Nation-Level Correlates of Violent/ Nonviolent Attitudes

Although we are focused on nonviolent attitudes, our main theoretical and empirical resource is the cross-national literature on violence which is more focused on various structural and cultural predictors of events (e.g., civil wars, low-intensity conflicts, and interstate wars). Our task is to probe the secondary effects and interactions these historical events might have on attitudes, as well as the effect structural and cultural factors play in shaping attitudes. The possible correlates of violent/ nonviolent attitudes to be tested, include the following numbered variables.

GDP per capita/ poverty and state as a Leviathan. Numerous studies have found that lower income per capita increases the likelihood of civil war (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Consider that half of contemporary wars take place in nations with the poorest sixth of the people (Pinker 2011, p.305). Fearon and Laitin (2003) contend that income per capita is a proxy measure of state power (i.e., state as a Leviathan) and functioning including capabilities in governance, financial, police, and military sectors (Of course, rising GDP per capita is heavily associated with industrialization and capitalism). In terms of Pinker's (2011) analysis of historical development and a long-term trajectory towards greater peace, this is a proxy indicator of whether the state is a "Leviathan" capable of preventing and resolving conflicts through the force of its power and reach. In fact, Holtermann (2012) found that the negative association between GDP per capita and the civil war risk disappeared when controlling

for “state reach” (measured by road density, telephone density, and % urban of the population), but remained robust controlling for poverty (measured by the mean income of the poorest decile). Thus, Holtermann argues that it is not poverty, but rather “low state reach and capacity give political and military opportunity for organizing insurgency” (p.56). The mountainous variable below is another proxy indicator for this.

Extending the Leviathan theory to international conflict, it would predict that the existence of hegemonic military powers should help maintain global peace as in the periods of the supposed “Pax Britannica” and “Pax Americana.” But Russett and Oneal (2001) found no evidence that these periods were more peaceful (pp.188-189), though they operationalize conflict not as a war (generally defined as at least 1,000 battle deaths a year), but as any form and degree of a “militarized interstate dispute.”

Population size of nation. One of the most robust findings of the cross-national research on civil wars is that nations with larger populations are more at risk for civil war (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). History suggests that many large nations are more belligerent, while small nations rely on diplomacy more consistently.

History of war vs. history of significant nonviolent movements. The effectsof successful nonviolent movements on mass attitudes has not been studied in a systematic cross-national analysis, but it was assumed that these movements would buttress confidence in nonviolent efficacy measured at the nation-level. In a study of the U.S. and 13 European nations, Listhaug (1986) found that historical experiences of defeat and sufferings in war shaped reported levels of “fear of war” and “willingness to fight.” Citizens in nations that lost during WWII including Italy, West Germany, and Japan report being less willing to fight a new war (p.73). Listhaug (drawing samples from

Europe in the early 1980s) found that citizens in European nations that had experienced more suffering and costs during WWII were more likely to fear a future war and less willing to fight in a future war (p.73). Similarly, Basabe and Valencia (2007) found that willingness to fight was influenced by victory in WWII (p.417). Of course, in general, the history of war variable may also be a proxy for factors that are difficult to disentangle including: a sense of grievance or resentment which might motivate additional violence, "learning" the lessons of war/ gaining antiwar knowledge through experiences of war, and/ or feelings of geographical/ geopolitical vulnerability (Listhaug 1986).

Population density. Research on the role of population density in wars and conflicts has produced mixed results. In a cross-national study covering the periods between 1930-1989, Tir and Diehl (1998) found that population growth pressures had a significant but modest effect on the likelihood that a state would become involved in wars and militarized disputes.

Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1996) critique a Malthusian over-reliance on population density as an indicator of "population pressure" or a resource base crisis, naming it the "Netherlands fallacy." However, they proceed to point out that the Netherlands "imports large amounts of food and extracts from other parts of the world much of the energy and virtually all the materials it requires. It uses an estimated seventeen times more land for food and energy than exists within its borders" (p.71). Thus, in poorer nations unable to import such vast quantities of food and resources, it seems unreasonable to dismiss as a fallacy the notion that higher population densities might contribute to forms of stress and conflict. In fact, studies of war and conflict propensities have had divergent findings depending on whether developed or undeveloped nations are sampled. A study by

Bremer et al. (1973) of the more developed European nations between 1816-1965 found that population density and population density change were not related to war propensity. But Choucri's (1974) analysis of 45 underdeveloped nation between 1954-1972 found that population factors played a role in 35 out of 45 cases of war and lower-order conflicts. Population distribution (i.e., density, movement, and population pressure) and composition (i.e., youth bulges) played a bigger role than population size and change. Furthermore, we should note regional and time period differences in these two studies, as throughout the period of Bremer et al.'s study, Europeans often had viable immigration options to North America and Australia, serving as a release valve for population pressures, and changes in technology and the pace of globalization made the importation of food and resources more viable in the 20th century, especially in the developed nations.

In case study research, population density is often linked to conflict in underdeveloped nations. For instance, many agree that the 1994 genocide in Rwanda "is best understood as a contest between too many people on too little land" (Perry 2007, p.39). And, Durham (1979) contended that population pressures and land stress contributed to the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador. Likewise, the bloody civil war in Darfur (in western Sudan) has roots in ecology: overpopulation has been interacting with the shrinking size of fertile land as well as ethnic divisions (Perry 2007). Obviously, this demonstrates how it is actually the accumulation of factors (e.g., land fertility and availability, drought and climate change, ethnic dominance patterns, etc.) that interact with population density (or just population size relative to fertile land or wealth) which make it a significant factor, but in sometimes unpredictable ways. Thus, Urdal (2005) found some evidence that scarcity of potential cropland can have a

"pacifying effect," but where scarcity combines with high rates of population growth, "the risk of armed conflict increases somewhat" (p.417). Sharply rising wheat prices appear to be one underacknowledged stressor contributing to civil conflicts in 7 Arab nations in 2011 (this region leads the world in reliance on wheat imports). And, a contributing factor in the ongoing civil war in Syria is that 60% of Syria's land suffered the worst drought on record between 2006 and 2011, causing an exodus in which 800,000 Syrians completely lost their livelihoods (Friedman 2013, March 5). Similarly, sudden changes in income linked to rainfall patterns in 41 African countries were found to drive civil conflict (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004). Some have theorized that population pressures are most likely to contribute to intrastate violence, especially ethnic civil wars (Homer-Dixon 1995), and low-intensity conflicts (Urdal 2005).

Democracy. Are democratic nations more peaceful/ less belligerent? As the number of democratic nations grew during the late 20th and early 21st centuries, Immanuel Kant's theory of the "democratic peace" has become one of the most debated topics in political science. The empirical evidence is somewhat mixed (for reviews, see Hess and Orphanides 2001, pp.780-781; Cortright 2008, pp.249-251). Lending empirical support, Weart's (1998) comprehensive study found that well-established democracies have never made war on each other. However, he distinguished among types of democratic regimes, and demonstrated that "democratic republics" have often fought with "oligarch republics" – defined as regimes which repress an internal "enemy" class. Hence, rather than reifying democracy, we must recognize an important mediating variable is whether democracies perceive one another as "democratic." Russett and Oneal (2001) maintain, "The higher the level of democracy a state achieves the more peaceful

that state is likely to be" (p.122). Findings challenging the theory include the fact that major democratic nations frequently wage war against nondemocracies, especially developing nations (Cortright 2008, pp.250-251). In addition, Hess and Orphanides (2001) contend that even democratically elected incumbent leaders in an entirely democratic world would often engage in diversionary wars (i.e., an avoidable war/ war of choice/ "wag the dog" scenario) as they attempt to hold on to power and to compensate for poor economic performance.

And, we should recall the Marxist critique that industrial capitalism brings in its train not only the enslaving liberal capitalist ideology of individualism but also the "false veneer of democratization" (Cohen 1986, p.255). Taking up a critique of the Marxist tradition, Dwight Macdonald argued that Marxism had missed the significance of the ideology of "permanent war" (Hedges 2010, p.20). Lacking an analysis of the significance of permanent war, Macdonald argued that "modern socialism will continue to have a somewhat academic flavor" (p.20). Indeed, Hedges (2010) argues that it was permanent war which killed the liberal, democratic classes in Israel and the U.S. as well as the liberal, democratic movements in the Arab world (e.g., in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran). That is, it was permanent war, not Islam, that killed progressive movements in the Arab world in recent decades. Of course, such a notion denies the significance of the purported "clash of civilizations" hypothesis in which Western democracies are conceived as the good guys. Instead, Macdonald would have us consider how permanentwar cuts across many national projects, festering within capitalism and severely compromising the health of democracy.

Democratic civil peace theory holds that democracies are more internally peaceful. But while some researchers have found the level of democracy to be significantly associated with lower rates of civil war (Esty et al. 1998, Gurr 2000), others have detected few significant relationships (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003). Mansfield and Snyder (1995) find that newly democratizing nations experience an increased risk of civil war. Another reason for the mixed findings may be that civil war is less likely in strongly autocratic societies as well as strongly democratic ones (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, p.328). In their meta-analysis of the civil war literature, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) found that only one "level of democracy" variable was robustly related to civil war, but several "inconsistency of political institutions" variables were robust (p.527).

World-systems position. Are core nations more belligerent? I contend that world-system position is a proxy measure for the power which flows from geopolitical factors as well as the relative strength of a nation's political-economic structural base. Much like a "mode of production," it seems likely that this base has a key shaping influence on the superstructure (i.e., the ideological legitimation of social policies). Hence, it is assumed that ideologies of violence/ nonviolence that predominate in within a nation will stem from real historical conditions.

Industrialization. Different theoretical camps have held opposing hypotheses on the effect of industrialization on the war proneness of states (Cohen 1986). Following Norris and Inglehart (2004), one proxy indicator for industrialization, type of society ("typesociety"), is based on the 1998 Human Development Index scores. But Norris and Inglehart (2004) band the HDI data at thresholds for "post-industrial" societies (those

nations with HDI scores over .898) and “industrial” nations (those nations with HDI scores ranging from .740 to .886), and “agrarian” nations (defined as those with an HDI below .740). Here, I simply utilize the HDI scores to provide an interval-level variable that captures more variation and is more suitable for regression. Of course, a key problem with assessing the impact of industrialization is separating out the influence of co-variates such as urbanization, GDP per capita, capitalism democracy, education variables, etc. Here, multiple regression will be helpful, allowing us to partially control for some these factors.

Capitalism/ trade/ globalization. A large cross-national study found that a nation’s openness to the global economy is significantly associated with peace (Russett and Oneal 2001).Conversely, Collins (1974) builds on Marx as he theorizes: “Where social relationships are organized on a regular basis along impersonal lines...callous cruelty is maximal. This of course is the theme of Marx, especially in terms of the callousness of the wage system in an impersonal market economy” (p.432). This leads us to expect that highly capitalist societies will exhibit more belligerent attitudes, more “callous cruelty.”

Inequality. Structural inequality is likely to produce legitimation structures and ideologies that overlap with social dominance, otherization, and violent attitudes. For instance, not only Marx but also Alexis de Tocqueville theorized that ideas and beliefs are closely related to social contexts of inequality and equality. Zeitlin (2001) summarizes Tocqueville’s views: “Where inequalities are great and of long duration, the members of different social classes tend to regard one another as if they were members of distinct races. Inequality, therefore, militates against a general view. In democratic-

egalitarian societies, in contrast, people tend to recognize their common humanity" (p.95). But for Tocqueville, it was "political equality" (i.e., measures of civil liberties and democracy are proxy measures of this) that made empathy possible in the U.S. (Collins 1974, p.416).

Urbanization. Max Weber (1958) argued that pacifist moralities have arisen among city people, "especially those in crafts and commerce who never come in contact with animals" (Collins 1974, p.438). A supportive thesis on human-animal interactions has arisen more recently, proposing that herding cultures cultivate norms of violent retaliation and self-help justice because they live on rural frontiers and feel threatened by the potential theft of their assets (i.e., the herd of sheep or goats). This thesis has been put forth to explain why Southern culture in the U.S. exhibits more pro-violent attitudes – it was because many Southern immigrants came from Scotch-Irish herding cultures (Felson 2010, Nisbett and Cohen 1996). Alternatively, theories of the Leviathan state maintain that the reason Southern culture has more pro-violent attitudes stems from the rural character of life, i.e., the relatively weak states that historically prevailed there (as well as among the Scotch-Irish), forcing individuals to seek forms of justice by taking violence into their own hands (self-help justice, vigilantism, and frontier justice). Ironically, the same Leviathan theory has been offered for the violence found in the rural frontiers of history and the abandoned inner-city cores of the U.S. today: the poor, the uneducated, and members of minority groups "are effectively stateless" (Pinker 2011, p.84). Hence, in this view what would matter more than the proportion of rural or urban residents is some finely tuned measure of the "state reach" variable. The mountainous variable has also

been a proxy measure of this same Leviathan phenomenon – measuring pockets of relative statelessness where rebel groups can safely hide.

Like Weber above, it has often been assumed that cities are more likely to produce peaceful strains of "cosmopolitan" attitudes (Carlier 2011). For many theorists, cognitive cosmopolitanism includes nonviolent and post-nationalist attitudes. But long before World War I, thinkers like Nietzsche and Spengler believed that urbanization, industrialization, and popular democracy would be fuel nationalism and be

> ...background causes for unwise, pugnacious government and increased violence. The reasons for this lay in the unregulated, inexperienced, yet increasingly more powerful regimes associated with the enormous increase in productivity, and in the democratization of the postindustrial societies. They further believed such increased power would lead to conflicts over extraterritorial claims on other parts of the globe and over trade and its international control. Industrialization was thus seen as increasing power and decreasing internal discipline while leading to greater external conflict, more wars, and more civil strife. (Cohen 1986, pp.254-255)

But in cross-national perspective today, urbanization is exceedingly complex, and where it seems to foster political violence, its effects are strongly shaped by interactions with other factors – such as rural resource scarcity or fresh water scarcity (Klare 2001, Homer-Dixon 1999). Goldstone (2002) argues that urbanization is associated with increased risk of political violence if it is not accompanied by job creation and increased economic growth. Homer-Dixon (1999) proposes that urbanization can contribute to political violence in contexts of economic crisis or where the state is weakening. Nevertheless, many studies have found little correlation between urbanization and civic strife (Homer-Dixon 1999).

Against the urban-cosmopolitan thesis, in a sample from Mississippi, Day and Quackenbush (1942) found that urban residents were slightly more hawkish and

supportive of an imperialistic war than rural residents (p.19). The regionally limited and dated nature of that study suggests that replication is needed.

Education. Drawing from poll data, Loewen (2007) points out that in the U.S. increasing levels of education have been associated with more hawkish attitudes. Conversely, Pinker (2011) argues that increasing literacy and education have brought us an "escalator of reason" which has helped drive global declines in multiple forms of violence over recent centuries. On a related note, but one which speaks to validity issues in survey data, Bishop (1976) found that "ideological consistency" increases with the completion of progressively higher levels of education (i.e., grade school, some high school, high school, some college, college). But on average, higher degrees of education in the U.S. correlates with Republican party affiliation (Loewen 2007), and Republicans are consistently more hawkish (pro-war) in their attitudes.

Even after the two world wars (when Europe, which was more developed and better educated than the rest of the world, imploded from within in orgies of violence) the Enlightenment optimism that still drives a great many positive aspects in Western culture leads us to believe more education leads to more rational and ethical thinking and behavior – i.e., to dovish, nonviolent attitudes. Thus, Kofi Annan (2012), the former head of the UN, has argued, "Education is, quite simply, peace-building by another name. It is the most effective form of defense spending there is." My data will cast doubt on Annan's argument and suggest that we must be careful to not reify "education" as an inevitably progressive or modernizing force. After all, many children in places like Pakistan only receive a religious education (Krueger and Malečková 2003). The author

has observed young people in rural Ladakh (in northern India) where the only education option was a Tibetan Buddhist monastery that primarily taught ancient religious texts.

The assumption that education can combat the roots of terrorism was explicitly articulated by President George Bush after the September 11th attacks, however, there is no evidence to substantiate this on an individual level. In fact, multiple studies conclude that terrorists are likely to be better educated (and more politically engaged) than others in their societies (Krueger and Malečková 2003). In one large cross-national study (n=160), four indicators of educational investment and attainment were significantly associated with a reduced risk of civil war (Thyne 2006). Of course, the pacifying effects of schooling are likely related to several effects (increased work opportunities, giving young males incentives, increasing trust in the government, etc.), rather than simply the idea that people become more rational or smarter (Pinker 2011, p.666).

Religion/ civilization. Bellah (2006) andInglehart and colleagues (e.g., Pippa and Inglehart 2004,Inglehart and Carbalio 1997) have demonstrated that the historically predominant religious tradition of a nation can have long-standing and resilient effects in shaping psychocultural attitudes. Huntington's (1996), by now, infamous "civilizations" hypothesis has been challenged by numerous scholars, including Fox (2004) who finds evidence that religion has a greater impact on civil wars than does civilization. However, admittedly, there are significant areas of overlap between religion and civilization.

Ethnic/ linguistic/ religious fractionalization. It might be assumed that increasing diversity, especially in urban settings, is associated with cosmopolitan tolerance and nonviolent attitudes. Alternatively, others may surmise that increasing diversity is often associated with the cultural reproduction of intolerant attitudes that

overlap with violent attitudes. This line of thought has been called the "diversity-breeds-conflict school" (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, p.329). To restate the later view, many have assumed that cultural homogeneity tends to reproduce peace. After making a presentation on Costa Rica's tradition of peace, a gentleman came up afterwards and suggested, "Isn't part of the reason for their peaceful culture due to the fact that they are 95% Catholic? They don't have the sectarianism, the ethnic conflicts other places do – look at India." As another example, Fry (2006) states, "Norway fits the criteria of an internally peaceful society...The population...is relatively homogeneous in terms of many cultural and ethnic features..." (p.77). However, Ross (1993) contends that within Norway, regional differences often are conceived in racial terms, and thus, "Norwegian society appears more homogeneous to outsiders than to Norwegians themselves" (p.161).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) found that ethnic fractionalization did not predict civil war once poverty and income levels are controlled for. Hegre and Sambanis's (2006) meta-analysis found that ethnic fractionalization was significantly associated with low-intensity armed conflict, but not full-scale civil war (p.529). Moreover, they show that the most robust predictor for low-intensity armed conflict (internal armed conflict) is ethnic heterogeneity index and 6 more variables including linguistic diversity, an ethnic fractionalization index, the ethnic fractionalization index squared, religious diversity, ethnolinguistic diversity, and ethnolinguistic diversity squared are among the 20 most robust predictors of low-intensity conflicts.

Ethnic polarization and dominance. Rather than diversity and fractionalization in itself, some have argued that two variables related to fractionalization are much more important: "polarization" (a small number of large groups) and "dominance" (one very

large group) (see Fearon and Laitin 2003, p.521). Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) found that diverse states are *not* more likely to suffer from violent conflict, but "ethnic exclusion" is a very robust predictor of armed conflict. And, Reynal-Querol (2002) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b) have demonstrated that ethnic polarization helps to explain the likelihood of civil wars and low-intensity conflicts. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) show that ethnic dominance is one of the 18 most robust predictors of civil war and among the 20 most robust predictors of low-intensity conflicts.

Militarization indicators. We now turn to military spending indicators (proxies for political power of military sector/ elite policy cues), and the size of military forces (proxies for socialization into militarism). Nations with large militaries or with a large percentage of GDP spent on the military are two indicators that power elites favor these policies and perhaps the mass public will tend to accept these policies as legitimate. Grussendorf et al. (2002) found that national mean peace attitude scores (sampling from secondary students on the "Peace Test") were significantly and negatively associated with ($r = -.57$, significant at the .05 level) percent of GNP spent on the military, but the sample only included 21 nations. Some researchers note that nations with low rankings on the Global Militarization Index "experience high levels of internal unrest and violence" (BICC 2009, p.21). This returns us to Pinker's (2011) "Leviathan" argument – where strong states exist, intra-state violence is likely to decline.

Female empowered societies. Are female empowered societies more peaceful when compared with societies still shaped by patriarchal sexism? Two studies found that nations with higher levels of gender equality are significantly associated with more peaceful conduct in the international arena (Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Marshall and

Marshall 1999 cited in Cortright 2008, p.258). Several anthropological studies conclude that the status of women is lower in more violent societies, and a sample of 37 nations found that nations with higher female labor force participation rates tended to have significantly lower homicide rates (Iadicola and Shupe 2003, p.114). The correlation was negative .50, but the sample size was small and the study did not control for other variables.

Age, age cohorts, and youth bulges. Mannheim ([1928] 1952) argued that "generations" are deeply shaped by historical conditions and events transpiring in their formative years (which he defined as ages 17 to 25), such that cohort effects are likely to be as significant as effects based on social class. Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) has fruitfully tested this theory, finding significant support for it in his many cross-national studies of World Values Survey data. However, Hellevik (2002) has challenged Inglehart's interpretations by controlling for life cycle effects in longitudinal survey data from Norway.

"Historical generations," youth movements which attempt to bring radical reform to their society, have been documented around the world (Braungart 1984). Similarly, Ryder (1965) argued that youth cohorts are distinctively shaped by their historical context (which is marked by contingent historical experiences, changes in educational content and peer-group socialization), and demographic replacement brings both threats to social stability and opportunities for social transformation. In the context of the U.S., which spent more years in war (though fighting transpired on foreign soil) than almost any other nation in the twentieth century, support for military action was stronger among the youth age cohort during the Vietnam War, and weaker among youth in the post-Vietnam era

(Burris 2008). Assessing Vietnam-era data, Lunch and Sperlich (1979) offered four hypotheses explaining why older cohorts were more anti-war, but surprisingly little other theorizing on generational gaps in violent/ nonviolent attitudes has taken place (for a recent exception, see Burris 2008). Schuman and Rieger (1992) demonstrated that generational experiences had a significant effect on which of two analogies from the past, World War II or the Vietnam War, were most relevant for interpreting the prospects of a U.S. war with Iraq (1990-1991). In brief, there are important theoretical and empirical reasons to test cohort effects in this cross-national study of violent/ nonviolent attitudes, and where longitudinal data is available to control for life cycle effects.

Large youth cohorts, or "youth bulges," have been linked to increased political crisis and violence in several nations (Goldstone 2002, Huntington 1996). A variant of this theory specifies the proportion of *males* aged 15 – 29 appears to be linked to increased political violence (Gat 2006). One of the reasons this theory makes sense is that empirically, most violence is performed by young men of peak reproductive age (Collins 2008). Revolutionary and activist activities in general have often depended on youth mobilization. As noted above, data limitations will not allow us to test a male youth bulge, but we will test whether youth bulges are associated with changes in violent/ nonviolent political attitudes.

The temperature hypothesis. Do cooler climates equal cooler heads? Are lower average temperatures will be associated with more peaceful attitudes? The link between ambient heat and aggression has sometimes been theorized as direct, short-term and physiological, much as in conventional notions that "hotter heads" prevail in hot weather conditions. Reifman, Larrick, and Fein (1991) found a significant, positive, and linear

heat-aggression relationship in that, even after controlling for potentially confounding variables, higher temperatures led major league baseball pitchers to become more aggressive in their pitching, resulting in more batters hit by pitched balls per game. Zajonc, Murphy, and Inglehart (1989) proposed that brain temperature and temperature-related neurochemistry may provide the physiological mechanisms for heat-aggression effects.

But concerning the role of ambient temperature in cross-national conflicts, it is hazardous to generalize from an outdoor summer sport in temperate North America. Indeed, Van de Vliert et al.'s (1999) study of 136 nations from 1948 to 1977 found that riots and armed attacks occur more frequently in warm countries than in either hot countries or cold countries after controlling for several variables linked to conflict. Anthropological studies suggest that compared to warm climates, very hot and very cold climates tend to produce nurturing parental behaviors and reduce violence and extreme forms of cultural masculinity – though the effects tend to be more pronounced in cold climates (pp.300-303). According to Paternal Investment Theory, the hardships of very cold and very hot climates requires increased parental care and cooperative behavior for survival. Van de Vliert et al. argue that this has shapes degrees of cultural masculinity, so that masculinity mediates the association between temperature and violence. In a subsample of 53 nations, Van de Vliert et al. found that temperature predicted 13% of the variance in masculinity, with warm countries higher in masculinity than hot or cold countries (p.304).

Yet, numerous studies have found some evidence of a link between high ambient temperatures and forms of aggression including collective violence (e.g., riots), assault,

homicide, rape, domestic violence, and some forms of crime like burglary – though the results have sometimes been inconsistent (Cohn 1990). Several criminological studies have found a link between hot weather and increased homicide rates, and the mediating variable has often been theorized as the increased interpersonal interactions (leading to the increased incidence of conflict) during summer as people, at least in hot-summer regions without widespread air conditioning, are more likely to be outside their homes and interacting with others in the summer (Landau and Fridman 1992).

Temperature has also been theorized as interactive over the long-term with structural and environmental factors. Burke et al. (2009) found significant increases in African conflicts during warmer years (even when controlling for precipitation/ drought as well as country-level measures of per capita income and democracy). They theorize that hot years facilitate conflicts by creating shocks to agricultural and economic productivity (pp.20673-20674). However, Buhaug (2010) analyzed the same data and strongly challenged Burke et al.'s findings, concluding there was no significant relationship in the short-term, especially when various definitions of civil war are employed (p.16749). But existing data is imperfect due to its country-level measures (i.e., in large nations many weather patterns are better measured at the regional-level), and the long-term security implications of warmer weather is less well known (p.16481).

On a methodological note, although the sample was relatively small and geographically specific, Doob (1968) found that extreme seasonal fluctuations in the temperature/ weather of the tropical climate of East Africa, such that one season is commonly thought of as "unpleasant," did not effect survey responses in conventional interviews.

Mountainous geography. In James Hilton's utopian novel *Lost Horizon* (1933), the mountain barriers surrounding Shangri-La are imagined as a bulwark for the peaceful society, shielding it from the violence of other nations. Switzerland's track record of staying out of European wars is one historical example of this. But ironically, most theorists have held the opposite of Hilton's vision of Shangri-La, suggesting that mountainous nations are at greater risk for civil war. Sambanis (2004) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) found no evidence of any effect, but the mountainous terrain variable ranks in Hegre and Sambanis's (2006) list of the "25 most robust variables" predicting civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also found that mountainous terrain is significantly related to higher rates of civil war: "A country that is about half 'mountainous' (ninetieth percentile) and otherwise at the median [on ethnic diversity] has an estimated 13.2% chance of civil war over the course of a decade. A similar country that is not mountainous at all (tenth percentile) has a 6.5% risk" (p.85). Fearon and Laitin theorize that mountains/ "rough terrain" provide opportunities (in keeping with "opportunity structure" theorizing of social movements (e.g., Tilly 1978)) for rebels to hide from government forces in a rural base (p.80) and to engage in rural guerrilla warfare, in part because the rebels possess superior "local knowledge of the population" (p.76, p.88). Fearon and Laitin (2003) found no significant effect for forest coverage (i.e., the proportion of a country's terrain which is covered in woods and forest) (p.570, p.594), so that indicator was not tested in the present sample.

Do Urban Environments Reproduce Pacifist Moralities?

Above we cited Max Weber's theory that pacifist moralities tend to arise among city people. Of course, the conditions which foster the emergence of a particular ethos, need not necessarily be an ongoing source for cultivating and reproducing that ethos, as Weber's (1930) analysis of the Protestant Ethic suggests (i.e., the ethic became unmoored from its religious roots). Analyzing the Gallup World Poll 2008 data can approximate a test of an urban-pacifist link, but only approximate since the Gallup data is proprietary and we are limited to nation-level rather than respondent-level analyses. Moreover, as discussed above, the three Gallup questions are hardly robust indicators of "pacifist moralities," instead they are merely indicate acceptance/ rejection of moral constraints on total war (i.e., targeting civilians) and pragmatic nonviolence.

Correlations between percent urban (i.e., percent of the population in each nation which resides in an urban locale) and national-level mean responses to the Gallup World Poll's three violent/ nonviolent questions as well as the GPI were performed (see Table 87). The "nvworks" variable had a weakly negative though not significant relationship to percent urban. Thus, there is no relationship between percent urban and mean national affirmation that peaceful means alone will work. However, "milnerverjust" was positively correlated to percent urban, $r(93) = .25$, $p < .05$, and "indneverjust" was also positively and strongly correlated to percent urban, $r(93) = .40$, $p < .001$. These findings offer mixed support for the notion that urban environments tend to instill pacifist moralities. These findings are only suggestive, but they indicate that cities tend to reproduce attitudes of moral restraint in the conduct of warfare, i.e., protecting civilians, but cities do not necessarily reproduce confidence that peaceful means alone will work

for oppressed groups. Apart from the pragmatic nonviolence item, these findings are consistent with broad theorizing about the possible effects of urbanization on forms of "cognitive cosmopolitanism" (Eddy 2011) including respect for human rights.

Similarly, regression analyses were conducted on the Gallup World Poll's three violent/ nonviolent questions with the percent urban variable for each nation serving as the sole independent variable. Results revealed that percent urban did not significantly predict national means on "nvworks." Percent urban did predict national means on "milneverjust" ($F(1, 93) = 6.18$, $t = 2.49$, $p < .05$, R^2 was .06 and adjusted R^2 was .05). Hence, 5% of the variance in national mean responses to the "milneverjust" item is associated with the percent of urban citizens. Percent urban also predicted national means

Table 87. Nation-Level Data: Pearson Correlations Between Mean Nonviolent Attitudes (Gallup World Poll 2008 data) and Other Characteristics of Nation

Index	%urban	indneverjust	nvworks	milneverjust	GPI 2008	population
indneverjust	.40***					
nvworks	-.15	-.08				
milneverjust	.25*	.82****	.05			
GPI 2008	.37***	.18	-.14	.13		
population	-.14	-.16	-.12	-.19	-.14	
arms exports	.20	.06	-.02	-.07	-.07	.20*

Notes: *N*=95 nations; Pearson correlations with pairwise deletion of missing values; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; "indneverjust" = % affirming terrorism never justified; "milneverjust" = % affirming state terrorism never justified; "nvworks" = % affirming peaceful means alone will work for oppressed groups; Sources: %urban = percent of citizens residing in urban locale (CIA World Factbook 2012); population = population in millions (CIA World Factbook 2012); GPI 2009, transformed scores; arms exports data (SIPRI 2012)

on "indneverjust" ($F(1, 93) = 17.71$, $t = 4.21$, $p < .001$, R^2 was .16 and adjusted R^2 was .15). Hence, 15% of the variance in national mean responses to the "indneverjust" item is associated with the percent of urban citizens. However, far more robust tests of multiple regression will be conducted below.

Results: Analysis of Nations By Cultural and Structural Attributes

Below in Table 88, it is striking that sorting nations by "religious cultures," the highest national mean percentages on the nonviolence efficacy item are the "indigenous beliefs/ animism" cultures. That is, the religions generally regarded by Western observers as the most "primitive" have the most peaceful attitudes on nonviolent efficacy (but note these cultures score very low on the two principled nonviolent indicators). Although the sample size is small, these "primitive" cultures trump Protestant and Catholic nations by about 14% points and Buddhist/ Eastern nations by over 30% in affirmations of nonviolent efficacy for the oppressed. The second most robust beliefs in nonviolent efficacy are among the Orthodox Christian nations. This is almost certainly a reflection of the legacy of the nonviolent movements that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the break-up of the USSR in 1990-1991. Also of note, Muslim nations have slightly higher confidence in nonviolent efficacy than Protestant and Catholic nations. Israel, the soleJewish nation, exhibits the lowest confidence in nonviolent efficacy. Chris Hedges (2010) contends that a "prolonged state of permanent war killed the liberal classes in Israel and the United States...Permanent war...corrodes and diminishes democratic debate and institutions" (p.20). Arguably, the "peaceful means alone" question is one proxy indicator of faith in nonviolent democratic processes.

Table 88. Nation-Level Data: Nonviolent Attitudes (Gallup World Poll 2010) by Type of Culture

Type of Society	Frequency	Nonviolence Works (% affirming nonviolence will work)	State Terrorism: Military Attacks on Civilians (% Never Justified)	Terrorism: Individual Attacks on Civilians (% Never Justified)
All	130-136 (frequencies below are for largest sample)	57.9 (n=136)	65.4 (n=131)	71.9 (n=130)
Religious Culture	(n=135)			
Protestant	26	58	65.1	75.7
Catholic	43	57.6	67.8	72.2
Orthodox	10	63.1	73.1	77.4
Buddhist/ Eastern	11	39.4	60.1	74.8
Muslim	38	61.3	65.6	70.2
Hindu	2	58	44.5	42.5
Jewish	1	33	56	80
Other (indigenous beliefs/ animism)	4	71.75	46.8	48.3
Secularization	(n=66)			
Most people religious	22	58.5	62.6	69.6
Moderate	16	54.4	70.6	78.2
Most people secular	28	54.8	70.5	78.6
Difference by religious culture (eta2)		.222**** (a)	.130*	.197*** (b)
Difference by secularization (eta2)		.020	.083	.116 *

Note: * = Significant at the .05 level; ** = Significant at the .01 level; *** = Significant at the .001 level; **** = Significant at the .0001 level; The significance of the difference between groups without any controls is measured by ANOVA. Eta2 (i.e., Eta squared) was computed using a user written "effectsize" program for Stata (see UCLA (2012)). Eta2 is interpreted as the percent of the dependent variable accounted for by the effect in the sample (UCLA 2012). That is, Eta2 represents the same measure as R-squared: the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variables. As a rule of thumb for effect size, an Eta2 of .01 is small, .06 is medium, and .14 is large. Additional notes from table: (a) The only significant differences (at the .05 level) in the Scheffe table involved comparisons with Buddhist/ Eastern cultures and the following cultures respectively: Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, and "Other." (b) The only significant differences (at the .05 level) in the Scheffe table involved comparisons with "Other" and the following cultures respectively: Protestant and Orthodox. *In the Scheffe tables, the small sample sizes from Jewish and Hindu societies are a factor in preventing the group mean differences from rising to statistical significance*. The "nonviolence works" question has the largest sample size because more nations were asked this in the Gallup World Poll. "Religious Culture" variable represents the "Historically predominant major religions" from Norris and Inglehart (2004) among other sources (see Appendix P); "Secularization" variable from Norris (2009)

Above, on the secularization dimension, we see that the differences are only significant on terrorism, with the secular and moderately religious nations more likely to reject terrorism. However, the patterns overall suggest that religious nations (largely the poorer nations) are slightly more likely to embrace pragmatic nonviolence, while secular nations (largely the wealthier nations) are more likely to embrace principled nonviolent norms against terrorism and state terrorism.

In Table 89 below we see that confidence in nonviolent efficacy is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, fewer citizens rejected terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa than any

other region. The region with the second highest confidence in nonviolent efficacy is Eastern Europe and Central Asia, again, reflecting the collective memory of the largely nonviolent breakup of the Soviet Union. Principled stands against state terrorism are highest in the Middle East and North Africa, and principled stands against terrorism are highest in Western Europe, Canada, and the US, very closely followed by the Middle East and North Africa. Overall, regional differences are most significant on the terrorism item, closely followed by the nonviolent efficacy item.

Table 89. Nation-Level Data: Nonviolent Attitudes (Gallup World Poll 2010) by Region

Type of Society	Frequency	Nonviolence Works (% affirming nonviolence will work)	State Terrorism: Military Attacks on Civilians (% Never Justified)	Terrorism: Individual Attacks on Civilians (% Never Justified)
All	130-136 (frequencies below are for largest sample)	57.9 (n=136)	65.4 (n=131)	71.9 (n=130)
Region		(a)	(b)	(c)
Western Europe, Canada & US	20	54.7	68.5	80.9
Eastern Europe & Central Asia	19	60.1	67.7	71.6
Middle East & N. Africa	18	53.9	72.4	80.1
South & East Asia & Oceana	21	49.9	58.6	68.4
Latin America	22	57.5	66.1	69.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	36	65.6	62.6	66.3
Difference by region (eta2)		.153***	.086*	.167***

Note: * = Significant at the .05 level; ** = Significant at the .01 level; *** = Significant at the .001 level; **** = Significant at the .0001 level; (a) Bartlett's test for equal variance showed the sample variances in this column are significantly different and this casts doubt on the certainty of ANOVA, and Scheffe multiple-comparison tests revealed the only significant difference in this column were between "Sub-Saharan Africa" and "South and East Asia and Oceana"; (b) Bartlett's test showed no significant differences in sample variances, and Scheffe tests revealed no significant differences in this column; (c) Bartlett's test for equal variance showed the sample variances in this column are significantly different and this casts doubt on the certainty of ANOVA, and Scheffe multiple-comparison tests revealed the only significant differences in this column were between "Sub-Saharan Africa" and "Western Europe, Canada & US" as well as between "Sub-Saharan Africa" and "Middle East and North Africa."

Below in Table 90, we see that agrarian societies and economies with low GDP per capita are significantly more likely to embrace beliefs in nonviolent efficacy. Post-industrial societies and economies with high GDP per capita are least likely to embrace nonviolent efficacy. These patterns are largely reversed for principled objections to state terrorism and terrorism. But, compared with less developed nations, post-industrial

Table 90. Nation-Level Data: Nonviolent Attitudes (Gallup World Poll 2010) by Type of Culture (Continued)

Type of Society	Frequency	Nonviolence Works (% affirming nonviolence will work)	State Terrorism: Military Attacks on Civilians (% Never Justified)	Terrorism: Individual Attacks on Civilians (% Never Justified)
All	130-136 (frequencies below are for largest sample)	57.9 (n=136)	65.4 (n=131)	71.9 (n=130)
Type of Civilization	(n=130)			
Western Christianity	28	52.3	68.1	79.6
Muslim	36	61.2	64.6	69.2
Orthodox (Russian and Greek)	9	65.8	72.4	76.9
Latin American	20	57.6	70.7	73.1
Sinic/ Confucian	4	33	69.3	79.3
Japanese	1	34	87	91
Hindu	2	58	44.5	42.5
Buddhist	6	44.5	49.5	68
Sub-Saharan Africa	24	65.9	63.7	67.2
Type of Society	(n=134)			
Agrarian	74	61.9	62.1	66.8
Industrial	40	53.2	69.2	75.6
Postindustrial	20	52.5	68.6	81.7
Type of Economy	(n=133)			
Low GDP per capita	64	63.7	62.2	66.2
Medium GDP per capita	43	55.1	68.1	74.8
High GDP per capita	26	50.4	68	79.8
Difference by type of civilization (eta2)		.302****	.171**	.222*** (a)
Difference by type of society (eta2)		.100***	.058*	.170****
Difference by type of economy (eta2)		.157****	.042	.159****

Note: * = Significant at the .05 level; ** = Significant at the .01 level; *** = Significant at the .001 level; **** = Significant at the .0001 level; Additional notes from table: (a) The only significant differences (at the .05 level) in the Scheffe table involved comparisons between Western Christianity and Hindu.; Type of Civilization (Norris and Inglehart (2004); Type of Society (Norris and Ingelhart 2004) using the "reversetypesociety" variable (reverse-coded); Type of Economy (Norris 2009)

nations are more robustly different (and more peaceful) on the terrorism item, than on the state terrorism item.

Below in Table 91, we observe that full democracies are less peaceful on the nonviolent efficacy question compared with other regimes. This undermines the theory of the "democratic peace" from a novel direction – the realm of public attitudes towards pragmatic nonviolence. The core nations are significantly less likely to embrace pragmatic nonviolence, but significantly more likely to reject terrorism, with no significant differences on the state terrorism item.

Table 91. Nation-Level Data: Nonviolent Attitudes (Gallup World Poll 2010) by Regime Type and World-System Position

Type of Society	Frequency	Nonviolence Works (% affirming nonviolence will work)	State Terrorism: Military Attacks on Civilians (% Never Justified)	Terrorism: Individual Attacks on Civilians (% Never Justified)
All	130-136 (frequencies below are for largest sample)	57.9 (n=136)	65.4 (n=131)	71.9 (n=130)
Type of Regime	(n=134)			
Authoritarian	39	59.6	67	70.5
Hybrid regimes	30	62.3	61.2	66.1
Flawed democracies	41	56	64.7	71.8
Full democracies	24	53.4	69.3	81
Level of Freedom	(n=132)			
Not free	27	57.7	69.3	74.2
Partly free	47	62.5	60.9	65.3
Free	58	54.8	66.9	75.8
World system position	(n=115)			
Periphery	55	61.3	63.3	67.8
Semiperiphery	19	58.7	67.2	73.8
Core	41	51.9	65.7	76.3
Difference by type of regime (eta2)		.050	.037	.121 **
Difference by level of freedom (eta2)		.064*	.054*	.124***
Difference by world system position (eta2)		.090**	.010	.076*

Note: * = Significant at the .05 level; ** = Significant at the .01 level; *** = Significant at the .001 level; **** = Significant at the .0001 level; Type of Regime (Democracy Index 2010); Level of Freedom (Freedom House 2008); World system position (Clark and Beckfield 2009)

Below in Table 92, we see an additional test of democracy. It is shocking that electoral democracies are not more likely to say nonviolence will work. But much depends on how "electoral democracy" is coded – and the dichotomous nature of the variable may be problematic. The coding of four types of regimes according to levels of democracy above tells a slightly different story, but in neither coding scheme are the differences significant. These patterns will be further fleshed out in additional tests of correlation and multiple regression below. Immediately below, correlational analysis will help us to establish many of the predominant patterns in expected co-variates of peaceful attitudes, which will aid in interpretations of the more robust multiple regressions.

Table 92. T-Tests on Nonviolent Attitudes by Electoral Democracy

Type of Society	Frequency	Nonviolence Works (% affirming nonviolence will work)	State Terrorism: Military Attacks on Civilians (% Never Justified)	Terrorism: Individual Attacks on Civilians (% Never Justified)
All	130-136	57.9 (n=136)	65.4 (n=131)	71.9 (n=130)
Type of Regime	(n=136)			
Electoral democracies	77	57.1	66.2	73.6
Other regimes	59	59	64.3	69.4
Difference between group means		1.9	- 1.9	- 4.2

Note: None of the differences between group means are significant at the .05 level. Type of Regime: Electoral democracies (Freedom House 2012)

In Table 93 below, we see that the Cosmopolitanism Index and Globalization Index (see Appendix P for information on the construction of these indexes) have very similar effects on national attitudes on these three dimensions of violence/ nonviolence. Ironically, both of these measures of cosmopolitanism are negatively and significantly associated with confidence in nonviolence. The only peaceful attitude associated with these indicators of cosmopolitanism is rejection of terrorism. There is no significant association with attitudes towards state terrorism. This raises doubts about Pinker's (2011) broad theorizing that cognitive and relational forms of cosmopolitanism, and openness to global markets (i.e., "gentle commerce") might cultivate peaceful attitudes.

Table 93. Correlations of Globalization Indices with Gallup World Poll (2010) Items

	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% nonviolence will work	Cosmopoli-tanism Index	Globali-zation Index
% military attacks on civilians never justified	1.0				
% terrorism never justified	.8315****	1.0			
% nonviolence will work	.0026	-.121	1.0		
Cosmopolitanism Index	.0045	.3031**	-.3173**	1.0	
Globalization Index	-.002	.2783*	-.3755***	.8914****	1.0

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001

Below in Table 94, we see that increasing linguistic and ethnic fractionalization clearly correlates with declines in nonviolent attitudes towards terrorism. That is, increases in these two forms of fractionalization are significantly associated with an

attitudinal climate which is less likely to condemn terrorism as "never justified." Less robustly, but still significant is the association between increases in linguistic fractionalization and declines in nonviolent attitudes towards military attacks on civilians. Interestingly, increases in ethnic fractionalization is significantly associated with increases in confidence that nonviolent methods will work. One tentative conclusion here (but see below on the ethnic polarization indicator) would be that increasing ethnic heterogeneity leads to more ethnic conflict and opportunities to learn that nonviolent methods will work and have worked. But, the indicator of ethnic dominance ("% in largest group") reveals that as the percentage of the population in the largest ethnic group rises, there is a significant rise in peaceful attitudes which reject the legitimacy of terrorism, while confidence in nonviolent efficacy significantly declines. At the same time, as the percentage of the population in the second largest ethnic group rises (the ethnic polarization indicator), there is a significant decline in peaceful attitudes regarding terrorism. All of this supports the notion that terrorism is the weapon of the numerically weak, and it is seen as legitimate by ethnic groups not enjoying cultural dominance.

Below in Table 95, we see that increasing democracy, political rights, and civil liberties tends to correlate with the perception that terrorism is "never justified." But we also see that increasing freedoms, political rights, and civil liberties tend to have the opposite effect (cultivating less peaceful attitudes) on beliefs in nonviolent efficacy and they have no significant effect on objections to military attacks on civilians. These findings are relatively shocking. It seems that, on average and worldwide, democracy does nothing to instill ethical objections to one of the most basic violations of existing international law: the targeting and killing of civilians by a state military. Rather, it seems

Table 94. Correlations of Ethnic Dominance and Fractionalization with Gallup World Poll (2010) Items

	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% non-violence will work	Ethnic fract	Lang fract	Rel fract	% Largest group	% 2nd largest group
% military attacks on civilians never justified	1.0							
% terrorism never justified	.8315****	1.0						
% non-violence will work	.0026	-.121	1.0					
Ethnic fract	-.1464	-.3334****	.2023*	1.0				
Lang fract	-.1942*	-.3269***	.1364	.7317****	1.0			
Rel fract	-.1165	-.0541	-.059	.2834***	.3508****	1.0		
% Largest group	.1620	.2856***	-.1886*	-.9013****	-.6868****	-.3491****	1.0	
% 2nd largest group	-.1526	-.2665**	.0530	.6387****	.3261***	.0764	-.6287****	1.0

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; "Ethnic fract" = ethnic fractionalization; "Lang fract" = Language fractionalization; "Rel fract" = Religious fractionalization

Table 95. Correlations of Democracy Indicators with Gallup World Poll (2010) Items

	Variable name	Sample size (n=)	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% nonviolence will work
Democracy Index 2010	DemIndex2010score	134	.0557	.2740**	-.2012*
Political Culture 2010	PolCulture2010	134	.1155	.3745****	-.2348**
Civil Liberties 2010	CivLib2010	134	.0126	.1621	-.1253
Political Rights Index 2012	transPolRights2012	136	.0563	.175*	-.1103
Civil Liberties Index 2012	transCivLib2012	136	.0594	.2207*	-.1408

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; Democracy Index 2010, Political Culture Index 2010, and Civil Liberties Index 2010 are all scored with 10=Highly Functioning, 0=Poorly Functioning; Source: Democracy Index 2010 by Economist Intelligence Unit; Political Rights 2012 and Civil Liberties 2012 scores were transformed so that 7= most free, and 1=least free; Source: Freedom House 2012

democracies are effective in socializing their citizens into "moral disengagement" (Bandura 1990) from state military actions. Similarly, as Collins (1974) theorized about modern bureaucracies, it seems democracies socialize their citizens into "callous cruelty," as when they accept the "collateral damage" of military actions. This represents a

challenge to the much heralded recent optimistic assessments that civilization is becoming more peaceful (e.g., Pinker 2011).

Further, it seems democracy does nothing to instill faith that "peaceful means alone" "will work." How do we make sense of this finding? It could be because modern democracies are not educating their citizens about the efficacy of nonviolence. Below, this dissertation will argue from a qualitative analysis of state-approved textbooks that schools systematically cultivate historical amnesia about collective action, mass movements, general strikes, and social movement organizations. For example, a recent sample of U.S. college students found that most have no memory of leading U.S. civil rights movement organizations (Eddy 2012). Why? One answer is that our educational systems are shaped by the memories and interests of the 1% and perpetuate, in Marx's terms, forms of false consciousness regarding the potential power and historical record of collective protest. But much more also seems to be going on, raising questions about whether collective memory processes are biased towards the privileging of violent events.

In Table 96, we see that hotter average temperatures are associated with national publics who are less likely to reject state terrorism and especially less likely to reject individual acts of terrorism. Hence, hotter temperatures are associated with less peaceful attitudes on these two indicators. Of course, nations with hotter climates tend to have

Table 96. Correlations of Geography and Temperature with Gallup World Poll (2010) Items

	Sample size (n=)	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% nonviolence will work
Avg Temp	134	-.2013*	-.3067***	.0636
Avg High Temp	133	-.2045*	-.3271***	.0767
Mountainous	124	.1344	.0581	.1337
Log of mountainous	124	.1312	.0724	.0653

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001

historical legacies of poverty,colonialism, and neo-colonialism which have exacerbated multiple forms of violence and war. Post-independence, many of former colonies have had weak governments, and with the lack of a Leviathan, civil wars have plagued former colonies in Africa. Although Fearon and Laitin (2003) found mountainous terrain to significantly predict the chance of civil war (while controlling for ethnic diversity), this geographical factor has no significant effect on these three indicators of violent/ nonviolent attitudes.

Below in Table 97, we consider indicators of human development and inequality. The HDI represents the potential human development if no inequality in a society. The Inequality HDI takes into account inequality, so in effect, it is the *actual* Human Development Index. The Loss HDI is the loss in potential human development due to inequality (i.e., it is the difference between the HDI and the Inequality HDI). The results show that nations with greater human development (HDI and Inequal HDI) tend to be associated with higher rates of objection to state terrorism (i.e., military attacks) and especially to terrorism, but lower rates of confidence that nonviolence will work. The signs (positive/ negative) on Loss HDI and Gini (2000-2010) are opposite those of theHDI and Inequal HDI variables on these 3 indicators of violent/ nonviolent attitudes because a higher Loss HDI score and a higher Gini coefficient represent greater inequality in a nation. In Table 97, we see that greater inequality as measured especially by Loss HDI is associated with significantly greater confidence in nonviolent efficacy and lower rates of objection to state terrorism and especially to terrorism. All three of the HDI indicators point in a consistent direction – poorer, less developed nations have more

confidence in nonviolent efficacy and less morally principled objections to violence in the form of state terrorism and terrorism.

Table 97. Correlations of Human Development and Inequality with Gallup World Poll (2010) Items

	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% nonviolence will work	Gini 2000-2010	Loss HDI 2010	HDI 2010	Inequal HDI 2010
% military attacks on civilians never justified	1.0						
% terrorism never justified	.8315****	1.0					
% nonviolence will work	.0026	-.121	1.0				
Gini 2000-2010	-.0993	-.2289*	.1396	1.0			
Loss HDI2010	-.1982*	-.4040****	.2978**	.6086****	1.0		
HDI2010	.1847*	.3786****	-.3940****	-.3368***	-.8704****	1.0	
InequalHDI2010	.2039*	.4131****	-.3293***	-.4625****	-.9400****	.9812****	1.0

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001

In the Table appearing in Appendix Q, the first three columns are our main concern. The first column of data is striking: more peaceful nations, according to the criteria in the GPI, the PPI, the WPI, and the WPI's three sub-indexes, exhibit only moderate to weak associations with peaceful responses on the military attacks question. Only two variables are significantly associated with the military attacks question at the moderate .05 level, the transformed GPI 2009 score correlation (.1911) and the decade average WPI score (2001-2010) correlation (.1938).Note, the WPI decade average was computed because it was observed that the yearly fluctuation between WPI scores is somewhat volatile. On the terrorism question, the WPI and two of the WPI's sub-indexes are associated with more peaceful answers. On the efficacy of nonviolence question, we again observe a consistent pattern and a striking contradiction: citizens in more "peaceful" nations according to the WPI and GPI indicators, exhibit significantly weaker confidence in nonviolent methods.

Below in Table 98, we see that increases in national wealth are significantly associated with decreased confidence in nonviolent means, but with the increased rejection of terrorism. Meanwhile, increases in national wealth are not significantly associated with peaceful attitudes on state terrorism. These findings likely reflect historical experiences – many wealthy nations have been the victims of terrorism, but state terrorism tends to happen to others far away. Thus, it is easier for citizens in wealthy nations to morally disengage from state terrorism (i.e., it is harder for them to take the perspective of the civilian victims). Nevertheless, if these divergent historical experiences are the explanatory link, the question arises why, given so many successful nonviolent campaigns around the world, why is confidence in nonviolent efficacy not higher?

We also see that larger nations (total population) are associated with less peaceful attitudes on all three attitude measures, but the only associations that achieve significance at the moderate .05 level involve military attacks on civilians. Larger nations have significantly less peaceful attitudes (at the .05 level) on the military attacks on civilians question, with a -.1741 correlation.

As we saw previously (above), nations with a larger percentage of urban citizens are significantly less confident that peaceful means alone "will work," but are significantly more peaceful on the military attacks question, and especially on the terrorism question. Similarly, nations with a higher percentage of rural citizens have significantly more faith in nonviolent methods, but fewer object to terrorism and state terrorism. Hence, the patterns are consistent – on many variables, belief in nonviolent efficacy does not trend in the same direction as moral/ principled objections to terrorism and state terrorism. And, indicators of development and modernity are far more robustly

related to peaceful attitudes on terrorism than they are to peaceful attitudes on state terrorism.

Table 98. Correlations of Structural Factors with Gallup World Poll (2010) Items

	Variable name	Sample size (n=)	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% nonviolence will work
Population total (World Bank 2009)	WB_Population_total	135	-.1741*	-.1424	-.1146
Log of population (World Bank 2009)	lnpop_total	135	-.0963	-.0257	-.0414
Population total (in millions), CIA 2011	pop_in_millions_CIA2011	135	-.1741*	-.1441	-.1164
% urban (CIA 2010)	per_urban_cia2010	133	.2003*	.3343****	-.2845***
% urban (World Bank 2009)	percent_urban_pop	135	.1881*	.3172***	-.2716**
Urban population	Urban_population	134	-.1293	-.0529	-.1215
Log urban population	lnUrban_population	134	-.0242	.0719	-.1049
% rural	Ruralpopulation_ percent_of_total	134	-.1845*	-.3154***	.2707**
Population density	Population_density	135	-.2373**	-.1618	-.3396****
GDP per capita PPP	GDPpercapitaPPP constant2005inter	130	.1387	.3472***	-.3980****
Log GDP per capita PPP	lnGDPpercapita	130	.1834*	.3966****	-.4447****
GNI per capita PPP	GNIpercapitaPPP currentinternat	129	.1007	.3531***	-.4080****
Log GNI per capita	lnGNIpercapita	129	.1640	.3886****	-.4382****

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; GDP per capita = GDP per capita in PPP (purchasing power parity in constant 2005 international dollars, World Bank data 2009; GNI per capita = GNI per capita in PPP in current international dollars, World Bank data 2009

Much like the effect of higher urbanization but even stronger, higher population density is associated with lower faith in nonviolent efficacy. However, on the military attacks question, the effect of higher population density is opposite the effect of higher urbanization. This is almost certainly because percent urban correlates much more strongly with GDP per capita (.67), GNI per capita (.6858), and Human Development (.7275), than population density does. That is, higher population density is more associated with poverty, while urbanization is more associated with wealth. We see this in Table 99 below.

Table 99. Correlations of Population and Income Variables

	Population density	% urban (CIA 2010)	GDP per capita	GNI per capita	Inequal HDI 2010
Population density	1.0				
% urban (CIA 2010)	.2310**	1.0			
GDP per capita	.2862***	.6700****	1.0		
GNI per capita	.3236***	.6858****	.9888****	1.0	
Inequal HDI 2010	.0283	.7275****	.8361****	.8610****	1.0

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; Population density (people per sq. km of land area, World Bank data 2009); GDP per capita = GDP per capita in PPP (purchasing power parity in constant 2005 international dollars, World Bank data 2009; GNI per capita = GNI per capita in PPP in current international dollars, World Bank data 2009; Inequal HDI 2010 = The inequality-adjusted human development index, UN Human Development Report 2010 (this represents the *actual* level of human development)

Several variables were logged because it is commonly expected that for variables with wide variation between states (e.g., population size, income, etc.), there are diminishing effects as we move towards the extreme values on any given variable. The variables for total population, urban population, and military expenditure (Local Currency Unit) were also logged, but no association with the three violent/ nonviolent attitudes achieved significance.

Below in Table 100, we see that increases in military spending as a percentage of the government budget is significantly (at the .0001 level) associated with decreases in the percentage of citizens who reply that military attacks on civilians are never justified. Certainly, higher government expenditures on the military is one indication that power elites have bought into a military-industrial-congressional/ legislative complex. We observe here that where this happens, elites in tandem with social structures and institutions are able to shape public opinion in such a way as to legitimize military attacks, even attacks in which civilians are targeted.

On the other hand, this same variable (military spending as a % of government budget) is also associated with decreases in the percentage of citizens who claim terrorist attacks are “never justified.” Hence, it may be that in some nations with a large military budget (as % of government budget), violent means in general are more likely to be seen

Table 100. Correlations of Military Sector Indicators and Gallup World Poll (2010) Items

	Sample size (n=)	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% nonviolence will work
% labor force who are soldiers	131	.0058	.0901	-.2197*
Total soldiers	131	-.0960	-.0355	-.1595
Log total soldiers	131	-.0659	.0380	-.2010*
Military expenditure as % of govt budget	105	-.3946****	-.3165**	.0241
Military expenditure as % of GDP (SIPRI 2009)	128	-.0732	.0107	-.0227
Military expenditure as % of GDP (CIA 2010)	132	.0051	.1381	-.0787
Military expenditure (LCU)	128	.0996	.0971	-.2317**
Natural log of Military expenditure (LCU)	128	-.1211	.0056	-.0946
Military spending per capita (US$)	133	-.0041	.2308**	-.3141***

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001

as legitimate, or it may be that some citizens in these countries are violent dissenters against their militarized governments. However, this finding is undermined by the reverse pattern (i.e., an increase in the percentage of citizens claiming terrorist attacks are "never justified") associated with Military spending per capita (US$), a .2308 correlation which is significant at the .01 level. The latter finding draws from a larger sample size (n=133), so it is possible that some of these findings are artifacts of sample bias.

In the table above, we also observe four patterns which lead to significant decreases in the belief in nonviolent efficacy: increases in the percentage of the labor force who are soldiers, the natural log of the total number of soldiers, total military expenditure (Local Currency Unit), and military spending per capita (US$). Military expenditure (LCU) was also logged, but no association with the three violent/ nonviolent attitudes achieved significance.

Below in Table 101, apart from the % of government spending on education variable, which does not achieve significance on any of the three questions, the direction of influence is entirely consistent in each of the columns (recognizing that the final variable, Pupil-teacher ratio, is the only variable in which a higher number represents a

lower quality educational system, and so the positive/ negative signs are switched on this variable). Hence, we see that the pattern is clear with each of the educational variables: increasing literacy, increasing mean years in school, increasing school enrollments, increasing educational spending (as a % of GDP), and lower pupil-teacher ratios all are associated with less confidence in nonviolent efficacy, but more peaceful attitudes regarding military attacks on civilians (state terrorism) and especially terrorism.

The robustness of the findings on terrorism and nonviolent efficacy merits comment. Elias (1997) has argued that nation-states reproduce an entire set of pervasive double-standards regarding violence such that some forms of violence are "officially illegitimate," but other forms are "officially legitimate" (i.e., "what the state does or finds acceptable") (p.133). For instance, violence by the government and against activists, foreigners, or terrorists is always legitimate, while violence against the government and by activists, foreigners, or terrorists is always illegitimate. Centralized state-directed educational systems are likely to socialize citizens into internalizing these "basic social rules" (Loewen 2007, p.350), these patriotic, "conservative double-standards" on violence (Bell 1968). It seems plausible that this helps explain the robust association between education and rejecting terrorism compared to the weaker association between education and rejecting state terrorism.

We have to keep in mind here that the form of state terrorism posed by the question is the most extreme form – targeting and killing civilians. Presumably, other forms of state violence, such as soldiers killing foreign soldiers would likely be met by respondents with far greater approval under a variety of conditions. Indeed, Loewen (2007) reports that more educated U.S. citizens were significantly more supportive of the

Table 101. Correlations of Educational Variables and Violent/ Nonviolent Attitudes

	Variable name	Sample size (n=)	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% nonviolence will work
Literacy rate, adult	Literacy_rate_adult	126	.2157*	.3427***	-.3016***
Mean years of schooling	Mean_yrs_school	132	.1405	.3280***	-.2944***
Primary school enrollment (% net)	primary_enrol_ratio_net	126	.1946*	.3439***	-.2486**
Secondary school enrollment (% net)	secondary_enrol_ratio_net	109	.1945*	.3495***	-.2683**
Tertiary enrollment (% gross)	enroll_tertiary_percentgross	122	.2311*	.4299****	-.2044*
Population with secondary education (%)	pop_with_secondary_ed	112	.1690	.3182***	-.2578**
% of govt spending on education	educ_percent_govt_spent	124	.0211	-.0930	.0952
% of GDP spent on education	educ_spent_percent_GDP	127	.1806*	.2080*	-.0291
Pupil-teacher ratio	pupil_teacher_ratio	101	-.2149*	-.3735***	.3356***

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001

Vietnam War in 1966, 1968, and 1971, and the Iraq War in 2004 (p.351). To many Americans such findings are surprising, as we "tend automatically to equate *educated* with *informed* or *tolerant*" (p.351). But these findings are less surprising when we consider that during the Vietnam War and today, on average, educated people are more likely to be Republicans (p.352). Hence, to make sense of the education variable we must break it down by party affiliation (or left-right ideology) as well as income. Burris (2008) found that, in the days prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, 37% of Democrats with a college degree favored the military invasion versus 64% of Democrats with a high-school education, while 85 – 90% of Republicans at all education levels favored the invasion (pp.469-470). Thus, there are interactions and nuances, but party politics and ideology often trumps education when it comes to attitudes on particular wars.

The question on nonviolent efficacy may be a proxy question of historical knowledge. We now know that, on average, nonviolent groups have experienced significantly more success than violent groups (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). But it

seems that educational systems in nations around the world have not helped their citizens to learn this. Loewen (2007) writes, “Only in [the subject of] history is stupidity the result of more, not less schooling” (p.353).

Testing the Youth Bulge Theory

The presence of a large youth cohort has been linked to increased political crisis and violence in several nations (Goldstone 2002, Huntington 1996). A variant of this theory specifies the proportion of *males* aged 15 – 29 (Gat 2006). But World Bank data could only provide a proxy indicator, using cohort statistics on “Population ages 0-14” (% of total population) without gender breakdowns. Nevertheless, the cross-national variation in sex ratios is relatively small (though data was lacking from China). For instance, World Bank data shows that the sex ratio at birth (females per 1,000 males) in 1992, varied from a low of 909 in South Korea to a high of 990 in Rwanda. In order to test the proportion of youth aged 15 – 29 when the Gallup World poll data was collected (about 2009), I simply selected the population data from 15 years earlier (i.e., the year 1994). Of course, this indicator is a proxy measure of a youth bulge, since the younger cohort might also be a disproportionately large percentage of the population. The proxyindicator tells us how large a percentage of the population this age cohort was 15 years previously, but its use as a proxy measure is defensible. In fact, for our purposes, the size of the younger cohort is probably irrelevant. Thus, our proxy measure may represent a better indicator (than the proportion of ages 15-29 matched to the time of the survey data) of the social stresses and strains which emerge as a large birth cohort arises within a society and moves through its institutions as they age. Nevertheless, the

Encyclopaedia Britannica (Time 2012) includes country-level data on the proportion of the total population who are youth ages 15-29, so this indicator was also tested.

In Table 102, we see that larger youth bulges (larger youth populations) are associated with less peaceful attitudes on the military attacks question (it achieves significance at the .05 level), with significantly less peaceful attitudes on terrorism, and with significantly more peaceful attitudes on the nonviolent efficacy question. The proxy youth bulge measure has very similar effects. Thus, whatever the effects of youth bulges on violent political *behaviors*, youth bulges are associated with confidence in nonviolent efficacy and declines in moral condemnation of terrorism and state terrorism. Of course, the effect of youth bulges may be difficult to disentangle from other associated factors. The youth bulge variable is negatively and significantly correlated with GDP per capita, GDP per capita, and low human development (Inequal HDI). That is, poorer nations have much larger youth bulges.

Table 102. Correlations of Youth Bulge, Income, and Gallup World Poll (2010) Items

	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% nonviolence will work	Proxy youth bulge measure	Youth bulge	GDP per capita	GNI per capita	Inequal HDI 2010
Proxy youth bulge measure	-.1597	-.3571****	.3028***	1.0				
Youth bulge	-.1875*	-.3670****	.2798**	.8616****	1.0			
GDP per capita	.1387	.3472***	-.3980****	-.7689****	-.7383****	1.0		
GNI per capita	.1007	.3531***	-.4080****	-.8368****	-.8230****	.9888****	1.0	
Inequal HDI 2010	.2039*	.4131****	-.3293***	-.9265****	-.7691****	.8361****	.8610****	1.0

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001;

The Major Episodes of Political Violence Data Set

Marshall's (2012) data set, "Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2012," was utilized to provide statistics on number of years at peace, number of years at war, and

estimated casualty counts. Research has shown that the definition and operationalization of war matters a great deal in statistical analyses of correlates and predictors of war. For instance, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) found that "civil war" (which they define as over 1,000 deaths in total and in at least a 3-year period) and "internal armed conflict" (which the Uppsala/ PRIO data set defines as at least 25 battle deaths a year) have numerous distinct correlates not shared by both forms of conflict. The Marshall (2012) data set has the advantage of capturing conflicts that do not quite meet the standard civil war threshold of 1,000 deaths a year, or the 1,000 deaths within 3 years threshold utilized by Hegre and Sambanis (2006). Marshall (2012) defines "major episodes of political violence" as involving at least 500 "directly-related" fatalities, and which "reach a level of intensity in which political violence is both systematic and sustained (a base rate of 100 'directly-related deaths per annum'). Episodes may be of any general type: inter-state, intra-state, or communal; they include all episodes of international, civil, ethnic, communal, and genocidal violence and warfare" (p.1).

The Nonviolent History Data Set

Cross-national studies with large sample sizes and variables dependent upon interpretations for coding are always challenged by the task of achieving comprehensive and accurate coverage. Moreover, many of the nonviolent history variables are dichotomous and somewhat crude, and thus, the results and interpretations of the results should be considered impressionistic. This is quite typical in the field however, as dichotomous variables are always crude, and a great deal of the quantitative war and peace literature rests upon highly specific operationalizations. For example, defining "civil war" as any intra-state armed conflict with over 1,000 battle deaths in a given year

(e.g., the UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset) is a mainstay in the literature. Researchers often run statistical tests with dichotomous variables (e.g., "war onset" in a given year with the codes: 1=yes, 0=no) that do little to capture the magnitude and significance of the conflicts.

In the present data set, consider the validity issues in testing the following variable: Years elapsed since most recent nonviolent campaign achieving "success." This measure is somewhat crude since, for simplicity's sake, significant nonviolent campaigns which failed or which achieved only "limited success," as well as the presence and outcome of significant *violent* campaigns, are not captured in this variable. Nevertheless, the present project is concerned with analyzing collective memory (and its impact on attitudes about the efficacy of nonviolence), and it is plausible that successful nonviolent campaigns could be more salient in the collective memory than failures or cases of limited nonviolent success. However, it is equally plausible that if a successful nonviolent campaign is followed by a *failed* nonviolent campaign, or by a nonviolent campaign achieving only "limited success" (or for that matter, a successful *violent* campaign) citizens might perceive that nonviolence no longer "works." We might recall here the U.S. civil rights movement in the years following Dr. King's assassination and even before, when black militants grew impatient with nonviolent methods and viewed them as ineffective.

Chenoweth (2008) correctly identifies a potential data problem in the ground-breaking study and dataset of major violent and nonviolent campaigns compiled by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), which provides a key source of codes for the present study. The potential problem with the data is the "underreporting bias" of failed

campaigns – especially among the failed *nonviolent* campaigns, due to "extreme repression or poor news sources" (Chenoweth 2008, pp.2-3). Their study attempted to compensate for this problem by soliciting cases of failed nonviolent campaigns by the world's leading experts on nonviolent conflict. Moreover, I would contend that failed *violent* campaigns would likely achieve more press and historical memory (than failed *nonviolent* campaigns) among both scholars and average citizens due to the systematic biases in historical memory which privileges violence and well-documented news media penchants for reporting violence.

The significance and type of nonviolent campaign is difficult to capture in numbers. Path dependency models, which emphasize the important precedent-setting and institution-shaping role bound up with national origins, would propose that when a nation achieves independence through a nonviolent campaign, as in the case of Ghana, such a nonviolent movement is likely to be particularly salient for the culture. But additional complications abound – such as regional effects (i.e., if a neighboring nation experiences a dramatic, successful nonviolent or violent movement) and subsequent historical developments. Many newly independent nations in Africa went on to experience lengthy and traumatic civil wars.

We are also forced to bracket possible effects on foreign opponents: might citizens in target occupying/ imperial nations also "learn" and believe in the efficacy of nonviolence through the resistance campaigns of the occupied/ colonized? It was decided not to code nonviolent successes under the column of the occupiers/ colonizers, because it was theorized that the primary mobilization and potential for developing belief in nonviolent efficacy is likely to reside in the people who perceive a grievance and engage

in nonviolent social action and thereby develop a praxis. For instance, did the British come to believe in the efficacy of nonviolence through the successful (or somewhat successful) nonviolent campaigns against them in Egypt (1919-1922), India (1919-1945), Ghana (1951-1957), Malawi (1958-1959), Nigeria (1945-1950), or Zambia (1961-1963)? Did the Indonesians develop faith in nonviolence through the successful East Timorese nonviolent struggle (1988-1999) against the Indonesian occupation? There is some evidence that opponents tend to mirror one another in their attitudes where conflicts are highly salient. For instance, in the 2009 Gallup World Poll, only 33% of Israelis and 32% of Palestinians affirmed that "peaceful means alone" "will work" for oppressed groups.

Measuring the long-term significance of a nonviolent campaign is also fraught, since how a nonviolent campaign becomes preserved in collective memory is highly variable. Ironically, in the present study, the one campaign that was most frequently listed as a successful nonviolent revolution by respondents in Costa Rica, and the second most frequently listed case by respondents in the U.S. – India's campaign for independence under Gandhi (1919-1945), is coded as achieving only "limited success" by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008). Hence, the single campaign which is, in all likelihood, best remembered around the worldas a case of successful nonviolent action – Gandhi's campaign for India's independence, is coded by scholarly experts as achieving only "limited success." Arguably, the measure of "success" is too narrow (focused on short-term and intra-state effects) when the movement that solidified the practice and ideology of Gandhian nonviolence - which has already shaken the world to its foundations in nation after nation, is judged and coded as falling short.

Coding cases. The Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) data set provided the initial set of major nonviolent movement cases around the world. One problem with this data set is that it excludes cases that occurred between the end of 2006, when the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) data ends, and when the Gallup World Poll surveys were conducted in each nation (around 2009 in most cases; see Appendix R for dates). In order to fill the gap for these years (an important concern for achieving greater data validity in the dataset), the online *Global Nonviolent Action Database*(GNAD), retrieved February 2013, was analyzed for the inclusion of additional campaign cases resolving in 2007-2009. Further, since it was observed that some significant cases were missing from the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) data, it was decided that the GNAD would be analyzed, seeking to identify additional cases for all 136 nations in the Gallup World Poll data (i.e., all existing data on the nonviolent efficacy item).

This process was considered to be fraught with potential biases because the criteria for inclusion in the GNAD is much broader than that for Stephan and Chenoweth (2008). Additionally, the GNAD website claims that additional cases are added each week. Although virtually all nations in the GNAD only have a few cases listed (usually between one to 5 cases), and roughly 20% of the cases appear to be significant national events, the U.S. case file has 232 cases listed. The only other nations with more than 10 cases listed as of February 20, 2013 are: Bolivia (12), Canada (32), China (22; but this was not analyzed since not included in Gallup World Poll data); France (12), Germany (13), India (20), South Korea (15), and the U.K. (12). The U.S. case file was the only file which was not analyzed to identify possible cases of inclusion (data retrieved in February, 2013), because numerous other sources were consulted in identifying the most

significant nonviolent campaigns in the U.S. In the future as the GNAD dataset grows, other nations will likely also have an abundance of cases, making the determination of case significance somewhat more difficult, or at least more time consuming.

One modification to the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) coding scheme includes coding all of the former Soviet states as having undergone a "successful" nonviolent campaign, as seen in the table below with the following notation:"1991 success, USSR break-up." These thirteen states include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine (two other former Soviet states are not included in the data because they are omitted from the Gallup World Poll data or the Global Peace Index: Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).

Surprisingly, major nonviolent campaigns achieving "success" or "limited success" were not identified for such large nations as Canada, Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. in the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) dataset. Likewise, an analysis of the GNAD dataset failed to identify significant campaigns listed for Canada, Australia, and the U.K. However, some nonviolent campaigns with outcomes of "limited success" and "success" (not yet listed in these datasets) would likely merit inclusion, such as the women's suffrage movements in each nation.

In making selections for inclusion, the present author had to interpret which cases in the GNAD merited inclusion as a significant nonviolent case. Again, a few cases were added though they were omitted from Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and the GNAD. This process depended on the knowledge (based in diverse scholarly sources) of the present researcher only and was considered even more fraught with bias, since time constraints prevented an analysis of the history of every nation looking for significant

nonviolent cases. And, it is one thing to be aware of a significant nonviolent case somewhere in the world and to include that in the dataset, but it is quite another to be positive that other nations do not have movements deserving inclusion as well. Hence, the "sins of omission" are likely to be significant. Nevertheless, such problems are common in many cross-national datasets.

In keeping with the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) coding, only "major non-state resistance campaigns" were sought, defined as "campaigns with the objective of expelling foreign occupations, regime change (i.e. removing dictatorships or military juntas), self-determination or separatism, and in some cases, other major types of social change (i.e. anti-apartheid campaigns)"; campaigns that were "primarily nonviolent"; and campaigns where it is certain that "more than 1,000 people were actively participating in the struggle" (Chenoweth 2008, pp.1-2). Thus, they define "major" nonviolent campaigns as "those that are already 'mature' in terms of objectives and membership" (p.2). And again they clarify, "We only included cases where the objective was maximalist (i.e., regime change, secession, or self-determination) as opposed to limited (i.e., greater civil liberties or economic rights)" (p.2).

In all instances, cases were only added to the present data set if the campaigns resolved before the Gallup World Poll survey was conducted in each country (see Appendix R). Unfortunately, a dramatic case of nonviolent success in Iceland occurred just after the survey was conducted in Iceland in December of 2008.

The GNAD includes more nonviolent campaigns than Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), but at times, it is also less systematic and comprehensive in its coverage of major campaigns – such as campaigns that resulted in regime change. For instance, Stephan and

Chenoweth (2008) include the 2001 Second People Power Movement in the Philippines, and in 1963 and 1974 successful nonviolent revolutions in Greece, but these were all lacking in the GNAD database (retrieved February 19, 2013). The GNAD certainly includes cases where greater economic civil liberties or economic rights were the goals, and as we saw above, such campaigns were not included in Stephan and Chenoweth (2008).

Considerations of validity in the present data set prompted the recognition that there is a slight mismatch between the Gallup World Poll question on nonviolent efficacy and the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) criteria for inclusion as a major nonviolent campaign. That is, it is possible many respondents would think of "limited" cases, seeking greater civil liberties or economic rights (as opposed to the "maximalist" revolutions), as examples informing their answer for the abstract question on whether peaceful means alone "will work" for oppressed groups. Thus, in reviewing the more inclusive GNAD dataset, an effort was made to include major campaigns seeking civil liberties or economic rights. In all cases this was a qualitative assessment guided by GNAD's coding. This process resulted in the inclusion of several campaigns that had involved over 1,000 people (and in most cases, well over that number, usually tens of thousands), dramatic street actions or general strikes, and significant concessions or victories. This inclusion was deemed appropriate since the present project is concerned with identifying the most significant nonviolent campaigns, those likely to become embedded in collective memory and to shape subsequent attitudes about the efficacy of nonviolence.

To fill in the gap in years during 2007 to 2009, the following case of nonviolent "success" were added because they met the above stated criteria and resolved in 2007-2009:

- Pakistan (2007-2009; Save the Judiciary Movement; activist lawyers engaged in numerous nonviolent tactics and pressured President Musharraff to reinstate the Chief Justice and 60 other judges who had been dismissed illegally; the President was removed from office and civilian control of the army restored; a 4-day long march culminated in the participation of 500,000 people; the campaign resolved in mid-March, 2009; coded: "success"; the GNAD rated it 6 out of a possible 6 points in the degree of success in achieving campaign goals))
- El Salvador (2007-2008; numerous nonviolent tactics including a 3-day march involving 700 people protesting the neo-liberal privatization of water in El Salvador and the arrest and imprisonment of 13 anti-privatization activists, called the "Suchitito 13"; the last day of the march had 3,500 people; all 13 prisoners were released; coded: "success"; the GNAD rated it 6 out of a possible 6 points)

Several additional cases were added, though the campaigns resolved before 2006 and were omitted from the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) data. These included, for example:

- Benin (1989-1990) strikes by university students and general strikes by public sector employees (teachers and civil servants) demanding salaries owed them, the President was overthrown, democratic elections held; the majority of the nation's 22,000 teachers and 50,000 government employees went on strike; anti-

government demonstrations with 40,000 people (code: “success”; the GNAD ranks its degree of success 5 out of 6 possible points).

- Liberia’s women’s nonviolent movement (2003-2005) to end the civil war and to push for democratic elections; various nonviolent tactics including marches, occupations, and a sex strike by over 2,500 women (coded: “success”; the GNAD rated it 6 out of a 6 possible points).

Nonviolent campaigns were *not* added if GNAD rated them 0 to 2 (out of 6 points) in achieving goals, which was considered “failure.” Otherwise, assessments for justifying inclusion were both quantitative (considering the score out of 6 points) and qualitative (analyzing the narrative description of outcomes in the GNAD). The data from Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) was considered more authoritative. Hence, for example, Stephan and Chenoweth coded Brazilians’ movement against military rule in 1984-1985 as a “success” and this coding was adopted, even though the GNAD coded the degree of success for this case as only 3 out of a possible 6 points. And, following Stephan and Chenoweth, the 1987 South Korean movement against the military government was coded a “limited success,” though the GNAD coded the degree of success as 5 out of 6 points. Generally, campaigns scoring 3 to 5 (out of a possible 6 points) were considered as candidates for “limited success,” with the qualitative analysis of the campaign’s narrative description helping to decide the proper code.

Again, the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) dataset presents some limitations. For instance, significant cases of general strikes and labor strikes are not coded, even if they launched movements that eventually resulted in electoral victories which definitively undermined the power of the elite 1% and established robust social democracies with

strong welfare states. As Lakey (2012a, 2012b) has argued, such movements occurred in Norway and Sweden in the 1920s and 1930s.

Scholars of contemporary Latin America have noted that in recent years strikes and "mass street actions" have brought down governments in Peru (2000), Argentina (2001), Bolivia (2003 and 2005), and Ecuador (1997, 2000, and 2005) (Buono and Lara 2006; Rénique 2006,p.38). In most of these cases, masses were quickly mobilized to form largely nonviolent "people power" movements against neoliberal policies. In almost all of these cases, the result was the resignation of a president, but there was no "decisive break with neoliberal domination" (Buono and Lara 2006, p.10). Hence, the code of "limited success" fits for many of these Latin American cases. But this speaks to the challenge of coding the degree of "success" in nonviolent campaigns, and much depends on how radical are the goals envisioned. One of the elder scholars of nonviolence and director of the Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD), George Lakey (2012b), has argued that he could not think of any *violent* movements that have: 1) used violence to overthrow a regime, and 2) established democracy afterward, and 3) "curbed the dominant power of the 1 percent" to borrow language from the Occupy movement. Actually, Costa Rica in 1948 might be the one case where all three criteria were met, except for the fact that democracy had a long tradition in Costa Rica (the violent campaign merely restored democratic norms), and the dominant power of the 1% was severely reigned in through the progressive "Social Guarantees" legislation under President Guardia just a few years prior – a development that some Costa Ricans have called "the real revolution of Costa Rica" (Eddy and Dreiling 2013). Lakey only listed two nonviolent movements that he felt met this criteria: Sweden and Norway. Indeed, with such a high threshold, perhaps few

mass nonviolent movements have achieved "success." Nevertheless, the campaigns in Bolivia resulted in more systemic changes and culminated in the election of Morales, an indigenous leader representing a sea change in Bolivian politics. The failure of Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) to include these dramatic cases (highlighted in Table 103) is puzzling.

Table 103. Coding of Significant Nonviolent/ People Power Movements: Cases of Regime Change Missing from Key Data Sets of Nonviolent Action

Nation (years of nonviolent campaign)	Included in Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), data from 1900 to 2006 (outcome code)	Included in Global Nonviolent Action Database (outcome code/ success ranked 0 to 6)[a]	Other sources (outcome code)
Liberia (2003-2005)	**No**	Yes (success)/ 6	
Peru (2000)	Yes (success)	Yes (success)/ 6	
Argentina (2001)	**No**	**No**	Yes* (limited success)
Bolivia (2003)	**No**	Yes (success)/ 6	
Bolivia (2005)	**No**	Yes (success)/ 6	
Ecuador (1944)	**No**	Yes (limited success)/ 4	
Ecuador (1997)	**No**	Yes (success)/ 6	
Ecuador (2000)	**No**	**No**	Yes* (limited success)
Ecuador (2005)	**No**	**No**	Yes* (limited success)
Venezuela (2002)	**No**	Yes (success)/ 6	Yes* (success)

Notes: (a) I borrow the three-fold coding scheme (success, limited success, or failure) used by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), but base these codes on translations of the Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD) coding scheme of 0 to 6 points (with 6 representing complete success) assessing the movements "Success in achieving specific demands/ goals" (e.g., I coded "4" as "limited success" and "6" as "success"); * = clear cases of people power/ street action movements that were largely nonviolent, with some limited violence and property destruction as a form of direct action. The President (or Junta leader in the case of Venezuela) resigned in each case; Note that the GNAD includes a much larger class of movement cases (e.g., major workplace strikes, etc.) than Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), but in the table above, we limit ourselves to the "maximalist" criteria of inclusion i.e., regime change, secession, or self-determination) stipulated by Stephan (2008, p.2).

Caveats. There are many potential problems and imperfections in using these data sets as indicators of historical experiences relevant to the Gallup World Poll question on the efficacy of "peaceful means alone." As already discussed, many nations around the world are relatively democratic and democracies consist largely of daily and institutionalized nonviolent means of negotiation and conflict resolution. Here, nonviolent methods become "conventional action," an are unlikely to be conceived by democratic citizens as "nonviolence." These data sets coding significant nonviolent movements and campaigns primarily identifies a type of social action that can be termed nonviolent "people power," mass street protests, strikes and other forms of civil disobedience. Nevertheless, just as war is the most dramatic instance of violence, these

actions are the most dramatic instance of nonviolence, and both war and people power movements are likely to instill in populations a form of faith in the efficacy of either violent or nonviolent methods.

The data set attempted to include only significant nonviolent campaigns. That is, largely nonviolent "people power" campaigns that grabbed national attention, with dramatic street actions involving over 1,000 people (and in most cases, well over that number), nonviolent events likely to be maintained and reproduced in the collective memory. The reason for this criteria is that it was theorized that dramatic nonviolent events can become ideological master images and paradigm shifters in the thinking of average citizens, just as war is the most dramatic instance of violent methods and war furnishes the most socially visible narratives and discourses which undergird the myth of redemptive violence. Likewise, people power and mass nonviolent civil disobedience is the most dramatic instance of nonviolent methods, and they furnish the most socially visible narratives and discourses that undergird the ideas of principled and pragmatic nonviolence. Violence and nonviolence in their manifold forms surround us on a daily basis, but only extreme forms of these phenomenon are likely to seep into collective memory and national narratives.

The aim of including only "significant"/ "major" nonviolent campaigns is very difficult to achieve given all the potential indicators of significance. For instance, the women's suffrage movement in the U.S. is arguably worthy of inclusion, but in an open-ended question in the present survey, only 8.8% of students in the 2012 survey and 13.1% of students in the 2013 survey listed this case as an example of a successful nonviolent movement. By contrast, a higher percentage of students listed the U.S. civil rights

movement: 20.6% in the 2012 survey and 24.6% in the 2013 survey. By this measure, the U.S. civil rights movement has clearly been more significant in collective memories of nonviolent action.

The nonviolent history data set and opinion outcomes. In Table 104, a cursory analysis suggests that the nationsexpressing the strongest confidence in nonviolent efficacy have recently experienced succussful nonviolent revolutions. This qualitative assessment will be born out in statisticaly analyses below. We can also observe below how universally widespread successful nonviolent campaigns have been, as well as, for our purposes, how incomplete Stephan and Chenoweth's (2008) dataset is and the utility of the GNAD and other sources in helping to fill in gaps in the historical record of nonviolent campaigns.

Table 104. Rank/ % Affirming "Peaceful Means Alone" "Will Work"/ Nation/ Nonviolent History

Rank	% Affirming "Peaceful Means Alone" "Will Work"	Nation	Nonviolent History
1	85%	Madagascar	**1991-93 success over Didier Radsiraka – called Active Voices campaign; 2002-03 pro-democracy movement success over Radsiraka regime**
2	84%	Liberia	[2003-2005 success]
3	82%	Cote d'Ivoire	[1989-1990 pro-democracy movement success]
4	81%	Georgia	**(1991 success, USSR break-up);2003 success over Shevardnadze regime – called Rose Revolution**
5	81%	Philippines	**1986 success against Marcos – called People Power; 2001 success against Estrada regime – called Second People Power Movement**
6	80%	Kyrgyzstan	**(1991 success, USSR break-up);1989 Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement success against Communist Regime; 2005 success against Akayev regime – called the Tulip Revolution**
7	79%	Mongolia	**1989-90 limited success against Communist regime**
8	79%	Pakistan	**1968-69 limited success against Khan regime;** [2007-2009 Save the Judiciary Movement success]
9	78%	Rwanda	None
10	77%	Burundi	[2007 civil servant strike success]
11	77%	Greece	**1963 success over Karamanlis regime; 1974 success over military rule;** [2008, success, 13,000 prisoners' hunger strike for reforms]
12	76%	Uruguay	**1984-1985 success over military rule**
13	76%	Bangladesh	**1989-90 limited success against military rule**
14	76%	Sierra Leone	[1997-1998 pro-democracy movement success]
15	76%	Central African Republic/ CAR	None

Rank	% Affirming "Peaceful Means Alone" "Will Work"	Nation	Nonviolent History
16	76%	Benin	**1989-1990 limited success over Communist regime**
17	76%	Nepal	**1989-90 limited success against Monarchy; 2006 limited success against Nepalese government/ martial law**
18	75%	Tanzania	**1992-95 limited success of pro-democracy movement against Mwinyi regime**
19	73%	Costa Rica	[1919 Women teachers help overthrow Tinoco; 1947 successful strike for electoral reforms; 1999-2002 defeat of U.S. oil companies]
20	72%	Tajikistan	**(1991 success, USSR break-up)**
21	72%	Cameroon	[1958-1961 successful women's movement]
22	71%	Moldova	**(1991 success, USSR break-up)**
23	71%	Haiti	[1946, Haitians strike & overthrow a dictator; 1956, Haitians strike & overthrow a dictator]; **1985 success, overthrow of Duvalier {note: GNAD codes this overthrow as 1984-1986}**
24	70%	Sudan	[1964 success, overthrow of dictator Abbud]; **1985 success over Jaafar Nimiery**
25	69%	Yemen	None
26	69%	Ghana	**1951-1957 success over British rule {Note: GNAD codes this campaign as 1949-1951}; 2000 success over Rawlings government**
27	69%	Armenia	**(1991 success, USSR break-up)**
28	69%	Kazakhstan	[1989-1991, success, Kazakhs stop nuclear testing]; **(1991 success, USSR break-up)**
29	69%	Egypt	[1919-1922 Egyptian campaign for independence from Britain];**2000-2005 limited success over Mubarak regime;** [2006-2007 success, textile worker strike]
30	69%	Chad	None
31	68%	Republic of Congo/ Congo-Brazzaville	[1990, success, trade union strikes]
32	68%	Finland	[1898-1905 limited success, Finns resist Russification]
33	68%	Comoros	None
34	67%	Nicaragua	None
35	67%	Indonesia	**1997-98 success over Suharto rule**
36	67%	Mauritania	None
37	66%	Togo	None
38	66%	Mali	**1989-1992 success over military rule**
39	66%	Iceland	[1975 success, women strike for equality]
40	66%	Niger	[1991 limited success, women campaign for inclusion in Nat'l Assembly]
41	65%	Kosovo	None
42	65%	Argentina	**1977-1981 pro-dem mov't success over military junta; 1986 success over attempted coup;** [2001 limited success]
43	65%	Cambodia	None
44	65%	Portugal	**1974 Carnation Revolution success over military rule**
45	65%	Ireland	None
46	64%	Belarus	**1989 limited success against Communist regime; (1991 success, USSR break-up)**
47	64%	Jordan	None
48	64%	Lebanon	**2005 success over Syrian forces – called Cedar Revolution**
49	64%	Guinea	None
50	63%	Hungary	[1859-1867 success, campaign for independence from Austrian Empire; 1984-1989 success, Danube river dam prevented]; **1989 pro-dem mov't success over Communist regime**
51	63%	Colombia	[1957 success, dictator overthrown]
52	63%	Senegal	**2000 limited success against Diouf gov't**
53	63%	Mozam-bique	None
54	63%	Cyprus	None
55	62%	Spain	[1919 success, Barcelona general strike for economic justice; 1962 success, coal miner strikes against Franco; 1976-1978 success, mov't to stop nuclear power plant]
56	62%	Malawi	**1958-59 success over British rule; 1992-94 success over Banda regime**
57	61%	Russia	[1905 limited success, Russian Revolution]; **1990-91 success of pro-democracy mov't against anti-coup**
58	61%	Turkey	None
59	61%	Canada	None
60	61%	Saudi Arabia	None

Rank	% Affirming "Peaceful Means Alone" "Will Work"	Nation	Nonviolent History
61	60%	Angola	None
62	60%	Slovenia	**1989-90 success over Communist regime**
63	60%	Dominican Republic	None
64	60%	Ecuador	[1944 limited success; 1997 success**]; (2000 limited success; 2005 limited success)**
65	59%	Latvia	**1989 pro-dem mov't success over Communist regime;(1991 success, USSR break-up) {Here, the coding follows GNAD's code: 1989-1991 success, campaign for national independence}**
66	59%	Nigeria	**1945-1950 limited success over British occupation; 1993-99 success over Military rule;** [2002 success, Nigerian women over Chevron oil]
67	59%	South Africa	[1906-1914 success, Gandhian campaign for Indian's rights]; **1984-1994 success against Apartheid**
68	59%	Sweden	[1931 limited success, general strike]
69	59%	Azerbaijan	**(1991 success, USSR break-up)**
70	59%	Chile	**1931 success over Ibanez regime; 1983-9 success over Pinochet**
71	58%	Djibouti	None
72	58%	Morocco	[1992-1994 success, feminist campaign to reform Islamic Family Law]
73	58%	Panama	None
74	58%	Democratic Republic of Congo/ Zaire	None
75	58%	Ukraine	**(1991 success, USSR break-up);2001-2004 success over Kuchma regime, called Orange Revolution**
76	57%	Botswana	None
77	57%	Brazil	**1984-1985 success over military rule**
78	57%	Guatemala	**1944 October Revolutionaries success over Ubico dictatorship** {Note: the nonviolent movement in June and July of 1944 could be included too, but it was decided that separate coding was not essential, especially since that case achieved only "limited success" as Ubico's regime largely continued under General Vaides}
79	57%	Zambia	**1961-63 success over British rule; 1990-91 limited success over one-party rule; 2001 success over Chiluba regime**
80	56%	El Salvador	**1944 Strike of Fallen Arms success over Martinez dictatorship;** [2002-2003 success, mov't prevented privatization of health care; 2007-2008 success, Suchitito 13 mov't]
81	56%	Namibia	None
82	56%	Bolivia	**1977-1982 success over military juntas;** [2000 success, Cochabamba water war; 2003-2005 success, mov't wins democratic control of gas reserves]; **(2003 success; 2005 success; 2007 success)**
83	55%	Bahrain	None
84	55%	Australia	None
85	55%	Tunisia	None
86	55%	Venezuela	**1958 success over Jimenez dictatorship;** [2002 success, military coup defeated]
87	55%	Algeria	[1962 success, citizens non-violently prevent full-scale civil war]
88	54%	Burkina Faso	None
89	54%	Afghanistan	None
90	54%	Uganda	None
91	54%	Taiwan	**1979-1985 limited success over autocratic regime**
92	54%	Kenya	**1989 limited success over Daniel Arap Moi**
93	54%	Italy	None
94	54%	USA	**(1955-1965 civil rights movement)**
95	54%	Zimbabwe	None
96	53%	Honduras	None
97	53%	Germany	[1920 success, citizens defend democracy against coup]; **1923 Ruhrkampf Resistance success over French occupation; 1989 pro-dem mov't E. German success over Communist Regime**
98	52%	Iraq	None
99	52%	UK	None
100	51%	Estonia	**1989 success over Communist regime – called the Singing Revolution; (1991 success, USSR break-up)**
101	50%	Syria	[1936 success, general strike against French occupation]

Rank	% Affirming "Peaceful Means Alone" "Will Work"	Nation	Nonviolent History
102	49%	New Zealand	None
103	49%	Paraguay	None
104	49%	Mexico	**1987-2000 success over corrupt gov't**
105	48%	Romania	None
106	48%	Austria	None
107	48%	Norway	**1944 limited success over Nazi occupation**
108	48%	Peru	[1971 success, squatter's movement]; **2000 success over Fujimori**
109	47%	Netherlands	None
110	47%	Denmark	**1944 limited success over Nazi occupation**
111	47%	Sri Lanka	None
112	46%	Kuwait	[2002-2005 success, struggle for women's suffrage called the Blue Revolution]
113	46%	Qatar	None
114	46%	Belgium	[1913 success, general strike for universal suffrage; 1950 success, movement prevents King Leopold III from resuming the throne]
115	46%	Guyana	**1990-1992 success over autocratic regime**
116	45%	Lithuania	**(1991 success, USSR break-up);1989-1991 pro-dem mov't success over Lithuanian regime**
117	45%	South Korea	**1960 Student Revolution success over Rhee regime; 1987 limited success against military gov't**
118	45%	Luxem-bourg	None
119	45%	Belize	[2005 success, general strike of unions for reforms]
120	42%	Poland	**1956 limited success over Communist regime; 1968-70 limited success over Communist regime; 1981-89 Solidarity Movement success over Communist regime**
121	41%	Trinidad and Tobago	None
122	40%	India	**1919-45 limited success over British rule**
123	39%	Ethiopia	None
124	39%	Malta	None
125	38%	Iran	**1977-78 Iranian Revolution success over Shah**
126	37%	Thailand	**1973 success, student protests overthrew military dictatorship; 1992 limited success, pro-dem mov't against Suchinda regime; 2005-6 success, overthrew Thaksin regime**
127	37%	Malaysia	None
128	37%	France	[1994 success, over-turning sub-minimum wage; 2006 success, defeat of new employment law]
129	34%	Japan	None
130	33%	Israel	**1981-82 Druze resistance – limited success against Israeli occupation of Golan**
131	32%	Palestinian Territories	**1987-1990 Intifada limited success against Israeli occupation**
132	26%	Hong Kong	None
133	25%	Czech Republic	**1989 Velvet Revolution success over Communist regime**
134	20%	Laos	None
135	19%	Singapore	None
136	7%	Vietnam	None

Notes: **years** = major nonviolent movements identified in Stephan and Chenoweth's (2008) dataset, only cases whose outcomes are coded "success" or "limited success" are listed here; [years] = significant nonviolent campaigns identified by Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD) and coded as "success" or "limited success," retrieved February 2013; **(years)** = additional significant nonviolent movements added based on other sources; Respondent % in Gallup World Poll (2010) data affirming "peaceful means alone" "will work" for oppressed groups struggling to improve their situation.

Additional Historical Indicators of Cultures of Peace: Peace Years and War Years

Drawing from Marshall (2012), nations were also coded according to their "peace years" and "war years." The following 42 nations experienced zero years of war (i.e., 64 years of peace) from 1945 to 2009 (sorted by region):

- Western Europe, Canada & U.S.: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden
- Eastern Europe & Central Asia: Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine
- Middle East & North Africa: Bahrain, Qatar
- South & East Asia & Oceana: Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore
- Latin America: Belize, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
- Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Malawi, Togo

Conversely, the following nations experienced over 30 years of war(see Appendix P for details on this "war_years" variable) from 1945 to 2009, sorted by region (number of years indicated in parentheses):

- Western Europe, Canada & U.S.: UK (31), USA (33)
- Eastern Europe & Central Asia: Turkey (34)
- Middle East & North Africa: Iran (34), Iraq (64), Israel (61), Palestinian Territories (44)

- South & East Asia & Oceana: Afghanistan (32), Cambodia (39), India (64), Indonesia (64), Pakistan (47), Philippines (64), Thailand (35), Vietnam (45)
- Latin America: Colombia (47), Guatemala (31)
- Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola (64), Chad (36), Democratic Republic of Congo (32), Ethiopia (36), Nigeria (33), Sudan (42), Uganda (40)

Results: Nonviolent Campaign History Variables

Below in Table 105, we see that there is a significant difference (at the .05 level) between nations that have experienced two or more major nonviolent campaigns and nations that have had no major nonviolent campaigns. And, nations with progressively more major nonviolent campaigns with more positive outcomes exhibit more confidence in nonviolent efficacy. That is, nations with two or more nonviolent successes enjoy slightly higher confidence in nonviolence than nations with only one nonviolent success. These results suggest that successful nonviolent campaigns do impact national mean attitudes on the efficacy of nonviolence. In short, it seems history matters and people do "learn" from experience.

The variable "years since nv success" involved the coding choice of how to code nations that have not experienced a major nonviolent campaign "success" according to the Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) data set and (the author's assessment of) the GNAD data set. In Table 106 below, those with no successful nonviolent campaigns were coded as 1900 for the "years since nv success" variable. In a second test, these nations were coded as missing data. In the second test, once again the only correlation with the "years since nv success" variable that achieved significance was the correlation with "% nv will work." The correlation was -.2578, significant at the .05 level. Thus, as the years elapsed

Table 105. Nation-Level Data: Nonviolent Attitudes (Gallup World Poll 2010) by Nonviolent History

Nations Sorted by Nonviolent Historical Experiences	Frequency	Nonviolence Works (% affirming nonviolence will work)
All	(n=136)	57.9
Nonviolent history		
2 or more nonviolent success	28	62.8
1 nonviolent success	39	60.8
nonviolent "limited success" only	15	58.7
No major nonviolent campaigns achieving even "limited success"	54	53.1
Difference by nv history (eta2)		.084**(a)

Note: * = Significant at the .05 level; ** = Significant at the .01 level; The significance of the difference between groups without any controls is measured by ANOVA. Eta2 (i.e., Eta squared) was computed using a user written "effectsize" program for Stata (see UCLA (2012)). Eta2 is interpreted as the percent of the dependent variable accounted for by the effect in the sample (UCLA 2012). As a rule of thumb for effect size, an Eta2 of .01 is small, .06 is medium, and .14 is large. Additional notes from table: (a) The only significant differences (at the .05 level) in the Scheffe table involved comparisons between nations with "2 or more nv successes" and those with "no major nv campaigns," but the difference between nations with "1 nv success" and "no major nv campaigns" was significant at the modest .1 level.; Bartlett's test for equal variance showed the sample variances in this column are not significantly different, and this lends support to the significance finding; Source: nonviolent history data comes from Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and the Global Nonviolent Action Database (see Appendix P); public opinion data from Gallup World Poll 2010

since a successful nonviolent campaign increases, the confidence in nonviolent efficacy decreases. Or, to put it another way, the more recent a nonviolent success/ the smaller the number of years since a successful nonviolent campaign, the stronger the confidence in nonviolent efficacy.

Surprisingly, casualty counts were not related to cross-national attitudinal variation on the three Gallup World Poll violent/ nonviolent items. Also surprisingly, the number of "peace years" and number of "war years" (mirror images of one another) were related to only one of the attitudinal variables (the state terrorism item) and at only the moderate .10 level. Nevertheless, the longer the "peace years" enjoyed by a nation (and the fewer the "war years" suffered), the higher the principled nonviolent attitudes against state terrorism. The fact that this association only achieves the .10 level of significance raises some doubts about the peace-specific capital accumulation hypothesis, which can be formulated as: "the longer a country is at peace, the lower should be the risk of (another) war as conflict-specific capital remains unused and peace-specific capital is

Table 106. Correlations of Nonviolent Attitudes and Historical Experiences of War and Peace

Variable	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% nonviolence will work	years since nv success	peace years	war years	years since war
% military attacks on civilians never justified	1.0						
% terrorism never justified	.8315*****	1.0					
% nonviolence will work	.0026	-.1210	1.0				
years since nv success	-.0807	-.0169	-.2917****	1.0			
peace years	.1649*	.1029	.0977	-.0881	1.0		
war years	-.1649*	-.1029	-.0977	.0881	-1.0	1.0	
years since war	.1833**	.2111**	-.1596*	.0817	.6754*****	-.6754*****	1.0
casualties	-.1275	-.0969	-.0932	.0940	-.5668*****	.5668*****	-.3437*****

Notes: Pearson product-moment correlations. Tests of significance: * = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01; **** = p < .001; ***** = p < .0001; All time period data extends between 1945 and 2009, with the exception of the "years since nv success" which tracked data from the years 1900 to 2009; Source: public opinion data from Gallup World Poll 2010

accumulated" (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, p.515). However, it must be remembered that these variables count the total/ cumulative and non-consecutive number of years at peace/ war since 1945 up to 2009.

Hence, the "years since war" variable is a better test of the peace-specific capital accumulation hypothesis. The "years since war" variable (i.e., the time at peace since the last war), a consecutive count, *is* significantly associated with peaceful attitudes at the more robust .05 level, on the terrorism and state terrorism items. Hence, when peace years accumulate in consecutive fashion, this is associated with peaceful, principled nonviolent attitudes which reject terrorism and state terrorism.

Since "years since war" is more robustly related to peace attitudes than "war years" or "peace years," this may provide indirect evidence for the theory that war events tend to re-set attitudes to a new belligerent level, regardless of how common periods of peace are or how long a previous period of peace was in a nation. But an obvious

alternative interpretation would hold that there are other factors mediating here which make some nations both more likely to engage in war and less likely to hold principled nonviolent attitudes against state terrorism.

Note also that the accumulation of "peace capital" is quite specific. Here, it is indicated by principled nonviolent attitudes against terrorism and state terrorism, but it does not carry over to pragmatic nonviolent attitudes. The "years since war" variable is not significantly associated with the confidence in nonviolent efficacy at the .05 level. But the correlation is negative (-.1596) and significant at the moderate .10 level (p= .0634). Thus, on average, the more recent a war (i.e., the fewer the number of years since a war was fought) the higher the confidence in nonviolent efficacy. Although the effect is weak, this suggests that war often creates a reaction and backlash against violent methods and a hope in nonviolent methods as an alternative means of conflict resolution. This may be mediated by the fact that wars are sometimes at least partly resolved through nonviolent methods – namely, negotiations and diplomacy. But, the confidence in nonviolent methods can be short-lived. In other words, through engaging in war, many cultures "learn" that violence is ineffective and morally problematic, but on average, the lessons are not long remembered or sufficiently embedded (e.g., institutionally embedded) to prevent new armed conflicts.

All of this suggests that the accumulation of peace-specific capital of the pragmatic nonviolent variety (i.e., confidence in nonviolent efficacy) is specifically related to the praxis of significant nonviolent campaigns, rather than simply the absence of war. However, when wars have recently ended they can foster reactions against violent methods and also instill hope in alternative nonviolent means of solving conflicts. But the

collective memories of war and their link to the collective rejection of violent methods can be short-lived. Moreover, the results suggestively support the view that attitudes on violence/ nonviolence are linked to collective memories and that these attitudes and memories are bounded by nation-state. Hence, the value of cross-national studies rests in the fact that nations do reproduce distinctive memories and culture can be understood as a form of accumulated praxis (action, reflection and revised strategic action). But this praxis is informed by very specific forms of experiential capital (resources) and collective memories. Successful nonviolent social movements and nonviolent revolutions are likely to reproduce faith in nonviolent efficacy, at least for several years, but such experiences do not seem to reproduce higher rates of principled nonviolent stands against state terrorism or terrorism. Similarly, when nations enjoy long periods of peace they are not, on average, more likely to develop higher degrees of confidence in nonviolent efficacy.

Of course, the "years since war" variable strongly and positively correlates with "peace years," and it strongly and negatively correlates with "war years," indicating that there is a set of nations which frequently engage in war and have done so recently, and another set of nations that enjoy peace and have not fought a war in many years. As can be seen in Table 107 below, two separate dummy variables were created which allow us to test the significance of these patterns: "war prone" nations (coded as those nations with over 40 years of war since 1945) and "historically peaceful" nations (coded as those with 0 years of war since 1945). Surprisingly, none of the t-tests on these dummy variables and the three nonviolent attitudinal indicators (from the Gallup World Poll 2010) achieved significance. This speaks to the complexity of conflict histories and the potential for innumerable mediating dynamics, none of which is captured well by the

dichotomous variables employed in T-tests. Nevertheless, it is notable that the "war prone" nations have less faith in nonviolent efficacy than the "relatively peaceful" nations, while ironically, in the alternative dummy code of "historically peaceful" nations, the *most* peaceful nations have less faith in nonviolent efficacy than the set of nations experiencing war since 1945 (see Table 108). Thus, both war prone nations and nations that have experienced the least conflict demonstrate the least confidence in nonviolent efficacy. In the case of the former, war-prone belligerence has solidified in attitudes that affirm the utility of violence and the myth of redemptive violence. In the case of the latter, it may well be a proxy indication that these peaceful nations have lacked the development of a nonviolent praxis which tends to be forged in the fires of civil conflict. Alternatively, it could be that *some* exposure to armed conflict tends to make populations recoil against violence, while extended exposure to decades of armed conflict tends to make populations believe there is no alternative.

Table 107. T-Tests of National Mean Attitude Scores: War Prone Nations

Gallup World Poll item	**Relatively peaceful nations (*n* =121 or 120 or 125)**		**War prone nations (*n* = 10 or 11)**		**df**	***t***	$\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$
	M	***SD***	***M***	***SD***			
% military attacks on civilians never justified	65.5	14.2	64	16.9	129	.3182	1.51
% terrorism never justified	72.1	13.8	69.7	15.2	128	.5151	2.36
% nonviolence will work	58.4	13.0	53.1	22.8	10.58	.7530	5.26

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; "war prone" = nations with more than 40 years of war since 1945; "relatively peaceful" = all nations not coded as "war prone"; Because the variances in the variable "% nonviolence will work" are significantly different in the two samples (robvar tests were run in Stata), the t-test commands run in Stata on these items specified unequal variances (and Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom are reported). Source: public opinion data from Gallup World Poll 2010

Below in Table 109, we see that nations experiencing one nonviolent success express significantly higher confidence in nonviolent efficacy at the .01 level. Looking at the means across the dummy variables we see that nations experiencing recent nonviolent success (since 1998) score even higher than nations with two or more nonviolent successes (since 1900). But comparing nations with two or more nonviolent successes

with nations lacking two successes, we see that those with two or more successes are significantly more confident in nonviolent efficacy, at the .05 level. Similarly, the two dummy variables indicating recent nonviolent successes, since 1988 and since 1998, are both significantly related to affirmative national mean answers on the nonviolent efficacy item at the .01 level. All of this suggests that history matters in shaping attitudes and there are empirical grounds for asserting that culture is a form of praxis. But nations with more recent nonviolent successes express slightly higher affirmations of nonviolent efficacy. The limited nonviolent success variable is not significantly related to the national mean attitudes on the nonviolent efficacy item. This is not surprising since a campaign with "limited success" is likely to be interpreted as campaign failure by many people.

Table 108. T-Tests of National Mean Attitude Scores: Historically Peaceful Nations

Gallup World Poll item	**Nations experiencing war since 1945 (*n* = 90 or 89 or 94)**		**Historically peaceful (since 1945) (*n* = 41 or 42)**		**df**	***t***	$\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$
	M	***SD***	***M***	***SD***			
% military attacks on civilians never justified	64.8	14.3	66.8	14.7	129	-.75	-2.05
% terrorism never justified	70.7	13.8	74.5	13.8	128	-1.49	-3.88
% nonviolence will work	59.3	14.1	54.8	13.4	134	1.76	4.54*

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; "historically peaceful" = nations with 0 years of war since 1945; Source: public opinion data from Gallup World Poll 2010

Table 109. Nonviolent History and Mean National Attitudes on Nonviolent Efficacy

Variable	% nonviolence will work		$\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$
	Nations with nv success $\bar{x}$	Nations lacking nv success $\bar{x}^2$	
Dummy: nv success since 1900	61.6 (n=67 nations)	54.3 (n=69 nations)	7.3***
Dummy: limited nv success since 1900[a]	58.4 (n= 26 nations)	57.8 (n=110 nations)	.57
Dummy: two or more nv successes since 1900	62.6 (n= 29 nations)	56.7 (n= 107 nations)	6.0**
Dummy: nv success since 1988	62.3 (n = 50 nations)	55.4 (n= 86 nations)	7.0***
Dummy: nv success since 1998	64.8 (n= 26 nations)	56.3 (n= 110 nations)	8.6***

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01; (a) This dummy variable did not exclude nations that have experienced successful nonviolent campaigns in addition to campaigns of limited success; Source: public opinion data from Gallup World Poll 2010

In Table 110, we see that nations with a history of nonviolent campaign successes (as measured by these four dummy variables) do not exhibit significantly higher rates of principled nonviolent attitudes on the state terrorism item of the Gallup World Poll, not even at the moderate .1 level of significance. Identical tests were run on the individual terrorism item of the Gallup World Poll, and very similar results were obtained: nations with a history of nonviolent campaign successes (as measured by these four dummy variables) do not exhibit significantly higher rates of principled nonviolent attitudes on the individual terrorism item, not even at the moderate .1 level of significance. Once again, this supports my contention that peace capital is highly specific – it is bifurcated between principled and pragmatic nonviolence, each of which is related to specific forms of historical praxis.

Table 110. Nonviolent Campaign History and Principled Stand Against Military Attacks

Variable	% military attacks on civilians never justified		$\bar{x}$ - $\bar{x}^2$
	Nations with nv success $\bar{x}$	Nations lacking nv success $\bar{x}^2$	
Dummy: nv success since 1900	66.5 (n=65 nations)	64.3 (n=66 nations)	2.2
Dummy: two or more nv successes since 1900	68.5 (n= 28 nations)	64.5 (n= 103 nations)	4.0
Dummy: nv success since 1988	66.4 (n = 50 nations)	64.8 (n= 81 nations)	1.6
Dummy: nv success since 1998	67.4 (n= 26 nations)	64.9 (n= 105 nations)	2.5

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; Source: public opinion data from Gallup World Poll 2010

We see another indicator of this dynamic below in Table 111. The mere absence of war does not instill beliefs in pragmatic nonviolence. In fact, the nations with no wars between 1945-2009 have *less* faith in pragmatic nonviolence. And, the most war prone nations do not hold less faith in pragmatic nonviolence to any statistically significant degree.

Table 111. Historical Accumulation of War Capital vs. Peace-Specific Capital and Pragmatic Nonviolence

Variable	% affirming peaceful means alone will work		$\bar{x}^2 - \bar{x}$
	Nations experiencing this factor (1=yes) $\bar{x}$	Nations lacking (0=no) $\bar{x}^2$	
Dummy: Historically peaceful	54.79 (n= 42 nations)	59.33 (n= 94 nations)	4.54*
Dummy: War prone	53.09 (n= 11 nations)	58.35 (n= 125 nations)	5.26

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; "historically peaceful" = nations with 0 years of war since 1945; "war prone" = nations with more than 40 years of war since 1945; When robvar tests were run in Stata, the war prone dummy had unequal variances, so the t-test specified unequal variances.; Data source: Marshall (2012), Gallup World Poll (2010)

Likewise, below in Table 112, on the terrorism and state terrorism items, we see that there are no statistically significant attitudinal differences between nations with historical experiences coded as the extreme of peace (no war) and the most war prone nations.This table suggests that it is difficult to generalize about the attitudinal effects of historical experiences of extended periods of war or peace.

Table 112. Historical Accumulation of War Capital vs. Peace-Specific Capital and Principled Nonviolence Against State Terrorism, Individual Terrorism

Variable	% military attacks on civilians never justified		$\bar{x}^2 - \bar{x}$
	Nations (1=yes) $\bar{x}$	Nations lacking (0=no) $\bar{x}^2$	
Dummy: Historically peaceful	66.8 (n= 41 nations)	64.76 (n= 90 nations)	-2.05
Dummy: War prone	64 (n= 10 nations)	65.5 (n= 121 nations)	1.5

Variable	% individual attacks on civilians never justified		$\bar{x}^2 - \bar{x}$
	Nations (1=yes) $\bar{x}$	Nations lacking (0=no) $\bar{x}^2$	
Dummy: Historically peaceful	74.54 (n= 41 nations)	70.65 (n= 89 nations)	-3.88
Dummy: War prone	69.7 (n= 10 nations)	72.06 (n= 120 nations)	2.36

Notes: Two-tailed t-tests of significance: * = p < .1; ** = p < .05; "historically peaceful" = nations with 0 years of war since 1945;"war prone" = nations with more than 40 years of war since 1945; Data source: Marshall (2012), Gallup World Poll (2010)

Results: Multiple Regression on the Pragmatic Nonviolence Item

The regression models (see Appendix S) on the nonviolent efficacy item (from the Gallup World Poll 2010) allow us to analyze predictors of pragmatic nonviolent attitudes at the nation level. The strongest predictors of civil war (from the civil war literature) were entered into Model 1: GDP per capita, population, and years since war. In addition, the nonviolent history variable, years since last nonviolent success, was expected to predict strong pragmatic nonviolent attitudes. Building on the civil war literature, additional historical and structural variables were added on a theoretical basis.

Across the seven models, several consistent patterns emerge. The most significant ***negative*** associations are: GDP per capita, years since nonviolent success, and population density.

GDP per capita: A significant negative relationship - as GDP per capita increases, confidence in pragmatic nonviolence decreases. This raises some doubts about the optimistic theories of modernization by Stephen Pinker (2011) and of Norbert Elias's "civilizing process" bound up with modernity. This finding also pointsto the civil war literature where civil wars (the dominant form of war in the contemporary era) are far more likely among poorer nations, and a high GDP can be a proxy indicator for strong states.Thus, it seems that poverty often leads to civil wars which often leads to suffering/ painful learning and the rejection of violent attitudes. From another angle, this data reveals the opposite of what might be commonly assumed– the more advanced, modern, wealthier nations are less likely to express confidence in nonviolent methods. The finding lends credence to Wink's (1992, 1998) theorizing on the pervasiveness of the myth of

redemptive violence, a metanarrative which is bound up with the myth of the efficacy of violence.

Years since last successful nonviolent revolution/ major movement: A significant negative relationship was found – the fewer the number of years since a nonviolent success, the stronger the confidence in pragmatic nonviolence. This suggests that history matters: dramatic nonviolent movement successes do influence public attitudes about the efficacy of nonviolence, but on average, over time the belief in nonviolence diminishes. Thus, the passage of time presents serious challenges for the reproduction of nonviolent attitudes and for embedding nonviolent successes in collective memory. To say it another way, the accumulation of this peace-specific capital, belief in pragmatic nonviolence, tends to dissipate over the decades. The data suggests that successful nonviolent revolution or movement tends to instill faith in nonviolent methods, but other forms of peace as in the mere absence of war, do not instill as robust faith in "peaceful means alone." Thus, the "peace years" variable achieves significance only in Model 6, and then only marginal significance (at the .10 level).

Population density: Population density has rarely been found to predict civil war outbreaks (but recall that in the literature, "war" is usually operationalized as over 1,000 battle deaths in a year) in large cross-national data sets, but it emerges here as a significant negative predictor of nonviolent confidence. That is, as population density decreases, confidence in nonviolence increases. Or, to state the same relationship in different words, as population density increases, confidence in nonviolence declines.

While not depicted above, a few other significant negative relationships emerged: Religion: The "historically predominant religious culture" variable,

typereligion, was transformed into dummy variables. Adding to Model 9 the dummy variable for Buddhist/ Eastern religious cultures yielded .4373 (Adj-R^2) variance explained, and the Buddhist/ Eastern variable was highly significant at the .001 level, with the negative Coefficient, -15.049, (S.E. 4.284; p = .001). The maximum VIF was 5.43, the VIF of the "years since war" variable, and the mean VIF was 2.56.

Adding the rest of the religious culture dummy variables (but omitting Catholic as the reference variable) to Model 9 yielded .4677 (Adj-R^2) variance explained (the most of any model), and the following Coefficients were obtained: for Protestant .513(S.E.=2.965; p=.863), Orthodox Christian 4.975 (S.E.= 3.775; p =.19), Buddhist/ Eastern -11.652(S.E.= 4.44; p= .010), Muslim 7.435 (S.E.= 3.227; p=.023), Hindu 10.229 (S.E. = 10.546; p= .334), Jewish -10.858 (S.E. = 11.874; p= .363), Indigenous 15.69 (S.E. = 6.126; p= .012). The maximum VIF was 5.70 and the mean VIF was 2.55. Thus, in this model, the only religious culture which is significant at the .01 level are Buddhist/ Eastern, but the relationship to pragmatic nonviolence is *negative*. Two of the religious cultures are *positively* related to pragmatic nonviolence and significant at the slightly less robust .05 level: Muslim cultures and Indigenous religious cultures. On average and controlling for other factors in the model, Muslim cultures are 7.4% points higher and Indigenous religious cultures are about 15.7% points higher in national mean scores on the pragmatic nonviolence item, when compared to Catholic nations (the omitted reference category). If Catholic is substituted for Protestant (and Protestant becomes the omitted reference variable), the variance explained remains the same (Adj-R^2 = .4677), but the Catholic dummy variable is not significant at even the marginal .10 level, with a negative coefficient of -.513 (S.E.= 2.965; p= .863). With Protestant cultures as the

reference category, the significance level of the Muslim variable declines to the marginal .10 level, and the Buddhist/ Eastern variable and Indigenous religious variable both decline to the .05 level. In any case, we see that the religious culture dimension captures some significant variance not fully captured by the other factors in the model.

As can be seen in Figure 10 below, the variation within the religious cultural categories is quite pronounced. Among Hindu nations, India expressed 40% confidence in pragmatic nonviolence, while Nepal (site of a 2006 nonviolent campaign achieving "limited success" (Stephan and Chenoweth (2008))is approaching 80%. Among Buddhist/ Eastern nations, Mongolia is approaching 80%, while Vietnam (the world's most war prone nation historically, according to Sullivan (1991)) ranks the lowest in the world at under 10%. Remarkably, the four indigenous religious cultures all score above 60%.

Region: When the dummy variables for region were added to Model 9 (all region dummies were added, excluding the dummy for Western Europe, Canada and the USA as the reference variable), only .3898 variance (Adj-R^2) was explained, an increase of only .008 beyond Model 9 (less than 1% additional variance explained). And, only one region dummy, Latin America, obtained significance at the .05 level, with the Coefficient -9.056 (S.E.=4.478; p = .046). Moreover, beyond this finding, no regions obtained significance at even the marginal .10 level. That is, controlling for all other factors, only Latin America has a regional effect which pushes down confidence in nonviolent methods. This makes Costa Rica's relatively high confidence in nonviolence all the more impressive.

Figure 10. National Means of Pragmatic Nonviolence by Historically Predominant Religious Culture



Source: Gallup World Poll 2010; typereligion = historically predominant religion in each nation; 1=Protestant; 2=Catholic; 3=Orthodox Christian; 4=Buddhist/ Eastern; 5=Muslim; 6=Hindu; 7=Jewish; 8=Other (indigenous beliefs, animism)

However, while Costa Rica ranks high in pragmatic nonviolence in the Gallup World Poll (which is based on representative cross-national samples), my own survey of

University students did not find a difference between Costa Rican and U.S. students in a replication of this Gallup World Poll item. However, the Costa Rican survey slightly oversampled from University students and engineering and physics majors (who typically hold more hawkish pro-violent attitudes), while the UO survey oversampled from females and respondents who identify with the Democratic Party (two populations who typically hold more dovish attitudes). And, as we have seen above, questions with Likert scales probing violent/ nonviolent attitudes did reveal nonviolent attitudes were significantly more robust among Costa Rican students as compared with U.S. students. Given that the UO survey oversampled from Democrats and females it is perhaps little wonder that our sample of U.S. university students expressed more faith in pragmatic nonviolence than the general U.S. population. Nevertheless, it remains something of a puzzle as to why Costa Rican university students have less faith in pragmatic nonviolence than the general population. Public opinion studies in the U.S. (Loewen 2007, pp.346 ff.) and Palestine (Krueger and Malečková 2003) have found that higher levels of education can be related to more belligerent, pro-violent attitudes. Without longitudinal data it is difficult to disentangle possible generational and lifespan effects.

A few additional negative relationships emerged which attained *marginal* significance (at the .10 level) in some of the models: population, years since war, casualties, and "second" (an indicator of ethnic polarization: the share of the population in the second largest ethnic group). **Population size:** As population increases, confidence in nonviolence decreases. This fits with the civil war literature, where larger nations have been found to be more likely to suffer civil war. Of course, it is unclear if doubting the efficacy of nonviolence is an indicator of belligerent attitudes. That is, if you have no

confidence in nonviolent methods, you may be more likely to affirm that violence is necessary and effective. Alternatively, one somewhat plausible interpretation here would be that saying peaceful means alone "will not work," is a proxy indicator of political alienation and a sense that the political system is so broken that nothing works.

Ethnic polarization: As the indicator of ethnic polarization, "second" (i.e., the share of the population in the second largest ethnic group), increases, confidence in nonviolence decreases. Thus, as polarization increases, belligerent attitudes may increase in the form of frustration with peaceful means alone (and believing that violence is necessary for oppressed groups to improve their situation).

Years since war: The less the number of years since war, the stronger the confidence in nonviolence. How can this be? Again, I propose a "backlash" theory: the more recent a war, the more people are likely to learn that violence is tragic, to develop and hold onto anti-violent attitudes, and to place hope in nonviolent methods as an alternative to violent means. When the last war was long ago (controlling for casualties and other variables), the public tends to forget how tragic and horrific violence is, existential capital (i.e., experiential capital) dissipates, and attitudes become captive again to the myth of redemptive violence (Wink 1992). All of this is conjectural and tentative, since it is difficult to generalize to all types and magnitudes of war. Nevertheless, this line of interpretation is supported by the fact that the "war prone" dummy variable is also positively related to faith in pragmatic nonviolence, though it never achieves any robust level of significance. In actuality, the 11 "war prone" nations (those with over 40 years of war between 1945 and 2009) express less faith in peaceful means alone with a mean score of 53.1%, as opposed to the 125 other nations' mean score of 58.4%. But a t-test

showed this difference between the group means was not significant, probably because 11 is such a small sample size. Again, this finding is notable – the most war prone nations do not express significantly lower faith in nonviolent methods.

Casualties: As the number of casualties from wars increases (controlling for years since war and other variables), confidence in nonviolence decreases. This variable, of course, illuminates the magnitude of war in a way in which the "years since war" variable does not. This finding fits with broad psychological theorizing that suffering is more deeply embedded in memory (discussed below) and that people can perversely cling to what causes them pain. Similarly, Koenigsberg (2009), a psychological and anthropological theorist of war, has proposed that the human sacrifices of soldiers in wartime makes nations come alive, legitimating nationalist ideology as well as faith in violent ideology and methods. He writes, "Injuries, wounds and deaths suffered in battle function to persuade society members of the truth of their nation's ideology...Warfare, in short, is that cultural activity that seeks to produce dead and wounded soldiers in order to establish the truth of a society's ideology" (p.74). Soldiers are the "sacrificial class" (Marvin and Ingle 1999) who legitimate the ideology of war through giving their lives for the nation. What the variables "years since war," "war years," and "casualties" all leave out is the issue of victory in war – a judgment not always as clear-cut as it was at the end of WWII, perhaps especially with civil wars. Certainly losing an imperial war abroad might cultivate different attitudes than losing a war of self-defense, but again, most wars in recent decades have been civil wars. The pacifist A.J. Muste argued, "The problem after a war is with the victor. He thinks he has just proved that war and violence pay. Who will now teach him a lesson?" (Chomsky 1999, p.8) Vietnam was a potential

"lesson" for the U.S., but as we have seen above, collective memory processes have muted the lesson of that war for subsequent generations. And, we know that rather than "learning" an antiwar lesson, right wing factions in Germany after WWI,and in the U.S. after Vietnam were defiant in loss. Japan's conservatives have now pushed beyond postwar pacifism in educational guidelines and history textbooks, while structurally according Japan's generals greater budgetary powers and prestige (Coleman 2006, Hook 1988, Ienaga 1994). These are examples of how "ideology has no history" (Althusser 1971, p.160).

As for ***positive*** relationships, only three variables achieve marginal significance (at the .10 level), and only in a few of the models: % urban, civil liberties, and peace years. **Urbanization:** The % urban variable might be theorized as a proxy for cosmopolitan attitudes including nonviolent attitudes. **Civil liberties:** The civil liberties variable makes theoretical sense here as well, since nations with strong civil liberties are likely to instill confidence that "peaceful means alone" can work for oppressed groups struggling to improve their plight. **Peace years:** Note that the dummy variable "historically peaceful" (those nations with no wars since 1945) is also positively related to pragmatic nonviolent attitudes, but across the models, it never achieves more than the marginal .10 level of significance. The "peace years" variable only achieves the marginal .10 level of significance in Model 6. That is, the peace years and historically peaceful variables have only weak associations with pragmatic nonviolent attitudes. Again, it seems that the accumulation of peace capital is highly specific, and pragmatic nonviolent attitudes are not robustly related to the mere absence of war. Indeed, one proof of this is found through t-tests conducted on the "historically peaceful" dummy variable. As we

have seen above, ironically, the 42 historically peaceful nations (those experiencing no wars between 1945-2009) have a lower mean confidence in pragmatic nonviolence, 54.8%, as compared with the other 94 nations' mean score of 59.3%. A t-test showed that this 4.5% difference is marginally significant at the .10 level. Hence, we have several reasons to conclude that pragmatic nonviolent attitudes are most robustly created through the historical praxis (a cycle of action and reflection) of social movements. **Democracy:** Across all of the models, democracy, controlling for the other variables, is positively related to confidence in nonviolent efficacy, but not robust at even the marginally significant .10 level. The lack of significance casts doubt on the long held and much debated positive assessments of democracy as reducing belligerent attitudes and war proneness among nations.

In order to monitor the possibility of collinearity in the models due to co-related predictors, I report mean and maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for each model. The maximum VIF score across every model is far below 10, suggesting that collinearity is never severe (Hamilton 2003, p.167; Chatterjee et al. 2000, p.240). However, the mean VIF falls between 2 and 3 in 7 of the 9 models, suggesting the presence of mild collinearity.

Above, we see that the higher the casualties since 1945, the lower the faith in nonviolent efficacy. In the anthropological literature, population density has long been thought to be related to conflict. Hence, the Great Basin Shoshone were theorized to be perhaps the most peaceful North American tribe in the pre-contact era because of their very low population density.

In an attempt to explain additional variance in the dependent variable (pragmatic nonviolent attitudes) serial additions were made to Model 1, including the following variables added one at a time:

- **peace indexes** (transGPI2009, WPI2009, WPI decade average, MIL2009, PPI2012 (2012 was the first year the Positive Peace Index was compiled))
- **democracy indicators** (DemIndex2010score, PolCulture2010)
- **ethnic dominance indicators (**plural (ethnic dominance), second (share of pop in 2nd largest ethnic group))
- **education indicators** (Mean years of schooling, Literacy_rate_adult, primary_enrol_ratio_net, secondary_enrol_ratio_net, enroll_tertiary_percentgross, pop_with_secondary_ed, educ_percent_govt_spent, educ_spent_percent_GDP, pupil_teacher_ratio)
- **military sector indicators** (percent_labor_soldiers, percapita_mil_spending, total_soldiers, lntotal_soldiers, Military_expenditure_percent_gov, Military_expenditure_percentGDP, Military_expenditure_currentLCU, lnmilitary_expendLCU)
- **youth bulge indicator** (Proxy youth bulge)
- **cosmopolitanism and globalization indicators** (Globalization Index 2005, Cosmopolitan Index)
- **geography and climate indicators** (Mountainous terrain, natural log of mountainous terrain (lnmount2), Average Temperature, Average High Temperature)
- **inequality indicators** (LossHDI2010, Gini2000_2010)

- **gender indicators** (Gender Inequality Index 2011, percent_parliaments_female, and Masculinity Index).

Of the above variables, the only ones which were significant at the .05 level were the Cosmopolitanism Index (Coef.= 2.246; p= .035) which explained about 1.5% additional variance, and Average Temperature (Coef. = -.222; p= .021) and Average High Temperature (Coef.= -.225; p= .02), each of which explained about 2.5% additional variance beyond the 26.33% explained by Model 1. The only variable which was significant at the .01 level was Military_expenditure_currentLCU(Coef. = -3.78; p = .004), but it only explained about 1.7% additional variance beyond the 26.33% explained by Model 1.

Results: Multiple Regression on the State Terrorism Item

Below in Table 113, we move on to the second Gallup World Poll item that is of special interest in the present study, the state terrorism item (i.e., military attacks on civilians). The key findings across the various regression models are highlighted below:

GDP per capita (natural log): The significant positive association (in most of the models) between GDP per capita and the rejection of state terrorism fits with the optimistic assessments of modernization. As nations become more advanced they are more likely to object to state terrorism. But the significance disappears in Models 4 and 5, and almost in Model 2. And, more problematic for the modernization thesis is the finding on democracy below.

Table 113. OLS Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of National Means for State Terrorism (% "Never Justified") Item (Gallup World Poll 2010) on Independent Variables

Independent variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Log GDP per capita	4.119**	3.213†	3.358*	3.091	2.968	6.308*
	(1.479)	(1.681)	(1.691)	(2.129)	(2.966)	(2.470)
Population total	-1.43	-1.01	-6.81	-4.27	-4.89	9.76
	(1.07)	(1.07)	(1.06)	(1.04)	(9.16)	(1.01)
Years since war	.082	.096	.144†	.123	.182†	.176*
	(.057)	(.072)	(.078)	(.079)	(.096)	(.086)
Per capita military spending	-.007†	-.004	-.004	-.007	-.009†	-.006
	(.004)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
DemIndex2010score	-1.390†	-2.25**	-2.772**	-1.735	-5.041*	-2.967*
	(.801)	(.857)	(.882)	(1.107)	(1.915)	(1.228)
Population density	-.005***	-.007***	-.007***	-.033***	-.033*	-.034***
	(.001)	(.002)	(.002)	(.009)	(.014)	(.009)
second (share of pop in 2nd largest ethnic group)	-24.875*	-17.485	-18.824	-22.694†	-12.578	-27.947
	(11.257)	(11.998)	(12.323)	(12.600)	(15.311)	(17.294)
transgpi2009		5.168	6.116	3.488	-.329	-5.266
		(4.487)	(4.542)	(4.670)	(5.769)	(5.509)
mountainous			.188**	.188**	.092	.161*
			(.068)	(.068)	(.080)	(.078)
LossHDI2009				-.036	-.426	.034
				(.227)	(.399)	(.273)
Masculinity Index					-.095	
					(.091)	
Educ % govt spending						.538
						(.367)
Military % govt spending						-.654†
						(.384)
N	124	112	104	93	46	72
Adj R^2	.1758	.21	.2648	.2954	.3960	.4202
High VIF (Mean VIF)	2.83	3.11	3.17	4.90	8.46	5.97
	(1.66)	(1.66)	(1.66)	(2.41)	(3.46)	(2.71)

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; † = p≤ .10; * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .01; *** = p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests); The dependent variable is the national means for the state terrorism/ military attacks on civilians item (Gallup World Poll 2010): % never justified

Years since war: The significant positive association in Model 6 at the .05 level (and the marginal significance in Models 3 and 5) between "years since war" and the rejection of state terrorism, suggests that the "moral disengagement" of war-time lingers for the initial years after a conflict, but this dissipates and with the passage of increasing numbers of years, the public becomes more likely to object to state terrorism.

Mountainous terrain: The significant positive association (in most of the models) between mountainous terrain and the rejection of state terrorism could reflect a "backlash effect" against the experience of state terrorism, since several studies (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003, Hegre and Sambanis 2006) show that nations with a greater

percentage of mountainous terrain are more likely to experience civil war (and it is theorized that rebels are likely to hide in the mountains). However, if this is the mechanism for producing attitudes against state terrorism, it is somewhat puzzling that the casualties, war prone, and war years variables do not also produce a significant effect when entered into model 3, one at a time, in place of the mountainous variable. And when these variables (casualties, war prone, and war years) are added to model 3 one at a time, and all together as control variables, they do not reduce the significance of the mountainous variable, nor do they achieve significance themselves, nor do they explain additional variance except when all 3 are entered together, in which case they explain a very insignificant .0003 additional variance. The imperfections in the data may be playing a role here. Namely, that there is some imprecision in the casualties and war years variables since they conflate together different types of wars (foreign wars fought on foreign soil and civil wars). Nevertheless, the vast majority of wars sine World War II have been civil wars.

Democracy: The significant negative association between the Democracy Index 2010 and the rejection of state terrorism demonstrates that as democracy increases, the rejection of state terrorism declines. This flies in the face of the long-standing optimistic assessments of modernization and democracy, and offers support for the "callous cruelty" theory of modern bureaucracies including democratic ones (Collins 1974). Similarly, we can assert that these results suggest that modern democratic nations have been adept at cultivating "moral disengagement" (Bandura 1990, 1996). To approve of the targeting and killing of civilians certainly indicates callousness and moral disengagement, attitudes

which are buttressed by the rationalizations of political and military elites in modern democratic bureaucracies.

Population density: The significant negative association between population density and the rejection of state terrorism suggests that as population density increases, the rejection of state terrorism declines. Thus, controlling for other factors in the models, higher population densities are linked to lower national means on the principled rejections of state terrorism.

Militarization: Per capita military spending and % of government spending devoted to the military are negatively related to the rejection of state terrorism. That is, as these indicators of militarization and the political power of the military sector increase, the rejection of state terrorism declines, even when controlling for the level of democracy, but at most (only in some of the models), the associations only achieve a marginal .10 level of significance. Consistent with the "elite cues" theoretical model, a stronger military sector is likely to shape public discourse and attitudes towards military actions and violence. Model 6 was adjusted by dropping the two military variables (per capita military spending and % of government spending devoted to the military) and adding the Global Militarization Index (GMI) compiled by BICC (2008/ 2009). This raised the number of observations (N=81 nations) but the GMI was not significant at even the moderate .1 level, and the Adjusted R-squared fell to .3053 and so this variable was not explored further. When "percent labor force who are soldiers" was added to the full Model 6, one percent more variance is explained (Adjusted R-squared = .4301), but this variable did not obtain significance at even the moderate .1 level. When Model 6 was adjusted by again dropping the two military variables and adding "percent labor force

who are soldiers," this raised the number of observations (N=86 nations), but the amount of variance explained fell (Adjusted R-squared = .2990) and this variable did not obtain significance at even the moderate .1 level. While Payne (1989) found that the proportion of a nation's population who are soldiers was the best indicator of its ideological adherence to militarism, the results here do not offer corroboration. However, admittedly, the state terrorism question is only one indicator of militaristic ideology.

Ethnic polarization: The negative association (significant in some of the models) between ethnic polarization (the "second" variable - the share of population in the 2nd largest ethnic group)and the rejection of state terrorism suggests that as ethnic polarization increases, the rejection of state terrorism declines. Thus, increasing ethnic polarization seems to foster belligerent attitudes and callousness regarding military attacks on civilians. However, this relationship only achieves significance in some of the models.

Insignificant variables: In an attempt to explain more variance in the dependent variable (principled nonviolent attitudes against military attacks on civilians) serial additions were made to Model 1, including the following variables added one at a time:

- **peace indexes** (WPI2009, WPI decade average, MIL2009, transPPI2012 (2012 was the first year the Positive Peace Index was compiled))
- **democracy indicators** (CivLib2010)
- **indicators of state functioning** (statereach, PolCulture2010)
- **ethnic dominance indicators** (plural (ethnic dominance))
- **education indicators** (Mean years of schooling, Literacy_rate_adult, primary_enrol_ratio_net, secondary_enrol_ratio_net, enroll_tertiary_percentgross,

pop_with_secondary_ed, educ_percent_govt_spent, educ_spent_percent_GDP, pupil_teacher_ratio)

- **military sector indicators** (percent_labor_soldiers, total_soldiers, lntotal_soldiers, Military_expenditure_percent_gov, Military_expenditure_percentGDP, Military_expenditure_currentLCU, lnmilitary_expendLCU)
- **youth bulge indicator** (Proxy youth bulge)
- **cosmopolitanism and globalization indicators** (% urban, Globalization Index 2005, Cosmopolitan Index)
- **geography and climate indicators** (natural log of mountainous terrain (lnmount2), Average Temperature, Average High Temperature)
- **history indicators** (casualties, Ryrs_since_lastnvsuccess, war_years, peace_years, war_prone, historically_peaceful)
- **inequality indicators**(LossHDI2010, Gini2000_2010)
- **gender indicators** (Gender Inequality Index 2011,percent_parliaments_female, Masculinity Index)

Of these variables, none attained significance at the .05 level. The only variables which attained significance at the marginally significant ($p \leq .10$) level were: educ_percent_govt_spent (Coef = .540; p=.057; Adj-R^2 (of Model 1 + variable) = .1936)); Military_expenditure_percent_gov (Coef = -.562; p = .057; Adj-R^2 (of Model 1 + variable) = .3027)); Globalization Index 2005 (N = 75; Coef = -.318; p = .089; Adj-R^2 (of Model 1 + variable) = .3132), this explains more variance, but note the smaller sample size; and, the natural log of mountainous terrain, lnmount2 (Coef = 1.790; p =

.057; Adj-R^2 (of Model 1 + variable) = .1999). The first two of the above variables were added to form Model 6 above (when the Globalization Index was also added, a VIF score of 10.05 was found for the Globalization Index, suggesting severe collinearity problems). These two indicators on percent of government expenditure are particularly interesting because they would seem to point to two mechanisms. First, sectors with a larger percentage of government spending obviously have more resources and as a result, more power, thereby producing feedback loops and policy streams. Second and relatedly, these indicators would seem to reflect national priorities and elite policy cues, especially in democratic nations where budget decision-making processes are at least somewhat transparent.

Meanwhile, the PPI2012 (Positive Peace Index) did not attain even marginal significance, yet it explained notably more variance (Adj-R^2 (of Model 1 + variable) = .2558). These patterns were also observed in the Cosmopolitanism Index (Adj-R^2 (of Model 1 + variable) = .2866). However,VIF tests showed that the PPI had a VIF score of 14.35, and the Cosmopolitanism Index had a VIF score of 11.11, suggesting severe collinearity problems

Model 6 (42.02%) and Model 5 explain the most variance (39.6%) in the dependent variable (peaceful attitudes on the state terrorism Gallup World Poll item), but the low sample sizes are problematic (N=72 and N=46, respectively), as are the relatively large “high VIF” scores, especially in Model 5, suggesting the presence of collinearity.

When Model 7 from the nonviolent efficacy regression is utilized for a regression on the state terrorism item, only .1460 (Adj-R^2) of the variance is explained, and only two variables are significant at the .05 level: the “second” variable on ethnic polarization

(Coefficient of -25.9), and population density (Coefficient of -.005). Thus, as expected, we see that the nonviolent attitudes probed by these different items are quite distinct.

Regressions on National Means By Gender

Below in Table 114, we see that the coefficients for females are larger (whether positive or negative) than for males on most of the religious variables, except for Muslim and Jewish. Religious fractionalization also had a slightly bigger effect on females than on males. This is not surprising since it is virtually a universal law that females are more religious than males, with a large amount of empirical data supporting that conclusion.

Table 114. OLS Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of National Means, By Gender, for Peaceful Means Alone (% "Will Work") on Independent Variables

Independent variables	Model 1 (Females)	Model1 (Males)
Log GDP per capita	-6.930*** (1.314)	-4.962*** (1.402)
Population total	-2.67* (1.06)	-2.57* (1.22)
Females with secondary ed	.032 (.059)	
Males with secondary ed		-.051 (.067)
Protestant culture	1.482 (2.837)	.619 (3.268)
Orthodox Chr. culture	8.156† (4.192)	7.041 (4.817)
Buddhist/ Eastern	-15.357*** (4.135)	-12.554** (4.746)
Muslim	7.30* (3.161)	8.242* (3.637)
Hindu	10.399 (9.995)	8.973 (11.555)
Jewish	-7.203 (10.565)	-11.984 (12.113)
Indigenous	13.068† (7.808)	12.626 (9.032)
Years since last nonviolent success	-.054* (.022)	-.059* (.026)
Population density	-.002 (.001)	-.001 (.001)
Religious fractionalization	-5.429 (4.887)	-4.909 (5.547)
second (share of pop in 2nd largest ethnic group)	-17.971 (9.335)	-18.189† (10.716)
Civil Liberties 2010	1.713** (.643)	1.884* (.725)
N	120	121
Adj R^2	.5214	.3644
High VIF (Mean VIF)	3.65 (1.90)	3.14 (1.81)

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; † = p≤ .10; * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .01; *** = p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests); The dependent variable is the national means, by gender, for the peaceful means alone item (Gallup World Poll 2010): % will work

When the following variables were added into a regression model of national means of female attitudes on pragmatic nonviolence, controlling for log GDP per capita and population size (World Bank data), they failed to achieve significance at even the marginal .1 level:

- **Indicators of female empowerment:** GenderInequalIndex_UN2011, percent_parliaments_female, Labor_force_percent_female, Labor_participation_fem_over15, Ratio_female_to_male_labor_parti, percent_females_in_total_nonagri, adol_fertility, fertility_rate, Birth_rate_perthousand
- **Indicators of female education**: Literacy_rate_youth_females15_24, Literacy_rate_adult_female, Ratio_youngliterate_fem_to_males, Primary_completion_rate_female, Progression_to_secondary_female_, Ratio_female_to_male_primary_enr, Ratio_female_to_male_secondary_e, Ratio_fem_to_male_tertiary_enrol, Ratio_girls_to_boys_primary_n_se, enroll_secondary_female_percentg, Secondary_ed_percent_female, Totalenroll_primary_female_perce

The following variable was significant at the .05 level, but the sample size fell to 65: enroll_secondary_female_percentn (% net); The following variable was significant at the .01 level, but the sample size fell to 87:enroll_tertiaryfemale_percentgro (% gross).

THE GENDER GAP IN NONVIOLENT ATTITUDES

Numerous researchers have highlighted a relatively persistent “gender gap” in foreign policy attitudes, especially those involving militarism, with women more likely to

oppose military spending and war (Burris 2008, Sapiro 2003; Jelen, Thomas, and Wilcox 1994; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). A study in Norway found that women were less likely to express confidence in the military, less "willing to fight" and less willing to risk their lives for their nation (Listhaug 1986, p.75). However, a great deal of this research has focused on the U.S. or Western Europe, and it "cannot be taken for granted that these results can be generalized to other countries" (Togeby 1994, p.375). Similarly, Sapiro (2003) notes, "there is little truly comparative research on gender differences and similarity in public opinion, and even less that attempts to explain cross-national variation in the amount of gender difference" (p.609). Because there are enormously wide differences between cultures in gender roles, gender equality, and feminist consciousness, the present cross-national analysis is well-situated to observe and theorize global variations in the gendered production of violent/ nonviolent attitudes and values. The data sources employed in this study (including the GPI, WPI, and Gallup World Poll), draw from over 100 nations covering the spectrum of traditional/ egalitarian gender roles, levels of modernization, political regimes, predominant religious traditions/ degree of secularism, and types of historical experiences with violence/ nonviolence.

Research on the Arab-Israeli conflict has found no gender gap in attitudes towards militarized conflict, leading researchers to theorize that the gender gap disappears when the salience of a conflict is extremely high in a culture (Tessler and Warriner 1997; Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant 1999).

York and Ergas' (2011) cross-national study found that where women's status is higher a variety of human needs-centered social policies are more prevalent: military expenditures are lower, foreign direct investment is lower (i.e., less dependence on the

global economy), and government health care expenditures are higher. The mechanism here may be linked to divergent attitudes and values between the sexes. Attitudinal research suggests that women often express more concern for the environment than men do (Bord and O'Connor 1997, Davidson and Freudenburg 1996). York and Ergas (2011) theorize that some cross-national policy differences may be linked to women's relative power within nations and gender valuation differences, which themselves are "...a product of differentiated historical, material and social conditions, in particular, women's roles as primary caregivers and nurturers of households,...[thus] women in positions of power tend to value different things than do men" (p.159).

Jane Addams, one of the most important peace activists of the World War I era and an adherent of Tolstoyan nonviolence, argued

> The belief that a woman is against war simply and only because she is a woman and not a man, of course, does not hold. In every country there are many, many women who believe that the war is inevitable and righteous, and that the highest possible service is being performed by their sons who go into the army...The majority of women and men doubtless believe that. But the women do have a sort of pang about it. (Elshtain 2002, p.230)

Hence, Addams sought to reduce the gender essentialism on the issue, but also affirmed an aspect of it – positing that women feel more regret over war. Moreover, Addams viewed feminism as an attitude, held by both men and women, that was in "eternal opposition" with the attitude of militarism (p.237). Militarists, she wrote, believe government "rests upon a basis of physical force," while feminists "assert the ultimate supremacy of moral agencies" (p.237).

The *Range*column in Table 115 below reveals stark worldwide variations in the national means for each demographic category of gender and age. These patterns explode

any reified notions that females or older people are “naturally” peaceful in their attitudes, or that males or youth are “naturally” belligerent.

Table 115. Gallup World Poll (2008-2009) Global Means by Gender and Age Cohort

% affirming military attacks on civilians never justified	Mean	Std. Dev.	Range	N
All nations sampled	65.4	14.4	20-96	131
Males	64.5	14.3	22-97	
Females	**66.1**	14.8	18-95	
15-24	63.6	14.4	24-97	
25-34	65.2	14.9	17-96	
35-49	65.7	14.9	20-95	
50+	**66.7**	15.5	17-97	

% affirming peaceful means alone will work	Mean	Std. Dev.	Range	N
All nations sampled	57.9	14.0	7-85	136
Males	57.2	14.2	7-85	
Females	**58.5**	14.3	7-88	
15-24	56.7	14.7	9-86	
25-34	56.4	14.7	9-84	
35-49	58.1	14.3	6-88	
50+	**59.5**	15.3	4-94	

The age cohort means show that, for the most part, older cohorts are progressively more peaceful, but not dramatically so. The largest differences between cohorts are as follows: the 50+ cohort is 3.1% more peaceful than the 15-24 age cohort on the military constraints item, and the 50+ cohort is 2.8% more peaceful than the 15-24 age cohort on the pragmatic nonviolence item. This weakly corroborates previous research finding that in the U.S. context, older cohorts tend to be more dovish (Burris 2008,Page and Bouton 2006), but it must be remembered that the global means obscure significant cross-national variations.

A likely explanation for the muted differences in the cohort data may rest in pointing out that these cohort age groupings are very arbitrary when superimposed on cross-national data. The salience of historical events and shaping forces vary in their timing from nation to nation. In other words, to the extent that attitudinally-linked

generational units exist, they are formed through highly particular contexts (and their particular historical experiences), and this is missed by forcing all nations into the same age cohorts.

The Table above shows that the global female mean is 1.6% higher on the "never justified" national mean response on the "military attacks on civilians" item and 1.3% higher on the "will work" national mean response for the nonviolent efficacy/ pragmatic nonviolence item – sex differences which failed to attain statistical significance in t-tests, even at the .1 level. However, worldwide, males were more likely to say peaceful means alone "will not work," as 34.9% for males versus 31.0% for females (a difference of 3.9%) answered "will not work," and this sex difference was statistically significant at the .05 level (t=2.6). Less robustly, worldwide, males were more likely to say "military attacks on civilians" are "sometimes justified" (the more violent answer in the dichotomous framing of the question), but the sex difference was significant only at the .1 level, with 20.1% of males versus 17.8% of females affirming "sometimes justified" on this item (a 2.3% difference between the sexes).

Additional tests showed that females were significantly more likely to give "don't know" responses to the two questions on civilians attacks (see methodological note in Appendix L on Gallup's acceptance of "don't know" responses). T-tests showed that on the "military attacks on civilians" item, for the "don't know" response there was a significant difference between males and females at the .01 level (t= -2.9), as worldwide (N=128) females were slightly more likely to answer "don't know," with 6.8% of females versus 4.8% of males (a 2% difference) claiming "don't know." Similarly, on the "pragmatic nonviolence" item, there was a significant difference between males and

females at the .01 level (t= -3.0), as worldwide (N=136), females were slightly more likely to answer “don’t know,” with 10.5% of females versus 8.0% of males (a 2.5% difference) claiming “don’t know.”

As can be seen in the figures below, these global means by sex clearly obscure the cross-national diversity that actually exists. But the muted global mean differences between the sexes may be partly explained by the dichotomous nature of the question. That is, given that many nations continue to reproduce patriarchy, rigid traditional gender roles, and educational deficits for females, it may be that females are more likely to respond “don’t know” to these survey items which ask about political attitudes, and for which political knowledge would be useful. That is, a lack of education may disempower women from holding strong opinions on these topics.

Moreover, females may be more likely to respond “depends” to a dichotomous question, as males are socialized into assertiveness in patriarchal cultures. That is, some of the gap between the genders might be explained by the relative indecisiveness or appreciation for nuance of females when faced with a dichotomous political question as compared with the relative decisiveness (through socialization in masculine assertiveness and certainty) of males.

These two assumptions were tested. Nations were coded in dummy variables according to their mean responses by sex on the “military attacks on civilians” item and the “pragmatic nonviolence” item. For each item, the nations were sorted into two groups: nations in which female mean scores were more peaceful were coded 1, and nations in which there was no difference or males scored more peaceful than females were coded 0. Against expectations, no significant differences existed between these two

groups on the national mean percentage of female respondents answering “depends” on the “military attacks on civilians” item.

However, as expected, tests showed that on both items, the higher percentage of women answering “don’t know” helps to explain some of the gender gap in peaceful attitudes. But these relationships were not very robust. On both items, there was a difference between group means in the percentage of “don’t know” responses, but only at the .1 level of significance for the “military attacks on civilians” item (p=.07), as well as the “pragmatic nonviolence” item (p=.07). The group of 48 nations where male means scored more peaceful or where there were no gender differences in the“military attacks on civilians” item, had a higher percentage of women saying “don’t know” by a difference of 8.2% of females versus 5.9% of males (or a 2.3% difference). On the “pragmatic nonviolence” item, in the group of 65 nations where males scored more peaceful or there were no gender differences,these 65 nations had a higher % of women saying “don’t know” by a mean difference of 11.7% of females versus 9.4% of males (or a 2.3% difference). Hence, on both of these items there is mild support for my hypothesis that males outscored females in peace in cases where females were more likely to answer “don’t know,” when faced with these dichotomous questions.

The figures in Appendix T help to describe the cross-national attitudinal variation that exists on the gender variable. These pattern are particularly interesting to explore since one of the most persistent findings on attitudes towards war has been the gender gap, with women universally thought to be more peaceful. Here, we do well to recall Scheuch’s (1993) warning that “Comparisons that include both modern and developing nations produce differences that are very hard to interpret – if they make sense at all”

(p.190). In the Figure depicting nations where males are more peaceful than females on the "military attacks" item, it seems most of the nations exhibiting this surprising pattern are patriarchal or developing nations in which we would expect women's status to be relatively low. The more developed nation of Chile seems to be the main exception here. In the Figure depicting nations where males are more peaceful than females on the "nonviolent efficacy" item (i.e., "peaceful means alone will work"), we see the U.S. joins a wide mix of different types of societies exhibiting this pattern.

In-Depth: Gender and Nonviolent Attitudes

Below in Table 116, we see that increasing gender inequality (as measured by the Gender Inequality Index 2011) is significantly associated (.3837) with *more* peaceful attitudes on the nonviolent efficacy question, but with *less* peaceful attitudes on terrorism in the Gallup World Poll (2010). To state this differently, modernity's trend towards increasing gender equality (i.e., decreasing gender inequality) is associated with *less* peaceful attitudes on the nonviolent efficacy question, but with *more* peaceful attitudes on terrorism. Modernity's trends towards lower fertility rates, increased female literacy and increased rates of female education are all associated with the same pattern: *less* peaceful attitudes on nonviolent efficacy, but *more* peaceful attitudes on terrorism. Of course, it may simply be that wider trends of modernity are driving these shifts, rather than female empowerment. But note that of all of the educational variables (including female enrollment rates at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels (higher education)), not one is associated with increased confidence in peaceful methods of protest.

However, increased rates of female literacy and female education are associated with increases in some types of peaceful attitudes measured at the national level. In fact,

Table 116. Correlations of Female Empowerment Indicators and Gallup World Poll Items

	Variable name	Sample size (n=)	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% nonviolence will work
Masculinity Index	MasculinityIndex	59	-.0305	-.0683	-.0713
Gender Inequality Index 2011	GenderInequalIndex_UN2011	123	-.1714	-.3609***	.3837****
% parliaments female	percent_parliaments_female	128	.0403	.0444	-.0398
Adolescent fertility	adol_fertility	134	-.1370	-.3212***	.3353***
Birth rate per thousand	Birth_rate_perthousand	135	-.1365	-.3123***	.3598****
Fertility rate	fertility_rate	135	-.1105	-.2668**	.3422****
Ratio, female to male labor participation rate (%)	Ratio_female_to_male_labor_parti	134	-.0680	-.0551	.0964
Labor force, % female	Labor_force_percent_female	134	-.0979	-.0676	.0988
Labor force, % female (ages 15 and older)	Labor_participation_fem_over15	134	-.0927	-.1237	.1210
% female in nonagricultural labor	percent_females_in_total_nonagri	54 (low n)	-.2074	-.0809	.0457
Literacy rate, adult females	Literacy_rate_adult_female	70	.3202**	.3919**	-.3192**
Literacy rate, youth females (15-24)	Literacy_rate_youth_females15_24	70	.3050*	.3625**	-.3331**
Ratio young literate females to males	Ratio_youngliterate_fem_to_males	70	.2762*	.3062*	-.1706
Ratio female to male primary enrollment	Ratio_female_to_male_primary_enr	111	.1434	.2456*	-.2130*
Total enrollment, primary school, female %	Totalenroll_primary_female_perce	81	.1965	.2924**	-.2213*
Primary school completion rate, female (% of relevant age group)	Primary_completion_rate_female	91	.3128**	.4196***	-.3149**
Progression to secondary school, female	Progression_to_secondary_female_	42 (low n)	.0670	.1797	-.4003**
Ratio female to male, secondary enrollment	Ratio_female_to_male_secondary_e	97	.1310	.2749**	-.2355*
Secondary education, % female	Secondary_ed_percent_female	101	.0986	.2233*	-.1937
Female secondary enrollment (% gross)	enroll_secondary_female_percentg	95	.2035	.4313****	-.3344***
Female enrollment secondary (% net)	enroll_secondary_female_percentn	66 (low n)	.2976*	.5031****	-.3131*
Females with secondary educ. (% ages 25 and older)	females_w_second_ed	125	.1278	.2590**	-.2550**
Ratio girls to boys, primary & secondary	Ratio_girls_to_boys_primary_n_se	97	.1593	.2929**	-.2032*
Ratio female to male tertiary enrollment	Ratio_fem_to_male_tertiary_enrol	88	.2891**	.3410**	-.1613
Tertiary enrollment, female % gross	enroll_tertiaryfemale_percentgro	88	.2761**	.4958****	-.1812

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001

increases in all of the female literacy and female educational variables (including female enrollment rates at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels (higher education)) are associated with increases in peaceful attitudes on the state terrorism and terrorism questions, but not all of these findings are significant. Looking at which variables are most strongly linked to more peaceful attitudes in both the terrorism and state terrorism questions, higher rates of female literacy, female completion rates in primary school, and female tertiary school enrollments present the most significant associations.

But note that if we omit the variables on labor force participation and the percentage of females in parliament, a clear and consistent pattern emerges: *all of the below* indicators of increasing female empowerment (recognizing that for the fertility these variables means less female empowerment) are associated with the increased prevalence (and the inculcation/ reproduction) of attitudes which rejects terrorism much more strongly than state terrorism.

Hence, we would appear to stand on solid ground in asserting that modernity and modern education systems inculcate forms of nationalism and conservativism (i.e., identification with the nation state) which condemn terrorism, while reproducing some degree of "moral disengagement" (Bandura 1990) or "callous cruelty" (Collins 1974) on issues of state terrorism (i.e., military attacks on civilians). Alternatively, in Durkheimian terms we could note here the evidence that modern nations reproduce social solidarity that is sufficiently robust to shape moral conceptions in terms of jingoistic insider-outsider patterns. Thus, citizens of developed nations readily affirm that outsiders, even civilians, sometimes have to be killed for the needs of the state and for security. Rather than inculcating morally principled objections to violence of all sorts, with increasing

rates of development, education, and female education in nations around the world, military violence is more likely to be given a pass by the average citizen, than is terrorism.

Thus, while Walter Wink (1992, 1998) has forcefully argued that the world's number one religion or faith is faith in "the myth of redemptive violence," it seems that modernity does inculcate attitudes which question this faith, when it comes to political violence, especially in the case of terrorism. The violence of the state is more likely to be seen as justified than terrorism, but rejection of even state violence does increase (though not always at significant levels) with increasing female empowerment.

Meanwhile, the same forces of modernity are associated with decreasing confidence that peaceful means alone can help oppressed groups improve their lives. Could it be that modern educational systems and textbook accounts of history are partly to blame for this trend as well?

Table 117 isolates female responses at the national level on the question of military attacks on civilians. Here, we see that column of "sometimes justified" data is consistently negative (recognizing that for the fertility variables and Gender Inequality Index, the signs are reversed because a higher score on these variables means less female empowerment): that is, higher female empowerment (in education and increasing gender equality more generally) is associated with declines in the belligerent/ less peaceful answer "sometimes justified." Likewise, the column of "never justified" data is consistently positive (again, recognizing that the signs are reversed for the fertility variables and Gender Inequality Index): that is, increasing female empowerment is

associated with increases in the percentage of respondents offering the peaceful answer of "never justified."

Table 117. Correlations of Nation-Level *Female* Attitudes (on Military Attacks on Civilians) with Full Menu of Answer Choices by Indicators of Female Empowerment

	Variable name	Sample size (n=)	% females military attacks on civilians "never justified"	% females "sometimes justified"	% females "depends"	% females "don't know"
Gender Inequality Index 2011	GenderInequalIndex_UN2011	123	-.2490**	.3609***	-.0998	.0801
% parliaments female	percent_parliaments_female	128	.0886	-.0867	-.0353	-.0241
Adolescent fertility	adol_fertility	134	-.1788*	.3729****	-.1078	-.0716
Birth rate per thousand	Birth_rate_perthousand	135	-.1801*	.3599****	-.0583	-.1028
Fertility rate	fertility_rate	135	-.1558	.3506****	-.0641	-.1438
Ratio, female to male labor participation rate (%)	Ratio_female_to_male_labor_parti	134	-.0291	.0354	.0849	-.0611
Labor force, % female	Labor_force_percent_female	134	-.0384	.0362	.1215	-.0878
Labor force, % female (ages 15 and older)	Labor_participation_fem_over15	134	-.0711	.0930	.0370	-.0020
% female in nonagricultural labor	percent_females_in_total_nonagri	54 (low n)	-.0876	.0962	.1686	-.2482
Literacy rate, adult females	Literacy_rate_adult_female	70	.3813**	-.5262****	-.1359	.1047
Literacy rate, youth females (15-24)	Literacy_rate_youth_females 15_24	70	.3637**	-.5091****	-.1379	.1182
Ratio young literate females to males	Ratio_youngliterate_fem_to_males	70	.3186**	-.03843**	-.1896	.0766
Ratio female to male primary enrollment	Ratio_female_to_male_primary_enr	111	.1671	-.2878**	.1018	-.0235
Total enrollment, primary school, female %	Totalenroll_primary_female_perce	81	.2319*	-.3295**	.0022	.0445
Primary school completion rate, female (% of relevant age group)	Primary_completion_rate_female	91	.3305**	-.4761****	-.0631	.0495
Progression to secondary school, female	Progression_to_secondary_female_	42 (low n)	.0687	-.3776*	.1353	.3045
Ratio female to male, secondary enrollment	Ratio_female_to_male_secondary_e	97	.1481	-.3244**	.0807	.1782
Secondary education, % female	Secondary_ed_percent_female	101	.1361	-.2961**	.0843	.1460
Female secondary enrollment (% gross)	enroll_secondary_female_percentg	95	.2426*	-.3499***	.0450	.0076
Female enrollment secondary (% net)	enroll_secondary_female_percentn	66 (low n)	.3107*	-.3265**	.0181	-.2291

	Variable name	Sample size (n=)	% females military attacks on civilians "never justified"	% females "sometimes justified"	% females "depends"	% females "don't know"
Females with secondary educ. (% ages 25 and older)	females_w_second_ed	125	.1920*	-.3145***	.1019	-.0655
Ratio girls to boys, primary & secondary	Ratio_girls_to_boys_primary_n_se	97	.1742	-.3356***	.0949	.1213
Ratio female to male tertiary enrollment	Ratio_fem_to_male_tertiary_enrol	88	.2521*	-.3679***	.-.0569	.2077
Tertiary enrollment, female % gross	enroll_tertiaryfemale_percent gro	88	.3398**	-.3652***	-.0621	-.0672

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001

In addition, no significant changes are observed in the "depends" and "don't know" columns (see Appendix L for a methodological note). It is fairly striking that, on average, responses of "depends" and "don't know" do not change significantly with rising levels of female education and female empowerment. Hence, with increasing education, respondents are not increasingly lost in nuances (as with a "depends" answer), but neither do we see a significant decrease in women who feel disempowered in answering the question (as with a "don't know" answer). This means that increasing female empowerment is associated with a clear shift from the perception that military attacks are "sometimes justified," to the morally principled view of the illegitimacy of military attacks on civilians.

Below in Table 118, we see that increases in female literacy, female education, and general female empowerment leads to increases in "don't know" responses and declines in attitudes affirming nonviolent efficacy/ nonviolence "will work" responses. If we interpret "don't know" responses to represent disempowerment in answering a survey question with confidence, it seems education and modernity disempowers women in answering this item. All the evidence here is remarkably consistent: increasing female

Table 118. Correlations of Nation-Level *Female* Attitudes (on Peaceful Means Alone Will Work) with Full Menu of Answer Choices By Indicators of Female Empowerment

	Variable name	Sample size (n=)	% females nonviolence "will work"	% females "will not work"	% females "don't know"
Gender Inequality Index 2011	GenderInequalIndex_UN2011	123	.3855****	-.2413**	-.3398***
% parliaments female	percent_parliaments_female	128	-.0447	.0394	.0306
Adolescent fertility	adol_fertility	134	.3479****	-.2077*	-.3307***
Birth rate per thousand	Birth_rate_perthousand	135	.3702****	-.1638	-.4454****
Fertility rate	fertility_rate	135	.3522****	-.1461	-.4415****
Ratio, female to male labor participation rate (%)	Ratio_female_to_male_labor_parti	134	.1238	-.0975	-.0798
Labor force, % female	Labor_force_percent_female	134	.1364	-.1372	-.0390
Labor force, % female (ages 15 and older)	Labor_participation_fem_over15	134	.1478	-.0746	-.1621
% female in nonagricultural labor	percent_females_in_total_nonagri	54 (low n)	.0907	-.1465	.0815
Literacy rate, adult females	Literacy_rate_adult_female	70	-.2867*	.0320	.4849****
Literacy rate, youth females (15-24)	Literacy_rate_youth_females 15_24	70	-.3110**	.0953	.4334***
Ratio young literate females to males	Ratio_youngliterate_fem_to_males	70	-.1508	.0087	.2686*
Ratio female to male primary enrollment	Ratio_female_to_male_primary_enr	111	-.2094*	.1156	.2056*
Total enrollment, primary school, female %	Totalenroll_primary_female_perce	81	-.2558*	.1072	.2751*
Primary school completion rate, female (% of relevant age group)	Primary_completion_rate_female	91	-.3346**	.1246	.3950***
Progression to secondary school, female	Progression_to_secondary_female_	42 (low n)	-.4288**	.1300	.5693***
Ratio female to male, secondary enrollment	Ratio_female_to_male_secondary_e	97	-.2639**	.0982	.3302**
Secondary education, % female	Secondary_ed_percent_female	101	-.2123*	.0760	.2775**
Female secondary enrollment (% gross)	enroll_secondary_female_percentg	95	-.3623***	.2002	.3574***
Female enrollment secondary (% net)	enroll_secondary_female_percentn	66 (low n)	-.3336**	.2365	.2312
Females with secondary educ. (% ages 25 and older)	females_w_second_ed	125	-.2607**	.0644	.3952****
Ratio girls to boys, primary & secondary	Ratio_girls_to_boys_primary_n_se	97	-.2153*	.0879	.2555*

	Variable name	Sample size (n=)	% females nonviolence "will work"	% females "will not work"	% females "don't know"
Ratio female to male tertiary enrollment	Ratio_fem_to_male_tertiary_ enrol	88	-.1823	-.0460	.3997***
Tertiary enrollment, female % gross	enroll_tertiaryfemale_percent gro	88	-.1925	.0002	.3424**

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001

empowerment (as measured by the Gender Inequality Index, fertility rates, and female education rates) results in decreases in faith in nonviolent efficacy and increases in the "don't know" response. For most of the variables above, both of these patterns are statistically significant.

In Table 119 below, we see that with the exception of the education spending variables, these education variables are consistent in their effects on male attitudes: increasing literacy, increasing mean years of schooling, increasing school enrollments, and lower pupil-teacher ratios are all associated with increases in the percentage of males responding "don't know" to the nonviolent efficacy question, and decreases in the percentage of males responding that nonviolence "will work" for oppressed groups. Hence, the shift is from affirming that nonviolence will work, to uncertainty (i.e.,

Table 119. Correlations of Nation-Level *Male* Attitudes (on Peaceful Means Alone Will Work) with the Full Menu of Answer Choices by Education Indicators

	Variable name	Sample size (n=)	% male nonviolence "will work"	% male "will not work"	% male "don't know"
Literacy rate, adult	Literacy_rate_adult	126	-.2841**	.1241	.4017****
Mean years of schooling	Mean_yrs_school	132	-.2778**	.1115	.4054****
Primary school enrollment (% net)	primary_enrol_ratio_net	126	-.2275*	.1390	.2326**
Secondary school enrollment (% net)	secondary_enrol_ratio_net	109	-.2314*	.0628	.3951****
Tertiary enrollment (% gross)	enroll_tertiary_percentgross	122	-.1888*	.0406	.3417***
Population with secondary education (%)	pop_with_secondary_ed	112	-.2714**	.1135	.3655***
% of govt spending on education	educ_percent_govt_spent	124	.0822	.0005	-.1909*
% of GDP spent on education	educ_spent_percent_GDP	127	-.0321	.0091	.0459
Pupil-teacher ratio	pupil_teacher_ratio	101	.2983**	-.1345	-.4348****

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; These educational indicators include both genders.

answering “don’t know”).

As for the nonviolent efficacy question, the consistent effects in the above indicators is startling. Trends of modernity and development are associated with declines in confidence in nonviolent efficacy. Perhaps issues of validity can be raised about the nonviolent efficacy question. Perhaps citizens of modernizing and modern nations are more likely to feel political alienation and frustration at the pace of change. This might lead them to be more likely to question whether “peaceful means alone” will work for oppressed groups. In any case, this is one possible critique of the question’s validity. Other possible critiques include – how was “peaceful means” translated around the world, and what did people understand the terms to represent?

Below in Table 120, we see that indicators of educational advancement in a nation consistently and significantly correlate with declines in the percentage of males who claim that military attacks on civilians are “sometimes justified.” However, the shift in attitudes is not clearly linked to growth in robustly peaceful attitudes, as there is no significant rise in the percentage of civilians claiming such attacks are “never justified.” Instead, the shift in opinions is split between increases in “don’t know,” “depends,” and “never justified” responses.

Table 120. Correlations of Nation-Level *Male* Attitudes (on Military Attacks on Civilians) with the Full Menu of Answer Choices By Education Indicators

	Variable name	Sample size (n=)	% males military attacks on civilians "never justified"	% males "sometimes justified"	% males "depends"	% males "don't know"
Literacy rate, adult	Literacy_rate_adult	126	.1628	-.2521**	-.0223	.0998
Mean years of schooling	Mean_yrs_school	132	.0791	-.2307**	.1119	.0626
Primary school enrollment (% net)	primary_enrol_ratio_net	126	.1438	-.2795**	.0567	.0926
Secondary school enrollment (% net)	secondary_enrol_ratio_net	109	.1371	-.2649**	.0808	.0291
Tertiary enrollment (% gross)	enroll_tertiary_percentgross	122	.1733	-.2497**	.0492	-.0733
Population with secondary education (%)	pop_with_secondary_ed	112	.1084	-.3036**	.1789	.0308
% of govt spending on education	educ_percent_govt_spent	124	.0229	.0416	.0081	-.1581
% of GDP spent on education	educ_spent_percent_GDP	127	.1349	-.1264	.0564	-.1798*
Pupil-teacher ratio	pupil_teacher_ratio	101	-.1862	.2537*	.0020	.0309

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; These educational indicators include both genders.

CHAPTER IV

SEARCHING FOR CULTURES OF PEACE

CRITIQUE OF THE GLOBAL PEACE INDEX

This chapter sketches out a critique of the Global Peace Index (GPI). The GPI 2008 nation scores and ranks are reported in Appendix U. The researcher elected to focus on the GPI because it is better known, and because, in any case, the World Peace Index (WPI) robustly correlates with the GPI. Although the indicators of these two peace indexes are different, they share many parallel or roughly parallel indicators (see Appendix V). Nevertheless, in many ways the WPI indicators (see Appendix W) are superior since they encompass historical indicators with longer time spans. Thus, the WPI better captures the historical track record of the peace propensities of nations. In addition, as discussed below, the WPI data is superior for researchers since three sub-indexes are reported (as opposed to the GPI which refuses to release nation scores on the Internal and External peace indexes).

In even a cursory analysis of the GPI rankings (see Appendix U), questions arise. Given the unparalleled military power and overseas adventurism of the U.S., how can it be that the U.S. does not score more poorly in the GPI? When comparing military budgets in 2011 of the 30 nations with the largest armed forces , the U.S. spends more (US$739.3 billion) than the other top 29 combined (US$645.7 billion) (Time 2012). The closest competitor is China which spent US$89.8 billion. Thus, the U.S. spent over 8 times more than its closest competitor. The U.S. has 11 major aircraft carrier ships, while the closest competitors are Japan and Italy which have 2 each (Time 2012). The U.S. has 122 major warships, while the closest competitors have 78 (China), 48 (Japan), and 32

(Russia). The U.S. has 3,591 combat aircraft, while the closest competitors have 2,004 (China), 1,909 (Russia), 829 (India), and 603 (North Korea). Only China has more active military personnel than the U.S. Clearly, the U.S. exhibits the most pervasive military-industrial complex, even though a handful of nations do rival the U.S. in such statistics as the number of military reserves (only on this indicator do some nations vastly exceed the U.S.), battle tanks, and submarines (Time 2012). And, any accounting of propensities for war and peace must take into account the fact that only 9 nations possess strategic nuclear weapons: the U.S., China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Russia, France, the U.K., and almost certainly Israel.

In 2001, the U.S. had about 725 military bases in 38 countries, with over 250,000 military personnel deployed in 153 countries (Johnson 2004). By 2007, the U.S. had about 300,000 military personnel stationed abroad (Duffy 2007). No other nation in the world even comes close to rivaling those numbers. Over the years, the GPI has been something of a moving target for critique, as some of the GPI's indicators have been changed. The main reason that the U.S. ranked as more "peaceful" in the 2009 GPI compared to previous years, is that a key indicator of militarism was dropped: Non-UN deployments. Clearly, the organizers of the GPI decided to give the U.S. a pass for its empire of bases. The GPI's own explanation for this change is revealing:

> The indicator of Non-UN deployments was initially included on the assumption that a country deploying troops overseas cannot be considered free of violence. However, members of the panel of experts acknowledged that the indicator is potentially ambiguous – should the deployment of troops overseas, whose mission is to prevent genocide in a foreign country, be recorded as a 'negative' indicator in the GPI? In order to avoid making such judgments, the consensus view was to remove the indicator. (IEP 2009a, p.3)

Arguably, this change in the GPI criteria cloaks the imperial activity of core nations, while uncritically accepting the human rights rhetoric increasingly used to legitimate core nations' military interventions abroad (Chomsky 2008).

Although the GPI includes among its 23 indicators (see Appendix O), the "Aggregate number of heavy weapons per 100,000 people," the "Military capability/sophistication," and "Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP," these indicators are not weighted as heavily as some of the measures of internal peace such as "homicides per 100,000 people." Thus, to some degree the distinctive characteristics of the U.S. military presence in the world (i.e., the "empire of bases" abroad (Johnson 2004), nuclear arsenal, pre-eminence in air and sea) is given a pass by the GPI.

Beyond defining peace as the absence of war/ war preparation, we can also briefly consider peace as international justice and question the pragmatic effects of U.S. hegemony. Through international financial institutions and agreements, the U.S. routinely extracts wealth from poor underdeveloped nations and perpetuates unfair double standards. For example, during the 1960's the Alliance for Progress facilitated a transfer of wealth from Latin America to private investors in the US on the order of five dollars for every one dollar sent to Latin America, and this does not even count the billions of dollars in loan debt incurred (Agee 1975, pp.569-571). More recently, Bourdieu (2003) points out that IMF requests that the U.S. "reduce its persistent public deficit have long fallen on deaf ears, whereas the same body has forced many an African economy, already greatly at risk, to reduce its deficit at the cost of increasing levels of unemployment and poverty" (pp.94-95). Similarly, Bourdieu argues the WTO allows "the dominant powers and particularly the United States to resort to the very protectionist measures and public

subsidies they deny to developing countries" (p.89). However, for our purposes it is worth noting that Bourdieu misses the fact that Japan (ranked #3 in the GPI 2011) and EU nations (many of which rank in the top 20 in peace in the GPI, year after year) have been even greater beneficiaries of the WTO than the U.S. (Ellwood 2001, p.33; Lane 2006, p.162). Thus, neoliberal economic policies and the world-system's structural violence are off the radar screen of the GPI. As we will see below, that is not all that is missing from the GPI's criteria.

Comparing the WPI and the GPI

While the GPI has reported annual cross-national scores and rankings in peace since 2007, a second cross-national peace index, the World Peace Index (compiled by the World Peace Forum of Seoul, South Korea), has reported annual scores and rankings since 2000. A strength of the WPI is that it in addition to reporting an overall score (for 76 nations in 2007), it breaks down national scores into three dimensions: a Political Peace Index (for 140 nations in 2007), a Military-Diplomatic Peace Index (for 140 nations in 2007), and a Socio-Economic Peace Index (for 76 nations in 2007). These three peace indexes are averaged to produce the overall WPI score for each nation (see Appendices O, U, and V for a comparison of GPI and WPI indicators).

The correlation between the GPI 2007 and WPI 2007 is quite high (r = .8035). In preparation for testing the correlation, the GPI score for each nation was transformed (GPI score X (-1) + 4) so that the most peaceful countries in the GPI have the highest scores as in the WPI. Squaring the r value (.8035) yields a coefficient of determination of 0.65 (r^2 = 0.65), which suggests that the indicators used in the WPI can explain 65% of the total variation in the GPI. The WPI 2007 scores 76 nations in the overall index,

making possible a comparison with 72 nations that are also scored in the GPI 2007. We will revisit these indexes below, since later versions of these indexes have expanded their sample sizes.

Figure 11 below indicates that the WPI and GPI really only noticeable diverge on a few cases. Israel is ranked very low in peace by the GPI, while the WPI ranks Israel much closer to the middle. Conversely, the WPI ranks Syria almost near the very bottom in peace, while the GPI ranks Syria near the middle. These divergences are likely traced, at least partly, to the WPI's inclusion of a longer span of years for conflict data.

Figure 11. Scatterplot of GPI 2007 and WPI 2007 Scores with Trendline



NOTE: N=72. The GPI score for each nation was transformed (GPI score X (-1) + 4) so that the most peaceful countries in the GPI have the highest scores as in the WPI. Source: Global Peace Index 2007; World Peace Index 2007

The Gallup World Poll

Comparing peace indexes (the GPI and WPI) with cross-national attitude polls opens up additional areas for critique. Simply put, many of the most peaceful nations according to the objective indicators in the peace indexes, do not rank as particularly peaceful in their attitudes when compared with other nations. This raises questions about the adequacy of the GPI and WPI as indicators of "cultures of peace," as well as the relative influence of structural factors (many of which are captured by the indicators of the GPI and WPI) upon peaceful attitudes in general. The Gallup World Poll 2008 provides adequate initial operationalizations and measurements of two theoretically important dimensions of nonviolence, pragmatic nonviolence and principled objections to very particular and egregious forms of violence (constituting the weakest form of what can be called "principled nonviolence"): terrorism and state terrorism. Analysis of this cross-national public opinion data is likely to yield theoretical dividends due to the relatively large sample of nations, and the very wide ranges in the responses of national publics (see Table 121 below).In addition, these questions were replicated in the surveys (e.g., Appendix A, Q4-Q6).

Table 121. Descriptive Statistics for Nation-Level Data on Three Questions Probing Nonviolent Attitudes in the 2008 Gallup World Poll (N=104 Nations)

	% respondents claiming individual attacks on civilians are "never justified"	% respondents claiming nonviolent means "will work" for oppressed groups	% respondents claiming military attacks on civilians are "never justified"
Mean ($\bar{x}$)	70.92	56.47	64.60
Standard deviation	15.11	14.32	14.97
Range	95% - 8%	85% - 8%	93% - 11%

The specificity of the Gallup World Poll questions are worthy of comment. The two questions on violent tactics do not discuss civilian deaths as "collateral damage" – the term Chalmers Johnson (2001) refers to as "another of those hateful euphemisms

invented by our military to prettify its killing of the defenseless" (p.14). Rather, these questions posit cases where a military or individuals "*target* and kill civilians." Such tactics are clearly against international law including the Geneva Conventions, yet about 35% of respondents worldwide refused to condemn such military tactics as "never justified," and about 29% of respondents worldwide refused to condemn individual attacks on civilians – or what is commonly called "terrorism." Hence, worldwide, there is only a 6% gap in the number of people willing to condemn terrorism as opposed to the number of people willing to condemn military attacks targeting civilians. Of course, within many nations the gap is much wider. If we adopt the language of "terrorism" for individual attacks, we can also use a parallel term – as Chomsky often does – for military attacks on civilians: "state terrorism." As actor Peter Ustinov once said, "Terrorism is the war of the poor and war is the terrorism of the rich." This frame obviously undermines the legitimacy state violence is often accorded, as Young (2007) notes, "The idea that the state is nothing but monopoly on the legitimate use of violence slides easily for many people into the idea that the use of violence by legitimate agents of a legitimate state is itself legitimate" (p.98).

It is doubtful whether many respondents were aware that the question on the legitimacy of militaries targeting and killing civilians presents a war crime according to international law. In fact, as the civil war continued to rage in Syria during early 2013, the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon felt he had to remind the world that targeting civilians is against international law, as Robert Siegel of National Public Radio noted below.

> The head of the United Nations has harsh words for whoever carried out an attack on Syrian University students, as they were taking exams. Two explosions at the

> university in Aleppo killed more than 80 people yesterday and injured some 200. Today, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said such heinous attacks are unacceptable. And he added that deliberate targeting of civilians constitutes a war crime....Now, as I mentioned, Ban Ki-moon reminded all that deliberate targeting of civilians is a war crime... (NPR 2013, January 16)

But consider Sam Wineburg, professor of education and history at Stanford University, who, in an often reactionary critique of Howard Zinn's landmark book *A People's History of the United States*, rationalizes U.S. military bombing campaigns during World War II. Wineburg (2013) defends the U.S. bombing of Dresden, which claimed between 20,000 to 30,000 lives, by noting that it occurred near the end of the war in February 1945, "...when all bets were off and long-standing distinctions between military targets ('strategic bombing') and civilian targets ('saturation bombing') had been rendered irrelevant" (p.30). This rationalization is just one form of "moral disengagement" that is pervasive in common views of war (Bandura 1990, 1996).

Cross-National Contexts and the Gallup World Poll Indicators

The three Gallup World Poll questions are likely to be "heard" differently in democratic and non-democratic contexts. In core nations, the question on state terrorism likely evoked scenarios in which civilians in nations far away are targeted. Conversely, in nations of the periphery, the same question likely evoked scenarios in which the respondents themselves could be killed by the government's armed forces, or equally plausibly, scenarios in which ethnic minorities or rebel factions are targeted by state forces. Similarly, in some peripheral nations, the question about individual terrorism was likely a proxy question on the perceived degree of legitimacy of the government in power, or whether terrorist groups had emerged in their national context and received popular support.

The Gallup World Poll question on nonviolent efficacy furnishes one of the empirical touchstones of this dissertation. The question posits a scenario where "oppressed groups" strive to "improve their situation" and lessen their "suffering from injustice" through a strategy termed "peaceful means alone." The scenario involves significant ambiguities and will almost certainly be heard differently in different contexts. In a democratic society, individuals might be more likely to think of conventional action such as democratic processes (e.g., petitions, lobbying of politicians, lawsuits in the context of an independent judiciary branch of government, etc.), whereas citizens living under dictatorship might be more likely to envision nonviolent mass street protest actions/ "people power" movements. The scenario they envision will likely depend heavily on the recent historical experiences of their own nation as well as neighboring nations.

Again for democratic citizens, the "peaceful means alone" question likely framed the degree to which electoral politics might resolve conflicts involving oppressed groups. Indeed, Meyer and Tarrow (1998) argue that modern democratic states tend to be "movement societies" in which social protest movements are institutionalized within the polity.Given that democratic nation states have institutionalized forms of political contention (e.g., electoral politics) and also experience more disruptive forms of contention, such cross-national survey questions remain somewhat muddy in terms of what they are operationalizing in each national context. As Zald (2000) observes, "we do not know much about the population's consciousness of movements and how it compares with the consciousness of institutionalized politics," but he ventures the following: "Compared to social movements, in most nations institutionalized politics is a larger part

of everyday life" (p.7). Thus, especially in democratic nations, election rituals tend to figure more prominently than protest rituals in the discourse of most families (p.7).

Perhaps the salience of election rituals in family discourse and experience helps explain the political socialization literature finding that families of origin impact political party identification more than attitude and policy orientation. During the competitive "horse race" of election campaign rituals, parties attract emotional and financial investments, jingoistic identity links, attachment to particular charismatic leaders, etc. so that changing political parties – even later in life, can make people feel like sports fans who betray the "home team" by rooting for the "other side." Zald (2000) proposes that the link between identity and family of origin traditions can be quite resilient in the arena of self-identified labels like political party adherence, while attitudes and policy orientations are "more open to experience and societal events" (p.8). But one of the reasons for this might be that most families simply do not engage in social movement campaigns, discourse, emotional investments, hero worship, and celebration linked to particular issues and policy debates, like they do in electoral rituals. All of this speaks to a possible bias towards conventional action, and the potential disadvantages of nonviolentprotest in collective memory processes

Below, Figure 12 graphs national rankings (ordinal variables) on the GPI and the Gallup World Poll question. It is descriptive of the wide range and diversity among nations and hints at the disconnect between objective and subjective indicators of peace. Looking at the bottom right-hand quadrant, we see that several nations ranking in the top 30 for belief in nonviolent efficacy, rank in the bottom 20 of the GPI. But a more accurate test of the relationship between these twovariables appears in Figure 12 below,

as a scatterplot of the same data as ratio level variables demonstrates that as national scores on the transformed GPI go down (as nations become less peaceful according to the GPI's objective indicators of peace), confidence that peaceful means alone "will work" goes up (the subjective indicator of peace becomes more robust). Hence, ironically, the more objectively/ structurally "peaceful" nations (as measured by the GPI) tend to express less confidence that peaceful means alone "will work." Indeed, as we see in Table 122 below, the correlation between the GPI's objective indicators and the subjective indicator (mean% of citizens affirming peaceful means alone "will work") is a weakly negative (-0.1402).

Table 122 shows that the correlations between the GPI 2008 (using objective indicators for peace) and the nonviolent attitudes (subjective indicators) operationalized by the Gallup World Poll 2008 are very small, suggesting that there is little relationship between them. As illustrated in Figure 13, the GPI scores are negatively related to the nonviolence works item (i.e., on average and ironically, the more peaceful nations are according to the GPI's objective measures, the less confident they are that nonviolence works for oppressed groups seeking justice). To re-phrase this finding, it seemsto suggest that more objectively "peaceful" nations (according to the GPI's objective indicators)are more convinced that violent methods must be used by the oppressed. Theonly alternative tothat interpretation would be that the more objectively "peaceful" nations tend to believe that nothing can improve the conditions of the oppressed, neither nonviolence nor violence.

Figure 12. Scatterplot of GPI and Gallup World Poll Nation Ranks in Pragmatic Nonviolence



NOTE: Q: "*Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can improve their situation by peaceful means alone. Others do not believe that peaceful means alone will work to improve their situation for such oppressed groups. Which do you believe?1. Will work 2. Will not work 3. Depends [not read by survey conductor] 4. DK/ RF [not read by survey conductor].*" Rank of national percentage citizens affirming peaceful means alone "will work" (affirming pragmatic nonviolence).*Source Data:* Gallup World Poll 2008 (Rank of 1 = nation with highest % of citizens affirming pragmatic nonviolence (i.e., peaceful means alone will work); Global Peace Index 2008 (Rank of 1 = most peaceful nation)

Figure 13. Scatterplot of GPI and Gallup World Poll Nation Means in Pragmatic Nonviolence



Note: The GPI score for each nation was transformed (4 - GPI score) so that the most peaceful countries in the GPI have the highest scores (with 3 the most peaceful score and 0 the least peaceful score possible). *Data sources*: Gallup World Poll 2008; GPI 2008; The GPI score for 4 nations (Burundi, Georgia, Guyana, and Nepal) come from the GPI 2009 because this is the first year they appeared in the index. However, it should be noted that the scoring methodology in the GPI 2009 did change slightly from the GPI 2008.

In Table 122 we also see that the GPI scores are more strongly related to the terrorism variable ("indneverjust") than to the state terrorism variable ("milneverjust"). All things considered, this seems to reflect the fact that modern industrial Western nations tend to score more highly on the GPI, and the citizens in these populations object more to terrorism than they do to state terrorism. This is not surprising since citizens of modern Western nations are unlikely to be the victims of military attacks on civilians, while fear of terrorism, though often relatively irrational, has been cultivated through several dramatic and tragic attacks on civilians in Western nations in recent years. Among the subjective indicators themselves, the relationships are also very weak, with

Table 122. Correlation Matrix for Nonviolent Attitudes of World Publics (Gallup World Poll 2008) and Nation Scores in Global Peace Index 2008

	gpi2008	indneverjust	nvworks	milneverjust
gpi2008	1.0000			
indneverjust	0.1820	1.0000		
nvworks	-0.1402	-0.0781	1.0000	
milneverjust	0.1287	0.8221***	0.0549	1.0000

NOTE: Pearson product-moment correlations between variables. N=95 nations. *** = $p < .0001$
GPI 2008 scores range from 1.176 for Iceland (the most peaceful country) to 3.514 for Iraq (the least peaceful country). The GPI score for each nation was transformed (4 - GPI score) so that the most peaceful countries in the GPI have the highest scores (with 3 the most peaceful score and 0 the least peaceful score possible). "nvworks" = % of respondents affirming that peaceful means alone will work for oppressed groups; "indneverjust" = % of respondents affirming that individual attacks on civilians are never justified; "milneverjust" = % of respondents affirming that military attacks on civilians are never justified; *Data sources*: Gallup World Poll 2008; GPI 2008; The GPI score for 4 nations (Burundi, Georgia, Guyana, and Nepal) come from the GPI 2009 because this is the first year they appeared in the index. However, it should be noted that the scoring methodology in the GPI 2009 did change slightly from the GPI 2008.

the exception of the robust correlation between objecting to terrorism and military attacks on civilians. The weakness of the relationships between the pragmatic nonviolence item (peaceful means alone "will work") and each of the principled nonviolent items (i.e., views on terrorism and military attacks on civilians) is particularly striking.

This is part the theoretical puzzle we shall explore. Why is there no cross-national relationship between objective and subjective indicators of peace?See Appendix Q for a fuller analysisof the GPI and WPI vis a vis the Gallup data than was depicted in Table 122 above. Clearly, with the sole exception of the terrorism item, there is little relationship between ranking high in the GPI or the WPI (which primarily employ objective measures of "peace") and ranking high in the subjective attitude dimensions of nonviolence. In general, can the current peace indexes be said to really measure a nation's peace propensities when there is little relationship to the scores of these nations on more subjective measures like attitudes relating to nonviolence and militarism? Are structures irrelevant to the cultivation of attitudes? In terms of shaping attitudes, is the mediating role of historical experience more important than structure?

A Closer Look: How Nations Perform in Objective Vis a Vis Subjective Indicators of Peace

Large data sets of cross-national data presents numerous theoretical and empirical challenges. When the data set include nations from different levels of development, interpretation is likely to be especially difficult (Scheuch 1993). In analyzing global means, there is an obvious risk in overlooking substantial cross-national variation. For this reason, scatterplots are constructed below which demonstrate variation in the subjective attitudinal indicators and the objective indicators of the peace indexes. The global means are highlighted in each case. In the scatterplot with "nvworks" and the transformed GPI scores (see Figure 14), there is no nation occupying the space of the upper right hand corner. That is, no single nation clearly outcompetes others in both of these indicators. Thus, to select the most peaceful nations based on both of these indicators would require us to weight either the objective or subjective indicator more highly.

However, at the other extreme, Israel is a clear outlier in occupying the lower left hand space of the graph. Using these two indicators (and weighting them equally), Israel is the least peaceful nation sampled. Below in Figure 15, when we graph GPI scores by the national mean score on the "military attacks on civilians" (% never justified) item, Japan is the clear leader since it performs very well on both of these indicators of peace. Again, Israel joined by Central African Republic are outliers performing very poorly on both of these indicators of peace. Likewise, when we substitute the "individual attacks on civilians" (% never justified) item (see Figure 16), Japan and Finland are clear leaders in both indicators. Hence, they occupy the upper right hand space of the graph. Finland, like

Germany, has large numbers of youth applying to be conscientious objectors (Cortright 2008). Bordering Russia, it is easy to imagine that Finland's peaceful attitudes have been shaped by being small and having a "wolf at the door." And, the Central African Republic is alone in occupying the lower left hand corner as the least peaceful nation by these two combined indicators. Israel ranks as the 3rd most militarized nation in the world out of 151 nations ranked in the Global Militarization Index (BICC 2009). In 2004, the Central African Republic, one of the world's poorest nations, became embroiled in a civil war. Many citizens favored government attacks on rebel groups (IRIN 2006). By 2007,

Figure 14. Scatterplot of GPI Score by National Means on Pragmatic Nonviolence



Notes: nvworks mean line at 55.5; gpi mean line at 1.96; "nvworks" = % of respondents affirming that peaceful means alone will work for oppressed groups; "gpi2008trans" = transformed GPI 2008 scores; See Appendix X for key to 3-letter abbreviations for nations; Source: Gallup World Poll 2010, GPI 2008

there had been 11 attempted coups or rebellions in the previous decade (Melander 2007). These recent historical experiences certainly impact its scores on both the attitudinal indicators as well as the GPI.

Figure 15. Scatterplot of GPI Score by National Means on Military Attacks Item



Notes: milneverjust mean line at 64.8; gpi mean line at 1.96; “milneverjust” = % of respondents affirming that military attacks on civilians are never justified; “gpi2008trans” = transformed GPI 2008 scores; Source: Gallup World Poll 2010, GPI 2008

Figure 16. Scatterplot of GPI Score by National Means on Individual Attacks Item



Notes: indneverjust mean line at 71.67; gpi mean line at 1.96; "indneverjust" = % of respondents affirming that individual attacks on civilians are never justified; "gpi2008trans" = transformed GPI 2008 scores; Source: Gallup World Poll 2010, GPI 2008

A Second Look at Gallup World Poll Data: Nonviolent Attitudes Around the World

At the level of national means, correlations between the pragmatic nonviolence question and the two dimensions of principled nonviolent attitudes are quite low. However, a closer analysis (see Table 123) using threshold attitude scores (nation-level data) reveals that a number of countries have a relatively high percentage of citizens affirming nonviolent attitudes in all three of the Gallup World Poll questions. These countries present something of a theoretical puzzle, unexpected and unexplained by the peace studies literature. In their attitudes, these nations appear to be "cultures of peace," but as can be seen in Table 123, their GPI rankings suggest that many of these nations lack objective structures peace. Such discontinuities will help to guide the analytical

focus of the present project. Isolating nations by threshold values, detailed in Table 123, reveals that in some cases, the principled and pragmatic nonviolent attitudes in national mass publics overlap to a large degree.

Table 123. Nation-Level Data: Nations Scoring High in 3 Measures of Nonviolent Attitudes

High Thresholds (met on all 3 nonviolent questions)	Nations (GPI 2009 ranking)
At or over 79%	Georgia (134)
At or over 77%	Liberia (NR)
At or over 73%	**Costa Rica** (29)
At or over 72%	Uruguay (25), **Ghana** (52)
At or over 71%	Nicaragua (61), Kazakhstan (84)
At or over 69%	Mauritania (124)
At or over 68%	Finland (9), Tunisia (44), Greece (57)
At or over 67%	Philippines (114)
At or over 66%	Sierra Leone (NR), Madagascar (72), Mali (96)
At or over 65%	Pakistan (137), Argentina (66), Burundi (127), Ireland (12)
At or over 63%	Colombia (130), Kenya (113), Armenia (NR), Russian Federation (136)
At or over 62%	Spain (28), Hungary (27), Morocco (63), Nigeria (129)
At or over 61%	Turkey (121), Canada (8), **Chile** (20), Ukraine (82)
At or over 60%	South Africa (123), Chad (138), Ecuador (109)

NOTE: Case studies highlighted in bold. The 3 questions: % citizens affirming individual attacks on civilians "never justified"; % citizens affirming military attacks on civilians "never justified"; and, % citizens affirming peaceful means alone "will work" for oppressed groups. Data sources: Gallup World Poll 2008 (n=104); GPI 2009 ranking (1 = most peaceful; 144 = least peaceful); the GPI 2009 (n=144) was employed here because it ranks more nations than the GPI 2008 (n=140); NR = not ranked in the GPI

Because this nonviolent attitudinal coherence occurs in some nations, a "Nonviolent Index" was constructed. However, it must be remembered that on average national means for the nonviolent efficacy item and the principled stands against terrorism and state terrorism items respectively, do not correlate at significant levels. The only significant correlation is between principled stands against terrorism and state

terrorism. Of course, a key problem with the constructed Nonviolent Index(see Appendix Y) is that extreme values on any one indicator become obscured by the aggregate index score. That is, in a real sense the Nonviolent Index presents us with less information since the three variables often only weakly correlate.

Who Are the Most Peaceful Nations?

Since the Nonviolent Index reveals that some nations do hold high peaceful attitude thresholds on all three Gallup World Poll indicators, we will utilize this Index (constructed from 2010 Gallup World Poll data since it has a larger sample size than the 2008 data) to help isolate cultures of peace by correlating this subjective Index with the objective peace indexes. In Appendix Z, in scatterplot graphs we see that a handful of nations consistently rise to the top upper-right-hand quadrant representing the most peaceful nations on both indicators, including: Iceland, Finland, Slovakia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Hungary, and Spain. While the WPI and the GPI are flawed, and the Gallup World Poll indicators are very incomplete, together they represent more information about the attitudes and the socio-structural bases of nations than we have ever had before.

Nonviolence and collective memory. Many of the nations reporting high thresholds in Table 9 have experienced successful nonviolent revolutions in recent decades, such as Georgia, Liberia, the Philippines, and South Africa. Alternatively, and in accordance with path dependency theory (which posits that the origins of a nation have an enormous impact on subsequent developments) some of these nations experienced nonviolent independence movements (e.g., Ghana), or major nonviolent transitions (e.g., Costa Rica's demilitarization in 1948-1949). Is it possible that collective memory plays a major role in reproducing nonviolent attitudes?

Of the three questions on violence/ nonviolence in the 2008 Gallup World Poll, the lowest global mean by far concerned the issue of pragmatic nonviolence – can peaceful means alone work for an oppressed group? Compared with 70.92% objecting to terrorism and 64.60% objecting to state terrorism (military attacks on civilians), an average of only 56.47% of respondents world-wide affirmed that "peaceful means alone" "will work" for an oppressed group, at least one with a reformist or revolutionary agenda as the question implied. After Gandhi, after Dr. King and the U.S. civil rights movement, after "people power" in the Philippines, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, how is it possible that faith in the potential efficacy of nonviolent means is not higher? Below, we will consider whether there is something about cases of nonviolent social movement success that contain the seeds of their own forgetting.

Testing Objective and Subjective Peace Indicators with Outcomes of Peace/ Militarism: Arms Exports and Treaty Ratification

A good test of whether these discontinuities between objective and subjective measures might be significant – and whether one or the other might do a better job of predicting the peace propensities of nations, can be found by analyzing behavioral outcomes for nation-states which represent peaceful/ militaristic policy choices. International treaties are one policy outcome of significance.

For all the influence and purported influence of regional, hemispheric, and world hegemons like the U.S., it is striking how many small nations and U.S. allies defy the will of the U.S. state through their ratification of international peace and disarmament treaties. For example, few nations if any nations in Latin America have had a closer relationship

to the U.S. than Panama (Perez 1999, p.3), yet Panama has ratified many of the treaties considered below (e.g., the Cluster Bomb Treaty, the Land Mine Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and the Rome Statute (creating the International Criminal Court)), while the U.S. has ratified none of these. On the other hand, like the U.S., Panama has not signed or ratified the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions, but smaller nation allies like Canada, Mexico, and Costa Rica have signed and ratified it. Similarly, the U.S. has not ratified the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; but Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama have ratified it. In sum, it seems that many smaller nations defy the will of the U.S. hegemon through their support of international treaties of peace and disarmament.

First, we analyze which nations have ratified, as of February of 2012, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (i.e., the treaty in which nations pledge to ban cluster bombs), which 107 nations adopted at a conference in Dublin in May 2008 (MAC 2008). To date, 108 nations have signed the treaty (UN 2012). Jody Williams, the Nobel Peace Prize winner has called the treaty "...the most important disarmament and humanitarian convention in over a decade" (Nebehay 2010). Cluster bombs have been a key method for targeting and killing civilians, including children who often think the unexploded bomb particles are toys. Thus, cluster bombs are highly relevant to the Gallup World Poll question on whether it is legitimate for the militaries to target and kill civilians. Indeed, advocates of the treaty well-understood the link between banning cluster bombs and protecting civilians. Portia Stratton, Advocacy Manager for Landmine Action, which is

on the Steering Committee of the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) has said, “By banning cluster bombs, the UK has made its priorities clear - protecting civilians is more important than protecting stockpiles of outdated weapons” (LA 2010).

To test the relationship between objective and subjective peace indicators and participation in international conventions aiming to protect civilians in international war, independent group *t* tests (difference of group means) were conducted on the four treaties for ratifying and non-ratifying nations. Results showed that ratifying nations had more peaceful national mean scores on the “nvworks” and “milneverjust” variables (from the Gallup World Poll 2008) than the non-ratifying nations on all four treaties, but the differences did not attain statistical significance. Ratifying nations also had more peaceful GPI scores (GPI 2008) than the non-ratifying nations on all four treaties, and the differences were statistically significant for the Landmine Treaty (at the .05 level), for the ICC (at the .001 level), and for the CNBT (at the .0001 level), but *not* significant for the Cluster Bomb Treaty (at the .05 level).

Regression analyses were conducted (entering independent variables in one at a time rather than in multiple regression), with the results reported inTable 1 in Appendix AA. We see that compared with GPI scores, national means on the subjective attitudinal indicator for military attacks (from the Gallup World Poll 2008), better predicted whether a nation was a Cluster Bomb Signatory State. And, national means on the subjective attitudinal indicator for pragmatic nonviolence (“nvworks”), predicted whether a nation was a Landmine Treaty State Party almost as well as the GPI. However, GPI scores better predicted whether states ratified the CNTBT and ICC than the attitudinal indicators. In any case, these results suggest that the GPI does not fully capture the peace propensities

of nations, and in some of the peaceful behaviors/ outcomes of nations, attitudinal indicators may have greater predictive value. The Cluster Bomb Treaty and the Landmine Treaty are recognized by human rights NGOs as vitally important steps, yet nations scoring high in peace in the GPI were not significantly associated with signing the Cluster Bomb Treaty, and GPI scores were associated with the Landmine Treaty at only the moderately robust .05 level.

Arms exports. One way in which militaristic practices are not fully accounted for in the GPI is in arms production and distribution. The GPI's methodology shields larger nations from harsh scoring penalties on a variety of militaristic dimensions by utilizing indicators which are weighted by the nation's population or GDP. Hence, among the 24 indicators of the GPI score we find: "Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people" (see Appendix O). To some degree, large nations are also shielded from harsh scoring penalties through the GPI's method of giving nations a standardized or "banded" score, using a 1 to 5 scale on many variables (GPI 2008 results, p.5). And imperialistic nations like the U.S. are given a pass for having 725 military bases abroad, and generally, protected from harsh scoring penalties for military adventurism abroad in that the GPI's external peace indicators are weighted at 40%, while the internal peace indicators are weighted at 60%.

Rather than giving larger nations a pass for distributing military weapons, a simple dollar figure on arms exports would be a better choice, if we assume that larger nations carry a larger responsibility for creating a world climate of peace. Indeed, an analysis of arms export data is illuminating. Between 1996 and 2000, the U.S .was the world's largest arms dealer, "responsible for 47 percent of all munitions transfers"

(Johnson 2004, p.63). Clearly, Dr. King's (1967) prophetic claim still holds today, that the U.S. is "the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today." Though, as we shall see in a chapter below, only 24.29% of University of Oregon students in 2010 "strongly agree" with Dr. King's quote. The SIPRI (2012) Arms Transfers Database shows that between 2000 and 2010, the USA was the world leader in arms exports, exporting $74841 million USD (almost $75 billion) worth of arms. Russia was second with $60198 million USD, and Germany third with $21321 million USD. A span of ten years was used for the arms export indicator because if only one year is selected, data can be misleading, as the arms industries in some nations are marked by boom and bust. For example, in the decade of our sample (2000-2010), in 2004, the Czech Republic only exported arms worth one million, but in 2001 it exported arms worth 87 million. Likewise, Chile exported 0 to 2 million each year of the decade, except in 2008 when it exported 133 million.

As another outcome indicator, how do GPI scores compare with the amount of arms exported by each nation? In Figure 17 below we see that two variables are not significantly correlated at the .05 level, $r(93) = 0.07$.

After removing the two clear outliers, the USA and Russia, Figure 18 below shows us that the two variables are negatively correlated,r (91)= -0.21, $p < .05$. Hence, the more "peaceful" a nation is according to the GPI's criteria, the higher their volume of arms exports. This suggests a serious weakness in the GPI. Moreover, after removing the two outliers, the largest arms exporters are populated by a number of nations ranking in

Figure 17. Scatterplot of GPI and Arms Exports by Nation, 2000-2010



Notes: N=95. Data sources: GPI 2008 (1=most peaceful score, 4=least peaceful score); SIPRI (2012) data on arms exports – figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIV) expressed in US$ million at constant (1990) prices.

the top 50 and even top 20 of the GPI 2008: Germany (ranked 14th), France (36th), Great Britain (49th), the Netherlands (22nd), Sweden (13th), Italy (28th), Spain (30th), and Canada (11th). In addition, Switzerland (12th),which is not included in our sample (because it was not included in Gallup World poll data), scores extremely close to Canada in both the GPI and in arms export volume. Hence, it is clearthe GPI gives modern industrial nations a pass for purveying military technology aroundthe world, as they maintain highrankings in the Global Peace Index. Table 124 below highlights GPI inadequacies in several areas in which structure, culture, and history interact and overlap.

Anthropological research has documented divergent causes for external and internal conflict.Ross's (1986) study of 90 preindustrial societies argues that the causes of *external* violence and warfare stem from particular structural roots (high socioeconomic complexity, a lack of polygyny, and in the case of uncentralized societies – those with

Figure 18. Scatterplot After Removing the Two Outliers (USA and Russia)



Notes: N=93. Data sources: GPI 2008 (1=most peaceful score, 4=least peaceful score); SIPRI (2012) data on arms exports – figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIV) expressed in US$ million at constant (1990) prices.

Table 124. Critiques of the Global Peace Index

Critique	Explanation
Attitudinal indicators neglected	Analysis in the present study shows that correlations between the objective GPI indicators of peace are not significantly associated with the Gallup World Poll's subjective indicators of peaceful attitudes.
Internal and external indicators should be reported separately	The GPI weights external peace indicators at 40% of the overall GPI score, while internal peace indicators are weighted at 60%. This helps to give some core nations like the U.S. a higher peace score. The correlation between the external and internal measures of peace have been relatively weak in a number of years. Anthropological research suggests that there are discrete social causes for internal and external warfare (Ember and Ember 1971, Divale 1974, Ross 1986).
Need more indicators of peaceful policies/ behaviors: Peace and disarmament treaty support is neglected	Analysis in the present study shows that in some cases, subject indicators of peace (attitudinal data) better predicts treaty support than the objective indicators of the GPI.
Indicators of military spending shield wealthy nations	The GPI utilizes % of GDP devoted to military spending. An important additional indicator should be used: total military spending.
Arms exports do not significantly penalize GPI scores	Analysis in the present study shows that after removing the two clear outliers, the GPI and arms exports are negatively correlated (r = -0.21), significant at the .05 level. Hence, the more "peaceful" a nation is according to the GPI's criteria, the higher their volume of arms exports.
Limited historical indicators	The GPI includes only a limited record of historical conflicts (spanning a 5-year period). The WPI is an improvement in that it includes conflict data back to 1945. However, consider the data on war experiences by Sullivan (1991) graphed below. Although this data set from 1990 is old, it clearly shows that some nations are far more war prone than others (e.g., the U.S.), yet they are not penalized by the GPI for this track record.

Critique	Explanation
Indicators of gender violence neglected	Gender violence, as well as sexism and institutionalized forms of patriarchal violence are neglected.
Peace-as-justice neglected	The GPI neglects to include domestic indicators of inequality and poverty.
Peace defined as international justice neglected	The consequences of core nation dominated institutions like the WTO are neglected. Similarly, the greater responsibility/ resources of core nations in the potential for peace and justice promotion are neglected. The failure of the U.S., for example, to lead the U.N. through fighting global poverty, arms trade treaties, and democratic reforms of the U.N.'s governance structure has perpetuated structural and physical violence around the world.
American hegemony assumed to be benign	American hegemony is neglected. For instance, there is no indicator for the number of military bases abroad, and the indicator for the number of non-UN deployed troops was dropped from the GPI in 2009. Some might assume that U.S. military bases around the world help to keep the peace, as if there is a "Pax Americana" or a "Pax Britannica" before this. But Russett and Oneal (2001) found no evidence that these periods were more peaceful (pp.188-189). Moreover, there is strong evidence that between 1898 to 1994, the U.S. intervened "intervened successfully to change governments in Latin America a total of at least 41 times" (Coatsworth 2005).

weak cross-cutting ties and martial endogamy (the custom of marrying only within one's tribe or group)) which are distinct from the causes of *internal* violence (weak cross-cutting ties, polygyny, and in the case of uncentralized societies – those with strong localized male groups). Similarly, cross-cultural anthropological studies have found that matrilocality is linked to external warfare, while patrilocality is associated with internal fighting (Ember and Ember 1971, Divale 1974).

Of course, we should be very cautious about generalizing from preindustrial societies to industrial and postindustrial nations. In any case, the findings cited above should give us pause and grounds for accepting the utility of a single composite GPI score for each nation. Unfortunately, the producers of the GPI have not been transparent about reporting individual and external scores for each nation, but the GPI has reported correlations between the internal and external scores (see Table 125).

Table 125. Nation-Level Correlations Between Internal and External GPI Scores

GPI Year	Correlation Coefficients		
	External Peace & Internal Peace	External Peace & Overall GPI Score	Internal Peace & Overall GPI Score
2007	0.28	0.53	0.96
2008	0.40	0.62	0.97
2009	0.40	0.62	0.97
2010	0.32	0.59	0.96
2011	0.28	0.56	0.95

Gender Inequality

One of the most glaring failures of the GPI is its failure to include indicators of gender violence and gender inequality. Below, we see that Qatar (QAT), Botswana (BOT), Laos (LAO), and Malawi (MAW) score clearly above the mean of the GPI 2009, ranking as among the more "peaceful" nations, yet they score below the mean of the Gender Inequality Index, ranking among the nations with the least gender equality. Similarly, Mali (LMI) ranks in the top 5 nations with the greatest Gender Inequality, yet it falls just barely below the mean GPI score, and in the WPI, Mali scores above the mean (see below). While these may be outliers, they demonstrate that the GPI and WPI do not penalize nations for systemic forms of gender violence and inequality. However, gender inequality (as measured by the Gender Inequality Index) tends to be strongly and negatively associated with GPI scores ($r = -0.6594$, significant at the .0001 level) and with WPI scores (-0.7247, significant at the .0001 level). The scatterplots below (Figure 19 and Figure 20) depict these relatively robust correlations as most of the nations fall close to a trendline with a negative slope (i.e., a diagonal stretching from the upper left corner to the bottom right corner of the graphs).

Figure 19. GPI by Gender Inequality Index



Figure 20. WPI by Gender Inequality Index



Tracking U.S. Exceptionalism

I have briefly argued above that U.S. militarism is not accurately captured by the GPI's indicators. Although the U.S. is one of the most war prone nations (ranking in the top 4 (see Appendix BB)), it merely ranks near the middle of the pack in the GPI 2008. But, American exceptionalism (in a negative sense) finally emerges if we graph GPI 2008 nation ranks by type of society, type of state, and world-systems position (see Appendix BB). Among post-industrial nations and core nations, the U.S. is a clear outlier, ranking far lower in the GPI than nations enjoying similar levels of development and world-system position. Among older democracies, both the U.S. and India are clear outliers, ranking far lower in the GPI than other established democracies.

INDICATORS FROM OTHER CROSS-NATIONAL POLLS

Because the Gallup World Poll operationalizes violent/ nonviolent attitudes with only three indicators, additional cross-national data (from Pew and the World Values Survey (WVS)) was analyzed with the sole purpose of identifying possible "cultures of peace." Unfortunately, the samples sizes are limited, and Costa Rica is not included in these data sets (see Appendix CC). Again, the multidimensionality of nonviolent attitudes is suggested as we observe that any one attitudinal indicator can offer an inadequate basis from which to generalize. The task of weighting objective and subjective indicators of peace appropriately introduces significant challenges. A simple visual strategy is adopted through the presentation of a series of scatterplot graphs, helping us to identify possible candidates for "cultures of peace."

In Figure 21 below, we see the pattern identified by Listhaug (1986) found in data decades before: citizens in nations that lost during WWII including Italy, West Germany, and Japan report being less willing to fight a new war (p.73). Of course, Sweden was neutral during World War II. In the bottom right-hand quadrant we see that in nations such as Sweden, Mexico, and Peru, citizens are much more "willing to fight" in a hypothetical war, though they reject military prioritization (i.e., military spending) to a degree that rivals Germany, Italy, and Japan. Once again, this suggests the complexity and multidimensionality of peaceful attitudes. For instance, views of war are likely to interact with such context-dependent factors as a nation's previous experiences with war – victory or defeat, imperialist wars abroad, civil wars, "total wars" with civilian victimization, etc.

Figure 21. Two World Values Survey Indicators of Peaceful Attitudes with Trendline



Appendix CC charts national rankings in peace indicators from the recent large-scale cross-national polls in existence, while Appendix J charts rankings in smaller cross-national polls. In Table 1 of Appendix J we see that Costa Rica ranks very highly in peace in most indicators, but in Table 2 involving interpersonal violence, Costa Rica ranks merely in the middle on some measures, but still much more peaceful than the U.S. In Appendix CC we see that, among our case studies, Germany is a leading nation in peaceful attitudes in the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes (PGA) survey and the 2005 World Values Survey (WVS), except on the domestic violence item where it falls to the rank of 38th. The USA hovers near the bottom or the middle of the rankings on all items. Chile ranks in the top 13 or better on all items. Ghana ranks in the top 20 on the 2007 PGA, but in the bottom 20 on the 2005 WVS items. As will be discussed below in the Ghana chapter, Ghana's low rankings on the peace indicators in the WVS suggest that any "path dependency" notion (i.e., Ghana won independence through a nonviolent movement, and thus, might be expected to harbor a high percentage of nonviolent attitudes, according to path dependency theory's emphasis on the importance of national origins) must be sufficiently complex in accounting for national origins. Hence, accounts of Ghana's "national origins" should include the military coup that deposed Nkrumah as well as the nonviolent movement that helped bring independence (i.e., led by Nkrumah and inspired by Gandhi) and the election of Nkrumah. Note as well that India, another nation born partly through nonviolence (i.e., Gandhi's independence movement), partly through violence (i.e., the violent partition with Pakistan), hovers near the very bottom of all of these peace indicators from the PGA and WVS.

Below in Table 126, we consider further indications of how multifaceted attitudes towards violence and nonviolence are. Although the data spans several years, these are the largest cross-national datasets to date probing attitudes towards violence/ nonviolence. The world means on some of these items reveals relative global consensus in some peace attitudes including the following: those who affirm that wife beating is never justified (83%), political assassinations are never justified (78%), terrorism is never justified (76%), and a strong military should not rank in the top two priorities of our nation (73%). On other items, only minorities affirm peaceful attitudes, including the following: those who affirm that killing in self-defense is never justified (29%), that military force is not necessary to maintain order in the world (30%), and those not willing to fight for the nation in a war (38%). On still other issues, world publics appear to be relatively split, as suggested by the following: those who strongly approve of the disarmament movement (50%), those who believe nonviolence "will work" for oppressed groups (52%), and those who view state terrorism as never justified (66%).

From these ten indicators, a "Peace Attitudes Index" was constructed. Below in Figure 22, we see that 3 Hispanic cultures ranked in the top 5 of the Peace Attitudes Index: Spain, Argentina, and Chile. We also see that Japan and Germany rank highly in both the GPI and the Peace Attitudes Index. Of course, both nations experienced the extremes of militarism during World War II, heavy civilian victimization, and defeat. The U.S. "disarmed and occupied [Germany and Japan] and imposed an elaborate system of domestic institutional safeguards and external alliances designed to prevent their reemergence as military threats" (Berger 1998, p.4). In Japan, the U.S. Occupation even censored school textbooks to reinforce penitent views of Japanese war activities (Ienaga

Table 126. Large Cross-National Survey Items Testing Peaceful Attitudes

Variable name	Survey Question	Response Tracked	World Mean (N=18)	Std. Dev.	Source	N (sample size of nations)
indneverjust	"Some people think for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion?"	% responding: "Never justified"	76.17	10.72	Gallup World Poll 2008	104
milneverjust	"Some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion?"	% responding: "Never justified"	66.22	13.64	Gallup World Poll 2008	104
nvworks	"...Which do you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful means alone will not work for oppressed groups?"	% responding: "Will work"	52.39	10.09	Gallup World Poll 2008	104
notwilling	"Of course, we all hope there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?"	% responding: "No"	38.16	16.34	WVS 2005	99
beatneverjust	"For a man to beat his wife"	% responding: "Never justifiable"	82.76	10.26	WVS 2005	99
no_military _priority	"People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years...please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important" [Choices: "A high level of economic growth"; "A strong defence forces"; "People have more say about things"; "Trying to make our cities more beautiful"]	% NOT listing "A strong defence forces" as their first or second choice for the nation's priorities	73.06	14.00	WVS 2005	99
killneverjust	"Killing in self-defense"	% responding: "never justified"	29.28	10.38	WVS 1990; EVS 1981, 1990	41
strongly_approve _disarm	"Disarmament movement"	% responding: "strongly approve"	49.69	18.05	WVS 1990; EVS 1990	38
neverjust_assass	"Political assassinations"	% responding: "never justified"	78.39	10.04	WVS 1990; EVS 1981, 1990, 1999	45
pewnomilitary	"It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world"	% who "disagree" ("Mostly disagree" + "Completely disagree")	29.89	12.11	Pew Global Attitudes survey 2007	47

Note: N=sample size of nations (and in a few cases: regions); WVS = World Values Survey; EVS = European Values Survey

1994, p.123). Hence, even many of the ruling elites in Japan and Germany were virtually forced to embrace a kind of nonviolent posture in defense policies. In this way, the robust

peaceful attitudes in Germany and Japan suggest possible support for the "elite cues"/ "policy cues" model and the structural model of peace culture, as well as the historical/ experiential/ "learning" model.

Figure 22. Graphing GPI Scores By Peace Attitudes Index Scores



Notes: N =18 nations; Peace Attitudes Index consists of mean national averages on 10 survey questions taken from the international surveys (the 10 questions listed in Table 126 above)

The U.S., Germany, and Japan could all be considered outliers on the world stage, due to their particular histories and traditions of militarism (Ehrenreich 1997). The degree to which the mass publics of Japan and Germany turned toward pacifism following World War II is a matter of debate (Kim 2008, Rathburn 2006). There are strong grounds for asserting that Germany (Schrafstetter 2004), as well as Japan did turn decisively away from militarism, though some emphasize that in Japan it was forced upon them by General MacArthur, "not the result of self-reflexive internal consensus" (Kim 2008, p.67). Recently, the pacifist policies structurally enshrined in their Constitution (Article

9), have become an increasingly contested issue (Samuels 2004). In both nations, demilitarization began to be reversed as the U.S. sought military allies during the Cold War (Berger 1998), and this turn towards limited re-militarizing even contributed to subtle shifts away from pacifism in Japanese history textbooks (Ienaga 1994).

If Alice Walker (2004) is correct in her claim about oppressors that "nothing short of total destruction will ever teach them anything" (p.363), Japan and Germany are likely candidates for learning through their WWII experiences of "total destruction." Some scholars have theorized on this proposition, but primarily in off-handed or non-systematic ways. Norman Finkelstein (2009), scholar of the Holocaust and human rights advocate, offered a theory that the militarism and racism of Germany was purged through WWII:

> It's a real paradox that the best thing that ever happened to Germany was Nazism. It was God- awful, the worst thing to happen to its victims, but to Germany it was Nazism and the defeat of Nazism that finally knocked sense into that society. And post-war Germany, the Germany of today, the young people – are by far and away the most morally serious, the most intelligent of all the European countries.

Finkelstein did not define what he means by "morally serious," but his suggestive explanation for the production of morals is compelling. However, in terms of principled and pragmatic nonviolent attitudes measured by the Gallup World Poll (the most comprehensive survey to date), Germany does not rank particularly high. In the military attacks on civilians item, German ranked 28th out of 105 nations with 73% of respondents affirming that military attacks on civilians are "never justified" (Gallup World Poll 2008). In the nonviolent efficacy item, German ranked 82nd out of 109 nations with 48% of respondents affirming that peaceful means alone "will work" for oppressed groups (Gallup World Poll 2008).This is somewhat surprising given the fact that, among other indicators of nonviolent attitudes, the number of conscientious objector applications in

Germany has grown (accompanied by a streamlined rubber-stamp process of approval) from 6,000 a year in 1967, to 68,000 in 1983, and 189,000 in 2002 (Cortright 2008).

Comparing Pew and Gallup data

Because the Pew Global Attitudes 2007 survey and Gallup World Poll 2008 only share 37 nations in their respective samples, only a limited comparison of survey items can be made. Table 127 documents the correlations. Graphing the Pew and the Gallup indicators revealsthat Japan ranks decidedly low in the Pew indicator (% affirming that miltary force is sometimes necessary) suggesting for all of the discussions about Japanese pacifism, there is more than a touch of political realism/ just war ideology that is prominent in the culture. Likewise, Berger (1998) argues that neither Germany nor Japan can be described as "pacifist," but "antimilitarist" is accurate for both nations (p.1). In Figure 23 below, we see that Japan ranks very highly in the Gallup World Poll indicator concerning military attacks on civilians. In fact, Japan tied with Iraq for 3rd in the world on this item, out of 105 nations, with 90% of Japanese affirming that military attacks on civilians are never justified.

Table 127. Nation-Level Data: Pearson Product-Moment Correlations

	nvworks	milneverjust	indneverjust	GPI 2008
pewnomilitary	-.27	.45**	.46**	.34*

Notes: N=37. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; "pewnomilitary" = % of citizens who "disagree" ("Mostly disagree" + "Completely disagree") on question: "It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world" (Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2007). Sources: Gallup World Poll 2008; Pew Global Attitudes 2007

If Costa Rican student results from the present survey sample could be graphed below, they would rank more peaceful than Argentina (ARG) on both indicators, as 41% of Costa Rican students Disagreed that "Military force is sometimes necessary" (replication of the Pew question); 89% of Costa Rican students affirmed that "military attacks on civilians are never justified" (Gallup question). This would place them spatially directly above Japan and make them one of the top 5 most peaceful nations in

the graph below, if the indicators were weighted equally. However, we established in Chapter 5 that Costa Rican University students' means score is +14% higher on the "military attacks" item than the general Costa Rican population. On the other hand, we saw above that the Costa Rican University students perceived the general population to be more peaceful on the Pew question than they are themselves (see Questions Q6.gg and Q6.hh in Appendix B).

Figure 23. Graphing Mean Attitudes Towards State Terrorism and Military Force In General



In Figure 24 below, we see that the trend line has a negative slope (i.e., the correlation (r = -.27) is negative), but it is not significant at the .05 level. As further evidence of a pervasive disconnect between these two attitudes at the nation-level (i.e., nonviolence works and military force is not necessary), there is a completely blank space

Figure 24. Graphing Mean Attitudes Towards Pragmatic Nonviolence and Military Force



Note: In the graph above, based on replications included in the present survey, Costa Rican students would rank almost exactly where Mexico (MEX) falls (actually directly below Mexico) in the scatterplot, as 41% of Costa Rican students Disagreed that "Military force is sometimes necessary" (replication of the Pew question); 61% of Costa Rican students affirmed that "peaceful means alone will work" (Gallup question). This would make Costa Rica one of the most peaceful nations above, if the indicators were weighted equally. However, we established in Chapter 5 that Costa Rican University students' means core is -12% lower on the "peaceful means alone" item than the general Costa Rican population.

in the upper right-hand quadrant: no nations rank robustly on both indicators. I argue that this disconnect between principled and pragmatic nonviolent ideological viewssuggests the presence of very unstable nonviolent attitudes among many respondents within these nations. I make this claim because both scholars (e.g., Kaplowitz 1973) and activists (Alinsky 1971) have observed a dialectic between means and ends. That is, where violent strategies are viewed as necessary or effective, they quickly become rationalized and legitimated in and through moral frames. Strategies that are perceived to "work," become seen as moral. Thus, nations like Germany and Japan would seem to be caught in ideological contradictions: a clear majority rejects military force, and yet less than half of

respondents affirm that peaceful means will work for oppressed groups.Japan ranked close to last in the world on the nonviolent efficacy item, ranking 103rd out of 109 nations, with only 33% of respondents affirming that peaceful means alone "will work" for oppressed groups (Gallup World Poll 2008).

Additional graphs crossing indicators from the GPI, and the Pew and Gallup polls (see Appendix Z), show Japan and Germany ranking as the most peaceful nations in many of the graphs, if we assume "most peaceful" is indicated by an equal weighting of the two variables of each graph (i.e., occupying the upper-right hand corner of the graph, where the maximum values of each indicator merge). Once again, the exception to this pattern is that Germany and especially Japan, rank low in confidence that nonviolence works. In addition, Spain, South Korea, and Egypt rank quite highly in several of the graphs. Nevertheless, given the fact that the Gallup World Poll draws from a larger sample size, and Germany and Japan do not rank especially high in some of the Gallup items, it is difficult to conclude, relative to other nations around the world, that Germany and Japan really are exemplary "cultures of peace" in the realm of attitudes, though they do perform very well on some indicators.

CHAPTER V

SEARCHING FOR COLLECTIVE MEMORIES OF NONVIOLENCE

TEXTBOOK PORTRAYALS OF NONVIOLENCE: SHADOW CASES

This chapter undertakes a cross-national analysis of collective memories of nonviolence. Table 128 below lists the key nonviolent episodes selected for analysis, and Appendix DD lists the textbooks analyzed, by nation. Many of these events transpired over 60 years ago. This time lag is ideal in that it allows for collective memory processes to unravel and gel into relative consensus. Recent events and even recent decades are very often excluded from government-approved and corporation-produced history textbooks. This is likely linked to the felt imperative to avoid controversy.

Table 128. Cases Studies and Outcomes

Nation	Campaign	Outcome: Coded by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008)	Indicator of collective memory outcome: National mean % affirming nonviolence will work (Gallup World Poll 2010)
Chile	1931 nonviolent overthrow of Ibanez regime	success	59%
	1983-1989 nonviolent overthrow of Pinochet regime	success (ousted)	
Costa Rica	1919 partly nonviolent overthrow of the dictator Tinoco	NA [success]	73%
	1947 Arms Down Strike	NA [limited success]	
	1948-1949 nonviolent demilitarization process	NA [success]	
El Salvador	1944, Strike of Fallen Arms against Martinez dictatorship	success	56%
Germany	1920 noncooperation with a military coup	NA [success]	53%
	1923 nonviolent resistance of French occupation (Ruhrkampf resistance)	success	
	1940-1945, nonviolent resistance of Danes against Nazis	limited success	
	1944, nonviolent resistance of Norwegians against Nazis	limited success	
	1943, nonviolent resistance of German wives of Jews against Nazis	NA [success]	
Ghana	1951-1957, nonviolent independence movement	success (ousted)	69%
	2000, Rawlings government ousted	success (ousted)	
Guatemala	1944, nonviolent overthrow of the Ubico regime and a few months later, the Vaides regime	success	57%
Norway	1942, nonviolent resistance of Norwegians against Nazis	limited success	48%
U.S.A.	1946-1948 Jackie Robinson and Branch Rickey lead racial integration efforts with an explicit nonviolent strategy	NA [success]	54%

Note: NA = Not analyzed by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008); [success] = the consensus view of scholars

Rather than arguing that textbooks are definitive instruments of student indoctrination, which they may be to some degree, I emphasize that textbooks are

indicators of hegemonic ideology reproduced through a social and bureaucratic process of knowledge selection, interpretation, and construction. The creation of these consensus views of national historical narratives serves to center power, center knowledge, and center ideology. The power and knowledge that is centered demarcates the legitimate/ realistic (i.e., ideological) boundaries of the imagination – a process that instills reified/ naturalized concepts. The capacity to imagine a different world is severely handicapped.

I argue that the failure of history textbooks around the world to theorize nonviolent action and their frequent glossing over of successful nonviolent revolutions, nonviolent movements, and nonviolent tactics is significant. The omission of nonviolent history and failure to give nonviolent adherents voice serves to perpetuate hegemonic ideologies of violence.

The Equal Neglect of Military Strategies?: An Exception that Proves the Rule

A counter-argument presents itself. It can be argued that violence is also not theorized and the strategies and tactics of war and armed conflict are also rarely discussed in the textbooks. But I contend that violence is widely taken for granted as a necessary and effective means of conflict resolution around the world. Thus, there is no need to theorize or explain what is widely assumed and hiding in plain sight: the myth of redemptive violence (Wink 1992).

Of course, textbook narratives are shaped by a variety of constraints, including concision and avoidance of controversy. The result is as if textbooks were reverse engineered to be boring - with less narrative arcs and colorful details and more a collection of stripped down facts (Loewen 2007). As an example of how not just nonviolence, but also the tactics and strategies of military leaders are also ignored by

textbook authors, consider the case of the Siege of Detriot during the War of 1812 – surely one of the more interesting battlefield tactics in the history of warfare, and one that produced a quick and nonviolent resolution to the battle. Tecumseh directed his 400 to 700 warriors (sources vary in their estimates; Gilber (1989) states that General Brock had 600 men and General Hull had 1,500 men inside Fort Detroit and 500 outside (pp.284-285)) to emerge from the woods in a clearing visible to the fort, and circle back and repeat in a steady line of rushing men, so that to the soldiers in the fort, it appeared to be surrounded by thousands of warriors. Tecumseh's tactic in the siege was brilliant, and yet simple and entertaining enough to delight my 6-year old son during a 2-minute bed-time story that I improvised, with the laughable largely bloodless surrender. A Canadian militia captain recounted the tactic: "Tecumseh extended his men, and marched them three times through an opening [in the woods at the rear of the fort] in full view of the garrison, which induced them to believe there were at least two or three thousand Indians" (Sugden 1997, p.303). Berton (1980) recounts the incident in this way, Brock ordered Tecumseh and his Indians to "march in single file across an open space, out of range but in full view of the garrison. The spectacle has some of the quality of a vaudeville turn. The Indians lope across the meadow, vanish into the forest, circle back and repeat the maneuver three times. Hull's officers, who cannot tell one Indian from another, count fifteen hundred painted savages, screeching and waving tomahawks. Hull is convinced he is outnumbered...is on the verge of giving up without a fight...appears on the edge of nervous collapse (p.177). Subsequently, a couple of fired cannonballs hit the fort, killing a few American soldiers, and within hours, Hull offered a full surrender. While it is certainly possible that Brock ordered Tecumseh to perform the ruse (as Berton

(1980) records), it is also plausible that the idea came from Tecumseh, especially given circumstantial evidence that Brock honored and thanked Tecumseh to an unusual degree. At noon on August 16, Tecumseh rode on horseback side by side with Brock into Fort Detroit to accept the American General Hull's formal surrender. And at that time, Tecumseh wore the formal wide red sash of Brock, which Brock had given him as a token of thanks (Gilbert 1989, p.285).

Gilbert (1989) pushes us to reflect on collective memory processes, writing that this was a "moment of delicious triumph" for Tecumseh: "It is *not remembered* as such *because it was such an easy, bloodless thing* but the capture of Detroit and an entire army of the United States was the most strategically significant red [Native American] accomplishment during the nearly 300 years of conflict in North America...it was a collective, racial victory" (p.285). Consistent with the thesis we are advancing, Gilbert suggests that Tecumseh's triumph at Detroit has not been remembered as a triumph because it was bloodless, nonviolent. It seems even unusual, tactically brilliant nonviolent action of military leaders is outcompeted in the collective memory by the pain and suffering of ordinary violent acts. Tecumseh's military tactics are the exception that proves the rule – nonviolence is routinely forgotten.

The historical evidence suggests that the presence of the Indian warriors had played the crucial role in the surrender, in particular because General Hull was afraid that a massacre was imminent – and many women and children were inside the fort. The British General Brock (the leader allied with Tecumseh), in a clear attempt at psychological warfare, even sent Hull a message in which he stoked fears of a massacre and again emphasized how many Indians were gathered outside the fort. Brock wrote, "It

is far from my intention to join in a war of extermination, but you must be aware, that the numerous body of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops, will be beyond control the moment the contest commences" (p.284). Hull "was overcome by a generalized fear of savages, one fed by hundreds of the hordes-from-hell stories which had been circulating among western whites for three generations" (pp.285-286).

Brock engaged in still more tactical trickery during the Siege of Detroit. Brock wrote a bogus document exaggerating the number of Indian warriors gathered outside the fort and as a ruse, deliberately had the document "captured" by the Americans (Heidler and Heidler 1997, p.153; Hickey 1995, p.24;). For his cowardice and neglect of duty on this occasion, Hull was later court-martialed and sentenced to death, but President James Madison "commuted the sentence because of Hull's age and Revolutionary War service" (Heidler and Heidler 1997, p.154).

Unfortunately, the shorthand style of the high school history textbooks obscure every engaging detail of battlefield tactics. In the text by Davidson and Lytle (1990), the credit for the tactic is also taken away from Tecumseh: "At Detroit, the British tricked Hull into believing that he faced a much larger force than was actually the case. Hull abruptly surrendered his army without firing a shot" (p.210). Even more economical is the text by Ayers et al. (2009): "Tecumseh then joined the British in a campaign to capture Detroit and invade Ohio" (p.226). Not to be outdone, the text by Lapsansky-Werner et al. (2008) limits discussion of this event to one sentence as well as a map of the "Major Battles of the War of 1812" in which we read: "2. Detroit, Aug. 1812 – British capture the city from Hull" (p.217). Within the text, the "battle" and tactics are obscured more than clarified, as we read, "One blundering general, William Hull,

surrendered Detroit to a much smaller British force commanded by Isaac Brock and assisted by Indians led by Tecumseh" (p.216). Similarly, the text by Appleby et al. (2005) tells us that Tecumseh was a "superb commander" but presents no example of his battlefield leadership (p.230). Again, the surrender of Detroit is misrepresented and obscured. We are told in one sentence that "The British navy on Lake Erie rapidly shuttled troops to Detroit and forced the American commander, General William Hull, to surrender" (p.230). On the next page a supplementary map of the War of 1812 labels "Ft. Detroit – Aug.16, 1812" with a golden explosion outlined in red, the symbol for a British victory (p.231). The fact that there were so few explosions in the battle are obscured on the map as well as the text.

So, if violent tactics also receive short shrift in textbooks, why is the neglect of nonviolent tactics and strategies significant? I suggest it is because nonviolent movements can challenge conventional assumptions about the utility of violence, but only if nonviolent tactics are explicitly recognized as "nonviolent" and if their efficacy is theorized. That is, nonviolent movements introduce a counter-frame than undermines the hegemonic ideologies of violence including militarism, just war, and the myth of redemptive violence. We can see the hegemonic ideology at work, when we consider that nonviolent leaders like Gandhi and King have been compelled to explain why nonviolence works much more than military generals and other practitioners of violence are called upon to explain why violence might work.

Moreover, I contend there is an unacknowledged problem of great sociological significance in the peace studies/ nonviolence literature. The problem is that a great many of the published case studies of nonviolent social movements need a caveat, which should

read: “Incidentally, there is virtually no *collective memory* of this event. It is a non-event in the ‘official history’ of the nation.”

The Latin American Cases

Inthe 2010 Gallup World Poll, 59% of Chilean respondents said peaceful means alone “will work,” compared with 57% in Guatemala and 56% in El Salvador These national averages score very close to the worldwide average of 57.9%.When we consider that all three of these nations have experienced spectacular nonviolent movement successes in their history, we might interrogate the public opinion data within a different frame. Rather than purely an opinion question, the question probes for historical and contemporary knowledge of political events. That is, it is likely to push respondents to draw upon their historical knowledge and to recall cases where peaceful means alone worked for oppressed groups, or did not work. Why is the popular awareness of the efficacy of nonviolence not stronger, given that mass street actions have brought down governments in Peru (2000), Argentina (2001), Bolivia (2003 and 2005), and Ecuador (2000 and 2005)? (Buono and Lara 2006) Do Chileans recall that in 1931, the president of Chile was overthrown in a mass nonviolent movement? More recently, is the overthrow of Pinochet remembered by Chileans in terms of specifically*nonviolent* action, or “peaceful means alone”/ primarily peaceful means? And, do Guatemalans recall that in 1944, mass nonviolent movements played pivotal roles in overthrowing not one but two home-grown dictators? Do El Salvadorans recall the 1944 nonviolent movement that toppled their own dictator? And, do state-approved textbooks in each country depict these events accurately?

El Salvador. El Salvador's textbook representation of the 1944 nonviolent revolution is a case where an outsider – a U.S. academic – *perceived* and *named* the revolution *as nonviolent,* and a government bureaucracy, the Ministry of Education under a conservative President (President Elías Antonio Saca), sponsored a collective memory that is an accurate portrayal of a nonviolent revolution transpiring some 60 years before. This suggests a role that outsiders/ third-parties can play in preserving the collective memory of dissident history, a theme we will return to again in the case of Guatemala.

Saca's administration (2004-2009) was not progressive in its policies. In fact, when a New York-based foundation linked to the Vatican curiously awarded a Catholic peace prize to Saca in 2008, representatives of 40 human rights NGOs and church groups delivered a letter bearing 750 signatures protesting the decision to give Saca the award (Marrin 2008). Moreover, Saca was a member of the conservative ARENA party, a party founded by the man who is said to be the "intellectual author" of the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero and also responsible for thousands of deaths linked to death squads during the civil war (p.16). And, Saca's administration resisted attempts to investigate war crimes during the civil war of 1980 to 1992 (p.16).

But the crucial factor is that Saca's ARENA party, though conservative, had no historical ties to the Martinez dictatorship. Hence, the Ministry of Education's account of the 1944 nonviolent revolution does not reflect political bias or sharp ideological leanings, but rather the distance and relative objectivity that such long time lags bring. Today, there is no political capital at stake in defending or distorting the memory of the dictator General Hernandez Martinez. In fact, in a survey of 8 nations, El Salvador had the lowest percentage of respondents affirming that "In some occasions, dictatorship is

good," with a national mean even lower than Costa Rica (see Appendix I). This helps explain why the 1944 nonviolent revolution is depicted relatively accurately in El Salvador's 2009 government-approved high school history textbook.

A practical issue also shapes the textbook's content. The Ministry of Education chose a digital file format accessible via the internet. Compared to other Central American nations, this allowed the Ministry to roughly double the textbook's coverage while saving costs on publication. With more coverage, there are likely to be fewer egregious omissions in coverage.

The textbook portrait of the 1944 nonviolent revolution relies on U.S. collective memory and knowledge production resources in three ways. First, the U.S. academic Patricia Parkman's analysis of the revolution is drawn upon and cited. Second, "Historians in the United States National Archives..." are drawn upon in their analysis of letters from the U.S. ambassador (MINED 2009, p.125). Third, the textbook's portrait of the President Hernandez Martinez relies heavily on an interview conducted by a *Time* magazine correspondent. Thus, the role of U.S. resources (financial, archival, journalistic, and intellectual) in helping to chronicle the history of a developing nation like El Salvador is demonstrated.

The text adopts *Time*'s description of General Martinez as a "grumpy grandpa" (MINED 2009, p.118). The text does not flinch from describing him as a "dictator," as "totalitarian," as an army man exercising "vertical" power [hierarchical], who "served the interests of the few" – "his idea of ruling was very distant from the idea of a democracy."

This transparent depiction of the dictator is matched by a straightforward account of the general strike. Unlike portrayals of pivotal general strikes in many other nations,

the events are recounted accurately, though in the typical highly abbreviated form of textbooks. Few significant details are missing, a real rarity for textbook portraits of nonviolent revolution. A few critiques can be made. The textbook's shorthand narrative utterly fails to capture how the strike spread day by day, from town to town, from sector to sector of the economy and the government. For this reason, Parkman's (1990) abbreviated timeline of events (pp.33-34), ironically, offers far more drama than the prose of the textbook narration. A significant omitted detail which merits inclusion is the fact that business owners "...financed the movement both by paying their own employees for the enforced vacations [i.e., strikes] and by contributing to the expenses of the movement" (p.10). Other missing details are relatively minor, but the text neglects to mention, for instance, that on May 8, all government employees walked out, bus drivers joined the strike and buses disappeared from the streets of the capital city, and a "huge crowd" gathered in front of the National Palace (p.34).

In an excerpt from the *Time* interview, Martinez dismisses and trivializes the student strike, then ongoing, saying that "students do not like to attend school in any part of the world" (p.118). Martinez rants against utopian intellectuals who, he says, fomented the student strike: "Our intellectual read a lot of books, and try to reform the world according to the writings of their favorite authors. The workers have nothing to do with the sedition that is happening at the moment" (p.118). But a few pages later the text shows that Martinez's claim about workers was wrong.

The text reports that some intellectuals like Joaquin Castro Canizales "...advocated for a peaceful opposition like the one that Gandhi was leading in India..." (MINED 2009, p.121). And in two places in the text the strike is called "the strike of

fallen arms" (p.121, p.124). The text also suggests that a failed military coup and the government's harsh repression of the conspirators (sentencing numerous soldiers to be executed) meant that "the military solution was ruled out" and the nonviolent strategy advocated by Castro Canizales was now "taken more seriously" (p.121). Moreover, the government's repression resulted in "massive opposition, for which the government found itself unprepared" (p.121). This is a clear instance of popular distaste for violent repression, which nonviolent theorists have called "political jiu-jitsu" (Sharp 1973), "the paradox of repression" (Smithey and Kurtz 1999), and the "critical dynamic" (McAdam 1999). Later in the strike, on May 7, when police shot at boys protesting in the street, killing one, popular reaction against violent repression may have again played a role in the escalation of protests (Parkman 1990, p.34).

But there are few other clues in the text that the movement had an explicit nonviolent strategy, except in a couple of quotations (taken from a book by the U.S. historian Patricia Parkman, who is credited) from the first leaflet issued by the Student Strike Committee on April 19, 1944. The student authors of the leaflet admit to readers, very much in the mode of pragmatic nonviolence: "We are not in any condition to initiate a revolution nor is it necessary to have more innocent blood shed" (p.124). The strategic rationale here at least comes close to nonviolence chosen as a fallback position simply because arms are lacking. And, the leaflet urges readers to "Behave like a man and not like an animal" (p.124). Recognizing that nonviolent protest will take courage they write, "Let us unite...and...shake with manliness the yoke that is oppression" (p.124).

After university students went on strike on April 26, the text reports on the emergence of a general strike: "Soon, high school students, teachers, theater employees,

market vendors, doctors, dentists, lawyers, judges and railway workers joined. Closures of commercial establishments spread quickly, a good number of workers joined the strike" (p.121). The text recounts that strikers refused to work until Martinez resigned. It tells how Martinez made threats against the strikers, mobilized hundreds of supporters, and realized violence could not put down the strike. The text emphasizes that it was "an extraordinary strike that employed only peaceful tactics" (p.119). With "crowds on the streets of the capital" on May 8, Martinez resigned (p.121). When Martinez left the country on May 11th, the strike ended.

Perhaps the most interesting addition in the textbook beyond Parkman's (1990) account, is that a young U.S. citizen and "member of one of the elite families" was shot by police in one of the protests in El Salvador in early May of 1944 (p.121). This prompted a visit by the U.S. ambassador to President Martinez and his Foreign Minister. Citing letters written by the U.S. ambassador, the text documents serious fears by Martinez and his advisors that this incident could lead to "the humiliation of armed intervention from the government of the United States" (p.125). It seems clear that the U.S. ambassador was quite annoyed that the Martinez administration expressed no regret (though two police officers had been detained, with charges pending against them), and this annoyance was misinterpreted as serious hostility, leading to fear of U.S. intervention. In fact, the U.S. had no such plans, but apparently the U.S. ambassador advised Martinez to resign which he did the very next day (p.121, p.125). So the text strongly implies the incident may have played a role in Martinez's decision to step down. Ironically, the nonviolent revolution may have received a little help from dumb luck (the odds that a U.S. citizen would be killed in the protests were remote) and the deeply

engrained fear of the regional Leviathon, U.S. hegemony. U.S. intervention and fears of it have played a role in the overthrow of many Latin American leaders, but usually for more systemic economic and political concerns, not, as in this case, for the accidental killing of a single U.S. citizen.

Chile: The context. National history is taught in Chile during the sophomore year of high school. The national standards mandating in-class time allotments recently lowered history instruction from 4 to 3 hours per week. Textbooks are approved by Chile's Ministry of Education, and a convenience sample of a handful of teachers in 2011 revealed that at least some teachers perceive they could be fired for straying from the curriculum. Private schools however can use their own textbooks, and in many of these schools, parents monitor teachers and also help to shape the curriculum. We should note that private schools have boomed in Chile since the 1980s when education became more decentralized (shifting authority from the federal to municipal government), funding for public education was cut deeply, and a voucher system was implemented. In 1980, private school enrollment was 12%, today over 50% of Chilean students attend private schools (Pons 2012), while neoliberal elites in the U.S. like the Cato Institute, have watched this development with admiration (e.g., Elacqua et al. 2011). Such a neo-liberal driven abandonment of public institutions is worthy of serious investigation. The consequences of decentralizing education for collective memory-making processes and outcomes inclusive of social justice perspectives is poorly understood, though it could open pockets of space for memory entrepreneurs by shifting the site of contention to local contexts. Still, when you remove middle-class parents (who enjoy greater cultural and social capital) from the public schools, "the most vocal advocates for quality in the

schools are eliminated" (Arnove et al. 1997, p.283). The decentralization/ municipalization of the Chilean educational system continues to be debated, with the right-wing supporting it and leftists seeking more state control (Burton 2012). In any case, the present project maintains a focus on government-approved public school textbooks because they represent one institutionalized outcome of contentious collective memory processes.

Given Chile's history of dictatorship and stark ideological shifts, what effect has government control of public school textbooks had? Consider developments in the Allende era, the Pinochet era, and today. Joseph Farrell (1986) argues that the Allende administration's brazen attempt at Marxist indoctrination of Chile's schoolchildren through the National Unified School (ENU) curriculum, proved to be the key factor in "destroying" the Allende revolution. Although Barnard (1987) believes Farrell overstates his case, she agrees the ENU was one important factor in mobilizing opposition forces and Allende's eventual overthrow. One lesson here may be that the 36% plurality of votes that elected Allende did not represent a mandate for sweeping social change (Ellner 2006, p.102).

The Pinochet era institutionalized curriculum that swept the recent past under the rug. Patricio Guzmán's (1997) documentary film "Chile, Obstinate Memory" shows Guzmán screening his earlier film "The Battle of Chile" on the 1973 coup, to Chilean students who had little knowledge of the events other than sanitized government-sanctioned accounts. In the 1997 film, many Chilean students register shock and disbelief at Guzmán's documentary on the coup. Turning again to opinion poll data, one indicator of collective memories of Pinochet can be discerned in a survey conducted in the late

1990s which asked Chileans to respond to the following statement: “In some occasions, dictatorship is good.” The percentage of Chileans answering “strongly agree” or “agree” on this item was 11.8% (McAlister, Orpinas, and Velez 1999).

Recent government leaders have waffled in their approach to state-sanctioned history. Some have felt even sanitized accounts are less than ideal, compared to the option of enforced silence. In 2009, under the conservative Sebastián Piñera administration, the government-approved Chilean high school history textbook by Montero et al. (2009) ends coverage of the 20th century around 1920. Of course, this cut-off point conveniently omits any discussion of the controversial Allende and Pinochet eras. In context, the preference for official silence makes perfect sense. In late 2009, the right-wing Piñera, while running for President, surrounded himself with Pinochet cabinet leaders (Barrionuevo 2010b), and in 2012 it was noted that Piñera’s “majority in parliament depends in part on the right-wing Independent Democratic Union, which supported General Pinochet” (BBC 2012). Back in 1998, Piñera reflected a pro-Pinochet bias as he objected to efforts by Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon to extradite Pinochet for human rights violations, a move which Piñera called a violation of Chile’s sovereignty (La Nacion 2009). But leftist Chilean Presidents like Eduardo Frei (President 1994-2000), had also opposed Spanish attempts to prosecute Pinochet abroad, though his loyalty to Pinochet may have changed with recent findings that the Pinochet regime killed Frei’s father through poisoning (Barrionuevo 2010a). At the end of 2011, this textbook omitting most of the 20th century was still the government-mandated history textbook.

In 2012, the National Education Council announced specific changes in the history curriculum's account of the Pinochet era. Although the Education Minister denied that the center-right Piñera administration had directly influenced the changes, the changes outraged the political left in Chile who accused the administration of "trying to whitewash history" (BBC 2012). The key change at issue – Pinochet's rule will no longer be called a "dictatorship," instead it will be called a "regime" or "military regime." Just a few months later, a pro-Pinochet documentary film about his "regime" was released by wealthy right-wing pro-Pinochet supporters, again sparking outrage and protests (Bonnefoy 2012).

Pushing past these recent trends, we analyze the 2006 government-mandated textbook by Rivas et al. (2006). Soon after the election of Michelle Bachelet (a center-leftist of the Socialist party) as President of Chile, the Rivas et al. (2006) government-approved textbook (for use in 2007-2008) covered history through 2003, including the controversial periods of Chile's recent past. Nevertheless, in this textbook key events of nonviolent action in Chile's history are neglected and distorted. Though Bachelet herself was a torture victim of Pinochet's regime (Barrionuevo 2010c), criticism of Pinochet in the textbook is somewhat muted. For example, we are never told in the text itself that Allende died or was killed. Instead, two small photographs of newspapers appear in the text, one with a headline, "Allende dead," the other with a headline, "Allende commits suicide" (p.314). In the text itself, readers are left to fill in the blanks.

If the *violence* of the recent past is still too painful and controversial for some Chileans to look in the eye, one might expect that *nonviolent* actors in the historical narrative might earn a place in the collective memory, since nonviolent action itself

prefigures the fragile turn towards national reconciliation. But no, the textbook curiously omits mention of prominent nonviolent leaders in key junctures of national history.

Chile has long been cited as an exemplary case of nonviolent resistance. Dudouet (2008) lists Chile (1983-1989) among the 32 most significant cases of nonviolent resistance campaigns since 1945 (p.9). In a large cross-national study of nonviolence, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) classify Chile (1983-1989) as the site of a "nonviolent" movement that achieved "success" by ousting the Pinochet regime, and Chile (1931) as the site of a "nonviolent" movement that achieved "success" in removing the Ibáñez regime from power. Let us first consider the textbook's description of this overthrow of Chile's president in 1931:

> The consequences of the Great Depression were so deep… Due to the crisis, there was a strong, popular and radical middle, represented by students and professional associations, which generated a political crisis that ended with the overthrow of Ibáñez in July 1931. (Rivas et al. 2006, p.264)

While such abbreviated narrative shorthands are the nuts and bolts of textbooks which cover centuries of national history, in this case we should note how many interesting details are left out, especially since they illustrate so well a larger cross-national pattern: the omission of significant nonviolent movements in hegemonic national collective memories. One explanation may rest in the fact that "leaderless" movements (or leaderful), like Chile in 1931, often seem to escape a resilient place in collective memory. Scholars have noted that collective memories of social movements tend to coalesce around one iconic leader, in whose shadow even prominent social movement *organizations* tend to be forgotten within a few generations (Eddy 2012, pp.190-191). Schwartz (2009) argues that this process exemplifies "oneness," society's need for

personified ideals. But the deeper explanation for the omissions must push towards more explicitly political accounts of collective memory processes.

Table 129. Significant Omissions of the Rivas et al. (2006) Textbook Portrayal of Chile's (1931) Struggle Against Ibáñez's Dictatorial Rule

1) The words "nonviolent"/ "nonviolence," "peaceful struggle," "passive resistance" and cognate terms are never used, though protestors themselves used the latter two phrases to mobilize citizens and frame their actions.
2) There is no mention of the street demonstrations.
3) The general strikes and threats of strikes by numerous professions and trades are never mentioned.
4) A clear historical case in which nonviolent methods proved effective is obscured through a form of extreme narrative shorthand. The result is that readers are not exposed to a significant case of national history in which nonviolent methods were a successful tool for social change.

What really happened in 1931? Parkman (1990) recounts that strikes probably placed the biggest role in bringing down the dictator, but demonstrations with mixed violent and nonviolent tactics played a role. Some anti-Ibáñez demonstrators shot at police, some carried guns in marches, some rioted, but most demonstrations were nonviolent. And, activists framed their actions and attempted to mobilize fellow workers and citizens by appealing to nonviolent ideals and tactics. For example, a leaflet urging Chilean bank employees to strike stated:

> WITHOUT ARMS, WITH IDEALS ALONE WE WILL OVERTHROW THE MURDERERS AND THIEVES.…Yes, comrades, peaceful struggle is necessary since we do not have violent means to overthrow the TYRANT. WE ARE GOING TO STRIKE. LET US PARALYZE THE NATION…If you are Patriots…grasp the arm of passive resistance. (p.15)

The textbook account glosses over key details and neglects to describe or explain how ordinary people organizing and engaging in non-cooperation brought down a dictator.

Table 130. What Really Happened: Timeline of 1931 Ibáñez Overthrow

July 13	□ Financial crisis escalates, President Ibáñez appoints a new cabinet to restore constitutional liberties
July 17	□ Cabinet proposes austerity measures □ Opponents of Ibáñez found Union Civilista to resist return to dictatorial rule
July 21	□ Cabinet resigns □ Union Civilista prepares for action □ Anti- Ibáñez demos begin
July 22	□ National University students strike, occupy main university building (and in mostly symbolic action, shoot guns at police) □ Union Civilista, National & Catholic University students plan for a general strike by all citizens, network with professional organizations and workers, to bring down Ibáñez
July 23	□ Assembly of doctors declare solidarity with students, call on Ibáñez to resign, declare readiness to strike □ Second cabinet resigns □ Students, still occupying the University, exchange fire with police
July 24	□ Joining the general strike, doctors suspend all but emergency care □ Lawyers and architects vote to strike
July 25	□ Shops in Santiago are closed; Courts shut down □ Dentists, school teachers, pharmacists, accountants, bank employees, and others declare themselves on strike. Bakers, slaughterhouse workers, and railroad workers will strike beginning on July 27. □ Engineers vote to suspend work and cut light and water in Santiago on July 27
July 26	□ Ibáñez resigns

Source: Parkman (1990)

As the timeline above clearly suggests, the plans and threats to strike, the beginning of a general strike and the rapid escalation in participation in the general strike played key factors in the overthrow of Ibáñez. We must keep in mind, that presidential politics is the home terrain of national history textbooks. That is, aside from accounts of war, textbooks around the world are preoccupied with the history of presidents (or comparable leaders) above all else. Yet, this dramatic display of people-power resulting in the overthrow of Ibáñez, is meagerly described by the textbook as a “political crisis that ended with the overthrow of Ibáñez in July 1931” (Rivas et al. 2006, p.264).

Chile (1983-1989). Secondly, let us consider the Rivas et al. (2006) textbook's portrayal of the nonviolent movement against Pinochet's military regime. Wink (1992) recounts the scene in Chile during 1983: "On May 11, at 8 P.M., the Chilean copper miner's union calls a countrywide protest. People respond by banging on pots and pans and blowing whistles, and discover for the first time that the vast majority oppose the dictator, General Pinochet. Peruvian women use the same tactic when a man starts beating his wife" (p.248). Ironically, this is much more information than we find in government-approved national history textbooks in Chile.

The textbook's bias in privileging narratives of violent events is clear. It is as if, like so many, the authors believe subconsciously that history is primarily violent events, or as a poet has said, they assume that "history…must sleep inside the belly of a bomb" (Smith 2012), but certainly not in pots and pans, not in nonviolent activists taking to the streets to bang pots and pans. The tactic of banging pots and pans is not even mentioned in the text. It was a distinctive tactic sending a symbolic message that resonated – and the messaging was pitch perfect nonviolent action and egalitarianism – since every household has pots and pans, and the people united have immense power – to withdraw their consent, to refuse to cooperate, to disobey.

The domestic symbol of pots and pans resonated so widely that it soon spread to Uruguay and helped to mobilize nonviolent protests that brought down Uruguay's military regime. Gillespie (1991) writes of Uruguay in late 1983, "Nothing gave the opposition radicals such hope as the massive pot-banging and blackouts of 25 August (copied from those in Chile) that greeted the new wave of repression" (p.125). Sosnowski and Popkin (1993) concur, "Mass demonstrations occurred regularly. In a show of truly

peaceful resistance Uruguayans took to the streets chanting slogans about the fall of the regime; turning off their lights, they banged on empty pots and pans" (p.39). Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) consider this Uruguayan movement to be nonviolent and successful, overthrowing the military regime in 1985. A variety of nonviolent tactics were employed: a successful general strike was launched and workers occupied factories and staged sit-ins (Weinstein 1988, p.84; Reuters 1984, January 20; AP 1984, January 19), three church leaders undertook hunger strikes in protest of human rights violations (Reuters 1983, August 26), some protests turned out over 300,000 Uruguays, a tenth of the country (Reuters 1983, November 28; Sosnowski and Popkin 1993, p.40). With knowledge of nonviolent movements in our own national histories and in the examples of other nations, forms of tactical innovation become live options grounded in historical praxis.

Below, I name the key omissions of the Rivas et al. (2006) textbook portrayal of Chile's (1983-1989) struggle against Pinochet's dictatorial rule.1. The words "nonviolent"/ "nonviolence" and cognate terms are never used. Nonviolence is un-named and untheorized – as is typical for textbooks in the present sample. However, Ackerman and Duvall (2000) argue that the mass protests were "deliberately nonviolent" (p.285).

2. Important nonviolent leaders like Ana Gonzalez, Monica Jiménez, and Rudolfo Seguel (president of the Copper Mine Workers' Confederation of Chile) are never mentioned by name. Seguel has said he was influenced by the movie "Gandhi" which showed in Chilean theaters in 1983. He and many Chilean activists in his network saw it "at least twice" (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.291). Similarly, during the Montgomery bus boycott, Dr. King and other leaders of the movement showed "old movies of Gandhi to demonstrate again and again how victory – real victory – come from non-violence"

(Barrett 1957, March 3, p.196). The cross-national diffusion of nonviolence has long depended on activists' knowledge of successful historical cases.

3. The strategic debate among resistance movements is briefly covered in the text, but the debate is framed as a debate over "violence," and the alternative option (i.e., nonviolent resistance/ protest) is not named. Instead, words like "protest" and "street protests" and "social mobilization" (p.326) are used as descriptors.

4. The narrative of the debate over violent resistance ignores the fact that eventually the radical Socialists renounced violence (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.298). Even more important, the warranted perception (e.g., see Ackerman and Duvall 2000) that opposition violence extended Pinochet's rule is never considered by the text.

5. There is no mention of nonviolent tactics that were central to the opposition movement, for example, the widespread public banging of pots and pans in the first protest against Pinochet on May 11, 1983. Realizing that a Copper miners strike would result in a bloody crackdown by the Pinochet regime, they resorted to nonviolent tactical innovation, as Kurtz (2009) describes:

> In an ingenious tactical move, the miners called instead for a nationwide, decentralized action for all Chileans who support them to walk and drive slowly, turn lights off and on at night, not buy anything or send children to school, and at 8pm in the evening bang pots and pans. These low-risk, decentralized actions helped to dissolve people's fear and develop a sense of confidence among the opposition. (p.2)

Similarly, Smithey (2011) explains:

> In 1983…Chileans used public 'slow-down strikesto spread awareness of dissent against the Pinochet regime. As ordinary people, including taxi drivers and pedestrians, slowed their activities, they communicated the widespread nature of public dissatisfaction with Pinochet's rule. Through their participation, Chileans became empowered.

6. There is no mention of the role that the U.S. played in overthrowing Allende, sustaining Pinochet (more on these issues below), or how a new U.S. ambassador, Harry Barnes, was more critical of Pinochet and helped bring Pinochet down by decisively supporting a fair democratic election (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.299, p.290).

7. There is no mention of the key role played by Pinochet's military commanders who ultimately, refused to obey him and thereby ended his dictatorial rule (Ackerman and Duvall 2000). Such noncooperation and defections within militaries are crucial factors in many successful nonviolent revolutions (Nepstad 2011).

During the Pinochet era, Ana Gonzalez organized and led protests, sit-ins, and hunger strikes against the Pinochet regimes' disappearances and human rights violations. She and her husband were members of Communist activist networks. When the Pinochet regime tortured and disappeared her husband, Gonzalez began a courageous life of organizing with other families of the disappeared, confronting the military dictatorship and appealing to the conscience of the regime and Chileans through nonviolent protest actions. She also traveled to the U.S. to highlight the human rights violations and put pressure on Chile's government. Observers of Ana Gonzalez have noted that she speaks with "no hatred" (Barrionuevo 2010c), a key marker of a principled nonviolent orientation. It is difficult to understand why Chilean textbooks do not highlight figures like Ana Gonzalez, aside from the probability that her links to communism make her unfit for mainstream history.

Guatemala. In Guatemala, an assistant to the researcher could only locate junior high/ middle school history textbooks. Here is the account from a 7th grade Guatemalan social studies textbook (EE 2011, p.125):

> General Jorge Ubico Castaneda assumed the presidency of the Republic on February 14, 1931. His regime was marked by terror. He imposed an intelligence service through which he denounced citizens in order to prosecute, imprison or shoot them if they were suspect by the regime. The regime applied martial law.
>
> Jorge Ubico was a man who loved himself. On his birthday he mandated special events around the country and the people offered him gifts. The Assembly annually earmarked the amount of two hundred thousand quetzals as a gift to the president...He ordered the closure of several colleges and schools in the country, which brought stagnation in the intellectual life of the citizens. Some colleges and schools were requisitioned for military use. He did complete some important works, such as the construction of the National Palace, the improvement of border security, payment of the foreign debt, and most of the paved roads that still remain.
>
> The dictatorship imposed by Jorge Ubico resulted in the people demonstrating their rejection through mass rallies in the streets, a situation which led to the suspension of constitutionally guaranteed rights and resulted in tremendous persecution. The teachers, students and workers held important demonstrations, but the government fell into using the intimidation and terror of police force. In the demonstration of June 25, 1944, a teacher named Maria Chincilla was killed by police. This event increased the people's hatred against the dictator Ubico, until he was forced to resign on July 1, 1944 and fled to the USA. He died in New Orleans on February 14, 1946.

Unfortunately, the textbook focuses on demonstrations and neglects to mention the pivotal general strike. From the 1930s to the 1960s, general strikes proved to be the essential tactic of noncooperation and nonviolent coercion in at least eleven cases of insurrection throughout Latin America (Parkman 1990, p.16). In fact, the role of demonstrations in Guatemala rapidly receded in importance as "Opposition leaders received word from the chief of police that any further demonstrations would be fired upon, even if the protesters were only women and children" (Paulson 2005, p.153). Indeed, Chincilla was killed during a women's march (p.152).

As activists deemed continued demonstrations suicidal, beginning on June 26, the general strike took center stage as the main strategy in the movement to overthrow Ubico. For five days a general strike was carried out with "nearly complete participation...The streets were emptied...Guatemala City was paralyzed. Students distributed leaflets calling on the public to remain nonviolent and to continue resisting" (Paulson 2005, p.153). During the general strike, people remained at home and the widespread participation led people to lose their fear. Meanwhile, the police and army felt powerless, unsure of who to arrest or repress. It was the general strike which played the pivotal role in forcing Ubico's resignation (Paulson 2005), yet the textbook fails to narrate these events between June 26 and July 1.

With the fall of Ubico, several months of power struggle ensued. General Ponce Vaides became the junta leader. As the textbook narrates, Vaides "continued with the same dictatorship as Ubico, committing many injustices against the people, including persecution, murder, torture, disappearances and forced deportation. The repression against the people continued, enforced by the police" (EE 2011, p.125). The textbook recounts that all of this "...provoked the people to begin the popular uprising of October 20, 1944, and with it came the fall of the regime" (p.125). The textbook vaguely informs us that "The October Revolution was carried out by teachers, students, workers and soldiers who became conscious and aware. The dictator Ponce Vaides was overthrown and a revolutionary junta took over" (p.126). While this description alludes to the nonviolent "people power" character of the takeover, the narration obscures the specific tactics and strategies of the movement.

Once again, as in the account of Ubico's overthrow, the textbook fails to mention the role of strikes undertaken by opposition parties and students against the Vaides regime. The role of striking students is not unusual here. Parkman (1990) documents eight cases of insurrectionary civic strikes in Latin America between 1931 and 1961 that began with student strikes or student demonstrations (p.9). The key role of "reform-minded junior officers" in actually carrying out the coup d'etat (Paulson 2005, p.154) is also neglected by the textbook, though the text vaguely mentions "conscious and aware" soldiers. The result is that methods of resistance, including nonviolent strikes, are seriously obscured and hidden in a hypersimplified account of events. A key opportunity to highlight nonviolent methods and their efficacy is lost in this reproduction of collective memory.

In addition, since the revolutionary junta of October 1944 initiated important democratic reforms, a key opportunity to highlight the link between nonviolent methods and democratic transitions is neglected. In fact, extensive cross-national research on 67 nations undergoing political transitions found that nonviolent methods are much more effective in fostering democratic institutions (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005). Moreover, in over 70% of successfully overthrown authoritarian regimes, nonviolent civic resistance played key roles. Similarly, Karatnycky and Ackerman found that nonviolent civic coalitions lead to better outcomes (using indicators of democracy and freedom) than elite-initiated coups. The two Guatemalan cases of 1944, the June movement and the October movement, were primarily instances of people power/ nonviolent civic coalitions. However, political elites also played a key role, as lawyers

were prominent leaders in the June movement, and junior military officers helped lead the October movement.

Although the Guatemalan text fails to name these important links between nonviolent means and democratic ends, the text does emphasize the democratic reforms undertaken by the junta of October 1944: "During this brief regime, they tried to eliminate many previous orders such as forced unpaid labor...To lift the country from ignorance, they created the National Literacy Committee. They released the university from government control and it was given autonomy. In order to organize the political life of the country they convened presidential elections" (EE 2011, p.126). In fact, as a result of the revolutionary junta, "Fair elections soon followed, and Guatemala entered into its 10-year 'springtime of democracy' (Paulson 2005, p.154). The text describes this period as "the revolutionary period of 10 years...an era of real economic, political, and social development" (EE 2011, p.127). This would be a "springtime" cut short through covert U.S. intervention, and some of the Guatemalan textbooks fail to accurately narrate this national tragedy (Eddy, forthcoming).

The Ghana Case

Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) code the 1951-1957 Convention People's Party (CPP) movement against British rule in Ghana (then called the Gold Coast) as a "successful" "nonviolent" movement which "ousted" the British. Leading peace scholars often list Ghana's independence movement as another case demonstrating the efficacy of nonviolent movements (e.g., Cortright 2008, p.212; Wink 1992, p.247). Wink (1992) writes that Ghana won independence "after a ten-year nonviolent struggle" (p.247). Similarly, scholarly narratives of the Ghanaian independence movement often describe

the campaign of "positive action" which Kwame Nkrumah initiated in 1950, as "involving nonviolent protests, strikes, and noncooperation with the British colonial authorities" (NEB 1998, p.735). These versions of Ghana's history, viewed through the lens of path dependency theory (Mahoney 2000) might lead us to surmise that since Ghana's origins as an independent nation are rooted in nonviolent action, nonviolence should be commemorated and celebrated within the culture. However, as a test of the collective memory and hegemonic narrative of the independence movement, the Ghanaian textbook is rather ambiguous on whether nonviolent methods played a crucial role. Thus, historians who question the significance of Nkrumah's Gandhian repertoire in Ghana (Carter, Clark, and Randle 2006, p.26) may have a point.

Textbook depictions of the Ghanian independence movement. In describing the independence movement the Ghanaian history textbook by Gadzepko (2005) never once uses the words "nonviolent"/ "nonviolence" or "noncooperation," nor does it use the similar terms "passive resistance," "pacifist," or "peaceful." The conspicuous failure to name nonviolent action begs the question of how the independence movement is framed in the text. In fact, several nonviolent actions are narrated by the text in an ad hoc fashion, but the rhetoric, strategies, tactics, and motivations of the social movement actors are never named in nonviolent terms, and never linked to nonviolent ideology, strategy, or moral principles (i.e., principled nonviolence). Moreover, no nonviolent actors or leaders are given voice, as no one articulating nonviolence is quoted in the text.

At the climax of the independence narrative, rather than pointing to the role of mass noncooperation, the textbook emphasizes the role of British cooperation. It is argued that independence came "due to the positive attitude of the local British Colonial

officials and the British Government to the independence issue" (Gadzepko 2005, p.206). The text informs us that the British Government had "relaxed her repressive measures on Nkrumah" – but we are not told why, only that now there was "so much co-operation" between the British and the CPP (p.206). Here the text would have done well to refer back to an earlier point which was made somewhat obliquely, that of the British Labor party's relative openness to de-colonization movements in Asia and Africa (p.189). Nkrumah himself at the time, made this point very directly, citing a potential threat to the political opportunity structure:a crucial reason for demanding "self-government NOW" was because the Labor Party was in power in Britain, and if the Conservatives returned to power in the next year they would be more likely to suppress the independence movement (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.26).

The role of mass nonviolent action in pushing the hand of the British is not at all clarified in the textbook, and there may be several important reasons for this. For one, multiple and contested versions of the independence narrative have been in circulation. Second, the degree to which nonviolent mass action played a key role is debatable, as is the question of which mass actions were most important. Third, a very strong case can be made that Nkrumah and other CPP leaders sent mixed signals regarding their endorsement of strikes and other nonviolent mass actions. This ambivalence is partly because CPP leaders sensed that the British were cooperating with the goals of self-government and because the independence movement was quickly channeled into electoral politics (i.e., conventional action).

It seems the textbook has adopted and synthesized two of the most prominent versions of the independence movement. First, there is the nationalistic Ghanaian version

which emphasizes the role of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) leaders as well as Nkrumah and the CPP leaders to varying degrees (the UGCC was a nationalist "organization of wealthy lawyers and traders" (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.15), together with a mass movement that forced the British to concede to demands for self-government. Second, there is the British version which denies that the colonial rulers were forced to grant independence. Rather, this version maintains, the British were happy to turn governing duties over to the colonized, "through an orderly process of constitutional devolution," as soon as the people proved themselves "capable of managing their own affairs" (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.11). The British claimed that the Gold Coast's 90% illiteracy proved they were not yet ready for self-government. But an editorial by Nkrumah in the *Accra Evening News* (May 19, 1949) pointed to the hypocrisy of this claim, since the British had done little to advance education in the 105 years of their rule in the Gold Coast. Nkrumah also pointed out that Britain granted independence to India though over 90% of the population was illiterate (Timothy 1955, p.91).

Initially the British did repress the independence movement, and the textbook glosses over the extent of British repression, episodes which offer crucial lessons for social movement actors. Indeed, Dr. King emphasized this point while counseling perseverance in his sermon on Ghana's independence, delivered in Montgomery, Alabama in the middle of the U.S. civil rights struggle (King 1957). The British did come around to cooperation with independence, and Dr. King argued that it was only due to the nonviolent means of the Ghanaians that the British, miraculously, harbored no ill will. At the official independence celebrations, the Duchess of Kent even danced the fox-trot with

Nkrumah at the State Reception and Ball. Although not included in the Ghanaian textbooks sampled, a photograph of the dance can be found in Kennard (1958, p.68). King (1957) remarked on the role nonviolence played in avoiding bitterness and making such a symbolic dance possible, though Louis Armstrong's wife, Lucille Armstrong, also played a role as she gave Nkrumah a half-hour dance lesson (Kennard 1958, p.65, p.70). Marxist historians would promote a different reading, seeing in such symbols of friendship and tolerance, a sure sign that the CPP had made too many accommodations to British financial interests – and whether those were furthered through colonial or neocolonial structures made little difference to the British power elite (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966).

The textbook posits that Ghanaian ex-soldiers played a pivotal role in the nationalist movement and suggests two factors that shaped the consciousness of the ex-soldiers. First, the text argues that the travel experiences of the soldiers during World War II exposed the myth of white superiority: "The African army was exposed to the dirty, the illiterate, the drunken, the stupid and the poor of Europe overseas" (Gadzepko 2005, p.187). The soldiers, many of whom had fought in Burma and India, also began to question their own internalized racism as they saw the "defeats inflicted on white-men by 'yellowmen'," (p.189) that is, a "coloured race" (p.188). With the ideology of white supremacy debunked, the ex-soldiers were no longer afraid of the "white terror" (p.186), and "no longer ready to meekly succumb" to colonialism (p.188).

Second, the text reports: "These soldiers were also impressed by the ideas of the Indian nationalist movement led by Mahatma Gandhi" (Gadzepko 2005, p.186; the same line is repeated on p.189). We are not told what the "ideas" were, and thus, an important

opportunity to name, if not theorize, nonviolence is missed. Moreover, Gandhi is never linked as an influence on Nkrumah, though he had been called the "Gandhi of Ghana" by the local press as early as 1949 (Nkrumah 1961, p.19).

We are told almost nothing about Nkrumah's biography, except that he was living in London when invited to be the general secretary of the UGCC, and that he "acquired the taste" for revolutionary nationalism "through his studies abroad where he also met many African nationalists" (Gadzepko 2005, p.184). The textbook frames him as the leader of a group of "young, revolutionary and radical politicians" (p.191), "full of youthful exuberance" (p.192). He is called "a personality with ideology which appealed to the politically awakened masses" (p.191), and is praised for his charisma (p.194), "dynamism and organizational ability" (p.191). As he emerges as a leader in his own right, Nkrumah is termed a "radical" and contrasted with the conservatives in the UGCC who favored "legitimate and non-confrontational means to attain eventual self-government" (p.191). Exactly how Nkrumah differed strategically is not spelled out, but the reader has little reason to fill in the blanks with nonviolent resistance. Indeed, violent militance seems to be hinted at, though this would be historically inaccurate in the early stages of Nkrumah's rise. We are told that the UGCC considered Nkrumah "too radical and confrontational" (p.193), and that the British repression during the 1948 riots radicalized the masses, so that: "Aggression was injected into the political attitude of the Ghanian" (p.191). Nkrumah and other movement leaders are called "martyrs" for being arrested and going to jail, and the text suggests they were arrested on general charges of "subversion" or "sedition," (p.195). We are not informed of any acts of nonviolent civil disobedience which would warrant their arrest – a significant sin of omission.

After several pages of such vague descriptions, the program of the CPP and Nkrumah is finally articulated: “to fight relentlessly by all constitutional means for the achievement of full ‘self-government’ now…” (Gadzepko 2005, p.194). To fight “by all constitutional means” certainly suggests a type of nonviolent movement, though it is not categorized as such. The author’s preference for militant language and avoidance of the term “nonviolence” is by now quite clear, but more significant is the fact that the Ministry of Education evidently did not find the omission of nonviolent ideology problematic.

Finally, the text details the tactics of the CPP which consisted of organizing branches of the CYO (Committee on Youth Organisation), building coalitions (of other existing youth organizations, local tribal chiefs, and the trade unions), organizing conferences, promoting “effective propaganda machinery,” and holding mass rallies (Gadzepko 2005, p.194). In addition to mentioning the barest details of the mass rallies (“improvised songs” were sung, Nkrumah and other CPP leaders spoke (pp.194-195)), the fast moving narrative only reserves space for a two sentence account of prototypical nonviolent action, though it is portrayed as pivotal: on January 9,1950, “the CPP called upon workers to stage a sit-down strike. By this the workers felt their Messiah had now appeared” (p.194). However, the actual strike and its effects are left unexplained. Messiah or no Messiah, the narrative’s use of extreme shorthand serves to de-emphasize the importance of the strike. By contrast, Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966) argue that the general strike, the first in sub-Saharan African, “forced the concessions which brought Dr. Nkrumah from Fort James prison to the position of ‘Leader of Government Business’ in the first popularly elected parliament in colonial Africa” (p.3).

Two other nonviolent actions receive more coverage in the textbook: a boycott of European goods in 1948 and a march of military veterans on February 28, 1948. We are told that "the leaders of the UGCC were not responsible for organizing either" (Gadzepko 2005, p.183). Nevertheless, six UGCC leaders were held responsible and arrested by the British colonial government, a move that backfired and turned the "Big Six" into national heroes and symbols of resistance, though they were only detained for about 8 weeks (p.183). The text claims, without fully substantiating it, that these actions amounted to a "relentless attack on colonial structures and institutions" (p.183). Again, this militant language fits the mold of the nationalistic account of independence, though there are reasons to doubt its complete accuracy, as we will explore below.

A few pages later, the text explains that there was a sharp rise in the cost of living and food scarcity, as well as a growing perception that the Colonial Government cooperated with European and Asian firms to exploit the indigenous people (Gadzepko 2005, p.187). As a result, a "general boycott of all European imports" was organized by "Nii Kwabena Bonne III (Osu Alata Mantse)" in January, 1948 (p.187). The extent of the boycott, the organizer, his rhetoric, and goals are not described, only his name is given. But we are told that a series of riots followed.

In fact, a brief *New York Times* article from the period, does much more to set the scene. Published a week after the boycott had been in effect, it reports the boycott "brought trade to a virtual standstill" with losses estimated at one million British pounds (NYT, Feb. 10, 1948, p.14). Though the boycotted imports were "mainly textiles," many stores run by foreign merchants had closed. The article clarifies that tribal chiefs were the pivotal actors backing the boycott, and reports: "Nii Kwanena Bonne III, a chief of Osu,

has been touring the country telling the Africans that high prices are evil. In many towns Africans are restricted by tribal oaths from buying all kinds of imported goods" (p.14). Aside from the "othering" of the chief by portraying his message in dismissively crude terms, the article suggests that tribal structures and traditions (i.e., tribal leadership and tribal oaths) were being harnessed for nonviolent action – a narrative detail missing in the textbook.

In addition, the text informs us that African military veterans who had served Britain during World War II were mobilizing around a series of grievances that were linked to the growing sense of economic crisis and discontent. In addition, the veterans had received promises that never materialized, including jobs, and their pensions were a "mere pittance" or were not honored (Gadzepko 2005, p.184, pp.186-187). The text explains that their "resentment exploded in protest marches to petition the colonial governor" (p.187). However, only one march is narrated.

The protest march of February 28, 1948 was far from the last time that soldiers seriously impacted the direction of the country. They would function again as an organized political force looking out for their own interests in the military coup d'etat overthrowing Nkrumah in 1966 (Gadzepko 2005, p.260), orchestrating a coup in 1972 (p.245, pp.246-247, p.261), again in 1978 (pp.262-263), and splits in the military also led to the coups in 1979 (pp.252-253) and in 1981 (pp.258-259, p.263).

The march of "unarmed" ex-soldiers on February 28 and subsequent rioting receives relatively extensive coverage in the textbook (Gadzepko 2005, p.184). Again, the word "nonviolent" is not used in the text, though the use of "unarmed" makes this implication plausible. However, the use of "unarmed" is somewhat conspicuous, since

journalists and scholars often utilize the descriptor “unarmed” when forms of spontaneous “limited violence” occur at a protest. Indeed, my hunch proved correct. A *New York Times* article reported that stones were thrown, with the word order implying that the protesters began the violence: “Stones were thrown, police used tear gas and shots were fired” (NYT, March 1, 1948). The *Times*’ headline accuses the veterans of rioting, as its subtitle states: “African Ex-Servicemen Riot in Protest on Grievances.” By contrast, the textbook makes no mention of stonethrowing, nor does it link the rioting to the veterans. Instead, the text says the veterans were “shot at by Police Superintendent Imray when the procession refused to obey the order to halt marching” (Gadzepko 2005, p.184). Thus, the text seems to cast the action in terms of nonviolent civil disobedience. Meanwhile, the rioting and looting is blamed on an “angry mob” who were reacting to the police killing of three of the marching veterans (pp.184-185).

Although days of rioting followed, the textbook points out that secondary school students engaged in a “demonstration in protest against the detention of nationalist leaders” on March 14, 1948 (Gadzepko 2005, p.185). With typical shorthand that omits dramatic detail, the text does not inform us that student marchers were kicked out of their schools, and faced criticism from some Ghanaians for participating (Timothy 1955, p.88, p.92). Overall, the textbook clearly portrays the key February 28 march as more nonviolent than we find in the *Times*’ account, but still without using the word nonviolence.

James (1977), using the report of a Colonial Office investigation among other sources, offers a still fuller account. Once the ex-servicemen began their march they were quickly joined by large numbers of sympathizers. The march of about 2,000 people

headed toward Christiansborg Castle, seat of the colonial government, as some marchers shouted: "This is the last European Governor who will occupy the Castle" (p.44). James (1977) argues that such anti-imperial chants and the march itself are indications of the rising sense of efficacy and power gained through the month-long boycott. The boycott had mobilized the people quickly, and on a national scale "because the first step was taken under their traditional leaders, their chiefs" (p.45). During the boycott, when a local chief was on trial for supporting the boycott, "posters had appeared in Accra calling upon the police to strike and to refuse to obey the orders of the European officers" (p.45). Such appeals to the African police recur below, as James' account of the march continues:

> The crowd directed a heavy fussilade of stones against the police. When the police tried to stop them, they shouted insults at the European officers and invited the Africans in the ranks to abandon their duty. It seems that they were successful. For when the Superintendent [Imray] finally gave the order to fire, the Africans did not shoot and he himself had to seize a rifle from the nearest man to fire the shots that caused the casualties…The crowd retreated… (p.44)

James rightly emphasizes that such defections by security forces often occur at the beginning of revolutions. More specifically, the refusal of soldiers or police to obey orders is often a key factor in successful nonviolent revolutions (Sharp 2005, p.482, p.282; Schell 2003, p.171; Nepstad 2011, pp.128-131).

Textbook depictions of the nonviolent replacement of the Rawlings regime.

Historians and peace scholars have classified the 2000 movement which "ousted" Rawlings as "nonviolent" (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). The movement revolved around emergent independent media, civil society organizations (e.g., new watchdog groups like the Center for Democracy and Development (Onishi 1999)), and political parties in preparation for the 2000 presidential election which resulted in the "first nonviolent transfer of power" since Ghana's independence (AFP 2000, December 31,

p.12). As such, the movement might be better categorized in terms of a mix of "conventional action" and "nonviolent action" (Martin 2008). Hence, the Ghanian textbook which covers the 2000 election should not be too harshly critiqued for failing to describe the movement as a case of nonviolent action (which it does fail to do), since, compared to the other cases analyzed in this project, this case involves relatively more conventional action.

However, the case demonstrates how nonviolent movements often elude naming and narrative description in journalistic coverage as well as textbook coverage – as peace is viewed as a non-event, while violence fills the news. Indeed, *The New York Times* was careful to describe the one case of violence in some detail, but not the mechanisms that ensured peace: "The elections were generally peaceful, although there was news today that four people had been killed in a polling center dispute that turned into an ethnic clash in the town of Bawku in the far north of the country on Election Day" (AFP 2000, December 10, p.36).

Still, the 2000 movement was a case of "nonviolent action" in the sense that, in context, the lack of democratic institutions meant that mass organizing under the nose of the Rawlings regime still in power, was marked by courage, improvisation, and nonviolent mass movement protest methods, rather than working through established political structures. Such nonviolent action "goes beyond routine behavior, often by challenging conventional practices" (Martin 2008, p.236).

In the months preceding the 2000 election, the ruling party's monopoly over the media rapidly crumbled, as over 30 FM radio stations and two independent TV stations emerged and helped level the playing field in the political arena (Gocking 2005, p.249).

The international community provided funding for voter-identification cards and election-monitoring projects, while civic and religious organizations helped to ensure a peaceful election. Transparency and accountability in the political process had finally come to Ghana, fears of violence were proved wrong, and all of this while the incumbent Rawlings was only 53 years old and at "the height of his power" (pp.250-253). The election was celebrated as Ghana's "second independence," a demonstration of the power of the vote over the power of the gun (p.253). In addition, the winner of the presidential election, J.A. Kufour had promised to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate past abuses, leading Rawlings to hedge his bets by offering an apology in his last address to Parliament in January 2000 (p.254). As an act of reconciliation, the Kufuor government organized a joint religious memorial service and allowed reburials of the three former heads of state and five military officers executed in 1979. However, some Ghanian leaders denounced this gesture, including those who feared they could be held accountable for their role in the executions (p.259).

Unfortunately, the 2000 election is not depicted at all in the secondary school national history textbook "approved and recommended by the Textbooks and Educational Equipment Committee of the Ministry of Education" (Gadzepko 2005, p.v). In Prah's (2010) *Government* text, the 2000 election is given condensed coverage highlighting eight factors which purport to explain why Rawlings and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) were defeated in the 2000 elections. The only listed factor that even hints at nonviolent action is the following: "4. The campaign style of the New Patriotic Party [NPP]:...youth wholeheartedly embraced the NPP and openly stumped for the party in view of its message of hope and reassurance..." (p.401). The 8th factor argues that the

NDC's "antagonistic posture toward the press" backfired, as independent media like private newspapers reacted "by playing up the soft underbelly (or weaknesses) of the party for public consumption. These weaknesses brought grist to the mill of the NPP, the largest opposition party" (p.402). Hence, in the context of a ruling party which grew out of Rawling's military dictatorship and had never lost its grip on power, in the context of a "culture of silence" that had long prevailed in Ghana (Onishi1999, p.A3; Prah 2010, p.405), the consciousness-raising role of media activism can be considered a sign of an emerging "democratic culture" (Onishi 1999, p.A3) as well as a form of nonviolent action.

The Gadzepko history textbook was printed in 2005, but the last historical event covered in any depth in the text concerns the installation of the Rawlings regime on December 31, 1981. Thus, there is essentially a 25-year time lag in the textbook, plus the five years elapsed since publication (the textbook was still being used in schools in early 2011), giving us a 30-year lag. Indeed, the only events narrated in the text after 1981 concern a mention of the undoubtedly controversy-free Pan African Fair for Arts and Music in 1990 (p.267), the barest detail that Kofi Annan from Ghana served as Secretary General of the U.N. (p.270) – though we are not informed when (he served in this post from 1997 to 2006), and a vaguely positive reference to the role of the IMF and World Bank in the "planning and restructuring of the country's economy since 1983" (p.270).

This development is framed in terms of "Ghana's effort to attain a high level [of] economic development," and it is uncritically stated that "Loans were granted to ensure growth in all sectors of the economy" (Gadzepko 2005, p.270, emphasis added). However, by 1996 Ghana was "spending one-fourth of its revenue on debt servicing" and

facing intense pressure from the U.S. and U.K. to engage in further restructuring through an IMF/ World Bank HIPC Initiative for "poor and heavily indebted" nations (Gocking 2005, pp.262-262).

In any case, such significant time lags warrant reflection. Obviously, time lags dissipate culpability for ugly truths. Hence, official government apologies – when they arise at all – typically surface many decades after the fact. In addition, it is no exaggeration to claim that generations of school children all around the world are disempowered from understanding the zeitgeist and engaging in political action in the present and near future partly due to such time lags in the social studies curriculum. The neglect of live issues misses an opportunity to model civil discussion and debate, a vital skill for democratic citizens and one that could be fostered in the context of a classroom.

Sins of omission: What is missing in the Ghanaian text? Any national history textbook is subject to accusations of selection bias as well as descriptive bias, but we will limit ourselves to a few issues relevant to the present study on the place of nonviolence in collective memories. Ironically, the U.S. history textbook, from my Junior year in High School, which I happen to still own, relates details about Ghana's history that are missing in the Ghana textbook. In a text box entitled, "New Nations in Africa," my U.S. history text reports,

> As a young man, Nkrumah had studied Western political systems in the United States and Britain…In 1950, inspired by the example of Gandhi in India, he organized a campaign of civil disobedience in the Gold Coast…Some leading black Americans, including W.E.B. Du Bois, later moved to Ghana to show their support for the new country. (Graff 1986, p.363)

These three sentences merit comment. First, the Ghana text stripped Nkrumah's biographical details to the barest summaries, for example, only informing us that he

"studied abroad" (p.184). How can it be that the U.S. text actually gives us more details? The Ghanaian text's minimal biographical coverage of Nkrumah likely illustrates how Nkrumah's dictatorial turn made him an object of derision, held in Ghana's collective memory with significant ambiguity.

This official ambivalence about Nkrumah may fade with time. Already by 1997, the 40th anniversary of Ghana's independence was accompanied by a new appreciation among Ghanaians for Nkrumah's accomplishments and his pan-Africanist vision (Gocking 2005, p.241). And even before the anniversary, Nkrumah was rehabilitated as "Africa's hero" among those who understood neocolonialism as a grave threat to Africa, just as Nkrumah had preached (Birmingham 1998, pp.110-111). But the fact remains that Nkrumah did rapidly transform the democratic government into a repressive dictatorship, a "personal political machine" (Bretton 1966, p.43, p.49). The textbook informs us of detentions of political enemies, but does not delve into other details, opting instead for a general condemnation of Nkrumah.

A few more suggestive details of Nkrumah's coercive rule will suffice to point out what is ignored in the text. From 1961 on, media censorship (especially targeting any criticism of Nkrumah or socialism) was enforced and extended to all media outlets including virtually all bookstores in the country (Bretton 1966, pp.89-90). A committee was appointed to "look into the content of books in our schools, colleges, universities and libraries, to eliminate those in direct conflict with the ideology of the Party and the nation, and to ensure that these vital means of molding the thoughts of the people, young and old, are attuned to the aims of the society we are building" (p.90). Bretton casts doubt on the significance of this committee, noting, "In practice, all that the committee really

had to guide them was the fact that the ideology of the party was Nkrumaism and Nkrumaism was what the Leader said it was" (p.90). However, control was further tightened when the State Publishing Corporation was established in 1965, creating a complete monopoly on publishing and distribution in Ghana (p.201). When Nkrumah was overthrown in the military coup, the CPP, with its two million members and 500,000 militants pledged by traditional African oaths to support Nkrumah, allowed itself to be dissolved and did not organize a single protest in support of Nkrumah (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, pp.2-3).

Second, of particular note to sociologists, the Ghanaian textbook credits W.E.B. Du Bois as the "father of Pan-Africanism" (p.129), but no mention is made of him again. While my U.S. high school textbook ascribes some significance to Du Bois's move to Ghana, the Ghana text ignores this event, perhaps due to Du Bois's Marxist leanings. Ghana, like most of the world, experienced deep political fissures over contending cold war ideologies, and power elite backlashes against forms of socialism and Marxism continues today. Other omissions are more puzzling, such as a failure to recount Ghana's independence ceremonies. Incidentally, those in attendance included leading nonviolent civil rights activists from the U.S. such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and A. Philip Randolph. King (1998) narrates how people walked through the streets of Accra crying, "Freedom! Freedom!" and "All hail, Nkrumah!," but he also sets the scene for the challenges ahead – again, 90% of Ghanaians were illiterate (p.112, p.115).

Third, while the Ghana text twice mentions Gandhi's influence on Ghanaian soldiers returning from World War II (Gadzepko 2005, p.186, p.189), Gandhi's nonviolent ideology and tactics are never discussed and Gandhi's influence is never

connected with Nkrumah – the key leader of the independence movement. Again, according to the theoretical tradition of path dependency, the origins of a nation are likely to play a significant constraining role in the future structural, institutional, and ideological direction of a nation (Mahoney 2000). This likely holds true if national origins are understood with sufficient complexity, i.e., as a dynamic and somewhat extended process. The Ghana text, directly and indirectly, by its narrative and its omissions, gives us reason for widening the template of national origins beyond the independence movement itself, to include a longer episode marked by three processes: independence/ or regime change, the new leader's turn towards dictatorship (with Nkrumah being only the first instance), and a military coup. In fact, this is a template that is repeated throughout Ghana's six decades of existence. This template helps to account for why the text mystifies important details of the independence movement – including the guiding nonviolent ideology of the movement.

Recovering the nonviolent independence movement. There are solid reasons for asserting that the independence movement was conceived and led as a nonviolent movement. In September of 1948, Nkrumah founded a newspaper, the *Accra Evening News*, as a mouthpiece of the CPP. He contributed daily editorials to the paper which document his advocacy of nonviolence and democracy and his critique of imperialism. He offers up the example of India: "When India found her continuance under British rule an indignity that belittled her nationality, and was unable by peaceful and constitutional means to obtain her freedom, Gandhi appeared on the scene with the weapons of non-co-operation and civil disobedience movement [sic]" (Nkrumah 1973, p.78). He then proceeds to theorize "organized people's power" (p.91) as he writes, "we have moral and

spiritual forces at our disposal which out-number all physical weapons…" (p.78). And in speeches, Nkrumah urged crowds to maintain absolute nonviolent discipline: "there should be no looting or burning of buildings, no rioting, damage or disturbance of any sort; that the success of our cause depended on the non-violent and peaceful character of our struggle" (p.114). Before launching "positive action," in a December 15, 1949 editorial in the *Accra Evening News*, Nkrumah had also urged his followers to refrain from violence against strikebreakers and added, "REMEMBER THE STRIKE IS ON THE BASIS OF PERFECT NONVIOLENCE …NON-VIOLENCE IS OUR CREED" (Timothy 1955, pp.96-97; emphasis in original).

A detailed statement on nonviolent strategy was also produced by Nkrumah in 1949, in the early stages of the independence movement. Nkrumah's pamphlet, *What I Mean by Positive Action*, clarified:

> The weapons of Positive Action are:
> 1) Legitimate political agitation;
> 2) Newspaper and educational campaigns and
> 3) as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non co-operation based on the principle of absolute non-violence.
> (Nkrumah 1973, p.94)

The pamphlet begins by refuting charges that Positive Action means "riot, looting and disturbances, in a word violence" (p.92). He clarified that he understood Gandhi to have "liquidated British Imperialism" by "moral pressure," and added: "We believe that we can achieve self-government even now by constitutional means without resort to any violence" (p.93). This emphasis on "constitutional means" can be called a "conservative interpretation of Gandhi, who never stipulated that non-violence must be 'constitutional'" (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.28).

In the pamphlet Nkrumah also reports that the CPP has adopted a "programme of non-violent Positive Action to attain Self-government for the people of this country and their Chiefs" (p.93). Taking yet another page from Gandhi's nonviolent action template, he rejects the idea that strikes and boycotts should be planned in secret and launched as surprises, stating: "As for us, our faith in justice and fair play forbids us to adopt such sneaky methods. We like to use open methods and to be fair and above board in our dealings" (p.94). Nkrumah then quotes two sentences from C.V.H. Rao's book *Civil Disobedience Movement in India*, which argue that a country like Britain "…can appreciate only force or its moral equivalent" (p.94). Rao's wordy rationale points to the moral dimension of nonviolent protest: "An important contributory factor to the satisfactory settlement of a disputed issue is the extent and the nature of the moral force and public sympathy generated by the righteousness of the cause for which the suffering is undergone and the extent of the moral reaction it has produced on the party against which it is directed" (p.94). It seems the passage may have raised more questions than it answered for its readers, but this is as close as the pamphlet comes to theorizing nonviolent action. The morality of nonviolence is not specifically defended, and in fact, "armed revolution and violent overthrow" are discussed as another means of achieving independence. Without condemning the violent means per se, the pamphlet does contrast violent means with "constitutional and *legitimate* non-violent, methods" (p.93; emphasis added). The pamphlet closes by reiterating that Positive Action is "based on the principle of absolute non-violence" and that if necessary, the "final stage" of Positive Action will be called into play: "namely Nation-wide Non-violent Sit-down-at-home Strikes, Boycotts, and Non-co-operation" (p.95). Nkrumah (1973) later recalled:

> In *What I Mean by Positive Action*, I called for non-violent methods of struggle. We had no guns. But even if we had, the circumstances were such that non-violent alternatives were open to us, and it was necessary to try them before resorting to other means. In those days, when we talked of tactics of non-violence we meant the kind of tactics employed by Gandhi in India. (p.86)

After his arrest by the British colonial authorities for inciting others to take part in an illegal strike aimed at coercing the government, Nkrumah stated at his trial that he was a disciple of Gandhi and that his Positive Action campaign was based on Gandhi's nonviolent methods, and included strikes in which he advocated that people "should follow proper methods; sit down at home and follow absolute non-violence" (Timothy 1955, p.108, p.111).

There is some evidence that Nkrumah's respect for nonviolence was sincere, though Nkrumah's own writings must be read with deep skepticism and many of his biographers also lack a sufficiently critical stance (Bretton 1966). Bretton argues that Nkrumah appeared "decidedly humane" in public, but at times he acted with "cold brutality" (p.21). Other biographers have described Nkrumah's "horror of violence" from a young age and his admiration for Gandhi and Gandhian nonviolence (Davidson 1989, p.19). Nkrumah (1961) wrote admiringly of Gandhi and "his adherence to non-violent resistance" (p.3, see also p.155). Moreover, Nkrumah (1957) wrote in his autobiography against the death penalty: "I have always been against the death penalty…I believe that it is a relic of barbarism and savagery and that it is inconsistent with decent morals and the teaching of Christian ethics" (p.132). Nkrumah's autobiography describes how after "months of studying Gandhi's policy" of nonviolence, he came to understand it as "the solution to the colonial problem" (p.viii).

In a sermon on Ghana given in Montgomery, Alabama on April 7, 1957, Martin Luther King, Jr. (recently returned from Ghana's independence ceremonies) approvingly cited this passage of Nkrumah's autobiography, and drew several lessons from the example of Nkrumah in Ghana, underlining how it was further support for the efficacy of nonviolence (King 1957). Incidentally, what King did not mention was the next sentence in Nkrumah's (1957) passage: "In Jawaharlal Nehru's rise to power I recognized the success of one who, pledged to Socialism, was able to interpret Gandhi's philosophy in practical terms" (p.viii). Nkrumah's comfort with using the word "socialism," even leaving aside his policies, made him something of a marked man in the context of the cold war. Moreover, the idea that Gandhi had to be translated into "practical terms" would be anathema to Gandhi and King, and it offers an important clue to Nkrumah's conception of Gandhi and Nkrumah's later movement beyond nonviolence to his legitimation of armed struggle as well as his ruthless realpolitiks in order to maintain power at home.

As mentioned above, also missing from the textbook narrative is the extent of the repression, propaganda, and intimidation the British employed in trying to put down the nonviolent movement. Offering a clearer account than the textbook, Nkrumah (1973) recounts how curfews were imposed, public meetings banned, newspapers shut down, newspaper editors arrested, CPP leaders arrested one by one and "homes and offices ransacked by the police" (pp.88-90). The textbook recounts some of these details but with much less detail and clarity. For example, we are merely told that there were "Attempts by government to suppress these papers…" (Gadzepko 2005, p.197). In addition, in a key meeting between Nkrumah and the British Colonial Secretary Reginald Saloway,

Saloway tried to threaten and scare Nkrumah out of initiating his Positive Action campaign. Saloway, who had also been a civil servant in British India, was aware that Nkrumah's campaign was modeled after Gandhi's movement in India, and Saloway pointedly argued that Gandhi's nonviolent action template would not work in Africa:

> India was a very different matter. The Indian was used to suffering pains and deprivations, but the African has not the spirit of endurance. Mark my words, my good man: within three days the people here will let you down – they'll never stick it. Now, had this been India… (Nkrumah 1957, p.116)

In the days that followed, civil servants who participated in positive action were fired (Timothy 1955, p.117). The British propaganda machine launched misinformation campaigns to undermine the resolve of the movement. For example, radio news declared the Positive Action campaign was cancelled, and Nkrumah's (1957) account claims radio news falsely reported that workers in various parts of the country had abandoned their strikes (pp.117-118). However, the *New York Times*, in a highly reactionary tone, called the CPP "nationalist extremists" (NYT, March 19, 1950), and reported on January 17 that "More strikers, out since Jan. 9…went back to work during the day" (NYT, January 18, 1950). Whether the *Times* was repeating British misinformation, or the strikers did in fact return to work cannot be verified.

It is not hard to imagine that the relative success of the movement, disproving Saloway's theory, could have figured prominently as a point of national pride in the textbook (i.e., the people did possess "the spirit of endurance"). But the narrative neglects this episode, perhaps because the campaign was so short-lived and the CPP rapidly shifted their agenda into electoral politics.

This brings up the larger point that the British colonial authorities remain nameless and faceless in the text (e.g., the names of Saloway and the colonial Governor

Charles Arden-Clark never appear in the text), and so the opponent targeted by nonviolent action never clearly emerges from the shadows. Perhaps Ghana's ongoing membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations, which is approvingly celebrated in the text (Gadzepko 2005, pp.264-266), fosters a subtle reluctance to fully recount the ugly repression of the colonial authorities during the independence movement. We do find general condemnations in the textbook, such as: "Whatever form the Colonial administration took it remained, until its termination in 1957, obnoxious, arbitrary and exploitative" (p.150). But the heated rhetoric of Nkrumah never surfaces, and pericopes from his newspaper editorials would seem somewhat out of place in the textbook: e.g., "…even when imperialism appears to give way, it tries to sabotage it by the back door" (Nkrumah 1973, p.81).

Nkrumah's turn from the comic to the tragic. At Nkrumah's trial, the Magistrate sentenced him to three one-year terms to be served concurrently (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.31), but Nkrumah was released early on February 12, 1951, because, while in prison, he had been elected to the Legislative Assembly in the first general election in the Gold Coast (Timothy 1955, pp.113-114). The speech he gave the next day, makes clear how conscious he was of the Cold War, of the importance of building the opponent's trust, and advocating modest reforms – typical of the "comic" rhetorical frame that Gandhi so often utilized (Carlson 1986):

> I would like to make it absolutely clear that I am a friend of Britain. I desire for the Gold Coast Dominion Status within the Commonwealth. We shall remain within the British Commonwealth of Nations. I am not even thinking of a republic. I am a Marxian Socialist and an undenominational Christian. I am not a Communist and never have been one. I come out of gaol [prison] and into the Assembly without the slightest feeling of bitterness to Britain. I stand for no discrimination against any race or individual, but I am unalterably opposed to Imperialism in any form. (Timothy 1955, p.114)

Utilizing the conceptual apparatus of Burke's (1959) tragic-comic frames, a brief sketch of Nkrumah's transition from a "comic frame" to a "tragic frame" can help us understand the seeds of his fall. Nkrumah's transition from nonviolence to violence is an obvious shift from the comic to the tragic, as defined by Burke.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. noted that when Nkrumah gave his speech to Parliament during the independence ceremonies, Nkrumah and his colleagues wore their prison caps and coats, as if a badge of honor but also a startling image of humility (King 1998, p.113), and an image clearly in tune with the "comic frame." But Nkrumah's turn to the "tragic frame" was swift, as we see in his many proclamations of utopian visions – a key marker of the tragic. After assuming the reins of power he promised that Ghana would become a "paradise" within a few years (Nugent 1995, p.5). His extremely ambitious, utopian pan-Africanist vision "…gradually deteriorated into a form of escape" (Bretton 1966, p.29). Similarly, Davidson (1989) argues that Nkrumah's extensive writings tended to be "theorizing in a vacuum. It had little or no impact on the political machine" (p.195).

The tragic rhetorical frame is also marked by megalomania. As the country struggled in an economic crisis early in his reign, Nkrumah ordered 9 bronze statues of himself made in Italy at an exorbitant price (Gadzepko 2005, p.232). A twenty-foot high statue of him was erected in front of Parliament House in Accra, bearing an inscription – a quote from Nkrumah: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be added to you" (Addo 1997, p.65). Here, Nkrumah seems to have aimed for frame alignment with Christians, as the line borrows heavily from the New Testament, Matthew 6:33: "seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all things shall be

added unto you." But combined with the larger than life statue, some Christians saw it as sacrilegious (Addo 1997), and one can readily consider a reading which sees Nkrumah as an egotistical, self-proclaimed Messiah. But defenders have argued this is a misreading: "the statement specifically referred to his belief in the primacy of politics and the need to address the question of national sovereignty as an index to socio-economic development" (Addo 1997, p.66).

Critics maintain that the ideology of Nkrumaism became a "religious phenomenon" with Nkrumah filling a divine role, but perhaps few were more than superficially loyal to Nkrumah (Bretton 1966, pp.87-88). Still, with Nkrumah's face on coins, bills, and stamps, and with streets and squares named after him (p.88), the personality cult pervaded the symbols of the young state, making his fall all the more devastating. The tragic frame extends all the way to the words inscribed in Guinea on his coffin: "THE GREATEST AFRICAN" (Milne 1990, p.x). Yet, after the coup ousting Nkrumah, few had misgivings about his overthrow. The next day, one of his top advisors pledged loyalty to the new police/ military government saying, "The Army has taken power to liberate the people from oppression. The Ghanaian people will now have a free country and will not idolize a single man" (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.2).

The text byGadzepko (2005) describes Nkrumah's increasingly authoritarian regime, writing that Nkrumah "never intended giving the opposition a respite. Right from the word go, he was ready to scare the small puppies to death before they could even open their eyes" (p.207). Thus, Nkrumah's dictatorial suppression of any political opposition, along with the warranted perception that his government had generally become "corrupt, tyrannical and incompetent" (pp.259-260, pp.230-232), were key

driving factors in his Shakespearean fall from grace: “He became obsessed with his own power and ambition” (p.230). The textbook argues: “it is crystal clear that, by removing the Government of Nkrumah, Ghanians were saved from a ‘reign of terror’” (p.237). But the textbook offers some details on how a reign of terror had already begun (pp.230-231), and Nkrumah’s coercive methods are said to extend beyond Ghana’s borders as the textbook alleges that Nkrumah may have played a role in several assassinations of African leaders in other nations (p.232).

Nkrumah’s pan-African vision and his role in mentoring revolutionary leaders and in fostering anti-colonial liberation movements throughout Africa receive prominent coverage in the text. Nkrumah’s role seems to be portrayed as one of strategic counselor, but again, “nonviolence” never appears and the tactics of the anti-colonial movements are not discussed, though references to “freedom fighters” and “radical methods” appear (Gadzepko 2005, pp.227-229).

Thus, there are vague hints in the text that Nkrumah had abandoned nonviolence as he pursued his pan-Africanist vision. In fact, before the coup in 1966, Nkrumah had already written a manual (later published as a book in 1968), *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution*, dedicated “To the African Guerrilla” (Milne 1990, p.9, p.446). Writing from Conakry, Guinea in July of 1968, Nkrumah argued that the Black Power movement in the U.S.A. and the struggles of African descendents in the Caribbean and South America were signs of a new phase of “African politico-military revolutionary struggle” against “imperialist and neo-colonialist aggression” (pp.446-447). Like his turn to violent means, Nkrumah’s previous adherence to nonviolence drew inspiration from the spirit of the times. In the mid-1940’s, anti-

colonial movements were inspired by Gandhi's example, and when Nkrumah attended the Sixth Pan-African Congress in 1945 in Manchester, the core themes included "nonviolence and positive action" (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.19). Thus, we should not overlook how the emerging interpretive community of pan-Africanists shaped Nkrumah's embrace of nonviolence, as well as his later turn away from it.

The "Handbook" outlines a six point argument for why "anti-imperialist pacifism is dying, and on a continental scale," while declaring that "Violence clears the 'neo-colonialist fog'…The issues are made clear" (Milne 1990, p.484). Nkrumah argues that "pacific political action" was potent during the "national phase of the liberation movement," though mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, but there were also exceptions to that pattern such as in Kenya where "recourse to peaceful political action was denied to the masses" and the Mau Mau emerged (p.483). He envisions a Pan-Africanist military struggle against "imperialist aggression" and states "Revolutionary warfare is the logical, inevitable answer to the political, economic and social situation in Africa today. We do not have the luxury of an alternative" (p.476). It seems Nkrumah's ideological transition beyond Gandhian nonviolence was complete, and influenced by the spirit of his time and context.

Why Nonviolence is Muted in the Ghana Textbook

I suggest four reasons why nonviolent action does not figure more prominently in the textbook's independence narrative – all of them linked to Nkrumah, the key leader of the independence movement. First, Nkrumah's fall, the dominant narrative of his "corruption" and "moral disintegration" (Bretton 1966, pp.28-29), his "idiosyncratic,

one-man rule" (Blum 1995, p.198) served to focus the collective memory away from the entire independence movement. What could have conceivably been a glorious narrative of national origins, a point of reference for patriotic as well as nonviolent norms in the culture, retrospectively transformed into an episode that was de-emphasized and mystified through neglect and disillusionment. The textbook even neglects to mention that Nkurmah was one of the heroic "Bix Six" arrested by the British in 1948, as if to redeem that episode by writing him out of it!

Second, the military coup served the same mystifying function, and for good reason. Though fledgling democratic institutions were severely compromised as Nkrumah rapidly turned dictatorial, the military coup brought a complete overhaul in the political opportunity structure. Beliefs in the efficacy of nonviolent political action must have been shattered. Perhaps some Ghanaians even argued the refrain heard around the world, "Nonviolence worked against the British, but it won't work against…" Fill-in-the-blank here, in this case: Ghana's military leadership.

Third, the potential survival of Nkrumah's nonviolent norms in the collective memory was undermined by the fact that Nkrumah soon explicitly endorsed armed struggle as the next phase of anticolonialism, the official positive action campaign only lasted two weeks (though rallies, marches, and threats to undertake positive action long preceded it), and Nkrumah and other CPP leaders showed deep ambivalence about mass nonviolent action and especially civil disobedience. Some have argued that Nkrumah's commitment to non-violence had been "abstract" (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.19). And, we must emphasize Nkrumah's explicit endorsement of violent revolutionary methods in his book.

Yet, as late as April of 1960, Nkrumah (1961) still took pages from the Gandhian repertoire as he convened a conference in Accra on "Positive Action and Security in Africa" and in his opening speech threatened a mass nonviolent march into the French nuclear testing zone in the Sahara, where France had already detonated two nuclear bombs (pp.214-215). He argued that "the result could be as powerful and as successful as Gandhi's historic Salt March," putting pressure on the De Gaulle government and winning over French and world opinion (p.215). However, the march was never planned and that this was a bluff was probably transparently obvious, as asking people to walk towards the nuclear contamination carried serious health risks. Though in fairness, he seems to have imagined that all protesters would be arrested before reaching the test site (p.215). Nevertheless, Nkrumah's speech praises Gandhi and the contemporary struggle in South Africa: "We salute Mahatma Gandhi and we remember in tribute to him, that it was in South Africa that his method of non-violence and non-co-operation was first practiced…But now positive action with non-violence, as advocated by us, has found expression South Africa in the defiance of the oppressive pass laws" (p.215). It is not entirely clear here if Nkrumah is claiming South African nonviolence to be modeled partly on his own "positive action" repertoire during Ghana's independence movement, but in truth he initiated no new tactical innovations to the Gandhian repertoire.

At the height of the independence movement, CPP leaders set an ambiguous tone regarding nonviolent action. The Trade Union Congress (TUC) actually declared the general strike to begin on January 7, 1950. This forced the hand of the CPP. Had they failed to endorse the strike they would have appeared far more moderate than their rhetoric, and risked letting the labor movement's revolutionary momentum pass them by.

On January 8, Nkrumah announced that the positive action campaign would begin the next day on January 9 (Gocking 2005, pp.92-93). Once again, it seems the reality was more complex than the textbook's portrayal, in which the CPP is said to call for the general strike and it was said to be the sign that the workers' "Messiah" had come (Gadzepko 2005, p.194). In fact, positive action only lasted two weeks, as Nkrumah called off the campaign the day he was arrested on January 21 (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.31). There were sporadic outbreaks of violence during the 2 weeks of the general strike, but the violence was effectively repressed by a "new force of mobile police" (p.30). Working-class solidarity was lacking and scabs were hired (p.30). Narratives of the movement typically fail to report that at least in working-class districts, the sentiment was that the strike and the positive action campaign had failed (p.31).

If failure is likely to lead social movement actors to doubt their tactics, how much more so when movement leaders waiver in their advocacy or even denounce those tactics. After several meetings between Nkrumah, Arden-Clarke, and Saloway, Nkrumah tried to get the TCU to call off the general strike, the CPP newspaper twice postponed positive action, and at one point Nkrumah called positive action off completely (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.29). After the government prosecuted TUC and CPP leaders for promoting an illegal strike, the "entire party leadership denounced the General Strike" during their trials (p.127). Fitch and Oppenheimer have pointed to this as part of CPP's first and last mistake – taking it as a sign of their "coalition with colonialism" (p.127).

What were the reasons for this ambivalence about nonviolent tactics, and more specifically, for the denunciation of the strike? To some degree, the behavior of the CPP leaders bears resemblance to other prominent nonviolent leaders. Perhaps we should

recall that unlike Gandhi, who insisted on truth telling in the courtroom, Dr. King and his colleagues engaged in evasions and prevarications in the court room (Burns 2004, p.98). In addition, Gandhi often sought to negotiate with his opponents, to gain leverage through the threat of launching a campaign, and often called off his campaigns. King repeatedly delayed the start of the Birmingham campaign (see Burns 2004, p.166). In Birmingham, King and the SCLC even considered abandoning direct action in favor of voter registration, in part because local conservative and moderate black leaders were reluctant to endorse civil disobedience as they hoped new political leaders would "make protests unnecessary" (p.167). Arden-Clark recalled that some CPP leaders were moderate in this sense as well, saying they "would have preferred not to resort to 'positive action' but to await the results of the general election, the outcome of which they were fairly confident" (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.29). In these senses, Nkrumah and other CPP leaders were not so unusual. Nonviolent protest involves strategic maneuvering and at times during a protest cycle, civil disobedience might be ill advised. Thus, Dr. King had always obeyed court orders but, partly because such obedience had proved too constricting in the failed Albany campaign, King defied a court injunction in the Birmingham campaign, finally merging civil disobedience and the nonviolent movement (Schulke and McPhee 1986, pp.123-125).

However, the way in which CPP leaders so completely denounced the strike and "positive action" during the trials must have been demoralizing to any CPP followers who had been inspired by Nkrumah's call for nonviolent action and civil disobedience. Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966) note of the trials: "The spirit of courageous defiance was clearly absent" (p.30). Nkrumah was the only CPP leader who admitted to any

connection to the positive action campaign, but even he distanced himself from the strike. Nkrumah "denied having called on anybody to strike," he "maintained that he even tried to stop the strike when he heard of it," and he claimed those who did strike were not influenced by the CPP (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, p.31).

Fourth, accounts of Nkrumah and the independence movement omit any evidence that he might have framed nonviolence in terms of native tribal traditions or Christian moral norms (Assensoh 1989, Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, Gocking 2005, Timothy 1955). Nkrumah's frequent editorials in the *Accra Evening News* seemingly neglect the opportunity to theorize nonviolence, though references to "relentless" "struggle" abound, and anecdotes from the military battles of Churchill and Garibaldi appear (e.g., Timothy 1955, pp.83-86). The crucial statement of nonviolent strategy encapsulated in the pamphlet, *What I Mean by Positive Action*, attempts no frame alignment or frame resonance with the moral and religious traditions of the Ghanaian people. This is somewhat puzzling given that, as we have seen above, in Nkrumah's autobiography, he clearly denounces the death penalty using Christian ethics frames (Nkrumah 1957, p.132). In addition, CPP gatherings often included Christian prayers, traditional sheep sacrifices, oath taking (taken from tribal traditions of loyalty oaths (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, pp.63-64)), and libation rituals ("a form of prayer directed to the Supreme Being and to the ancestors, in gratitude, for petition and protection" (Addo 1997, p.120, p.104). This syncretic, eclectic mixing of traditions was a hallmark of many post-colonial African leaders and governments, though some Christians in Ghana viewed the appropriation of some of these practices with "horror" (pp.104-105). Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966) inform us that CPP members were "pledged by oath to support Dr.

Nkrumah" (p.2). But it seems Nkrumah did not employ the tribal tradition of oaths to secure nonviolent commitments during the independence movement.

On this last point, we should note that Nkrumah studied Christian theology and preached in U.S. churches, but on several occasions he was also observed practicing African religious traditions (Assensoh 1989, pp.55-56; Bretton 1966, pp.31-32). Nevertheless, he called himself an "undenominational Christian" at the height of the independence movement. If Nkrumah had aligned his nonviolent frames with Christian or traditional African religious traditions (or more likely, a syncretic version of these), nonviolent strategies may have obtained more stickiness in the collective memory, especially if the frames resonated as organically related to pre-existing tribal and Christian traditions. The potential for pan-tribal frames would seem to be high given many common features of cultural practice, including language and chieftancy, between the tribes, coupled with the fact that the Akan peoples constituted up to 45% of the population (Gadzepko 2005, p.210).

However, there are practical reasons it may have been difficult to attempt frame resonance with existing traditions. Some argue that Nkrumah's political agenda aimed to reduce the salience of the tribal (Assensoh 1989, p.194), that bitterness quickly developed between Nkrumah and the chiefs (Gocking 2005, p.94), and that Christianity in Ghana has tended to be quite conservative politically (Addo 1997; Nugent 1995, p.9), "other-worldly" theologically (p.31), and culturally European or phobic about indigenous African traditions including African drums and clothing styles (Addo 1997). However, some Protestant Christian clergy did throw themselves into ardent support of the CPP and took up leadership positions in the CPP (Addo 1997, pp.103-104).

The symbols and frames surrounding Nkrumah's "cult of personality" are strongly contested. It seems the challenges of creating, virtually overnight, pan-tribal Ghanaian unity along with a Ghanaian "civil religion" (Bellah 1967) were destined to appear as too radical and disconnected from existing cultural and religious traditions. To be sure there was a "cultural and psychological void arising from the colonial experience" (Bretton 1966, p.11), but it could also be said that Nkrumah's CPP, with ideology and organizations modeled on Soviet and Eastern European Communist parties imported "tactics and practices" that "bore no relationship to either the culture or polity in Ghana (p.10). There is a sense in which the personality cult of Nkrumah was more organically related to a culture of chieftans, and in fact, the "most practical way of providing the new ship of state with a stable keel" (p.12). And in years to come, there was a void from the "deflating experience" of witnessing a charismatic independence leader pass from power (Geertz 1973 cited in Addo 1997, p.197). For example, Nkrumah was given a traditional title, Osagyefo, meaning "victor in war" (somewhat ironically for the leader of a nonviolent movement), but some translated this as "redeemer" to the delight of his ardent followers as well as his critics who took it as a sign of his megalomania (Davidson 1989, p.192). Just as Messianic titles were adopted for Nkrumah, Christian hymns, prayers, and Biblical passages were re-written (Addo 1997, pp.101-102). The CPP's propaganda machine even produced political versions of the Lord's Prayer, the Apostle's Creed, and the Beatitudes with Nkrumah and the CPP cast in pseudo-divine roles (Timothy 1955; pp.80-81, pp.101-102).

A Second Opinion: The Account of Another Ghanaian Textbook

The Prah (2010) *Government* textbook (i.e., a political science text) for senior high schools offers much more concise coverage of Nkrumah, independence, the rise and fall of the CPP. But the text includes a number of critical strengths. For instance, one chapter briefly but laudably critiques the widespread pattern of military coups and military rule in West Africa, while appealing to democratic and human rights norms. In addition, Prah's coverage of "positive action" is somewhat more comprehensive than Gadzepko's. For example, positive action is explicitly linked to Gandhi's "peaceful tactics":

> In 1950 Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of the CPP, declared 'positive action' by which he called upon workers in the country to stage a sit-down strike and boycott British good and refuse to co-operate with the colonial authorities to back their demand for an end to colonial rule. Nkrumah's positive action was influenced by the peaceful tactics of Mahatma Gandhi, known as Satyagraha. (p.385)

As in the Gadzepko (2005) text, Prah's (2010) coverage of the ex-serviceman's demonstration is vague. Unlike Gadzepko, Prah names the demonstration as "violent" – but again, with vague and unclear descriptors. Prah does signal the significance of the violence by giving it one of the six numbered paragraphs covering the CPP's "methods toward the attainment of independence" (p.385):

> 6. Violent confrontation: The declaration of positive action in 1950 by Nkrumah degenerated into rioting, demonstrations and violent confrontation when as ex-servicemen's demonstration clashed with the police and resulted in the death of two African policemen. Nkrumah and some of his party colleagues were tried and imprisoned. (p.386)

Unfortunately, the reader is then abruptly introduced to Nkrumah's rule as head of state, with little narrative of the intervening developments. For example, the nonviolent demonstration of students protesting the arrest of Nkrumah among the "Big Six" is left

out. A few pages prior, however, we were told that the arrest of Nkrumah and the other leaders "made them heroes in the eyes of the masses who regarded these leaders as martyrs...This development strengthened the people's loyalty to the [CPP] party" (p.384), and helped lead to the CPP's electoral victory in 1951 (p.383). In fact, the British decision to arrest the CPP leaders led to significant blowback in the form of mass protests which were ultimately a factor in British abdication of colonial rule.

Nkrumah consistently ranks as one of the most important African leaders of the 20th century. His legacy is complex. Some believe he was mediocre, merely opportunistic, while others claim he showed flashes of brilliance. The textbook by Prah (2010) demonstrates that Nkrumah's Gandhian phase has certainly been remembered in Ghanaian collective memory. In this sense, the omissions and selectivity of Gadzepko's (2005) text do not yet indicate collective forgetting. But in some ways it is hard to imagine how a successful independence leader who explicitly framed his movement in accordance with a Gandhian nonviolent "memory template" (Eddy 2012), could do more to tarnish his own legacy and bury the significance of nonviolent action in Ghana's collective memory. Some nonviolent movements may recede into collective forgetting for lack of a charismatic leader, but Nkrumah shows how a tarnished leader can also obscure the memory template of a nonviolent movement.

Yet for all his failings, Nkrumah was at least partly a victim of the Cold War and the reach of U.S. power. Nkrumah's socialist leanings set him up for stiff opposition abroad and at home. In the end, it seems Nkrumah was not subservient enough to U.S. interests, and his penchant for writing and talking about socialism and revolutionary violence did little to endear him to U.S. power elites. The final irony of Nkrumah's

political career is that he was overthrownby a military coup in which the CIA played a significant supportive role (Stockwell 1978, Milne 1990, Blum 1995). The textbook by Prah (2010) reports: “Nkrumah’s overthrow in 1966 was believed to have been financed by the Central Intelligence Agency of U.S.A....” (p.404).The textbook by Gadzepko (2005) offers no hint of U.S. involvement in Nkrumah’s overthrow. It states that a coup led by the Army and Police deposed Nkrumah while he was on a “peace mission to Vietnam” (p.232). In fact, he was traveling to Hanoi “with peace proposals for ending the war in Vietnam” when the coup occurred (Milne 1990, p.3). His final act as President was to seek the peace abroad that he could not establish at home.

The Case of Norway

Three Norwegian secondary school history textbooks from two different eras were analyzed. The first, Figved et al. (1976), has been called “the dominant” history textbook of the late 1970s in Norway (Lorentzen 1990, p.108). The second, Grimnes et al. (2008), offers much more comprehensive coverage of Norwegian and world history, as the size of the school history textbook has grown much more expansive, paralleling developments in U.S. textbooks. Figved at al. (1976) covers Norwegian and world history from 1800 to 1948 in 52 pages in a 6 ½ by 9 inch format, versus Grimnes et al. (2008) which covers from 1800 (beginning on p.43) to 1945 (ending on p.306), in a larger 8 by 11 inch format and in 263 pages. That is, the newer text offers over five times more coverage.

Norway’s experiences during World War II involved far less suffering and bloodshed than countries such as France and Poland (Halle 1966). But survey data

revealed that during World War II, 14% of Norwegians lost close friends, 10% lost close relatives, 12% of experienced material losses (to oneself or family), 4% performed forced labor or were prisoners of war, and 1% experienced wounds or damage to their health (Halle 1966). Such a significant historical episode would seem to merit significant coverage in history textbooks.

After the Nazis invaded Norway on April 9, 1940, numerous pockets of violent and nonviolent resistance began to evolve. Stephan and Chenowith (2008) code the 1944 Norwegian resistance of the Nazi occupation as nonviolent and the outcome as "limited success." Unfortunately, they do not code the 1942 resistance campaign of Norwegian teachers, parents, and Church leaders, which also resulted in at least "limited success." Perhaps if Norwegians interpreted, remembered, or celebrated these cases of nonviolent methods bringing "limited success," then they would tend to generalize beyond it and report belief in the potential efficacy of nonviolence. However, it seems this learning process has been thwarted through neglect. In the 2008 Gallup World Poll, Norway ties with Germany and Austria, ranking 71st out of 94 nations with only 48% of citizens responding that peaceful means alone "will work," well below the global mean of 57.9%.

Figved et al.'s (1976) coverage of Norway's nonviolent resistance of the Nazi occupation is extremely sparse. Judging from this popular textbook it would seem that *only some* aspects of Norway's nonviolent resistance of the Nazis and the NS-regime (the National Smling regime, i.e., the Norwegian Nazi party led by the Norwegian fascist "Minister-President" Vidkun Quisling) are embedded in collective memory, and it is not conceptualized as specifically *nonviolent* resistance. Such under-named and under-theorized nature of nonviolence is commonplace in school history textbooks around the

world. In retrospective interviews, at least one Norwegian teacher active in the resistance was aware of this dynamic: “Nowhere through all these discussions did the *idea* of nonviolent resistance come in. Instead of an idea, it developed as a way to work – a way to do something” (Sharp 2005, p.136). While Sharp (1959) notes that pacifists were associated with the teachers’ struggle, it was “not in such a way as to permeate the struggle with an aura of moral superiority of nonviolent over violent methods of resistance, or in sufficient numbers, as to warrant its classification under ‘peaceful resistance’” (p.54). Hence, Sharp designates this episode as an example of “passive resistance” (p.53). However, while Sharp’s 1959 typology includes nine types of generic nonviolence, there is little question that nonviolent theorists in recent years have tended to classify nonviolence as either principled or pragmatic (Eddy 2011, Eddy 2012). Here, Sharp’s description of the Norwegian teachers’ resistance names pragmatic nonviolence.

However, some elements of nonviolent resistance are described in the text, namely, underground newspapers and radio broadcasts:

> The German objective was to win the war. Quisling’s goal was to nazify Norwegian society. The Norwegians’ battle on the home front was aimed at preventing both. The Norwegians multiplied small newspapers that went from hand to hand, and the home front had firm leadership who organized resistance against all attempts at nazifying Norway. Everything that the German military was doing was reported to London [the Norwegian government in exile], and after a while armed forces, popularly called ‘the guys in the woods,’ were established. British airplanes dropped weapons and supplies to them by parachute. Quisling has managed to create national unity, the people said, he has gathered all the Norwegian people against him.
>
> [Caption accompanying a photo of an anonymous woman typing:] The Germans had seized people’s radios, and it could be dangerous to listen to Norwegian radio broadcasts from London and type them up on typewriters and let them circulate among the people. This young woman is sitting in the secret headquarters of ‘Hjemmefrontledelsen’ [the name of the group that organized the resistance in Norway] typing code messages from London. That was even more dangerous because if caught she could expect that the secret German police would torture

> her, attempting to force her to reveal the names of Hjemmefrontledelsen members. (p.47)

Again, this account emphasizes high-risk underground media activism. We are told that the homefront's resistance movement, Hjemmefrontledelsen, offered "firm leadership who organized resistance against all attempts at nazifying Norway" (p.47).

But beyond underground media, we are given few clues as to the strategies or scope of the nonviolent resistance efforts. As is typical of textbooks around the world, the word "nonviolence" is never used. We are not told the names of any of the "firm" leaders of the resistance movement – a narrative choice which, needless to say, serves to obscure their role. We are not told about the resistance of Norwegian teachers, parents, or church leaders (see below). Incidentally, in the photo appearing on p.47, there is a pistol beside the radio. The pistol is not remarked upon, but elements of violent resistance are highlighted, such as the armed "guys in the woods." In addition, the text tells us that Norwegian pilots were trained in Canada and many of the 40,000 Norwegians who fled to Sweden were secretly trained as soldiers. Thus, we are led to believe that the Norwegians were unified (with the exception of Quisling), and underground media and pockets of armed resistance were important tools of resistance.

The text does include two additional details which might escape notice as potential elements of nonviolent resistance. First, we are told that the Parliament and the King escaped to the United Kingdom so that the government in exile could "safeguard Norwegian interests" from afar (p.47). As such, it was a variant of the "parallel institutions" strategy relied upon by many nonviolent resistance movements. Second, the flight of 40,000 Norwegians to Sweden represent a type of nonviolent response even if the character and scope of resistance becomes drastically altered through exile. On both

of these counts we might be reminded of Tibetans who have fled China, and created a government in exile. This strategy born of necessity has preserved the Tibetan leadership, traditions, collective memory, and critical human rights documentation regarding the Chinese takeover of Tibet, while operating freely at a safe distance. Much like the Norwegian government in exile did, Tibetans in exile have served as an information clearinghouse, utilizing nonviolent methods of consciousness-raising through news media, publications, and activist networks, as well as international diplomacy.

In the much more lengthy and comprehensive Grimnes et al. (2008) text, very important details are still left out. Like the text above, we are not told the names of any resistance movement leaders. Though one activist in the underground press, PetterMoen is highlighted, the narrative here only focuses on his diary while imprisoned by the Nazis. The textbook's most significant omission is Quisling's tirade against teachers in a school near Oslo on May 22, 1944, in which he said, "You teachers have destroyed everything for me!" (Sharp 2005, p.139). Here, Quisling's admission of defeat casts the nonviolent noncooperation of the teachers as the fulcrum point, tipping the momentum decisively against Quisling's agenda of nazifying Norway and establishing "the Corporative State" based on Mussolini's model (p.136). On Quisling's admission, a teacher recalls, "That sentence was a triumph for us. It became a *slogan* and was taken up and *quoted everywhere afterwards*" (p.139; emphasis added). Sharp (1959) concurs that the teachers' resistance was "the most important of several actions in halting Quisling's plans for instituting the Corporate state in Norway" (p.54).

Ironically however, despite the enormous significance of Quisling's statement and the significance teachers themselves attached to it (as well as the fact that this sound bite

clearly meets standard textbook demands for concision), it was not quoted in any one of the three textbooks. Hence, though the teachers took this up as their slogan, it is not "quoted everywhere afterwards" in major vehicles of collective memory, far from it. Norwegian teachers – who because of this historical episode have reason to be proud of their predecessors and their profession – were not equipped by the textbooks to reproduce this collective memory.

Omitting Quisling's admission deprives nonviolent resistance in Norway of the "slogan" that had once been "taken up and quoted everywhere afterwards" (Sharp 2005, p.139). With this slogan, the efficacy of the teacher's nonviolent noncooperation comes into focus. Through remembering this slogan, the "cognitive praxis" (Eyerman and Jamison 1991) of their social movement, their lessons learned through experience, is reproduced. Without it, like in so many textbooks around the world, the efficacy of nonviolent action is obscured.

Nevertheless, the Grimnes et al. (2008) text deserves credit for naming "non-violent" ("ikk-voldelige" in Norwegian) protest and for presenting a relatively detailed account of Norwegian nonviolent resistance to the Nazi occupation:

> As time went on, the occupation forces met an increasing resistance in the population. The resistance was diverse, but roughly speaking it is possible to split it into two. It was firstly a civil resistance movement that was mainly directed at the NS, although it also had the Germans as a target. Secondly, there was a military resistance that primarily targeted the German military power.
>
> The core of the civil resistance movement was the many large and small resistance actions that the NS's 'nazifying' offensive elicited. The actions came across a broad front, taking the form of a large number of non-violent group and mass protests. The protest action that was the most dramatic and seemed to have the biggest impact on public opinion, was directed against the NS's attempts to nazify the teachers and the youth in the spring of 1942. Quisling's new government announced the fact that all teachers had to join an NS-directed teacher organization, and that all young people had a duty to participate in the party's Youth League. The vast majority of teachers protested against the order,

> and tens of thousands of parents overwhelmed the Ministry with protest letters. Terbovens' [the German officer in charge of the Nazi occupation of Norway] answer to the teachers' action was to arrest 1,100 teachers, and send a few hundred of them to Kirkenes on forced labor.
>
> The church supported teachers and parents. At the same time it fought its own battle against the NS-state. Bishops and priests announced that they would continue their activities as clergymen, but that they would no longer have any connection with the state. The Church's action, as the actions by teachers and parents, made a large impression. (pp.290-291)

Here the Grimnes et al. (2008) text, much like the Figved et al. (1976) text, highlights the role of the underground radio broadcasts and newspapers as important forms of "civil resistance" which "accommodated the enormous need for information in a society under censorship" (p.291). The text includes a large picture with this caption:

> The teacher action in the spring of 1942 was among the largest and most important civil resistance actions during the war. The Germans were afraid that it would lead to unrest in the population at a time when they feared an Allied invasion. Therefore Terboven took decisive action. Here are some of the teachers who were sent to Kirkenes on forced labor. (p.291)

The text then makes the efficacy of nonviolent noncooperation explicit:

> It was because of the civil resistance that the NS failed with its nazification. In retrospect it seems obvious that it had to go that way. At the time, when the Germans won on all fronts, it was not so obvious. Far from everyone was sure who would win the battle of the Norwegian public in 1940-42. The civil resistance continued and peaked in the spring of 1944 in a new big action. This time, the resistance was able to prevent the NS-regime from convening three age groups of young people in conscripted work. It was feared that the work was in reality a preparation for the war effort on the German side. (pp.291-292)

Such a reflection on the efficacy of civil resistance is a rarity in textbooks. However, note how even here it is under-theorized, as we are told that in "retrospect it seems obvious..." On the contrary, the efficacy of nonviolent resistance seems to remain "not so obvious." Again, under half of the Norwegian population concedes that "peaceful means alone" "will work" for oppressed groups (2008 Gallup World Poll). Some might argue that the wording of the Gallup World Poll question, "peaceful means alone," is imperfect, since

forms of violent and nonviolent resistance are often mixed in large movements. Such would be the case if Norwegians perceived violent resistance to have played an important role alongside the civil resistance – but this seems to be far from the truth, as the textbook itself implies.

Additional details left out of, or only vaguely described, in both textbooks include the following. We are not told about sabotage efforts or the rescue groups who saved about 800 Jews by smuggling them into neutral Sweden, sometimes through harrowing escapes that could furnish brief, engaging textbook-worthy narratives (e.g., Sherrow 2000, pp.207-208). We are not told how symbolic acts of resistance cultivated solidarity such as the wearing of paper clips in lapels or as necklaces and bracelets to signify "stick together" (Sharp 2005, p.136).

The Grimnes et al. (2008) text narrates, "The vast majority of teachers protested..." against the NS orders (pp.290-291). Such shorthand obscures what "protest" means and how it was organized. Sharp (2005) fills in key details here, many of which are so memorable, their omission from all three textbooks well illustrates the intellectual travesty of standard textbook modes of telling history. It is as if the texts have been reverse-engineered to be deliberately boring. Sharp explains that a "secret small resistance leadership group" in Oslo mobilized networks which asked every teacher to write protest letters, signing their names and addresses, and mail them to the NS officials. In their letters, each teacher refused to join the new teacher's organization and refused to cooperate in fascist education. Sherrow (2000) explains that Norwegian schoolteachers were "ordered to tell students that the Germans were 'friends' and that their takeover of Norway was an effort to 'protect' Norwegian citizens from the British, not an invasion"

(p.207). It is estimated that between 8,000 and 10,000 of the nation's 12,000 teachers wrote letters of refusal. That detail alone (left out of all of the textbooks) is incredibly memorable, and speaks to the scope and power of the noncooperation effort. The NS officials first threatened to terminate their jobs, then closed all of the nation's schools for a month – another memorable detail whose inclusion (if textbook authors could be bothered to be artistically skillful in retelling history) would begin to build a plot with suspense and turning points. In response, teachers and students met in private homes (yet another memorable detail). Censorship meant that news of these protests circulated only in the underground media, but eventually "almost every home in the country" became aware of these developments (Sharp 2005, p.137). The extent of noncooperation even within the governmentbureaucracy is well illustrated by the fact that throughout their 8 months of incarceration, the teachers' salaries continued to be delivered to their families (p.138). Many of the detained teachers endured death threats, forms of torture, and harsh living conditions in concentration camps in the South as well as in a labor camp in Kirkenes above the Arctic Circle.

Sharp (2005) summarizes the outcome:

> Fearful of alienating Norwegians still further, Quisling finally ordered the teachers' release...Quisling's new fascist organization for teachers never came into being, and the *schools were never used for fascist propaganda*. After Quisling encountered further difficulties in imposing the Corporative State, *Hitler ordered him to abandon the whole project*. (p.140; emphasis added)

It supplies a classic case of noncooperation, bearing out Gandhi and Thoreau before him who theorized that power is rooted in cooperation and can be withdrawn through noncooperation. But none of the three textbooks document the magnitude of these nonviolent victories: the schools were never used for fascist propaganda, the teachers

were released because Quisling was afraid, the teachers "ruined everything" for Quisling, and Hitler order Quisling to abandon the whole project of nazification in Norway.

The third Norwegian textbook analyzed (Abrahamsen, Dyrvik, Nielsen, and Aase 2008) introduces resistance to the Nazis writing, "The resistance in Norway during WWII was made up of two categories – the military and the civil resistance" (p.292). For both the military and civil resistance sections of the text, the historical accounts are swift moving, vague, bare bones facts, never pausing to develop plot or introduce characters. There is no narrative arc, no suspense, no tension, and thus, no real turning points that could sustain real human interest. The historical participants are not humanized, and very few are even named.

But organizations are named including the "Utefronten" (Norwegian armed forces abroad), the "Milorg" or "Hjemmefronten" (the Homefront military), and the following civil resistance groups: the "Kretsen" (the Circle, comprised of elites from the Church and the Supreme Court, among others), the Coordination Committee, the Homefront Leadership, and people in the labor movement are also said to have "joined in" (p.293). Nevertheless, the text emphasizes that the resistance movement was mostly comprised of "many self-run networks" (p.294): "the majority of those who carried out civil resistance worked in their own, partly or wholly, self-operated networks, and had no idea that there was a Homefront Leadership..." (p.293). The resistance networks are vaguely described, as are multiple conflicts: "From time to time there were large conflicts between the Circle and the government. Also within the civilian resistance movement there were large differences of opinion, and at times between the civil resistance movement and Milorg." The vagaries here can only cultivate boredom for students. Finally, a few specifics are

offered: “One topic of conflict was how Norway would be run in the first period after German capitulation...” (p.294).

The military resistance is covered first, but statements on its significance are limited to two: the 24,000 Norwegian merchant seamen who delivered military supplies to the Allies, and the Milorg (military homefront/ “secret shadow army”) who “...often kept a low profile in anticipation of an allied invasion, and became particularly important by maintaining law and order when Germany capitulated in May of 1945” (p.292). Thus, the significance of the army was limited to serving as a police force after Germany surrendered. The hypothetical allied invasion never happened.

Abrahamsen, Dyrvik, Nielsen, and Aase (2008) never use the word nonviolence, only “civil resistance.” This text emphasizes the civil resistance of youth and parents:

> Among the first civilian actions were a number of spontaneous protests at the high schools during the 1940-1941 school year by students who protested against NS-students [i.e., NS is the Nasjonal Samling, the Nazi-friendly political party in Norway during WWWII], who had begun wearing their paramilitary uniform at school. The actions were quelled with expulsions. But from the spring of 1942, the civilian resistance increased. Especially important was a comprehensive action by parents against nazification of the schools and against conscription to the labor service for youth, which NS had introduced... (p.293)

At this point, the text barely mentions the triumphant Norwegian teachers – limiting their appearance to one sentence: “Also actions among teachers and priests inspired resistance against nazification” (p.293). Thus, we are never told of the arrest of the 1,100 teachers, or the detention and forced labor of hundreds of teachers.

The text returns again to other elements of resistance:

> The civilian resistance also led to other outcomes. The sports clubs and many other organizations stopped working. Many boycotted the labor service for youth, a boycott that caused many youth to flee into the forests during the last year of the war. They have been referred to as ‘the lads in the wood.’ Many of them established contact with Milorg [the shadow army] and received weapons and

> training. There were also many civilians who, at the risk of reprisals, provided help for prisoners of war and others who were on the run from the German police. Others worked on the border between Sweden and Norway and helped people get over to Sweden, which was neutral during the war. (p.294)

In this way the text catalogs several forms of civil resistance, but because of the narrative is so stripped of plot and personality, these acts of courage and creative resistance are not memorably told. And so, they are unlikely to connect with students at the deep emotional level which is more likely to foster memory and learning.

The Case of Germany

In the first half of the 20th Century, Germany experienced several major instances of nonviolent noncooperation and general strikes. In these events, Germany was sometimes the agent of nonviolent resistance and sometimes the target. In 1920 Germany's fledgling Weimar Republic faced a coup d'etat led by extreme right-wing military leaders. The retreating democratically elected leaders urged noncooperation and a general strike. Sharp (1985) recounts that in addition to the general strike of workers,

> Civil servants and conservative government bureaucrats refused to cooperate with the usurpers. Qualified men rejected posts in the upstart regime. All along the line, people denied authority to the usurpers and refused to assist them...The coup was defeated by the combined citizens' action of workers, civil servants, bureaucrats, and the general population. (p.32)

Just a few years later, in 1923, as the French and Belgians occupied the Ruhr region, Germany was the scene of "probably the first case in history of nonviolent resistance being official government policy against a foreign invasion" (Sharp 1985, p.35). Post-WWI constraints on Germany (including the partial disarming and reduction of German forces) made military resistance impossible (Ackerman and Duvall 2000). In addition, in support of the scorched earth theory of nonviolent attitude formation, some

have observed that so soon after WWI “most Germans had no stomach for violence” (p.191). In this context, the German government pledged to finance the nonviolent resistance which included diverse forms of noncooperation, sabotage, strikes (of coal miners, rail workers, and steelworkers) with up to 800,000 German workers on strike (p.195, p.202), and demonstrations with up to 20,000 people in the streets (p.187). The strategy of strikes and noncooperation had been devised by German trade unions (Sharp 1985, p.35), but German Chancellor Cuno himself repeatedly endorsed “passive resistance” and instructed Rhur railroads to disobey orders of the occupying forces (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.184, p.197). French attempts to ship coal by rail back to France were constantly sabotaged. But virtually all resistance was harshly and systematically repressed by the occupation forces, merely singing patriotic German songs resulted in 6-months imprisonment or a heavy fine (p.191), and 140,000 Germans were expelled from the Ruhr with still others imprisoned (pp.196-197).

Sharp argues that the addition of demolition tactics which killed occupation personnel (rather than machinery alone) hurt “the previous unity of the resistance” as well as international sympathy for Germany (Sharp 1985, p.36). It also provoked occupation soldiers. Moreover, the resistance sometimes failed to maintain nonviolent discipline, probably because no overarching nonviolent strategy, no pragmatic or principled stand against violent retaliation was embraced (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.199). In this sense, the problem with the resistance was it was not nonviolent enough, not disciplined – a very common social movement failure, at least in the eyes of Gandhian theorists (see Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.206). To illustrate this, consider that Chancelor Cuno, the steadfast advocate of passive resistance, later strongly endorsed

Hitler (p.203). Right-wingers including Hitler himself argued that violence was needed, not passive resistance, which Hitler called a "united front of weakness" (p.201, p.206). Eventually, the German government secretly promoted lethal attacks on the French and Belgian soldiers (p.199). Nevertheless, because the resistance had been largely nonviolent, especially early on, some French became sympathetic advocates for the German cause (Sharp 1985, p.36), as did many Americans (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.185). A January 17, 1923 article in *The Nation* magazine editorialized, "what Germany needs in this hour is a Gandhi..." (p.185).

The occupation was aimed at securing Germany's reparation payments as well as separating Rhineland from Germany. Neither goal was achieved by the occupation, but negotiations involving the UK and the USA resulted in the Dawes Plan to deal with German reparations, and the occupation forces were withdrawn by June 1925 (pp.35-37).

These were pivotal episodes in early 20th Century German history, yet consider that Lyons (1999) has written, "In 1972, the concept of nonviolent civil disobedience was little known in the [Federal Republic of Germany]. Twelve years later, it had become a central factor in West German politics, widely endorsed and used by the peace movement, the largest social movement in postwar German history" (p.81). If the former part is true, that nonviolent civil disobedience was little known in West Germany in the 1970s, it is deeply ironic given that major national events – the 1920 military coup, the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, and the Nazi occupations of Denmark, Norway, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Italy in the early 1940s were all marked by significant nonviolent actions of disobedience and noncooperation (Sharp 1985).

How do the German textbooks perform in their coverage of these events? Table 131 provides a concise summary. Describing the 1920 military coup in Germany, the textbooks by Sellen (2010) and Bahr (2011) accurately use the words "general strike." Sellen (2010) does accurately narrate that the German government itself called for "passive resistance" against the French occupation of the Ruhr region of Germany in 1923, and that worker strikes and acts of sabotage were carried out (p.98), but this nonviolent resistance campaign is omitted from Bahr's (2011) coverage.

Table 131. Coverage of Major Successful/ Relatively Successful Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns in German History Textbooks

Nonviolent historical event	**Horizons II (Bahr 2011)**	**History 2 (Sellen 2010)**
noncooperation with military coup (1920) called the "Kapp Putsch"	Accurate descriptors: "general strike," calls for a "general strike" were "unanimously supported" by workers (p.282)	Accurate descriptors: "passive resistance," "general strike" (p.96)
nonviolent resistance of French occupation of the Ruhr region (1923)	Very brief coverage of the occupation, but no coverage of the nonviolent resistance.	The text inaccurately describes the resistance as a failure (p.98); Accurate descriptors: "passive resistance," "refusing to work," "acts of sabotage" (p.98)
nonviolent resistance of Danes against Nazis (1940-1945)	No coverage	No coverage
nonviolent resistance of Norwegians against Nazis (1942)	No coverage	No coverage
nonviolent resistance of German wives of Jews against Nazis (1943)	No coverage	No coverage

Of the 1923 resistance, Sellen (2010) describes some of the violent repression by French troops and quickly and curiously concludes that "Despite the broad support for the Ruhr resistance from the German population, it is eventually doomed to fail" (p.98). Why it was "doomed to fail" is not at all clear. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) code the Ruhr nonviolent resistance a full "success." Ackerman and Duvall (2000) conclude that it was both a success and a failure, but note that France lost in multiple ways (p.206). The notion that the resistance "failed" is implicitly questioned by Sellen's own observation a

few pages later that France had "become morally discredited by its crackdown in the Ruhr struggle," hurting French leverage in international negotiations (p.100). This is again the "political jiu-jitsu" (Sharp 1973), "the paradox of repression" (Smithey and Kurtz 1999), and the "critical dynamic" (McAdam 1999) of reactions against violent repression – but this time the dynamic operated on the international level. In addition, the costs of occupation stressed the French economy and mobilized opposition politicians in France (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.189). Sellen (2010) also neglects to mention that the "broad support" for resistance was not just from "the German population," but also entailed financial support including subsidized wages and food supplies for workers on strike from the German government (Sharp 1985, p.35; Ackerman and Duvall 2000, pp.182-183,193-194). Of course, the costs of subsidizing striking workers also dealt an enormous blow to the German government which took to printing money (leading to an inflation crisis), rather than taxing industrialists to share the burdens (pp.205-206). Unlike Sellen, Sharp (1985) emphasizes that the occupying French forces failed to achieve their economic and political goals (p.37).

As for the 1920 coup, Bahr (2011) narrates how Germany's fledgling democratic republic was led by social democrats, but the military and the right-wing did not fully embrace democratic ideals. For them, "democracy was deeply connected to the stigma of defeat in 1918 [WWI]" (p.282). As the Ehrhardt Militia occupied Berlin's government buildings on March 13, 1920, the social democrats fled to Stuttgart "but not without first calling for a general strike. The unanimously supported general strike, as well as the opposition within parts of the ministerial bureaucracy, led to the collapse of the Putsch after four days" (p.282). Likewise, Sellen (2010) recounts of the 1920 military coup that

it failed “due to the passive resistance of the administration, which refused to carry out Kapp’s orders, and to the general strike immediately called by the trade unions. The success of the general strike emboldens the trade unions to begin applying pressure on the government. They demand a partial socialization of the economy...” (p.96).

How do we explain the readiness of textbooks in Germany to use the words “general strike” when it seems to be deliberately and carefully avoided in Chilean and Guatemalan textbooks? A “patriotic” factor may be at work in solidifying and suppressing memory of the general strikes in each respective case. The targets of noncooperation and strikes in the German cases were a military coup and a French occupation, not the installed national government as was the case in Guatemala of 1944 and Chile in 1931, though these were onerous dictatorships.

In addition, promoting collective memories of effective general strikes might be rightly perceived as a form of class warfare, which is better politely avoided. But the relatively large presence of labor unions in Germany might play a role in German readiness to recount general strikes, making strikes less taboo in the culture and in fact, closer to “conventional action” in the German context (Martin 2008). For example, in 1986-1987, 43% of nonagricultural workers in West Germany belonged to labor unions, compared with 17% in the U.S. (Blanchflower and Freeman 1992). But during the 1923 Ruhr resistance itself, German political and even union leaders feared that a general strike against the French could get out of control, as the “workers’ zeal could go too far” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.183). Indeed, eventually 800,000 miners were on strike in the Ruhr, but by that time it was not always clear who had become communist

sympathizers and who were “engaged in government-sponsored passive resistance” (p.202).

An often overlooked case, overlooked by our sample of textbooks as well, is the nonviolent protest in Berlin of German “Aryan” wives seeking the release of their Jewish husbands who had been seized by the Nazis in early 1943, some were immediately transported to Auschwitz, others awaited transport. The Gestapo’s threats and insistence that the women protesters disperse, were ignored. Essentially, seven days of loud demonstrations involving upwards of 600 to 1,000 protesters, and including the chants of the wives screaming, “We want our husbands back,” rattled the nerves of the Nazileadership (Sharp 2005, p.145). After seven days, both Goebbels and Hitler approved the release of all of the intermarried Jews and their half-Jewish children. A German official later recalled, “Goebbels released the [the intermarried Jews] in order to eliminate the protest” (p.147). The Gestapo released between 1,700 to 2,000 Jews imprisoned in Berlin. At the end of the war, intermarried Jews made up “98 percent of the surviving German Jewish population that had not been driven into hiding” (p.147). It was a clear victory of nonviolent protest.

The Nazi occupations of Denmark and Norway are briefly mentioned in the textbook by Sellen (2010), but only as a chess-like move of geopolitics: “the occupation of Denmark(April 1940)and Norway(April-June 1940)....to ensure theimportant wartimeore importsfromneutralSweden,to geta baseagainstEngland andpre-empt aBritishoccupation of Norway...” (p.123). Below we will analyze portraits of the Norwegian resistance in Norwegian textbooks, but immediately below we consider the

Danish case and the significance of German textbook omissions of Denmark's nonviolent resistance.

The case of Denmark's resistance. Denmark declared neutrality during World War II (as it had during WWI), but the Germans invaded Denmark in April 1940 and began a five year occupation. To critique the omission of the Danish resistance movement in German history textbooks may seem like shooting fish in a barrel (i.e., aiming for an easy target). After all, it can be argued, given the Nazi legacy, much bigger issues must be addressed at length (i.e., German collective memory has much bigger fish to fry). However, I contend that the omission of coverage of the Danish resistance and the Norwegian resistance, both of which were largely nonviolent and experienced some significant successes, fails to acknowledge the Achilles heal of violent occupation and violent methods in general – that the "will of the people," in Jonathan Schell's (2003) words, is "unconquerable." Few lessons could do more to portray the history of occupations accurately and to undermine military adventurism in the future.

Initially, the Danes did not resist militarily, and this has been explained in pragmatic and principled terms: "they knew a battle against the mighty German war machine would be futile. Many observers concluded that the Danes were simply too civilized to fight" (Stein 2003, p.50). Danish resistance was primarily marked by significant nonviolent initiatives, noncooperation, and acts of sabotage. Almost the entire Jewish population, about 6,000 Danish Jews, were hid and clandestinely transferred into neutral Sweden, and thousands of Danes followed the example of King Christian X and wore the Star of David armbands required of Jews by the Nazis (Stein 2003).

The famous Catholic monk and advocate of nonviolence Thomas Merton (1980) writes of Denmark's resistance:

> It was one of the only nations which offered explicit, formal and successful nonviolent resistance to Nazi power...The resistance was successful because it was explicit and formal, and because it was practically speaking unanimous. The entire Danish nation simply refused to cooperate with the Nazis, and resisted every move of the Nazis against the Jews with nonviolent protest of the highest and most effective caliber, yet without any need for organization, training, or specialized activism: simply by unanimously and effectively expressing in word and action the force of their deeply held moral convictions. These moral convictions were nothing heroic or sublime. They were merely ordinary. (p.165)

When Hitler ordered the arrest and deportation of Jews in Denmark to concentration camps, the Danes "by strikes, by refusals to repair German ships in their shipyards, and by demonstrations of protest" (p.166). Ackerman and Duvall (2000) explain how German plans to seize Jews in Denmark were completely undermined by a single German bureaucrat, Georg Duckwitz, who alerted leaders of Denmark's Social Democratic Party and quickly spread the word through dozens of channels. In a single night, almost all of Denmark's Jews went into hiding with the help of the Danish people. Only 472 Jews were captured. In the coming weeks and months, with the help of the Danish, some 7,220 Jews escaped to Sweden (Ackerman and Duvall 2000). Later, many other German bureaucrats in Denmark also refused to cooperate with the final solution.

This episode supplies evidence of a crucial and still much debated theory of Gandhian/ principled nonviolence – that of the potential "conversion" of opponents through the use of nonviolent resistance (see Eddy 2012, forthcoming). Merton (1980) recounts that the Danish "open, calm, convinced" nonviolent resistance to Nazi anti-Jewish policies "shook the morale of the German troops and SS men occupying the country and changed their whole outlook on the Jewish question...the German officials in

Denmark were changed men...They refused to cooperate in the liquidation of the Jews, not of course by open protest, but by delays, evasions, covert refusals and the raising of bureaucratic obstacles" (Merton 1980, pp.165-166). This "conversion" of Nazi leaders based in Denmark is quite significant, and it suggests a role that *nonviolent third-parties* can play in persuading brutal aggressors, even those planning genocidal violence, to reconsider their ways.

The Nazi occupation of Denmark and the Danish resistance is a complex tale of numerous tit-for-tat exchanges and tipping points. Throughout, the Danish government remained quite strong on the issue of protecting Jews, but on other issues they often waffled, walking a tightrope of subtle noncooperation with the Nazis and concessions to avoid harsh reprisals. In turn, the Germans offered a constant mix of threats, repression and concessions, the latter included permitting Denmark to hold parliamentary elections in March of 1943. The Danish Nazis won only 3 out of 149 seats (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.218). If included in a German textbook, the results would bring into focus an important lesson for German students today – the obvious realization that the German occupation clearly took place against the will of Danish citizens.

During much of the occupation, Danish administrators "saw themselves as a shield for Danes rather than a source of resistance" (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.230). The resistance came from many sources in civil society: students and youth groups, factory workers, shipyard workers, railway workers, the church, an underground press, an underground Freedom Council (which the Danish army recognized as the nation's de facto government) and a Command Committee which coordinated resistance (p.225). The

King, the Danish police, and the Danish army were also heavily involved in noncooperation.

Numerous incidents would be textbook-worthy turns in a narrative plot, if only textbook authors were interested in telling an engaging story. For instance, when a German officer told the Danish King he had been ordered to raise the swastika over the castle, the king said, “If this happens, a Danish soldier will go and take it down.” The German officer replied, “That Danish soldier will be shot.” The King’s immediate response was, “That Danish soldier will be myself.” The Nazis never raised their flag over the castle (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.229).

Incredibly, the outbreak of nonviolent resistance has been partly traced to the initiative of a seventeen-year-old schoolboy, Arne Sejr, who lived in a small town in Zealand. Upset by the sudden appearance of German soldiers and outraged that the Danes’ friendliness with the soldiers, Sejr devised a strategy summarized in his document “Ten Commandments for Danes”:

1. You must not go to work in Germany and Norway.
2. You shall do a bad job for the Germans.
3. You shall work slowly for the Germans.
4. You shall destroy important machines and tools.
5. You shall destroy everything which may be of benefit to the Germans.
6. You shall delay all transport.
7. You shall boycott German and Italian films and papers.
8. You must not shop at Nazis’ stores.
9. You shall treat traitors for what they are worth.
10. You shall protect anyone chased by the Germans.

Join the struggle for the freedom of Denmark!
(Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.212)

Sejr typed out 25 copies and delivered them to his town’s most influential citizens. The Commandments spread throughout the country and the tactics widely adopted. Ackerman and Duvall (2000) claim that the Commandments became “sacred” to the Danes (p.212,

p.225). Sejr and his friends sent leaflets to high schools students around the country and also put sugar in the gas tanks of German army vehicles. Later as a university student in Copenhagen, Sejr joined the underground press (p.216).

While the resistance experimented with limited violence (stonethrowing), street barricades, and some underground military resistance, the bulk of the campaign was nonviolent – including strikes, work stoppages, going home early, nonviolent direct action/ sabotage of equipment (e.g., trains delivering war equipment), and other forms of noncooperation, demonstrations, singing nationalist songs in large festivals (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, p.212), etc. After a very successful "People's Strike," the Freedom Council "de-emphasized sabotage and military measures in favor of nonviolent action" (p.228). The lesson learned was that general strikes did more to undermine the occupation than any other weapon, as a Victory Bulletin of the Freedom Council observed: "The People's Strike was decisive – not the barricades or the unrest in the streets..." (p.228). From that point on, numerous strikes and nationwide general strikes were undertaken. The strikes halted the production of supplies for the German army, and many of the general strikes brought the entire nation to a standstill. Germany's many attempts at violent crack-downs only solidified resistance. Ackerman and Duvall (2000) draw the explicit lesson: "If the Nazis, the cruelest killing machine in the century's history, could be kept off balance by Danish schoolboys, amateur saboteurs, and underground clergymen, what other regime could ever be thought invulnerable to nonviolent resistance?" (p.231). The omission of this lesson in German textbooks is significant. World War II was not just a series of moving battlefronts and military strategy. Rather, resistance sprung up among ordinary people with ordinary weapons.

Some of the Danish leaders even understood that mobilizing "the great mass of people" for resistance was crucial and that nonviolent strategies would do this best, as one Frode Jakobsen argued in a letter at the time, "it is better that 1,000 men have been involved in the work [of resistance] than 10" (p.225). Research by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) has recently confirmed that nonviolent movements tend to mobilize the great mass much more effectively than violent campaigns.

TEXTBOOKS: THE COSTA RICAN CASE

The textbook analysis sought to evaluate claims for Costa Rican exceptionalism as a culture of peace. Like all of the textbook analyses, we are also pursuing the question of why confidence in nonviolent efficacy is not higher in Costa Rica, as reflected in the Gallup World Poll question on pragmatic nonviolence. If Costa Rica is exceptional in the Latin American context, as a culture of peace, as a middle class society, as a society that celebrates equality, social solidarity, the common good, social justice, and public institutions, textbook narratives should offer hints of a relatively distinctive cultural ethos. The textbooks in Costa Rica are approved by the Ministry of Education (MED) and an interview with a MED official revealed that publishers work hard to fulfill MED's textbook content criteria. Ten historical events were selected for analysis (see Appendix EE for a concise summary of key findings), each of them conceived as either potential indicators of a cultural celebration of nonviolence and peace, or as integral to the historical development of Costa Rica's culture of peace.

Surprisingly, none of the textbooks state that Costa Rica was only the 3rd nation in world to abolish the death penalty. This would reinforce national pride in Costa Rica as a

human rights leader. Textbook portrayals mention but do not celebrate (i.e., endorse the normative/ moral claims) or elaborate on the passage of this legislation. They offer no explanation for why and how the death penalty was abolished. No advocates of the policy are given voice (i.e., no quotations are offered). This is somewhat surprising since the capital rotunda in the Legislative Assembly building, perhaps the symbolic center of the government, prominently features this legislation. The rotunda has only 7 plaques decorating the walls, each one about 8 feet tall commemorating landmark legislation in the nation's history. These plaques recognize the abolition of the death penalty, the abolition of the army, the passage of the Social Guarantees (installing worker protections, universal health care, and a robust social safety net), and the Constitution of the Second Republic of Costa Rica adopted on February 1, 1949 by the Junta led by Jose Figures. On the plaque commemorating the abolition of the death penalty is listed Article 45: "Human life is inviolable in Costa Rica." Ricardo Ruiz González (the Director of Public Relations, Press, and Protocol at the Legislative Assembly) reports that Tomas Guardia decreed this law in 1882 for a couple of reasons. First, as a dictator concerned about coups and his own safety, this measure could conceivably save his own life in the imminent future. Second, he and his wife were very strong adherents of the Freemason movement which endorses strict ethical norms against killing, and Guardia gave his wife this law as a birthday present. The influence of his wife on this issue is said to be particularly strong (Textbook F, p.306).

The role of Freemasonry in this episode has proved difficult to verify. However, one source confirms that President Guardia was a Freemason and "member of Caridad Lodge No.26 and was 'Protector of the Order'" (Denslow and Truman 1957, p.157).

Other sources confirm that Freemasonry teachings have been interpreted by some Freemasons in various periods and nations as endorsing pacifism and similar cosmopolitan and humanistic beliefs (e.g., Hacohen 2000, p.47; Piatigorsky 2005, p.175). This theory of Guardia's motivations is highly ironic in a highly Catholic nation like Costa Rica. That is, in various times and places, Catholics and other Christians have understood Christianity as endorsing a ban on killing. Yet, this trailblazing ethical legislation is said to be motivated by Freemasonry not Catholicism. But sociologically, this makes sense since subcultural theories have long held that worldviews and beliefs can become more salient when linked to organizations that are small, tight-knit, and cut against the grain of wider society.

The second episode isolated for analysis involved the overthrow of the dictator Tinoco (1919), which occurred partly through nonviolent protest and nonviolent direct action (i.e., when protesters burned down the state newspaper building). The coverage in textbook E is particularly bizarre. In it, the overthrow of Tinoco is very heavily obscured in a textbox assessing the negative and positive aspects of Tinoco's government. In fact, there is no hint that Tinoco was ever overthrown. Instead, we are confronted with a textbox titled: "Federico Tinoco Granados' Government (1917-1919)" (p.104). Under one column are listed "Negative Aspects," and under the second "Positive Aspects." These columns are the same length, implying his regime was an equal mix of good and bad. Under Negative Aspects we read: "Tinoco's brother Joaquín was assassinated," and "The opposition burned down the official newspaper *La Información*." But the text offers no clues that these events helped to overthrow Tinoco, which is in fact what they did.

Moreover, in context, we are given no information to help us understand why anyone would want to burn down the newspaper building or assassinate the Tinocos.

Textbook F offers far better coverage of Tinoco's overthrow, but it is still quite incomplete. The text does not clarify all of the reasons for public discontent with Tinoco and his brother, Don Joaquín Tinoco. In fact, the assassination of his brother, recounted in the text, makes no sense at all within the text. The reasons for popular discontent included the fact that Tinoco and his brother "filled the jails with political prisoners and clamped rigid controls on the press" (Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999, p.27). Outrage over these restrictions on civil liberties motivated the direct action, setting the pro-Tinoco state newspaper building on fire, but textbook readers are not given the information necessary to understand the protest action. The text does insert the protests within the mix of factors leading to Tinoco's resignation, but its importance is unclear. By contrast, the historians Moliva and Palmer (2007) write, "The decisive mobilization of women teachers against the Tinoco dictatorship in June 1919, which accelerated the fall of the regime, was proof of the new public roles that women were prepared to assume" (p.93). The account by Textbook F is as follows:

> Tinoco exercised a dictatorial government, since he took political and military power...The popular sectors, unhappy, participated in demonstrations which were repressed with force. Also, the non-recognition of the Tinoco government by the United States closed the door of foreign loans.
>
> Prices of basic goods rose noticeably, while business practically was paralyzed. The dictator lost support and the opposition against him got organized. In 1919, Carmen Lyra led the fight against the Tinoco dictatorship. She organized educators to demonstrate publicly against the government and set the government daily newspaper *La Información* [The Information]on fire. Lyra was followed by the police but managed to evade them disguised as a newspaper vendor.
>
> On the 10th of August 1919, the President's brother and Minister of War, Don Joaquín Tinoco, was assassinated. This event, together with the growing economical and social instability, the possible military intervention by the United

> States and the pressures, both from the oligarchy as well as the popular sectors, forced Federico Tinoco to turn over power... (p.319)

The naming of a protest organizer (Carmen Lyra) and the details of her escape, though bare minimum details and hardly a suspenseful narrative drawing readings in, this is still more than textbooks typically include. Yet, three notable details are left out here. First, as we saw above, Costa Ricans were outraged about the Tinocos' systematic attempts to deny their civil liberties (Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999). Second, high school students also participated in the demonstrations and direct action (Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999). Third, the turning fortunes of the Tinocos and the growing perception of their illegitimacy involved a clear example of popular reaction against violent repression, a pattern which nonviolent theorists have called "political jiu-jitsu" (Sharp 1973), "the paradox of repression" (Smithey and Kurtz 1999), and the "critical dynamic" (McAdam 1999). Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz (1999) recount the event in this way:

> Costa Ricans might have tolerated an ineffective government, but they repudiated one that restricted liberties they had come to expect. Schoolteachers (mostly women) and high school students set fire to the pro-Tinoco newspaper's plant. When the government sent troops against them and fired into the U.S. consulate, where some had taken refuge, the public was thoroughly alienated. In August 1918, when a coup seemed imminent, the Tinocos fled to Europe. (p.27)

Thus, we see that textbook F does far better than other textbooks, but it still has several omissions which obscure the dynamics and significance of the nonviolent protests and direct actions contributing to the overthrow of Tinoco.

On the other hand, textbook F's coverage of the Tinoco era does include elements which point to Costa Rican exceptionalism as a culture of peace. These are twofold. First, the decline of military power and influence in politics is praised. Second, a subtle but

unmistakable tolerance for the Communist Party as just another political party is displayed. The text reads:

> Positive aspects from this period:
> * The army lost power and lost their important role in politics.
> * The electoral system gained power.
> * The political system tends towards continual improvement. The presidential candidates belonged to the intellectual groups in the country.
> * The political parties became better organized, with an ideological foundation, such as the Reformist and the Communist (Worker and Farmer blocs). (Textbook F, p.319)

This tolerance – not to mention the respect for intellectuals – is highly unusual for the Americas, and it reflects something about Costa Rican exceptionalism – Communists here have not always been demonized. In fact, all of the Costa Rican textbooks examined in the present study offer favorable or neutral portraits of Manuel Mora, the Communist Party founder and leader. But then, Communists in Costa Rica filled a unique niche compared to other nations in the Americas. Space was often (not always) made for them within the multi-party political system, key leaders in the Catholic Church hierarchy voiced respect for Communist leaders and their social justice aims, the Communists and the Church formed a political alliance, and the Communists never turned to violence. These factors are integrally and reciprocally linked.

As a result, Communists played very important roles in political coalitions advancing significant worker protections and social safety nets, as we will see below. Textbook B calls Mora one of the three main "protagonists" in its section on the Social Guarantees legislation together with President Calderon and Archbishop Sanabria. Textbook G notes, "It must be emphasized that in 1940 the Communist Party represented 10% of the electorate, and it was important due to its capability for mobilization, organization and filing complaints" (p.197). Assessing social problems in the 1940s, the

text argues, “problems existed, it was not a communist invention and solutions were needed” (p.197). The contrast with other Latin American countries could not be more stark. Consider this quote from Manuel Mora in Textbook B, which makes clear his social justice militancy as well as his strong preference for nonviolence:

> We never give ourselves up to imperialism nor to the native oligarchy. If necessary, we will fall fighting against these two negative forces for the life of our nation. Be we wish we could always fight through legal channels and not find ourselves obligated, neither us nor our descendants, to use procedures which do not agree with our principles nor with our positive national traditions, nor with the best achievements of culture and civilization. (Textbook B, p.101)

However, the 1949 Constitution banned the Communist party, and this dissolved the Communist unions as well. Textbook G notes, “this situation pleased the United States” (p.202). With the conclusion of the 1948 civil war, the country under Figueres’ leadership took a sharp anti-Communist turn. But Costa Rican tolerance and reconciliation emerged again in 1975, as the ban on the Communist Party was lifted (p.202), and a handful of Communists were again elected and seated in the Legislature. But they have typically only held two or three seats. In his later years, Figueres expressed strong approval of bringing the Communists back into electoral politics: “I feel that we have to defend even the communists’ right to be communist” (Burroughs 1988). In one sense this is typical of a long-history of Costa Rican reverence for tolerance and democracy, but on the other hand, Figueres’s anti-Communism was a major source of the 1948 Civil War.

Textbook coverage of the Social Guarantees legislation is a key area where Costa Rican exceptionalism definitively emerges – as a vital social democracy nurtured by a small developing nation. This comprehensive social safety net/ Social Security legislation is repeatedly celebrated (i.e., the normative/ moral principles behind these policies are endorsed) by the textbooks as a human right and fortifier of the common good: “It has as

a supreme goal the protection of the wellbeing of the national community" (Textbook G, p.195). Elsewhere the text routinely moves rapidly through historical developments as the main characters are given no voice (i.e., they are never quoted). Here, the texts slow down and include numerous long quotes from Archbishop Sanabria and President Calderon who make religious, moral, and rational cases for the Social Guarantees legislation. For instance, an extensive quote from Sanabria's "Pastoral Letter on a Just Wage" is shared in which he argues for the just treatment of employees and suggests that in "...the Christian community there are not nor can be class privileges...The rich convince themselves that wealth has a social function to carry out, missions of justice and of charity..." (Textbook G, p.195). This was preceded by the introduction which reports that Archbishop Sanabria (head of the Costa Rican Catholic Church" "gave all his moral and intellectual support for the social question that was discussed in the 40s" (p.195). An extensive quote of President Calderon from a May 1, 1941 Presidential Message, is also included:

> To start a politic that tends to favor not only the salaried person but also all other citizens whose economic situation deprives them of their supreme right to wellbeing, I propose sending one or various projects of legislation which tend to establish those social securities… sickness, disability, old age and death, are the constant causes of helplessness for many Costa Ricans and if the State does not decide to establish a system of true foresight, it will undermine its foundation, since no society can be founded upon injustice. (p.195)

The principles behind the legislation are also linked to the advocacy of "many noteworthy citizens educated in Europe" (p.195), and especially to Pope Leo XIII, "the Worker's Pope," and his Encyclical "Rerum Novarum." In it, the Pope is said to reject Communism, but "recommends cooperation between socialism and the Church," "defends regulation and improved salaries," and "seeking a quick remedy to workers'

poverty" (p.195). Again, the link to modernity and rationality is underlined: "All this modern philosophy influenced learned Costa Ricans, among them...Sanabria, Archbishop" (p.195). The association between educational enlightenment, modern rationality, Christian values, and support for the legislation is repeatedly made.

Offering one indicator of Costa Rican exceptionalism, Archbishop Sanabria is quoted as saying, "As long as I am leader of the Costa Rican church, she will be at the service of the poor and not in service to the rich" (Textbook B, p.101). Moreover, this appears in a text that offers the most conservative presentation of the Social Guarantees legislation. In other nations in Latin America, church leaders have been assassinated for taking such a clear stance. The fact that a textbook would include this quote decades later suggests that the culture is still comfortable with such social justice pronouncements. And, consider a second indicator: President Calderon is praised for his "eclectic stance" – for embracing the "doctrine which seeks to reconcile the best of divergent systems. Instead of taking extreme solutions, finely defined, middle ground is adapted," synthesizing "Christian socialism, the old liberalism and the new state interventionism" (Textbook G, p.197). The Social Guarantees legislation included Social Security and an extension of the Work Code which now "rose to constitutional rank" (p.195): the right to work, minimum wage, 8-hour work day, paid vacations, and "insurance for professional risks." On unions, the legislation took a middle path – it "legalized the workers' struggle," guaranteed the right to strike, but also weakened unions as "the right of freedom from union affiliations was established" (p.196). This conservative path on unionization continues to the present day, but when one considers how union leaders throughout Latin America have often been murdered and severely repressed, the Costa

Rican compromise has a definite appeal. Textbook G admits that "In spite of centrist efforts, unionism is dispersed and fragmented" (p.285), but in the past it had more influence: "The unions and the Communist Party had decisive participation in the establishment of the Social Guarantees of 1943. In the following years they were a large force in defense of worker's rights" (p.285).

Unlike Textbooks G and D, Textbooks B, E and F give very little voice to Calderon, Sanabria, and Mora in the Social Guarantees chapters. That is, there are very few quotes from these figures. But Textbooks E and F do celebrate the Social Guarantees in textboxes. For instance, Textbook E includes these statements:

> The Social Security Fund is based on the principles of universality, solidarity, equity and equality. It is funded by a tripartite regime in which workers, employers and the state contribute a percentage of their salary or payroll to ensure a dignified and timely attention to the entire population. The economic contribution of the parties is based on social justice, because everyone contributes according to their salary. Those who earn more contribute more capital, thus it ensures the same attention to them and to those who earn the least. Social Security became a pillar of social development and favored a better quality of life for the nation of Costa Rica. Thanks to it, the country has achieved health indices and life expectancy superior to many developed nations. (p.121)

Textbook F repeats the above verbatim, and also adds:

> With the Social Guarantees the range of the constitution is elevated to the social function of the State, this meant the obligation to legislate for the welfare of the nation, protect the family, women, children and the elderly; it also guarantees job security, access to decent housing, all levels of education and health. According to the Social Guarantees, the state must ensure the fair distribution of wealth and provide to Costa Ricans a decent life. (p.336)

Unlike the other texts which openly and repeatedly praised the Social Guarantees legislation, in places Textbook B assumes quite a neutral and even a conservative, cynical tone. Rather than praising the laws as a milestone supporting human rights, social justice, the poor, and the common good as in Textbook G, Textbook B says that the "Social

Guarantees recognize work as a social duty of human beings, through which he can acquire, according to his capacities, a dignified life" (p.92). It seems the authors fail to recognize that the reforms were grounded in the inalienable dignity of human beings, not their utility as workers. The text's one quote from Calderon in this chapter seems to be cherry-picked as it betrays a conservative ruling class tone: "When I was elected President...my Christian and human sensitivities obligated me to think on two fundamental matters: how to favor the efficiency of the working class, without placing disadvantage on the general development of the country..." (p.101). Likewise, rather than praising the principles of the Rerum Novarum, Textbook B says it "gave start to the Church's preoccupation with social problems" (p.90). The word "preoccupation" implies the Church would be better off sticking to an otherworldly spiritual mission. Cynically, Textbook B notes that in seeking to pass the legislation, "The government gave the people a series of offers to count on their support like: raising wages, regulating the prices of primary goods, guaranteed distribution of shoes to protect children from parasites..." (p.93). Thus, the ideological slant of Textbook B suggests there are some cracks in the Costa Rican consensus regarding the social safety net and egalitarian values. This is to be expected, since elites in the Costa Rican government have advanced neo-liberal economic policies for many years.

Textbook B does make clear that the legislation passed through the alliance of Calderon, the Church, and the communists. Manuel Mora is said to have conducted "campaigns around the whole country in favor of the Social Guarantees" (p.93). And, we are told of a secret meeting between Mora and Archbishop Sanabria in which a grand ideological compromise was made "...where both recognized, respected and kept their

doctrinal differences, but it is decided to dissolve the communist party and create a new group [the Popular Vanguard] that would not attack the Church and that would accept Catholic social doctrine as the foundation for solving the socio-economic woes of the country..." (p.93).

The fourth event analyzed is the Brazos Caídos/ Arms Down Strike. Only one out of 5 textbooks (20%) covers the pivotal women's march and occupation that occurred during this strike. Textbook B satisfactorily covers the motives, women leaders (nine of them are named by name), and outcome of the strike and pivotal 8,000 women's march and occupation (p.96). The strike and demonstrations sought "electoral guarantees for the 1948 elections" and were also motivated by "irregularities" committed by the government forces. The strike began on July 20, 1947 as businesses, factories, and banks shut their doors. The Calderonist government (Teodoro Picado was President, but he was widely viewed as a puppet for Calderon) organized counter-repressive measures. Banana and wharf workers from the coast came up to the capital and were given a rifle and a red blanket by the government, and they roamed the streets looking like "Mariachis." These coastal workers "ransacked striking businesses" (p.96). We then read that negotiations between the parties became "laborious" and that nine women planned a march, which turned into an overnight occupation:

> In August, a group of women from the opposition, headed by María Teresa Obregon de Dengo, Cristina de Esquivel, Rosario de Facio, Emma Gamboa, Maria del Rosario Quirós, Marta de Pages, Etilma de Romero, Margarita Baudrit, y Clarisa Mora, decided to organize a protest that would end in front of the Presidential House, which was taken to conclusion August 2nd, on the Day of the Virgin of the Angels. More than eight thousand women paraded, starting from the Cathedral, to go solicit electoral guarantees and the end to the strike from President Picado. The answer from the President was for them to go pray to the Virgin of the Angels for a miracle. So the women decided to spend the night in front of the Presidential Home, a night in which a shoot-out unfolded that was

> viewed as a lack of respect towards the women, some of whom had to throw themselves to the ground, others were mocked and insulted by the police. The altercation resulted in quick negotiations the next day, thanks to the intervention of the National Electoral Tribune of Don Ricardo Castro Beeche of the opposition and by the very president of the Republic, Don Teodoro Picado, who was weak of character. One cannot govern with mere good intentions, will and a powerful character is needed. The strike came to an end, but not the skirmishes between those for and against the government. One could feel in the ambience that this road was leading irreparably towards a civil war. In the middle of fights, bombs, fear and altercations the elections arrived. (p.96)

The slam on Picado's "weak character" is highly unusual for a state-approved textbook by global standards (such texts rarely insult Presidents), but also rare (by global standards) is the fairly comprehensive coverage of such a pivotal strike, march, and occupation. The climax of the occupation was the shoot-out surrounding the women (some of this exchange of gunfire no doubt returned by police or soldiers), and the fact that it was said to be "viewed as a lack of respect towards the women." It did not help that police also "mocked and insulted" the women. The text concludes that, "The altercation resulted in quick negotiations the next day" (p.96). Hence, we glimpse here what appears to be another instance of "the paradox of repression" (Smithey and Kurtz 1999). Violence and repression of the nonviolent women protesters quickly backfired against the government.

Like the other texts, Textbook D's coverage of the "Arms Down Strike" completely omits the women's march and occupation. Textbook D clarifies that the strike lasted from July 23 to August 3, and "Basically, it was a management shutdown, a closing of commercial and banking establishments...The strike was a massive phenomenon that was widely supported. The initial motivation was to protest police repression, but it transformed into an opposition that demanded electoral guarantees" (p.270). This description of a "massive phenomenon," "widely supported," barely hints at

the mass nonviolent actions involved beyond the work stoppage. Textbook D concludes by saying, “Some authors believe the goal was to overthrow the government, which did not happen when negotiations were implemented and opposition to the demanded Guarantees developed” (p.270). Textbook E clarifies that one of the key causes of the 1948 Civil War was: “Lack of knowledge of the agreements from the Arms Down Strike” (p.126).

It would seem that ademilitarized nation, confident that their national security plan is sufficient would want to socialize younger generations into the knowledge that their “no standing army” policy has worked in the past, even in the worst case scenario of an armed invasion. Given that Costa Rica’s national anthem includes a stanza that promises to rally a citizen’s militia in an emergency, it would seem that textbook authors would be eager to cite examples when this occurred. The national anthem includes this line: “...If an enemy seeking to slander you or/ Harms your name, then we will abandon our farms/ And arise with fervor to take up our arms...” Hence, I expected that the textbooks would cover the 1948 and 1955 invasions from Nicaragua. Moreover, if the texts portray the successful repelling of these invasions by accenting the militarized dimensions of Costa Rican resistance, it would seem to buttress pro-violent ideologies (e.g., just war ideology) and weaken confidence in the efficacy of nonviolence.

But it was found that the invasions and militarized dimensions of resistance were scarcely present in the texts. Only 1 out of 5 textbooks covers the 1955 invasion, but this text, Textbook E, does not explain how Costa Rica defended itself. We are given only the barest of summaries: “In 1955, Anastasio Somoza invaded Costa Rica to overthrow

President Figueres and with him the Caribbean Legion" (Textbook E, p.125). Nothing more is offered.

Longley (1997) recounts the 1955 episode as following a long build-up of tensions between Figueres and Somoza. For years, Somoza had sheltered Calderon and Calderonista exiles bent on a military invasion. On January 8, Figueres requested OAS intervention to prevent an attack on Costa Rica. On Jaunary 11, about 500 rebel troops led by a West Point graduate, Teodoro Picado, Jr., and comprised of Costa Rican exiles supportive of Calderon crossed into northern Costa Rica, while planes bombed and strafed three Costa Rican cities (San José, Cartago, and Liberia). A rebel radio station calling itself the "Voice of the Authentic Anti-Communist Revolutionary Army" urged Costa Ricans to join the rebellion and expel the "Communist" Figueres and his supporters (p.144). A comparison was made between Arbenz in Guatemala (deposed by a CIA and Somoza-backed coup) and Figueres. Meanwhile, "the Costa Rican civil guard and a hastily organized 'minuteman' army moved northward to repulse the invasion" (p.144). On short notice, an army of 6,000 volunteers, "including high school youths" was formed (Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999, p.32).

It was only when the rebels crossed into Costa Rica that the OAS acted, but they were swift with U.S. assistance: "Representatives from the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Paraguay, and Ecuador immediately boarded USAF (U.S. Air Force) transports to make an on-the-spot investigation of the fighting in northern Costa Rica..." (Longley 1997, p.145). Anti-aircraft ammunition was delivered from a U.S. base in the Canal Zone. On January 16, the OAS approved the sale of four P-51 Mustang fighter aircraft from the U.S. to Costa Rica. A day later they were flown down from the U.S. to Costa Rica and

U.S. experts taught Costa Ricans how to pilot the aircraft: "...the newly formed Costa Rican air force flew sorties against the aggressors. The new aerial presence was pivotal..." (p.146). At this point, Somoza rushed his own troops to the border and the OAS acted to diffuse tensions: "On 20 January, the [OAS's] investigative committee created a neutral zone three miles on each side of the border and forbade Nicaraguan and Costa Rican troops from entering it until 25 January. In that period, the committee ordered the insurgents to leave the area or face extermination by the Costa Rican army" (p.146). The rebels retreated into Nicaragua and surrendered to Nicaraguan officials.

U.S. press coverage was favorably disposed towards Costa Rica thanks partly to Costa Rican diplomats and their U.S. State Department allies. The *New York Times* praised the OAS and the U.S. for aiding Figueres. *Time* magazine lauded the inexperienced Costa Rican pilots and the "blue-jean militia armed with their own rifles" who beat back a well-trained, well-armed force led by Picado, a West Pointer (p.146). Figueres was quoted as insulting Picado, saying, "You can send them to school, but you can't give them brains" (p.147). It is rather amazing that this colorful episode is completely omitted from most of the Costa Rican history texts. Perhaps the textbook omissions and extremely brief coverage of the 1948 and 1955 invasions is one indicator of the cultural ethos of peace in Costa Rica– manifesting here as a disinterestedness in military history, or a de-emphasis of its significance.

While the rivalry between Figueres and Somoza is also neglected by the textbooks, it is a colorful case study that would seem to appeal to textbook authors, given the standard textbook trope of emphasizing presidential politics. When Somoza challenged Figueres to a duel, Figueres replied, "Grow up" (Longley 1997, p.145). A

culture of peace could certainly celebrate that response, and it almost models nonviolent conflict resolution for school yard playgrounds. The reality is that Figueres and Somoza had formulated multiple plots to overthrow one another. The U.S., which consistently backed the Somoza dictatorship, eventually sought to calm tensions between the two. It was Vice-President Richard Nixon who brokered a peace agreement between Figueres and Somoza as "each leader promised to issue a statement guaranteeing that he would not aid any more attempts to overthrow the other" (pp.147-149).

In only 2 out of the 5 texts (Textbooks D and G) covering the 1948 invasion is there any explanation on how the conflict was resolved. Even here, in the texts which offer the most comprehensive account of the 1948 invasion, the lesson that Costa Rica's security plan (and reliance on the Rio Treaty and international organizations like the OAS) is sufficient could be made more explicit and explained. Textbook G reads: "In December 1948 Calderon invaded Costa Rica from Nicaragua, but he failed due to intervention by the OAS, the U.S. and even from Somoza" (Textbook G, p.202). Textbook B offers more words about the invasion but even less explanation of its resolution. We are told that the Junta was forced do deal with "...some serious political events...the invasion from Nicaraguan territory organized by ex-President Calderón Guardia in December 1948 joined by a group of his partisans and assistance from the Somoza government. The movement failed and relations with Nicaragua worsened" (p.98).

In Textbook E, Monge's "Proclamation of Perpetual Neutrality" in 1983 is said to guarantee the Costa Rica "could no longer intervene in the internal affairs of another State" (p.174). But the motivation for it is only linked to a pragmatic outcome: it helped

"international assistance to return to the country, because the international organizations were assured that Costa Rica would not support the Sandinistas" (p.174). Other texts take a more idealistic view, linking Monge's Proclamation to extending regional peace (Textbook B), extending democratization in the region (Textbook A), or to ideals: "respect for the principle of the self-determinationof peoples" (Textbook F, p.135), as well as linked to a long history of Costa Rican leaders who "have proclaimed the necessity of peaceful coexistence" (Textbook D, p.279). The texts do not fully develop the contextual factors shaping the decision. Only textbooks E and F hint at the international and economic pressures Monge faced when he made this Declaration. Only one of the textbooks (Textbook A) refers to the full name of Monge's Proclamation: "the Declaration of Perpetual, Active, and Unarmed Neutrality." And none of the texts mention Monge's claim that Costa Rica's tradition of peace made it a "spiritual power" (Biesanz, Biesanz, Biesanz 1999, p.90). The texts might have incorporated an account of previous nations that have declared neutrality for limited periods of time, such as Denmark and several other European nations during World War I, Sweden during World War II, etc. In this sense, the declaration of "Perpetual" Neutrality could be cast a bold step on the international stage matching Switzerland's self-chosen status, and as one more example of Costa Rica's culture of peace worth protecting and celebrating.

On the case of Chile's nonviolent revolution, all four Costa Rican textbooks covering the Pinochet era and the overthrow of Pinochet, fail to cover the nonviolent protest movement that helped to bring him down. Instead, all four texts emphasize the 1989 election which unseated Pinochet, and most of the texts also mention the 1988 referendum which called for the 1989 election. In reality, the nonviolent movement was

instrumental in the outcome of the 1988 referendum as well as the 1989 election. The closest the texts come to acknowledging a nonviolent mass movement is the following – from Textbook C and G: “By 1983, increased unemployment and discontent was manifested publicly. The Junta reacted with crushing repression especially against students” (C, p.204; G, p.121).

This description of repression makes little sense without describing the nonviolent resistance the students were engaged in. Overall, a real opportunity is missed to describe one of the most significant nonviolent revolutions in Latin American history. It is little wonder that many Costa Rican students report little faith in nonviolent efficacy, if they lack knowledge of nonviolent revolutions such as the one in Chile. Textbook A is unique in that it skips right over the 1931 overthrow of Ibanez, despite covering events in Chile in 1929 and the Chilean presidency in 1925 and 1932, and numerous years surrounding these dates (p.197). Hence, Textbook A skips over opportunities to cover two separate nonviolent revolutions in Chile. Textbook A also discusses Guatemala’s dictator Ubico “who governed from 1931 to 1944,” and El Salvador’s dictator Martinez who “governed from 1931 until 1944” (p.203). What the text neglects here is the fact that both of these dictators were brought down by nonviolent revolutions. Once again, an opportunity is missed to discuss popular, mass nonviolent movements and their efficacy in overthrowing leaders, even dictators.

Textbook G is guilty of the same omission and obfuscation as it mentions the role of the U.S.’s support for dictators including “Somoza in Nicaragua, Ubico in Guatemala, Fernández Martínez in El Salvador...” on page 198. Then, on the next page the text reports: “At an international level, the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union

began. In Central America, due to military *and civilian uprisings* the dictatorships fell, except for Somoza in Nicaragua" (p.199; emphasis added). We see that the closest Textbook G comes to naming the 1944 nonviolent revolutions throughout Latin America is by referring to "military and civilian uprisings." The vagueness of "civilian uprisings" and its pairing with "military" serves to obscure the nonviolent revolutions of 1944.

The emphasis on electoral politics (and "conventional action" over against nonviolent action) is made explicit in Textbook A, which reports: "Chile is a democratic country that has managed to maintain a climate of peaceful coexistence and relative prosperity. The instrument of the polls [democracy] has been beating the imposition of weapons in dictatorial situations..." (p.198). This is a half-truth, since the omitted nonviolent resistance was instrumental in creating a climate free of fear, a climate where citizens could exercise their will in the streets as well as the polls.

Only one of the textbooks recounts that in1994, Panama and Haiti disbanded their armies. Textbook G reads: "Costa Ricathrough itsrulershas hada leading role inthe democratization of thearea. Dr. OscarArias Sánchez, who won the Nobel PeacePrize in 1987, achieved the pacification ofCentralAmericathrough dialogue, as well as the eliminationof the military inPanamaandHaiti" (Textbook G, p.124). This omission in the other textbooks is surprising, and its significance is only half-developed in Textbook G. The demilitarization of Panama makes Costa Rica's southern border more secure and together with Haiti, it shows that Costa Rica's security model can be exported. Moreover, the disbanding of both armies occurred through Oscar Arias's efforts. Many of the texts include subchapters on the Central American region. Textbook F includes a section on "Of War and Peace: The Integration of Central America" (p.407), and a section on "The

Future of the Central American Region" (pp.408-409). Textbook D has a section on Panama's recent history (p.337). Similarly, Textbook E, includes a subchapter on Central American regional problems (pp.197-202) and a "border conflicts" section (p.201). Such thematic topics could have easily justified including mention of the fact that Panama disbanded its army following the Costa Rican demilitarized model. Oscar Arias, for instance, has emphasizedthat the border between Panama and Costa Rica is "the safest in the world" because neither nation has an army (Jonson 2000).

Regarding coverage of the Iraq War, the textbooks completely neglect to focus on important development related to Costa Rica's national security plan. Completely unmentioned is how Costa Rica was pressured into becoming a part of President Bush's "Coalition of the Willing." In reality, this episode prompted a young law student, Roberto Zamora to sue the President of Costa Rica in the nation's Supreme Court. The outcome of the case elevated Costa Rica's Neutrality Principle to Constitutional status (Eddy and Dreiling 2013). In the concluding comment on Iraq, Textbook C seems to naively project onto Obama a Costa Rican-like preference for diplomacy: "In 2010, Barack Obama announced that at the end of August combat in Iraq will end. Military personnel will be exchanged for diplomats to back the Iraqis" (p.139). The only text which even comes close to discussing the Coalition of the Willing is Textbook D which writes, "President Bush persisted in a plan to attack Iraq on the pretext of liberating this country from the dictatorship of Hussein. It was supported by England and Spain, despite the weight of worldwide opposition" (p.106). The text mentions Bush's "pretext," the failure to find evidence of "chemical weapons" after "months of inspection," and continues in a critical tone: "On March 20, 2003 the attack began. The real reason was to control Iraq's oil

reserves in this country and have a partner that allows the U.S. to monitor Iran and Afghanistan, countries accused of supporting terrorism" (p.106). Hence, it is not for an unwillingness to criticize the U.S. that the authors of this text avoid the topic of how the Coalition of the Willing impacted Costa Rica's political scene.

Textbook Coverage of Abolishing the Army

Thus far, analysis of Costa Rican history textbook coverage of milestones and important junctures in Costa Rica's history revealed significant weaknesses and omissions in coverage. Overall, the *entire set* of textbooks perform relatively well on most of the selected events, as omissions by one publisher are compensated for by another publisher. Of course the problem is students are only assigned one text. On some issues such as the Iraq War and the nonviolent overthrow of Pinochet in Chile, all of the texts fall short. Coverage of two of Costa Rica's most significant nonviolent campaigns, the overthrow of Tinoco in 1919, and the "Arms Down Strike" in 1947 were only covered satisfactorily by one textbook each. Likewise, only one text covers the 1955 invasion from Nicaragua and only one text covers Oscar Arias's success in exporting the Costa Rican model with the abolition of the Haitian and Panamanian armies in 1994. In coverage of all of these historical events, signs of Costa Rican exceptionalism as a culture of peace are rare in the textbooks. However, Costa Rican exceptionalism did emerge in tolerant coverage of Costa Rica's Communist party and especially in the celebration of the Social Guarantees. In places, the distinctive values of a vital social democracy emerge in the texts, including this affirmation in Textbook B: "Besides the right and respect for liberty, Costa Ricans have managed to develop other values, upon which the nation has

been built: dignity, the common good, solidarity, tolerance, justice, civility, and peace" (p.149).

Turning to coverage of the abolition of the army, representations of Costa Rica's culture of peace finally emerge with impressive strength and consistency. Five out of six textbooks highly praise the abolition of the army for both principled and pragmatic reasons. A strong sense of pride emerges in the texts: "God gave us the privilege of being born in Costa Rica: a democracy with no armed forces" (Textbook C, p.96). We are told that on December 1, 1948 Costa Rica, with Figueres's declaration "becomes the first state in the world without an army. Afterward, the Constitutional Assembly of 1949 incorporates it into our Constitution" (Textbook D, p.279). And we read a quotation of Figueres in 1948: "Ours will be a nation of laws and a land of free men...Today Costa Rica is the only country in the world where military armies are constitutionally prohibited" (Textbook B, p.110). Figueres is praised because "he could have remained as dictator, imitating most Latin American countries" (p.280). Principled rationales include the notions that abolishment relates to ideals of peace and democracy including conflict resolution through dialogue rather than force. We are told that Costa Rica's abolition of the army and "love for our democracy...had led us to a peaceful coexistence. Conflicts are solved with dialogue and negotiation" (p.280). Another text concurs, the act of abolishment helps to realize democratic ideals: "The abolition of the army...reinforced the use of dialogue and elections to solve conflicts" (Textbook E, p.129). In addition, "It also strengthened confidence in national and international institutions and the full enjoyment of individual, social and political guarantees" (p.129). This reference to international institutions deserves further elaboration, as most of the texts fail to make it clear that

without an army, Costa Rica's security plan has relied heavily on the OAS and the Rio Treaty.

In the pragmatic realm, the textbooks indirectly imply that abolishing the army removed a source of coups (Textbook D, p.272; Textbook G, p.202). More directly, Textbook B says the abolition of the army "discarded" the power of a "military caste" in government (p.110). In addition, one textbook account argues that abolition and "The pacifist idea allowed Figueres to break his agreement with the Caribbean Legion" (Textbook B, p.110). This refers to Figueres' pact with the Caribbean Legion to help them overthrow dictators throughout the Central American region. The "pacifist idea" is also said to have increased trust in the Junta, and trust that they would turn power over to the President-elect Ulate, and "create a favorable space for the next elections" (p.110). Even more utilitarian in interpretation is Textbook B's contention that abolition was "one of the wisest measures taken by the Constitutional Assembly of 1949...[because] it served to project a pacifist image which allowed the influx of national and foreign funds that resolved the large economic problems of the nation" (p.110).

But the strongest pragmatic emphasis is the refashioning of budgetary priorities: "With this act, Costa Rica allowed a major investment in social development...The abolition of the army benefitted the development of education, health and culture..." (Textbook E, pp.128-129). Again, we read: "the economic resources of the State dedicated to maintaining the military apparatus, would instead be invested to promote and develop the education of the country" (Textbook B, p.110). And again, "All countries in our region and the world have an army on which millions of dollars are spent. In Costa Rica it is spent on education, health, and to improve the quality of life of citizens"

(Textbook C, p.96). Textbook F argues, “Thanks to this fact [abolition], the country has reached its highest levels of human development, higher than many of the developed nations” (p.341). Textbook B joins in the praise, but also strikes a note of critical modesty: “[Other] countries spend vast sums on their armies, in Costa Rica the money is spent on schools and health clinics. This does not mean we are the best. In recent years, many of these institutions are collapsing due to the corruption of public officials that have poorly managed public funds” (p.340). Of course, corruption is relative, and Costa Rica has recently ranked very high in transparency and lack of corruption.

The texts also tell us that Costa Rica has a tradition of peace, marked by President Monge’s declaration of Costa Rica as a country of “perpetual neutrality,” the founding of the University for Peace in Costa Rica, and Oscar Arias’s 1987 Nobel Peace prize for his “intervention in the pacification of Central America” (Textbook D, p.279). Further, Costa Ricans are portrayed as participating in a mission of peace to the world:

> Statisticians, politicians, intellectuals and simple Costa Rican citizens, according to each person’s resources, with talks at universities, international political forums or merely with their way of being or acting, have proclaimed to the world the urgent necessity of living in peace. The beginning of this great goal is eliminating weaponry and of course the army following the Costa Rican model. (p.279)

Here the text could have given far more specifics regarding Costa Rica’s track record as a world leader in peace and human rights initiatives. Textbook F improves slightly upon this by listing some highlights of Costa Rica’s leadership at the UN as Costa Rican leaders have pushed for an end to South African apartheid, the Agreement Against Torture in 1990, a peaceful resolution to the Iraqi conflict in 1995, and the Decade of Education and Human Rights in 1995 (p.109).

Surprisingly, only one out of six textbooks clarifies that the Rio Treaty has been part of Costa Rica's security plan since 1948. Only Textbook E included the explanation that was expected before analysis: "The signing of the Rio Treaty was one of the reasons that Costa Rica disbanded its army in 1948, considering the provisions of the Treaty as collateral sufficient to ensure national defense" (p.303). However, this only appears in a brief caption for a photo. Textbooks B and C critique the Rio Treaty and the OAS, arguing they have "not worked" because of U.S. hegemony (Textbook B, pp.192-193 ; Textbook C, p.148). Some of the texts also praise the OAS, but they are vague. For example, Textbook C refersonly to "positive accomplishments such as its intervention with peaceful means in border issues" (p.148). Examples are not given, even though Costa Rica has directly benefited from the OAS in this regard.

A fuller treatment of the OAS and the Rio Treaty would note that just days after disbanding the army on December 1, 1948, Figueres signed the Rio Treaty (the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), and just days after this, on December 10 it was confirmed that Calderon's rebel fighters invaded from Nicaragua. Figueres' response was to appeal to the OAS, and to the U.S., the latter to provide assistance in purchasing arms (Longley 1997, p.97). On December 12 the OAS met in a special session. On December 14, the OAS invoked the Rio Treaty. As a result of OAS intervention, including the creation of an investigative committee and later a border monitoring group, as well as pressure from the U.S., tensions with the *calderonistas* and Nicaragua (who had supported them) diffused (pp.98-102). A member of the OAS investigating committee concluded that thanks to the OAS, "the Rio pact has become a living instrument" (p.101). It seems that Costa Rican students, as members of a demilitarized

nation, would be interested in the Rio Treaty, its history, and its role as plank in their nation's national security policy. But the textbooks rapidly gloss over these events.

The roots of the idea to the abolish the army are not discussed, except that two texts refer to the coup attempt by Edgar Corona (Minister of Public Safety) after the Civil War, as building support for the abolition of the army (Textbook D, p.272; Textbook G, p.202). In addition, some texts note that the army had been a "tiny armed force" since the fall of the Tinoco dictatorship so that actually abolishing the army was a "symbolic act" (Textbook D, p.272; Textbook G, p.202). The difference here is that this is all Textbook G says about abolishment, which serves to diminish its significance.

Numerous other events of Costa Rica's distinctive peace history also merit comment, but appear nowhere in the textbooks. These include, but are not limited to the following: First, Figueres's decision as President to invite a Soviet embassy to Costa Rica. This bridge-making and peace-making gesture during the Cold War, was ill-received by the U.S. Second, in 1958, President Echandi, a rival of Figueres, initiated an exchange of Costa Rican military equipment for North American farm equipment: "The trade of some 2,000 small arms for six tractors was of little academic importance, but it demonstrated that Figueres' abolition of the army was not only accepted but expanded on by his political opponents" (Nelson 1983, p.262). Third, Costa Rica's decision under President Arias to normalize relations with Cuba in 2009, another policy frowned upon by the U.S., but again a peace-making gesture. Fourth, the decision to allow Calderón to return to Costa Rica and to even run for president in 1962. He lost but he was appointed as Ambassador to Mexico (1966-1970), a job that took him out of the country (surely a source of jokes in Costa Rica), but also demonstrated his re-acceptance. This could easily

be framed as one indicator of Costa Rica's tolerance and culture of peace. After going into exile, Calderón and his supporters attempted to militarily invade Costa Rica twice, once in 1948 and once in 1955. His acceptance back into the nation and his participation in electoral politics is worthy of comment.Mauricio Leandro, a UCR professor of psychology, has said this was a significant moment of reconciliation and forgiveness for "the Costa Rican family" (Eddy and Dreiling 2013).

In summary, Costa Rican textbooks reveal some of the same shortcoming observed in other nations around the world. Most of the Costa Rican textbooks fail to sufficiently cover the "Arms Down" Strike of 1947 and the nonviolent actions contributing to Tinoco's overthrow in 1919. On a regional note, despite the fact that many of the sampled texts cover Chile during the Pinochet era, they all fail to depict the nonviolent actions (which in fact, helped to remove Pinochet), and focus instead on the conventional action of electoral politics. However, Costa Rica's "culture of peace" very clearly emerges in portraits of the Abolition of the Army and the Social Guarantees legislation. But, most of the textbooks completely neglect to highlight some of the most important features of Costa Rica's national security plan as a demilitarized nation: the Rio Treaty, the 1994 abolition of Panama's army on its southern border, and the 2003-2004 lawsuit during the outbreak of the Iraq War which elevated Costa Rica's principle of neutrality to Constitutional status.

A CRUCIAL CASE IN U.S. NONVIOLENT HISTORY:

ROBINSON AND RICKEY

This chapter covers the pivotal, invisible nonviolent strategy of Jackie Robinson and Branch Rickey in U.S. History Textbooks. I begin on a general level noting that narratives, especially narratives addressed to large audiences (e.g., Hollywood films, Broadway musicals, and school history textbooks), are likely to employ relatively conventional storytelling structures and themes. For instance, the narrators, producers, and sponsors of a narrative are likely to cast it within a relatively de-politicized form – or at least one that will be perceived as de-politicized by the intended audience. Numerous other conventional narrative devices, patterns of communication and social conformity may also operate beneath the surface. For example, self-narratives in public arenas are often shaped by an etiquette of humility. Hence, in their self-narratives political activists seek to avoid appearing egotistical or morally superior, while actively constructing themselves as average joes and janes (Schudson 2012).

As another example of storytelling conventions, a study of sit-in activist narratives during the civil rights movement found that self-narratives of activism were marked by a theme of spontaneity (Polletta 1998b). Similarly, Rosa Parks, at least initially and under the public media spotlight, emphasized the spontaneous nature of her refusal to relinquish her seat on the bus (Schudson 2012).

To put it another way, these activists neglected to highlight the training, planning, organizational networks and supports which helped to make their activism possible. In some cases, this neglect may have been deliberate and strategically chosen, but it may also be that it often reflected an almost instinctive/ semi-conscious attempt at frame

alignment for mainstream audiences. To emphasize the spontaneity of forms of activism serves to de-politicize the action and humanize the actors for mainstream audiences. By contrast, if activists, especially activists in polarized political landscapes, were to begin their narratives by trumpeting their organizational affiliations, they would quickly be dismissed by mainstream audiences as radical "others." Here, one need only recall how Republicans sought to "otherize" Barak Obama during the 2008 and 2012 elections by emphasizing that he had been a "community organizer" – a term familiar to activists and urbanites, but unfamiliar to suburban and rural white conservatives.

When the narratives are historical and preserved in collective memory, an additional series of conventions comes into play. For example, collective memories of a social movement or event often solidify around one exceptional or representative individual, a convention Schwartz (2009) refers to as "oneness." Hence, the breaking of pro baseball's color line in the 1940s has become the Jackie Robinson story, and Branch Rickey – who played such a central role in Robinson's life is mentioned in only 23% of the textbooks which cover this episode. Several scholars have pointed out that school textbooks and children's literature coverage of Rosa Parks reduce her story to a myth that both errs from the facts and omits key details (Kohl 1995, Schudson 2012), including omissions of other activists who did more for the civil rights movement (Schwartz 2009). The Jackie Robinson story seems to follow this paradigm of errors and omissions – perhaps the most obvious of which is that he was not the first black to play in the major leagues. Loewen (2007) has argued that textbooks omit that fact in order to accommodate the narrative trope of relentless American progress. But beyond this detail, other significant dynamics are also missing from the Robinson story in the average textbook.

Re-visiting events that are included in nearly all U.S. history textbooks offers a good place to start in analyzing how and why significant nonviolent events often become outcompeted in the collective memories of nations. Below I will argue that Jackie Robinson's integration of professional baseball is a crucial case, since few incidents in U.S. history are more deserving of being categorized in terms of nonviolent action and strategy, and since textbooks portrayals almost *always* fail to use the words "nonviolence" or cognate terms in describing it. The absence of any mention of Jesus's ethic "turn the other cheek" is also conspicuous, since it played a pivotal role in motivating Jackie Robinson and his boss Branch Rickey, and was a flashpoint in their dramatic first meeting. As textbooks frame Robinson's significance solely in terms of breaking the color barrier, they neglect the planning and nonviolent strategy behind this process. I suggest these omissions are paradigmatic of the way textbooks frequently render nonviolence invisible, even when it played a crucial role in national events. This invisibility helps explain why recently, only 54% of Americans affirmed that "peaceful means alone will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups" (Gallup World Poll 2008). Below, I first analyze how textbooks portray Jackie Robinson and his accomplishments. Second, I detail the crucial textbook omissions and their larger significance.

U.S. History Textbooks on Jackie Robinson

In the present sample, virtually all U.S. history textbooks published in the 1980s through 2000s offer a few sentences about Jackie Robinson. Of texts covering Robinson, almost 60% include at least one photograph of Robinson as well. While in the 1960s and 1970s, it was common for textbooks to exclude any mention of Robinson (see Table

132), in recent decades,publishers have been more comprehensive in scope – adding literally hundreds of pages to the typical U.S. history textbook (Loewen 2007). Still, some texts contain no mention of Robinson, such as Appleby et al. (2005) - a text which runs to 1,138 pages. Consider the irony, given that historians like David Halberstam have contended that Robinson was the single most important American of the decade following World War II (Wilson 2010, p.xiv). Many texts limit coverage of Robinson to one sentence (e.g., DiBacco, Mason, and Appy 1991; Garcia 2005; Jones et al. 2008; Roden et al. 1984) or two sentences (e.g., Davidson and Lytle 1984; Faragher et al. 2004;Lapsansky-Werner et al. 2008), while others offer a paragraph. Hence, the

Table 132. Textbook Coverage of Jackie Robinson by Decade (N=37)

Textbooks Mentioning Robinson (n=22)	Textbooks With No Mention of Robinson (n=15)
	Clark 1960 Bragdon and McCutchen 1961 Graff and Krout 1961
Jacobs 1973 Graff and Bohanna 1978	Bidna, Greenberg, and Spitz 1971 FEP 1971 Sandler, Rozwenc, and Martin 1971 Ver Steeg and Hofstadter 1971 Leinwand 1975 Brady and Brady 1977 Pauline 1977 Todd and Curti 1977 Bass, Billias, and Lapsansky 1979 Wood, Gabriel, and Biller 1979
Garraty 1982 Davidson an Lytle 1984 Roden et al 1984 Jordan et al 1985 May 1985 Ritchie et al 1985 Graff 1986	Conlin 1985
Davidson and Lytle 1990 DiBacco et al 1991 Garraty 1991 Lowman et al 1996 Davidson and Stoff 1998 Norton et al 1998 Danzer et al 1999 Giese et al 1999	
Faragher et al 2004 Garcia et al 2005 Jones et al 2008 Lapsansky-Werner et al 2008 Ayers et al 2009	Appleby et al 2005

Notes: This is a convenience sample consisting of virtually every text in the UO Knight Library textbook collection and supplemented by additional textbooks produced by leading publishers.

Robinson story does not appear as a story at all in the average textbook. Instead, it is represented through a one or two sentence summary with no narrative arc at all. Most of the textbook accounts stick to a simple theme - that Robinson "erased" (Jones et al. 2008, p.554) or "broke" the "color barrier" (e.g., Norton et al. 1998, p.826) or "color line," becoming the "first black" player in major league baseball. The manner in which he did this is often left unexplored and unexplained, but a few of the sampled textbooks venture brief descriptions and explanations.

The history textbook I was assigned in my own Texas high school is typical. It briefly describes how Robinson broke the "color bar" by playing in the minor leagues in 1946, and then major league baseball in 1947 with the Brooklyn Dodgers. Incidentally, while few of the texts mention Robinson's first year in the minor leagues, none of them mention the fact that he played that year for a Canadian team. That is, ironically, the first year of the 3-year experiment took place while his home team was based in Canada – safely outside of the racially fraught U.S. Before moving on, the text adds: "Robinson's success on the baseball diamond helped open the door to black athletes in all professional sports. The color bar in professional football was broken in 1946, tennis in 1949, and basketball in 1950" (Graff 1986, p.319). In their textbook, Norton et al. (1998) explain that Robinson "cracked the color line" but then focus only on Robinson's baseball skill (a common approach of the textbooks), writing that he "electrified Brooklyn Dodger fans with his spectacular hitting and base running." And in a photo caption (below a picture of Robinson sliding into third base) they say Robinson had an "aggressive style that won him rookie-of-the-year honors" (p.826). With a similar focus on Robinson's athletic skill, Davidson and Stoff's (1998) textbook summarizes the Robinson story in one line:

"Ignoring insults and threats, Robinson won over fans with his daring play" (p.790). Faragher et al. (2004) explain that during the late 1940s, several "symbolic firsts" "raised black expectations and inspired pride," and then sum up Robinson in two sentences: "In 1947, Jackie Robinson broke the color barrier in major league baseball, winning rookie-of-the-year honors with the Brooklyn Dodgers. Robinson's courage in the face of racial epithets from fans and players paved the way for the black ballplayers who soon followed him to the big leagues" (p.547). Here, as in 32% of the textbooks, the shorthand explanation for Robinson's success is tied to his "courage."

In the same way, Lapsansky-Werner et al. (2008) explain: "Robinson braved death threats and rough treatment, but throughout his career he won the hearts of millions and paved the way for integration of other sports" (p.917). Incidentally, in fact, both Rickey and Robinson received death threats, hate mail, and obscene calls (Austin 1997, p.104). Again, Robinson's character is summed up as bravery, and no other clue is given as to how he "won the hearts of millions." Ironically, the preceding paragraph in this text discusses the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), whose members were "deeply influenced" by Thoreau and Gandhi and "became convinced that African Americans could apply direct nonviolent methods to gain civil rights" (Lapsansky-Werner et al. 2008, p.917). Yet no linkage is made to the Robinson case as an example of nonviolence in action. As a result, a key opportunity is lost to explain the reasons for Robinson's success from the vantage point of nonviolent theory. In many ways, the Robinson case illustrates hallmarks of Gandhian principled nonviolence which asserts that in any conflict, opponents can be "converted" and allies won over through nonviolent action, through a willingness to suffer and a refusal to strike back or give in to hate.

Similarly, Danzer et al. (1999) dance around the details of the Robinson story without using what would arguably be the best descriptor: nonviolence. The authors explain the violence opposing players perpetrated against Robinson (i.e., bean balls and flagrant cleat spikes), the abuse of fans, and death threats, adding:

> But he endured this abuse with poise and restraint, saying, 'Plenty of times I wanted to haul off when somebody insulted me for the color of my skin. But I had to hold to myself. I knew I was kind of an experiment.' And the experiment was successful... (p.639)

While "poise and restraint" are accurate descriptors, they obscure the extent to which Robinson and Rickey were specifically motivated and guided by nonviolent ideals and strategy. The text by Ayers et al. (2009) recounts: "Millions admired Jackie Robinson for his great skill as an athlete. Millions more were inspired by his courage. Robinson bore with bravery and dignity the pressure of being an individual so many people wanted to see succeed – and so many others expected to see fail" (p.910). Such descriptions of Robinson's actions are accurate, but woefully incomplete.

These textbook accounts offer an important clue as to why nonviolence often escapes textured description and resonance in collective memory. It is partly because nonviolent action overlaps heavily with mundane every day behaviors – i.e., ignoring insults and restraining oneself in conflicts – that it risks escaping special notice or explanation. For this reason, I contend that *principled nonviolence* is more likely to compete successfully for a share in collective memory – because of its coherence and distinctiveness as well as its resonance with moral and religious traditions. This helps to explain why Dr. King and Cesar Chavez are often presented in U.S. textbook accounts in such as way that their principled nonviolence is highlighted and portrayed with relative accuracy. I will argue that principled nonviolence belongs as the central fulcrum in any

accurate retelling of the Robinson story. Its absence in the textbook accounts suggests that other factors might help explain the narrative depictions of the Robinson story, including a conventional tendency to gloss over the role of religion in a secular society, and to leave religion out of school history textbooks in particular (Davis 1992). However, in depicting the Robinson story, the Christian textbook in this sample (Lowman et al. 1996) performed no better than the rest of the texts, and made no mention of the Christian faith of Rickey or Robinson. Perhaps this is not surprising since most conservative Christians in the U.S. have scarcely any notion of the nonviolence of Jesus or its implications.

Danzer et al.'s (1999) Teacher's Edition includes a suggested discussion question that goes to the heart of the Robinson story, i.e., nonviolent methods and changing racial attitudes, but as we have seen, the text just barely provides enough information to animate the conversation:

> Jackie Robinson once said, 'A life is not important except in the impact it has on other lives.' Have students discuss Jackie Robinson's impact on professional sports. Ask them whether they think Robinson's response to discrimination influenced American attitudes toward civil rights. (p.639)

While the final question is a very important one, the leading quotation does not prime students to specifically reflect on a nonviolent "response," but pushes to broader do-gooder theme.

Among the small percentage of textbooks that offer more extensive coverage of Robinson, a good example is an Oregon state adopted text which, in four paragraphs, details how Robinson was subjected to various forms of prejudice, exclusion, jeering, scorn, and physical aggression by other players, teammates, and fans. The text then explains:

> His only offense was that he was black – the first black ballplayer in the major leagues. The year was 1947, and Branch Rickey, general manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, had decided to make the first move toward ending segregation in baseball. But the first black player would need more than talent – he would need the character and restraint to endure the inevitable snubs and insults without returning the hostility. Robinson succeeded on all counts.
>
> In his first season, Robinson batted .297, led the National League in stolen bases, and was voted Rookie of the Year. By 1949, his batting average had soared to .342 and it remained over .300 for the next five years. Even more important, he won the respect of fans everywhere. By the end of his rookie year, national polls rated him the second most popular person in America, close behind singer Bing Crosby.
>
> Jackie Robinson became a symbol of change for blacks in America...The acceptance of Jackie Robinson and other black players who followed smashed the color barrier in sports..." (Davidson and Lytle 1990, p.712)

Reading this account while remaining mindful of America's fascination with violence and the purportedly widespread belief in the "myth of redemptive violence" (Wink 1992), one is struck by the nonviolent theory which is clearly implicated here. But again, the word "nonviolence" never appears. Employing matter-of-fact phrasing, which enjoys the benefit of historical hindsight and implies the strategic logic of nonviolence was the obvious choice, the textbook does not at all clarify that this nonviolent theory was held by Branch Rickey, nor how he came to embrace it and to argue for it. Nor are we told how Robinson came to embrace such a nonviolent strategy, where his "character" and nonviolent "restraint" came from, or the degree to which nonviolent ideals resonated with his own values. We are not told how in the face of violent bigotry, maintaining nonviolent discipline was a struggle for Robinson, as nonviolent ideals competed with his own – and culturally hegemonic images of masculinity in the U.S.

Again, most textbook portraits of Robinson briefly highlight his role in breaking the "color bar" in major league baseball, and that is all. When more is said, readers are often left to fill in missing details for themselves. For example, Graff and Bohanna's

(1978) text describes Robinson as the first Negro in the major leagues" (p.583) and quotes Bob Gibson, an African-American professional baseball player in the 1960s, who said of Robinson: "I have a great deal of admiration for him. He had an awful lot of courage to do what he did. I'm not sure I would have had as much courage in his place" (p.583). The situations which Robinson met with courage are not detailed in the text.

A minority of the textbooks (23%) name Branch Rickey, and when he is discussed the details are few. Keeping it brief, Garraty's (1982) text says, "...Robinson proved that Branch Rickey of the Brooklyn Dodgers was a shrewd judge of baseball talent as well as a believer in equal opportunity" (p.857). A more extensive treatment read:

> Rickey, however, believed the time had come for a change and, after much searching, chose Robinson to be the pioneer. At first there was resistance to Robinson. Unhappy baseball fans shouted insults from the stands, and some threw bottles and other objects onto the playing field. Several of Robinson's teammates refused to eat or socialize with him. But his skill and personality soon impressed colleagues and public alike. In 1949 the spectacular Robinson was voted the most valuable player in the National League. (Jordan, Greenblatt, and Bowes 1985, p.685).

Note, it is Robinson's "skill and personality" which helped him succeed, there is no mention of nonviolence, or of how it played a role in Rickey's choice of Robinson. Table 133 documents how common this approach to the Robinson story is, to the neglect of the specific role of nonviolence.

Of all the textbooks analyzed, Jacobs (1973) offers the longest account of the Robinson and Rickey story, and does a passable job of highlighting the role of Robinson having "enough courage not to fight back" (p.428). But the description of events heavilyobscures key details. The 3-year pledge of nonviolence is never clearly named or

Table 133. Textbook Coverage of the Jackie Robinson Narrative

Themes in coverage of Jackie Robinson	**% of textbooks including theme (N=22)**
1 photo of Robinson	45%
2 photos of Robinson	14%
Photo of Rickey	0%
Robinson called "1st black" in major leagues(1)	91%
Mention of Branch Rickey	23%
Robinson's "courage"	32%
Robinson's "restraint"	23%
Insults/ abuse/ threats Robinson suffered	36%
Rickey's decision to use/ conviction about importance of nonviolent strategy	9%
The phrase "turn the other cheek" (central to the initial Rickey and Robinson meeting and strategy of the 3-year pledge of nonviolence)	0%
Religious motivations/ religious ideals for nonviolence of Rickey and Robinson	0%
Mention of Rickey and Robinson's 3-year pledge of nonviolence(2)	9%
Role of new anti-discrimination law in New York state	0%
Role of new baseball commissioner	0%
Role of NYC mayor's push to integrate baseball	0%

Notes: The sample size (N=22) does not include 15 additional analyzed textbooks (mostly published in the 1960s and 1970s) which made no mention of Jackie Robinson. (1) Robinson was not technically the first African-American in the major leagues. (2) two texts (9%) somewhat vaguely discussed the 3-year pledge (Giese et al. 1991; Jacobs 1973), but Giese et al. (1991) depict it as a 1-year pledge of nonviolence.

explained, but it is indirectly addressed as the text recounts the end of the 3-year pledge:

> Robinson refused to fight back. He let his bat talk for him...Two seasons later Mr. Rickey was sure that Robinson was in the major leagues to stay...Rickey told Jackie Robinson that he was on his own. He could fight back. And Jackie did. He no longer stayed silent when white players cursed him or tried to kick him. He fought back and made them respect him. (p.428)

Note the traditional masculine assumptions here – it was when he began to fight back that Robinson "made them respect him." This completely obscures and contradicts the role of nonviolent restraint during the 3-year experiment.

By far the best account is offered by Giese et al. (1999):

> When Rickey and Robinson first met in 1945, Rickey lectured Robinson on what to expect in the major leagues. The player would face hostility – from fans, opponents, teammates, and the press. Pitchers would try to knock him down with pitches, and base runners would try to spike him. Rickey told Robinson he could not fight back. 'Mr. Rickey,' Robinson asked, 'do you want a ballplayer who's afraid to fight back?' Rickey responded, 'I want a ballplayer with guts enough not to fight back!' Robinson promised he would cause no incident. Through that lonely first season, he kept his promise and courageously endured every provocation. He played his game, helped the Dodgers win the National League pennant, and became Rookie of the Year. (p.564)

The text even includes a review question for students: "Do you think it was important that Robinson not react violently to the taunts of his fellow players? Why, or why not?" (p.564). The Teacher's Edition provides "answers" for teachers: "...It was important that Robinson not fight back, but endure the hostility...Student answers may differ, but in order for the color barrier to be broken for other players, it was very important that no violent incidents occur so Robinson could be judged as a baseball player and so no one would have excuses for continued exclusion of other African American players" (p.564).

What Really Happened

Why should we attach any importance to categorizing Robinson's entrance into the major leagues as a victory for nonviolent strategy and ideals? I am arguing without categorizing an event or action, it cannot be generalized and theorized. As such, the event is less fully explained and the operative strategies and principles are less likely to be understood, believed in, and applied in other contexts.

We move now to the key questions: Why is Jackie Robinson's entrance into major league baseball and his breaking of the color line *not* remembered in terms of nonviolent action? Before addressing that question more fully, let us consider why Robinson's story *should* be remembered as a victory for nonviolent strategy and ideals.

It should be remembered as nonviolence – (1) as part of Branch Rickey's plan, Rickey asked Robinson to pledge to maintain nonviolent discipline for three years. Formalized pledges like this have been a crucial internal organizing tactic for ensuring nonviolent discipline and accountability in activist organizations around the world, from the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC) in the U.S. civil rights movement to, as the author found in his master's paper fieldwork, the International Solidarity Movement in Israel-Palestine in the 2000's.

It should be remembered as nonviolence – (2) Robinson carried through with his pledge under enormous pressure, resisting repeated acts of physical and verbal aggression with disciplined nonviolence for three years. Many historians portray crisis moments where only Robinson's pledge held him back from physically lashing out at aggressors, but Rickey's grandson believes this is something of a misperception saying, "Jackie was not on a leash. It was Jackie Robinson who kept Jackie Robinson from exploding. He had given a pledge he believed in and he stuck by it – that's all" (Rampersand 1997 cited in Lowenfish 2007, p.466).

It should be remembered as nonviolence – (3) Rickey's first meeting with Robinson lasted three hours. During this time, he role-played numerous violent and insulting scenarios, testing Robinson's resolve to maintain nonviolent discipline (for versions of this exchange see Breslin 2011, pp.66-67; Lowenfish 2007, p.375; Mann 1957, pp.222-223; Polner 2007, p.153). Such role-playing is a standard training practice of nonviolent organizations. It helps prepare nonviolent activists for the aggression they might face, helps them rehearse nonviolent responses and imagine what nonviolence might look like in a variety of scenarios.

It should be remembered as nonviolence – (4) Dr. King, the key theorist and practitioner of nonviolence in America argued that Robinson had enormous significance for the U.S. civil rights movement – calling Robinson a "pilgrim walking the lonesome byways toward the high road of Freedom. He was a sit-inner before sit-ins, a freedom rider before freedom rides" (Zirin 2008, p.118). Dr. King said Robinson was "a legend and a symbol in his own time," who "challenged the dark skies of intolerance and frustration" (Dundas 2010). Similarly, Henry (1998) has argued that Robinson helped to change "the way blacks thought about themselves...giving them a sense of pride and reason to hope for genuine fulfillment in America," and Robinson did even more for white America: "he compelled white Americans to confront the reality of racial prejudice and to redefine their values" (p.211). And the conservative political columnist George Will has proposed: "the most important black person in American history is Martin Luther King – a close second I would argue is Jackie Robinson, who came before Martin Luther King and began the consciousness raising of whites and blacks that resulted in Martin Luther King's career" (Burns 2004). Though it had not been fully recognized, Robinson's nonviolence played an absolutely pivotal role in making all of that possible.

It should be remembered as nonviolence – (5) Rickey's own intellectual and even spiritual development led him decisively to principled nonviolence, through a network of scholars as well as his own commitment to social engagement, intellectual pursuits and religious study. (6) Branch Rickey specifically planned and theorized a nonviolent strategy, framed in the terms of Christian pacifism's norm of – in the words of Jesus – to "turn the other cheek" and asked Robinson to buy into it. Rickey knew that he and Robinson shared a Christian faith in common, and in this sense, Rickey sought and

achieved “frame alignment” with the values and religious tradition Robinson already embraced.

It should be remembered as nonviolence – (7) but the full portrayal of Robinson’s entrance into the major leagues must include (to cite again the distinction made by Martin (2008)) nonviolent action as well as conventional action through institutional and political processes which opened up space for Robinson’s hire by the Dodgers. History textbooks have often misrepresented the proper balance of conventional action and nonviolent action in key historical episodes like the U.S. civil rights movement. Though there has been moderate improvements in some recent textbooks, most U.S. history textbooks have long over-emphasized and mis-represented the role and initiative of U.S. presidents and legislation in advancing the civil rights movement (i.e., conventional action), while neglecting the vital role of mass nonviolent action and civil rights movement organizations in forcing the hand of politicians (Loewen 2007, p.220, pp.239-241). But the Jackie Robinson story as portrayed in U.S. history textbooks ignores the role of conventional action in the form of organizational initiatives, public policy shifts, and institutional changes.

First, a new major league baseball commissioner had recently been elected, A.B. Chandler, who unlike his predecessor (Kenesaw Mountain Landis), expressed genuine openness to integrating baseball, and even formed a Committee on Baseball Integration to explore the issue. Chandler, a former governor and senator from Kentucky, had told black reporters, “If a black boy can make it on Okinawa and Guadalcanal, he can make it in baseball” (Wilson 2010, p.54). While the use of the word “boy” was relatively offensive (and came from a long tradition of Southern racism), the statement signaled a

sea change. Second, consciousness-raising media activists had pushed for baseball's integration. For instance, the white communist press, located in New York City, had made baseball's integration a major campaign, correctly seeing baseball in symbolic terms as a major cultural institution of the time. But the black press probably played a more significant role - the large black newspaper *The Pittsburgh Courier* conducted a survey of major league players and found that three-fourths supported integration (p.49), and, Sam Lacy, a black journalist wrote an article in *Negro Baseball* which listed the best black prospects for integrating baseball – practically doing Rickey's scouting and field research for him, Lacy called Robinson "the ideal man to pace the experiment" (p.53). Third, public policy shifts in New York state and New York City (the home of the Brooklyn Dodgers) structurally pushed Rickey to integrate baseball. In 1943, progressive politicians from New York City helped the New York state legislature pass the Ives-Quinn antidiscrimination law which "opened up businesses, including baseball teams, in the state to lawsuits if they did not make some effort to hire qualified blacks" (p.54). In this sense, Stout's (2011) provocative research-based theory that "good laws make good people" has some relevance. Moreover, cross-national research on public policy shifts on the death penalty suggests that when new abolitionist policies are adopted by elites, mass opinion tends to rapidly follow (Stack 2004).

And Rickey was subject to still further pushes towards integration. In 1945, New York City's mayor LaGuardia, encouraged integration by forming a Mayor's "Committee on Baseball" (p.55)/ "Committee for Unity" (Lowenfish 2007, p.377). Further, LaGuardia's committee not only produced a report which concluded that "New York City's baseball public would certainly support the integration of Negroes," but LaGuardia

also wanted action before the November election of 1945 – a fact which Daniel Dodson (sociologist at NYU and director of LaGuardia's committee) impressed upon Rickey, practically twisting his arm (pp.377-379). In this context, Rickey organized a press conference and signed Robinson to the Dodgers organization on October 23, 1945. Hence, multiple institutional (i.e., a new state law pushing integration with the stick of lawsuits as a threat and the support/ pressure of the mayor), network (i.e., Rickey was surrounded by numerous advocates of integration), self-interested (i.e., the pull to win baseball games with all the accompanying financial incentives), idealistic (i.e., Rickey was intellectually drawn to integration and nonviolence; Robinson was indignant about racism - something he found to be very rare among Negro League players - and proud of his race, shaping his sense of mission in life), religious (i.e., Rickey and Robinson were strong Christians and understood nonviolence as rooted in the message of Jesus), and circumstantial factors (i.e., Rickey was convinced that he had found the right man in Robinson to lead baseball's re-integration) combined to push and pull Rickey and Robinson to re-integrate baseball. In short, several significant shifts in public policy and organizational and political networks pushed Rickey just prior to his landmark decision to sign Robinson, but Rickey's readiness to take this step had been cultivated through long reflection and study of nonviolence and racial issues.

It should be remembered as nonviolence – (8) Rickey's principled nonviolent orientation extended to a strategic awareness of how reconciliation between the races might be fostered or threatened - and how Robinson's success in baseball could lead to charged emotions and potential racial conflict, if not riots. In truth, any observer of Jack Johnson's career would well understand this and black sportswriters had long warned that

a “small unruly minority” of black fans often provoke disturbances (Wilson 2010, p.79), a factor which parallels the dynamics of a great many mass nonviolent demonstrations. But Rickey’s relative prescience was expressed through his networking with, and in essence, his nonviolent training and coordination with black leaders. In early 1947, weeks before Robinson played his first game in Brooklyn with the Dodgers, Rickey convened a meeting of thirty black leaders at a Brooklyn YMCA and engaged them in an extended reflection. Connecting this to Rickey’s earlier nonviolent training of Robinson, I believe this speech can fairly be called nonviolent training, with key parts of it reflecting on a second Weberian thought experiment/ counterfactual. In Rickey’s meeting with Robinson, he had asked – what if Robinson fought back? But in this meeting, he asked, what if black fans were violent or provoked violence through their attitudes? In essence, Rickey asked these leaders to imagine what will happen if black fans gloat and celebrate Robinson’s success as a “triumph of race over race” (Lowenfish 2007, pp.416-417). Again, his listeners might have here recalled the race riots after the black boxer Jack Johnson defeated Jim Jeffries (discussed below). Though many in the audience initially took offence (an understandable reaction), Rickey sufficiently convinced the black leaders to spur their action. As a proactive measure, the black leaders printed signs reading “Don’t Spoil Jackie’s Chances” and “posted them prominently in black churches, community centers, schools, stores, taverns, and wherever black people congregated” (p.417). Rickey’s goal was to spread consciousness that blacks should avoid antagonizing white fans “too quickly,” and Rickey even asked the black leaders in Brooklyn to “help organize committees of prominent Negroes in every major league city and spread the word” (Polner 2007, p.175). In any case, Rickey’s strategic thinking here approaches the

well-theorized Gandhian/ principled nonviolent aim to "convert" the opponent. In Gandhi's view, this can only be done by fostering trust, by overcoming hatred and acting on a principle of universal brotherhood/ sisterhood.

The meeting and the pledge to "turn the other cheek." Even many full-length biographies of Robinson and of Rickey leave out key details (relevant to the role of nonviolent ideals and strategy in baseball's integration) of the first meeting between these two men on August28 of 1945, so it may seem unfair to criticize history textbooks for doing the same. But below I will propose the central role of nonviolence can be summarized in a few sentences.

The role of religion is often left out of accounts of Robinson's entry into the Major Leagues, and it is always left out of school textbook accounts. The history textbook (Graff 1986) used in the Christian high school I attended in Texas in the late 1980s, and a more recent evangelical Christian textbook (Lowman, Thompson, and Grussendorf 1996) say not a word about Robinson's or Rickey's Christian faith, or the important link to Jesus' nonviolence. History textbook accounts of Robinson never link Rickey or Robinson's motivation to religious ideals. We might expect them to at least recite Jesus's phrase "turn the other cheek," but that never appears. This is likely partly due to the convention of not discussing religion in the public square, or of a conventional disdain for pacifism and Christian pacifism (or caricaturized versions of them). In any case, very few Christians understand what, in context, Jesus meant by "turn the other cheek" (in Matthew 5:38-42 and Luke 6:29-30 of the New Testament). This is not terribly surprising since in general, empirical survey studies demonstrate that ignorance of the Bible is profound among U.S. Christians (Prothero 2007). It is utterly fitting that in

an early scene of the film *Gandhi* (1982), Gandhi instructs a British Anglican priest on a correct interpretation of Jesus' turn the other cheek teaching. Even nonviolent theorists have misunderstood Jesus's "turn the other cheek" episode. Consider Mark Kurlansky (2006), author of one of the best popular explorations of nonviolent history in recent decades. Kurlansky misinterprets Jesus and as a result, drives an artificial wedge between forms of nonviolence, as he writes, "When Jesus Christ said that a victim should turn the other cheek, he was preaching pacifism. But when he said that an enemy should be won over through the power of love, he was preaching nonviolence" (p.6).

It is worth briefly considering the New Testament passages where Jesus discusses turning the other cheek. These passages comprise some of the very few Biblical passages which have received the *highest ranking* on a scale of potential historical accuracy by a team of contemporary liberal Biblical scholars, known as the Jesus Seminar. That is, most of these scholars agreed that "Jesus undoubtedly said this or something very like it" (Funk et al. 1993, p.36). The "consensus among Fellows of the Seminar was exceptionally high" (p.144). In fact, this teaching ranked, with the beatitudes, in the top two, while "love your enemies" ranked third. Hence, these teachings together are considered "close to the heart of the teachings of Jesus to the extent that we can recover them from the tradition" (p.147).

The "turn the other cheek" teaching of Jesus appears in the gospels of Matthew (Mt.5) and Luke (Lk.6). There is extremely strong, indirect textual evidence that the writers of each gospel were working from the gospel of Mark and a now lost collection which scholars call the Q source, or Sayings Gospel Q. The author of Luke altered the original trio of "case parodies" in the passage: turn the other cheek, give up your shirt and

your cloak (and go naked – since it was a "two-garment society" (p.294)), and "when anyone conscripts you for one mile, go an extra mile" (Mt. 5:41). Specifically, Luke omitted the third case of going an extra mile – a scenario, it seems, in which a Roman soldier asks someone to carry their load for a mile (Funk et al. 1993, p.144). Why was this omitted? Because Luke wrote for a Roman audience and he wanted to make Christianity palatable to Romans – including the Roman power elites. Luke evidently thought this example would offend the Romans (p.145) and omitted it "...because it probably referred to military conscription under the Romans, and Luke was particularly eager to make the Christian movement look safe and legal to his Roman patron, Theophilus" (p.294). Hence, the co-option of the nonviolent Jesus did not begin with the emperor Constantine, but it is present even in the gospel of Luke – even in one of the key nonviolent passages of the New Testament. Each of the three case parodies urge the listeners/ readers to react creatively, boldly, and nonviolently to acts of aggression, and thereby to shame the aggressor (pp.144-145).

In Matthew's gospel, Jesus's admonition to "turn the other cheek" is immediately followed by the admonition to "love your enemies" (this verse explicitly rejects the conventional mode of "love your neighbor and hate your enemy" (Mt.5:43)). The Jesus seminar notes, "The injunction to love your enemies...cuts against the social grain and constitutes a paradox: those who love their enemies have no enemies" (Funk et al. 1993, p.147). In Matthew, "turn the other cheek" is *prefaced* by his "thesis statement" - the principle of *not* returning evil for evil (of *not* extracting an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth (Mt. 5:38)), of *not* mirroring evil as in mimetic violence (Wink 1992, p.184). In Luke, "love your enemies" is the thesis statement which immediately precedes the "turn

the other cheek" teaching (Lk.6:27), and which is immediately followed by the Golden Rule: "Do to others as you would have them do to you" (Lk.6:31). On turning the other cheek, Wink argues:

> Christians have, on the whole, simply ignored this teaching. It has seemed impractical, masochistic, suicidal...Some who have tried to follow Jesus' words have understood it to mean nonresistance: let the oppressor perpetrate evil unopposed. Even scholars have swallowed the eat-humble-pie reading of this text: 'It is better to surrender everything and go through life naked than to insist on one's legal rights,' to cite only one of scores of these commentators from Augustine right up to the present. Interpreted thus, the passage has become the basis for systematic training in cowardice, as Christians are taught to acquiesce to evil. Cowardice is scarcely a term one associates with Jesus. Either he failed to make himself clear, or we have misunderstood him. (p.175)

Wink makes a strong case that most have misunderstood Jesus, and he goes on to offer a convincing interpretation of what Jesus meant by "turn the other cheek." In short, it was a defiant act of nonviolent resistance which demonstrated a refusal to co-operate with the oppressor, a refusal to be shamed, a refusal to accept servility, and a refusal to mirror evil, i.e., what René Girard terms "mimetic violence" (Williams 1996). That is, it connotes a refusal to imitate the violent methods of the oppressor, but to resist, rebel, and revolt by finding a "third way, a way that is neither submission nor assault, neither flight nor fight, a way that can secure your human dignity and begin to change the power equation" (p.185).

Another informed and scholarly interpreter of Jesus's phrase "turn the other cheek," working in the same radical stream as Wink, was Giovanni Papini, author of *The Life of Christ*. As it happens, it was a book that deeply influenced Branch Rickey. In fact, Rickey actually picked up the book and read a lengthy passage from it for Robinson during their first meeting. Rickey began by quoting the words of Jesus on turning the

other cheek, and then read "with excitement and feeling" Papini's interpretation of Jesus's words:

> Jesus had not yet arrived at the most stupefying of His revolutionary teaching. 'Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: But whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also...' For an infinite number of believers this principle of not resisting evil had been the unendurable and acceptable scandal of Christianity. There are three answers can make to violence: revenge, flight, turning the other cheek. The first is the barbarous principle of retaliation....Flight is no better than retaliation.... Turning the other cheek means not receiving the second blow. It means cutting the chains of the inevitable wrongs at the first link. Your adversary is ready for anything but this.... Every man has an obscure respect for courage in others, especially if it is moral courage, the rarest and most difficult sort of bravery. It makes the very brute understand that this man is more than a man...the results of nonresistance, even if they are not always perfect, are certainly superior to those of resistance or flight... To answer blows with blows, evil deeds with evil deeds, is to meet the attacker on his own ground, to proclaim oneself as low as he.... Only he who has conquered himself can conquer his enemies. (Papini 1923, pp.104-108 as cited in Polner 2007)

Polner (2007) recounts that here, Rickey put the book down and said to Robinson, "Now, can you do it? You will have to promise that for the first three years in baseball you will turn your other cheek. I know you are naturally combative. But for three years – three years – you will have to do it the only way it can be done. Three years – can you do it?" (p.153).

Rickey gave Robinson a copy of Papini's book during their first meeting (Polner 2007, Wilson 2010), but we must emphasize that Rickey knew that Robinson already held a strong Christian faith. Indeed, Rickey had inquired into Robinson's biography and liked everything he heard – Robinson was a "God-fearing, church-going Protestant," and did not drink (Lowenfish 2007, p.374). In fact, both men were members of the Methodist denomination (Wilson 2010, p.121). Jackie's wife Rachel has described Jackie and

Rickey as “alike in so many ways,” both were “deeply spiritual with a strong belief in God” (Polner 2007, p.183).

Rickey had internalized Papini’s interpretation of Jesus’s teaching to “turn the other cheek,” but it seems Robinson did not immediately resonate with Rickey’s understanding. Such complex arguments are rarely fully grasped after a single exposure. Robinson’s initial reaction was, “Mr. Rickey, do you want a ballplayer who’s afraid to fight back?” Here, it seems Robinson misunderstands what Rickey (and Papini) means by “turn the other cheek.” Rickey countered, “I’m looking for a ballplayer with the guts *not* to fight back!” (Simon 2002, p.81; Giese et al. 1999, p.564). Simon (2002) comments, “It was a masterful response; it called on that most competitive of competitors to make restraint, not ferocity, the measure of his courage” (p.81). Indeed, Rickey’s framing here is masterful, and meets several criteria that Polletta (2008) identifies with great narratives – they draw people in with familiar situations (e.g., in this case, a discussion of masculine courage/ “guts”), then make surprising shifts which defy expectations while combining irony and heroism (p.30). Rickey continued, “Above all, you cannot fight back. That’s the only way this experiment will succeed, and others will follow in your footsteps” (p.82). Before the end of their meeting, Robinson said he could turn the other cheek but not “be an obsequious, cringing fellow” (Polner 2007, pp.151-152). Of course, this is what Rickey had in mind all along – a proud, dignified, defiant nonviolence. Adherents of nonviolence like Gandhi, King, and a somewhat lesser known example – Emerson, all drew very clear contrasts between fear and cowardice as opposed to, in Gandhi’s phrase, the “nonviolence of the strong” (Mariani 2009; Wink 2003, p.109n).

In fact, Rickey selected Robinson knowing he was something of a fighter. Rickey already knew that during Robinson's stint in the military, Robinson had refused to move to the back of a segregated army bus in Texas (years before Rosa Parks), and that when he was charged with conduct unbecoming an army officer, Robinson fought the charge in court. The report of this had excited Rickey, who commented, "A man of ideals. A battler" (Polner 2007, p.148). Much like Gandhi consistently claimed, Rickey seemed to think it easier to take a courageous fighter and nudge them in the direction of nonviolent courage, than to begin with a coward. Rickey (1956) later expressed a similar sentiment in a speech in Atlanta, and by this point in time, Robinson was widely perceived as holding a hot temper and "subject to resentments":

> It didn't matter to me so much in choosing a man [to be the first black player] that he was temperamental, -- righteously subject to resentments. I wanted a man of exceptional intelligence, a man who was able to grasp and control the responsibilities of himself to his race and could carry that load.

While Rickey tried to nuance Jesus's "turn the other cheek" teaching in his extended Papini reading for Robinson, Wilson's (2010) observation still holds true - that "The scriptural injunction to turn the other cheek to those who would harm you provided a connection between the two" (p.60). In any case, before the end of their historic first meeting, Robinson said, "Mr. Rickey, I've got two cheeks" (Polner 2007, p.153), and "If you want to take this gamble, I promise you there will be no incident" (Wilson 2010, p.60).

Daniel Okrent has commented that Rickey picked Robinson "...because of who he was and what he was…Robinson had a determination, and an ability to – on the one hand turn the other cheek, but on the other hand, that as he turned the cheek to let the person who was his antagonist know that it would come around again" (Burns 1994). But this

description only approaches the meaning Rickey saw in Jesus's teaching to "turn the other cheek," and in fact, Okrent betrays confusion over the phrase. There is no "come around again," or cycle of violence in turing the other cheek; It is the refusal to enter that cycle. It shames the oppressor, and in the language of principled nonviolence, might "convert" the oppressor away from their hatred and aggression.

Rickey's road to principled nonviolence. Rickey had undertaken something of an intellectual quest, making long lists of books to read, and reading constantly, studying a number of sociological and historical books on slavery and race in the Americas as well as numerous books on President Lincoln - whose portrait hung on his office wall (Polner 2007, p.135, p.136, p.150). Granted, the intellectual development of historical actors is a theme that is almost never touched on in history textbook accounts, but it is worth recognizing that social networks and educational encounters can deeply shape worldviews and the choices historical actors make. For a visual representation of the network influences on Rickey and Robinson, see Appendix FF (and for documentation of network ties see Appendix GG).

Rickey was influenced by Giovanni Papini's book *The Life of Christ*, and William James's essay "The Moral Equivalent of War." In fact, Lowenfish (2007) contends this was "one of Rickey's favorite essays" (p.375). Next to Thoreau's essay on civil disobedience, James's essay, first published in 1910, was the most influential in the early American history of nonviolence (Mariani 2009; Lynd and Lynd 1995, p.65). Moreover, Papini had been a student of William James at Harvard (Lowenfish 2007, p.375), and it seems highly likely that James may have influenced Papini regarding nonviolence, that is,

it may be that James's own interest in pacifism is part of what enabled Papini to perceive and emphasize the pacifism of Jesus in his book *The Life of Christ*.

Rickey liked Papini's book so much, he underlined passages and ordered copies for all his children (p.375). Polner (2007) reports that Rickey "marveled at [Papini's] moving characterization of Jesus' nonviolent nature, a trait he believed necessary for the first black player" (p.136). Because Papini's interpretation of Jesus may be the strongest inspiration for Rickey's nonviolent ideals, it is worth dwelling on momentarily. Papini is a clear example of what, over the past century or so, has been variously called liberal, radical, or progressive Christianity. For liberal Christians, it has always seemed self-evident that "Jesus is the man of Peace" (Papini 1923, p.208) and only "literal-minded barbarians" (p.207) "determined to misread" (p.208) can find justifications for violence in the New Testament, taking verses out of context such as the line by Jesus: "I came not to send peace, but a sword" (p.206). Like Tolstoy before him, Papini emphasizes Jesus' Sermon on the Mount including the phrase, "Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the sons of God," which Papini interprets in standard liberal fashion, but Papini also accents his understanding of Jesus' ethic of defiant resistance (one supported by Wink's (1992) more recent interpretation of the text) in the "turn the other cheek" teaching:

> These peacemakers are not the meek of the second beatitude. The meek refrain from answering evil with evil; the peacemakers do more, they return good for evil, they bring peace where wars are flaring up. When Jesus said He had come to bring war and not peace, He meant war to evil...He means, in short, war against war. The peacemakers are those who wage war against war, those who placate, those who bring about concord. The origin of every war is self-love, love which becomes love of riches, pride of possession... hatred for rivals; and the new law comes to teach...love for all creatures, even for those who hate us. The peacemakers who teach and practice this love cut at the root of all war... (p.95)

Above, we saw how Polner (2007) edited the lengthy passage from Papini which Rickey read to Robinson in their first meeting. Polner's editing is likely just conjecture, unless he was working from Rickey's personal underlined copy. All we know is that Ricky read a lengthy passage and about where he started and ended. But the significance of the passage grows even more, since Rickey presented Robinson with his own copy of the book, and Robinson likely meditated on it further. Below, I select additional lines, not cited in Polner (2007) above, which also highlight nonviolent ideals and strategy, because, again, this book clearly inspired Rickey's nonviolent praxis, and Robinson trusted Rickey in a very close mentor-mentee relationship and friendship. After reciting Jesus' "turn the other cheek" teaching, Papini (1923) wrote:

> There could be no more definite repudiation of the old law of retaliation. The greater part of those who call themselves Christians not only have never observed this new Commandment, but have never been willing to pretend to approve of it... Often the punishment turns on the punisher and the terrible chain of violence from one revenge to another stretches out interminably. Wrong is two-edged; it fails even if inflicted with the desire of doing good, in nations, or families or individuals...the law of retaliation can give a bestial relief to him who is first struck, but instead of lessening evil it multiplies it...Flight is no better than retaliation. He who hides himself redoubles his enemies' courage...In spite of its apparent absurdity the only way is that commanded by Jesus. If a man gives you a blow and you return another blow, he will answer with his fists, you in turn with kicks, weapons will be drawn and one of you may lose your life, often for a trivial reason...Turning the other cheek means not receiving the second blow. It means cutting the chain of the inevitable wrongs at the first link. Your adversary who expected resistance or flight is humiliated before you and before himself. He was ready for anything but this. He is thrown into confusion, a confusion which is almost shame. He has the time to come to himself; your immobility cools his anger, gives him time to reflect. He cannot accuse you of fear because you are ready to receive the second blow, and you yourself show him the place to strike...An injured man who feels no resentment and who does not run away shows more strength of soul, more mastery of himself, more true heroism...There is no longer an adversary, but a superior who says quietly, 'Is that not enough?...The fact that some one has wronged me cannot force me to act wrongly.' Literally to follow this command of Jesus demands a mastery possessed by few, of the blood, of the nerves, and of all the instincts of the baser part of our being. It is a bitter and repellent command; but Jesus never said it would be easy

> to follow him.. without harsh renunciations, without stern and continuous inner battles...And yet the results of non-resistance...The example of so extraordinary a spiritual mastery, so impossible and unthinkable for common men, the almost superhuman fascination of conduct so contrary to usual customs, traditions and passions; this example, this spectacle of power, this puzzling miracle...this example of a strong, sane man who looks like other men, and yet who acts almost like a God...above the motives which move other men – this example if repeated more than once...if it is accompanied by proofs of physical courage when physical courage is necessary to enjoy and not to harm – this example has an effectiveness which we can imagine, soaked though we are in the ideas of revenge and reprisals...But whether it pleases us or not, only by accepting this command of Christ can we solve the problem of violence. It is the only course which does not add evil to evil...these are acts of heroic excellence...so extraordinary that they overcome the brutal bully with the irresistible majesty of the divine. Only he who has conquered himself can conquer his enemies. Only the saints can charm the wolves to mildness. Only he who has transformed his own soul can transform the souls of his brothers, and transform the world into a less grievous place for all. (pp.104-108)

In these passages we may come to marvel afresh at how difficult Robinson's task was, and the idealism or audacity of Rickey's vision. But we are set up for that impression by Papini's insistence that humans are "naturally" combative: "Man is a fighting animal..." (p.106), and his affirmation of the Christian doctrine that humans are "naturally" sinful: "all real moral conquests are repugnant to our nature" (p.107). Of course, this Christian version of the old debate over whether humans are naturally aggressive or cooperative lingers in the popular imagination. But Papini does not neatly fit on either side of that debate, as he models a different strain. Papini does not concede that humans must remain slaves to our "natural" predispositions, rather we have a choice, as he writes, "[Jesus] will make no concessions to evil and imperfect nature; He will not find specious reasons to justify it as the philosophers do. You cannot serve Jesus and Nature. He [sic] who stands with Jesus is against the old animal nature and is working for the higher nature which must conquer it" (p.109). Typical of liberal Christianity, the key point of emphasis for Papini is his view that overcoming selfish self-love and hatred of others is the main

spiritual and ethical task. When we do that we are "already entirely transformed; the rest flows from this as a natural consequence. Hatred toward oneself and love for enemies is the beginning and end of Christianity" (p.111).

Papini adds that to even imagine nonviolence as being this effective is difficult, and "we cannot prove it because we have had too few of such examples to be able to cite even partial experiments as proofs of our intuition" (p.107). Indeed, Rickey and Robinson provided an important "partial experiment," the results of which suggest nonviolence is uniquely effective. This makes it all the more tragic that collective memory has overlooked the role of nonviolence in their experiment.

Rickey had also conversed several times with Clarence Darrow (Polner 2007, Lowenfish 2007) – the famous agnostic and gifted lawyer of the Scopes "monkey trial," which addressed the teaching of evolution in Tennessee's public schools. Having authored two books on nonviolence, *Resist Not Evil* (1903) and *An Eye for an Eye* (1905), Darrow had earned a reputation as "America's foremost exponent of nonviolence in the years just prior to World War I" (Lynd and Lynd 1995, p.76). Through his personal link to Darrow, it is certainly plausible that Rickey would have become aware of Darrow's books and even discussed nonviolence with him. Of course, all of these details are completely absent in the brief high school history textbook portrayals of Branch Rickey. This is standard practice - virtually none of the figures covered in high school history textbooks are depicted as intellectual beings who evolve and wrestle with ideas.

Another book Rickey sent to all of his children was Frank Tannenbaum's *Slave and Citizen* – for Rickey it was an illumination. He wrote a friend that it had "good research on the effect of slavery on Western Hemisphere history – on culture – on social

relations...” (Polner 2007, p.155). Rickey sought out Tannenbaum (who was in some ways very different from the conservative Rickey), a left-wing socialist and professor at Columbia University, developed a friendship and engaged him in conversations over the Robinson integration experiment – conversations in which Rickey walked away with “growing faith in evolutionary and nonviolent racial progress” (Polner 2007, p.155). Rickey, well characterized by Lowenfish (2007) as a “cautious conservative progressive,” personally urged Tannenbaum to issue an updated edition of his book *Slave and Citizen,* hoping that a wider readership of it would dissuade black militants from employing violent methods (p.416). Tannenbaum advocated what has been more recently been called inter-group/ inter-racial/ inter-ethnic “contact theory” (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, Erasmus 2010) or the “deprovincialization thesis” (Verkuyten, Thijs, and Bekhuis 2010) in which prejudices are said to break down through “Physical proximity, slow cultural intertwining...” (Tannenbaum 1946, p.127). To overcome white supremacy, Tannenbaum wrote, “It is desirable that nothing should remain static...,” but that the two races continue “striving and disagreeing,” “engaged in the painful process of accommodation to each other...” (p.114). Clearly, Rickey put this vision into practice as he invited Robinson to join the Dodgers. The larger theoretical point here is that this is how ideas emerge and gain significance – in and through networks, in and through interpretive communities. Rickey’s path to faith in nonviolence and his convictions about how racism might be overcome emerged through an entire network of relationships, his rootedness in the Christian tradition, and his openness to new ideas – his engagement with scholarly books and research.

Tannenbaum (1945) brings the sociological imagination to the history of race in the Americas, detailing its social construction, and ripping out the floor under all reified notions that racism was natural. He shows how different nations in the Americas had different slavery practices and norms, and different attitudes about race – proving that U.S. attitudes are not "natural." Unlike in the Protestant U.S., in Catholic Latin America, slaves had been viewed as "moral beings" with souls given by God (Lowenfish 2007, p.415). Tannenbaum's argument on the divergent impacts of Protestantism and Catholicism upon slavery has been challenged by recent researchers (Wintz 2004), but in any case,Tannenbaum (1945) argues cogently that when individual blacks became recognized as great actors, scholars, lawyers, and citizens in their own right, their "moral worth" would be acknowledged (p.114); they will acquire a "moral personality": "the 'solution' of the Negro problem is essentially a matter of establishing the Negro in the sight of the white community as a human being equal to its own members" (p.115). This well illustrates philosopher Stephen Darwall's theory that "appraisal respect" leads to "recognition respect" (Appiah 2010).

Rickey (1956) was fully aware of this, as he said on one occasion, he knew the first black player had to "justify himself on the principle of merit," he did not want to risk accusations that he had chosen a black player for "holier than thou" moral reasons. In fact, Rickey had planned a handful of schemes to avoid such accusations. The first plan involved Robinson's minor league team playing a series of spring training games against the Dodgers. Rickey hoped this would "create a groundswell of support among Dodgers players" demanding Robinson's promotion to the Dodgers (Austin 1997, p.105). The second plan involved Rickey's manager Durocher who would tell reporters that Robinson

was needed to help the Dodgers win the pennant, and Rickey would publicly appear to reluctantly give in (p.105).

This implicates strategic advice frequently heeded by nonviolent adherents: moral suasion is not enough, you must appeal to the pragmatic self-interests of opponents and would-be allies, just as Saul Alinsky emphasized. Austin (1997) has argued at length that in his initial campaign to integrate baseball, Rickey deliberately approached the Dodgers board of directors and Dodger players by appealing only to pragmatic concerns – he justified signing Robinson in strictly business and economic terms. Similarly, Rickey's initial public relations campaigns as he signed Robinson in late 1945 to the minor leagues and in 1947 to the big leagues, were crafted around strictly pragmatic concerns. Austin contends the approach amounted to a masterful method of facilitating controversial social change in organizations. Although ignored by Austin (1997), this savvy strategic likely explains why many observers of Rickey have misperceived him as only shrewd and pragmatic. In fact, Rickey's principled motivations were undoubtedly significant from the beginning, but he pursued an initial pragmatic strategy in order to win key allies (Austin 1997). It was only in early 1948, after Robinson had played a year of minor league ball in 1946, a year in the big leagues for the Dodgers in 1947 – and proven his skill, that Rickey's rhetoric shifted beyond the economic rationales: "For the first time, Rickey began to speak about the desegregation of baseball as an ethical issue embodying American ideals of equality and social justice" (Austin 1997, p.106). However, early in Robinson's first year in the big leagues, the Dodgers released "details of the threatening letters that Robinson's and Rickey's families had been receiving" (p.106). This was one

of a series of public relations moves that helped create widespread public support for Robinson along principled lines of concern (p.106).

Likewise, early on, as when some of the Dodger players threatened to revolt when Robinson first joined the team, the manager Durocher appealed to their self-interests saying, "He's going to win pennants for us. He's going to put money in your pockets and money in mine" (Lowenfish 2007, p.419). But within the Dodgers organization, the *principled* motivations of Rickey also began to emerge fleetingly in 1947, but only in backstage contexts. In the 1947 spring training camp, when a group of Southern Dodgers players organized an anti-Robinson petition, Rickey met with the players, lectured them on "*Americanism*" and offered to trade each of them (Austin 1997, p.105). In any case, delivering pragmatic rewards is just what Robinson did – leading the team to many World Series, helping them all earn bonus checks that actually doubled most of their salaries for the year (Wilson 2010, p.100). But the principled and pragmatic can also be integrally related. For instance, the Dodgers, especially among many racial minorities, came to be perceived as "America's team" for the very principled reason of their racial integration. This resulted in a surge in their fan base and increased ticket sales for years.

The counterfactual. Equally overlooked is the counterfactual (recall that counterfactual thought-experiments were a key component of Max Weber's historical-sociological method (Zeitlin 2001, pp.252-254)) that Branch Rickey, the General Manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, himself proposed in his first meeting with Robinson. Rickey's counterfactual would have us ask, what would have happened if Robinson had fought back in response to the violence and intimidation of racist whites? Rickey argued it would set back U.S. race relations by twenty years. As Robinson (1997) recalled,

Rickey told him “one wrong move on my part would not only finish the chance for all Negroes in baseball, but it would set the cause of the Negro in America back 20 years...I had to hold my temper...I had to keep my mouth shut and take it, I couldn’t protest to an umpire and I couldn’t get back at players who taunted and insulted me with racial remarks” (p.196).

Rickey’s counterfactual drew from his context in which numerous sports figures had vocalized fears of racial incidents that might be sparked by baseball’s reintegration. For example, the great pitcher Satchel Paige had warned that integration would be threatened “when one of those colored players, goaded out of his sense by repeated insults, takes a bat and busts fellowship in his damned head” (Wilson 2010, p.48). And in 1942, *The Sporting News*, the leading sports newspaper of the time, argued against baseball’s integration “because of the possibility of unpleasant incidents” (p.53).

Building from Weber, Lebow (2000) argues that the most plausible counterfactuals arise from the context, are driven by compelling mechanisms, and involve “minimal rewrites” of history (p.568). Rickey’s counterfactual fits these criteria, and the significance of the thought experiment rests in trying to establish how many years a hypothetical incidence of Robinson’s violence might have delayed the integration of baseball. Rickey’s assertion that it would be a matter of years seems quite plausible. Here, I am only concerned with establishing the notion that Robinson’s nonviolence was pivotal in breaking down a regime of structural and symbolic violence.

In fact, back in the late 1880s Moses Fleetwood Walker was the first African-American to play in the major leagues. Virtually every U.S. textbook analyzed in the present study failed to mention this. Instead the textbooks state or imply that Robinson

was the first black man in the major leagues, a pattern which Loewen (2007) links to the pervasive textbook meme of linear cultural progress (p.168). Walker bounced around between the minor and major leagues while playing for various teams – at the time the American Association had no ban on black players. In 1887, International League owners voted to ban blacks, but soon after this, they and the newly organized International Association League allowed one black player per team (Rhoden 2006, pp.80-82). During a game in Syracuse, a racist manager from Toronto asked Walker to leave the stadium, which led to a heated argument. Rhoden explains, "By this time the cumulative effect of *turning the other cheek,* acting in a way that made whites feel comfortable, began to eat away at Walker's renowned restraint" (p.82).

We should take note here of Rhoden's insight that "turning the other cheek" was something Walker routinely did (again, in this, perhaps Robinson is not completely unique), and that it could be reduced to "acting in a way that made whites feel comfortable." Rhoden's use of "turn the other cheek" here may be quite apropos of Walker's own ambivalence about a term he probably had heard in church himself. Walker's father was a minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Ohio, and he was one of "many black ministers who were challenging the dogma of white churches that preached *racial passivity* as the acceptance of God's will" (Zang 1995, p.16). Returning to the conflagration, Rhoden (2006) writes, "According to one account, Walker was surrounded by fans and allegedly brandished a loaded revolver and threatened to put a hole in someone in the crowd. He was arrested but released..." (p.82). Zang (1995) corroborates the story, with slightly varying details, citing four different accounts by journalists published in two Toronto newspapers and the *Sporting Life* (pp.48-49). In the

face of racial insults Walker had long been "benign" (p.48) and "gentlemanly," but his "good-natured public demeanor was fraying" (p.49). These are the sorts of incidents that many proponents and detractors of integration alike, feared before Jackie Robinson came along – and Walker's short history of restraint and adds salience to Rickey's counter-factual. Walker's last season of pro baseball was 1889. The International Association moved to enforce the 1887 ban on black players, a policy followed by all levels of white-controlled baseball leagues nine years later (p.82). Hence, the integration of baseball was delayed for another 60 years.

Another counterfactual can be found in Robinson's own life, during his time as a student and multisport athlete at Pasadena Junior College. At the conclusion of a basketball game a white player from Long Beach Junior College punched Robinson. Robinson responded in kind, knocking the white player flat. What were the consequences? As the game had just ended, fans stormed the court and a "riot" nearly ensued. But the student body president from Long Beach soon apologized to Robinson and his teammates, and Robinson remained a highly respected student athlete at his college (Wilson 2010, p.13, p.16). However, this counter-example is readily explained away since, in some respects, racial tensions and racial otherization was relatively diminished in the California context.

Arguably, numerous reasons suggest that the nonviolence of Robinson in the major leagues deserves serious reflection. It is *only* because of Robinson's nonviolence that the U.S. civil rights leader and colleague of Dr. King in the SCLC, Rev. Jessie Jackson, could say during the eulogy at Robinson's funeral:

> Jackie as a figure in history was a rock in the water creating concentric circles and ripples of new possibility. He was medicine. He was immunized by God from

> catching the diseases that he fought. The Lord's arms of protection enabled him to go through dangers seen and unseen. And he had the capacity to wear glory with grace. Jackie's body was a temple of God, an instrument of peace. (Burns 1994, V9)

His gravestone presents a quote of his: "A LIFE IS NOT IMPORTANT EXCEPT IN THE IMPACT IT HAS ON OTHER LIVES." While Robinson is widely hailed for breaking the color line in major league baseball, the *impact* of his nonviolence has often been overlooked. Yet, Rickey's counter-factual brings the issue to the fore. Had Robinson engaged in violent retaliation, it may well have set racial progress back for decades. One of the best assessments comes from Dr. King, who once mused to his assistant W. T. Walker, a kind of counterfactual of his own saying, "Jackie Robinson made it possible for me in the first place. Without him, I would never have been able to do what I did" (Henry 1998, p.211). And shortly before he was assassinated, Dr. King told the black player Don Newcombe, "I don't know what I would have done without you guys setting up the minds of people for change. You, Jackie, and Roy [Campanella] will never know how easy you made it for me to do my job" (Wilson 2010, p.145). Similarly, W. T. Walker argued "Jackie Robinson's entrance into the big leagues did more for race relations than all the work of the so-called forces of Christ combined" (p.159). Of course, Robinson as the first, arguably played the most important role. Indeed, Robinson's pioneering nonviolence came more than a decade before the sit-ins and marches of Dr. King and the civil rights movement.

Robinson and the Perennial Challenges of Nonviolent Action

Robinson's story can also highlight perennial challenges of nonviolent action. Many commentators have argued that the violence and stress Robinson endured left a weight on his shoulders that endured all his life, and some suggest it probably contributed to his early death. The broadcaster Red Barber said,

> I don't know of anybody besides Robinson who could have done what he did. Many of the black players, Reggie Jackson, for example, said later, he's the only one of us who could have done it. Uh, Robinson – Mr. Rickey told him he'd have to turn the other cheek, and as Mr. Rickey said, it wasn't long before he didn't have any other cheek to turn, it just had simply been beat off. I think that – they said that Robinson died from diabetes and other things, I think he died from the load he carried. (Burns 1994 V9)

The author Gerald Early has implied that Robinson did not quite know how to process his anger, and that his anger is shared by all African-Americans in a society shaped by the hypocrisies of White supremacy (Burns 1994 V7).

In the following passage Robinson reflects on his feelings during a game against the Philadelphia Phillies who were particularly vociferous in keeping up a barrage of racial epithets directed at Robinson. He admits his deep ambivalence about his nonviolent pledge, how he felt it conflicted with masculine norms, even led him to feel like a "freak," and how he fantasized about lashing out in violence:

> for one wild and rage-crazed minute I thought, 'To hell with Mr. Rickey's 'noble experiment.' It's clear it won't succeed....What a glorious and cleansing thing it would be to let go.' To hell with the image of the *patient black freak* I was supposed to create. I could throw down my bat, strive over to the Phillies dugout, grab one of those white sons of bitches and smash his teeth in with my despised black fist. Then I could walk away from it and I'd never become a sports star. But my son could tell his son someday what his daddy could have been if he hadn't been too much of a man. (Ward and Burns 1994, p.291)

In another remembrance of the same day, Robinson recalled, "All of a sudden I thought, the hell with this. This isn't me. They're making me be some *crazy pacifist black freak*.

Hell, no. I'm going back to being myself. Right now...." He would go punch the Phillies and "Walk away from this ballpark. Walk away from baseball" (Falkner 1995, p.5). His characterization of pacifism as "crazy" and of feeling like a "freak," reveal how deep his ambivalence about nonviolence could be. And this ambivalence seems to go to the heart of the American conversation between John Wayne and Gandhi that has been going on for many decades. As a "codified hero-system" (West 1999, p.264), our culture and its hegemonic images of masculinity set nonviolent adherents up for a clash of ideals which requires the deconstruction of masculinity as well as hero images.

Robinson's nonviolent restraint is all the more remarkable when we consider that he played so many games under near perfect conditions for a type of violent outburst termed a "forward panic." As described by Collins (2008), it is a situation in which confrontational tension builds over time, with a sustained period of waiting and holding back, and then a sudden "shift from relatively passive...[to] fully active...[and] the tension/ fear comes out in an emotional rush" that is very difficult to control (p.85). In fact, in Collins' descriptions of the forward panic phenomenon, he recounts how the great pro baseball player Ty Cobb sometimes flew into "violent rages" after enduring several games or innings worth of heckling. Once in May of 1912 in New York, Cobb jumped into the stands and pummeled a heckler with "at least a full dozen punches" and then continued kicking the man with his spikes (p.91). It turned out the man had no hands due to an industrial accident. When fans pointed this out to Cobb, shouting, "He has no hands!" Cobb retorted, "I don't care if he has no legs!" (p.91). Underscoring the element of uncontrollable rage/ "blind fury," Cobb claimed to only recall jumping into the stands, while having no memory of actually attacking the man (McCallum 1956, pp.130-131).

Thanks partly to white privilege and hegemonic masculinity, such incidents left Cobb's reputation relatively unscathed. For this incident Cobb was initially suspended indefinitely by the American League president, Ban Johnson. But all 18 of Cobb's teammates signed a telegram to Johnson in which they refused to play until Cobb was reinstated (it was baseball's first strike, lasting 2 games), as they declared, "He was fully justified, as no one could stand such personal abuse from any one" (Cobb and Stump 1961, p.132). Ultimately, Cobb was suspended for 10 days and fined $50 (p.135).

What had the heckler said that was so offensive? Various accounts report that as the heckling escalated, teammates urged Cobb to defend himself. While some authors politely equivocate and vaguely describe the "inflammatory language" and the "particularly vile volley" of the heckler (McCallum 1956, pp.129-130; Collins 2008), it seems that when the heckler called Cobb a "half-nigger," Cobb suddenly flew into a rage and jumped into the stands (Alexander 1984, p.105; Holmes 2004, p.58). Cobb maintained, "I can get dozens of witnesses to prove that I had every right to attack this miserable mug who abused me" (Cobb and Stump 1961, p.134). Alexander (1984) argues that "Most working sportswriters tended to side with Cobb...that the slur hurled at him would have provoked almost any white man, especially a sensitive southerner" (p.107). Cobb was a native of Georgia, and both U.S. Senators and all ten U.S. Congressmen from Georgia sent Cobb a telegram of support: "As Georgians we commend your action in resisting an uncalled for insult" (p.107). Similarly, the Mayor and Police Commissioner of Atlanta argued Cobb had taken the right course of action, upholding "principles" of "Southern manhood," for without fighting "he would have lost the respect of every decent man in the country" (p.107). These details offer further insight into the context of

racism, hegemonic masculinity, and the Southern "culture of honor" (Pinker 2011, p.101)– a context which still heavily shaped the major leagues when Robinson entered the stage. Again, these were the norms Robinson was up against, making his nonviolent restraint all the more amazing.

In any case, Robinson's pledge to Rickey helped constrain him on that day, and again, in St. Louis in August 1947 when a player flagrantly spiked Robinson, opening up a gash in his thigh "Robinson's anger almost overcame him, but when his teammates threatened to avenge him, he was the one who talked them out of it" (Ward and Burns 1994, p.292). He did nothing and constrained himself as he always did during the three years of his pledge, though he had told another player immediately after the incident "I'm gonna kill somebody. I'm going to knock him into center field..." (Henry 1998, p.210).

In my own nonviolent activism and research I have found such anger and fantasies of engaging in violent retaliation are a common dynamic that nonviolent activists must process and learn to channel. For instance, this was confirmed in interviews of high-risk nonviolent activists engaging in nonviolent accompaniment and human rights work in Israel-Palestine. Thomas (of the International Solidarity Movement) remembered (transcribed interview (Eddy 2006)):

> A key moment when I changed my attitude about violence came after I had been in the West Bank for a few weeks and became very frustrated with the actions of the Israeli military. I was so upset with everything I had witnessed that I began to have violent feelings and fantasies towards the soldiers. I wanted to pick up a rock like some of the kids and hit one in the face. It made me hate violence as well as gave me a much clearer understanding of its roots.

Channeling such anger into nonviolent modes relies upon communal supports for nonviolent discipline.

The frequent mentions of Robinson's stress by himself and others partly suggests that he lacked sufficient support for specifically nonviolent action in his relational networks (i.e., friendships, church, etc.), in baseball, and in the Dodger's organization. Nevertheless, Robinson displayed amazing strength and discipline. To overcome resentment and to attempt to "love your enemies" takes strength and courage as Gandhi and even Nietzsche recognized. Nietzsche wrote,

> To be incapable of taking one's enemies...seriously for very long – that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget...Such a man shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others; here alone genuine 'love of one's enemies' is possible – supposing it to be possible at all on earth. (cited in Schell 2003, p.133)

And so it is that Robinson's nonviolent triumph also shows us how difficult it is to "shrug" off the oppression.

Robinson channeled his anger into playing harder on the field. Some have observed that he was probably one of the few athletes who played better when angry (Vin Scully in Burns 1994). But he also channeled his anger into prophetic outlets of social action. Just ten days before he died, Jackie Robinson used his turn at the microphone during the 1972 World Series pre-game ceremony to say, "I must admit I'm gonna be tremendously more pleased and more proud when I look at that third base coaching line one day and see a black face managing in baseball" (Burns 1994 V9).

Explaining the Omission of Nonviolence and Exploring Competing Accounts

So, why is nonviolence neglected in textbook accounts of Robinson? Leaving aside for a moment the particularities of the Robinson case, we can say that Robinson shares with other recent and significant nonviolent cases a number of handicaps and challenges as it competes for a share of collective memory.

First, to deal with Robinson's nonviolent heroism honestly, one has to unpack the violence and bigotry of whites. This turns a feel-good American story of racial progress into a narrative with a critical edge, something many textbooks often shy away from.

Second, it may be that because baseball is a structured, rule-bound game in which violent actions are against the rules, observers then and now have tended to overlook Robinson's nonviolence. On the other hand, physical contact, verbal and physical aggression between players on opposing teams as well as referees is fairly routine in baseball. Still, much of the aggression against Robinson was verbal, and racial insults on the field were difficult for most fans to hear in large stadiums. At times, the racial taunts were so loud that the Brooklyn Dodgers radio program turned off their crowd microphones (Wilson 2010, p.89), hiding the taunts from the radio audience. Perhaps the harassment of Robinson was dimly perceived by white audiences. Is it possible – perhaps only fans who devotedly followed his games would notice that he was singled out as the target of high spikes when players slid into second base, or the bean ball pitches? He was hit nine times his first season (Ward and Burns 1994, p.291), he regularly led the league in receiving bean balls (Wilson 2010, p.131), and other players like Ted Williams recognized that Robinson got more bean balls thrown at him than any other player (Burns 1994). But his nonviolent discipline may not have been perceived by the average fan.

Third, textbooks tend to ignore strategic considerations for social action, and oftentimes neglect religious (Davis 1992), intellectual, or ideological motivations for action – and all of these name the sphere within which nonviolence moves and breathes. Such conventional forces of simplification have shaped the Robinson story even outside of textbook accounts. One often finds simplification of the plot into conventional

plotlines of courage, and friendship transcending racial barriers – as in the much retold narrative of how the Dodgers' shortstop Pee Wee Reese befriended Robinson. The result is no reflection on the role of nonviolent resistance to bigotry.

Fourth, Robinson's real and perceived inconsistencies regarding nonviolence handicapped the clear interpretation and memory of his nonviolent example. The mix of principled and pragmatic nonviolence which characterized Robinson's overall stance on and embodiment of nonviolence sent inconsistent messages. To some degree, this inconsistency dynamic reflects an unfair, largely subconscious, insistence that nonviolence be pure and flawless, when in fact, any real human action and certainly, any conflict, tends to be quite a messy affair – infused with contested interpretations from day one, as perception is imperfect and filtered by biases, and as interpreters are inspired by competing ideologies as well as self-interested motives.

Although Robinson exemplified nonviolent action flawlessly for 3 years, both Robinson and Rickey later expressed deep ambivalence about nonviolence. As Robinson described it, some of this ambivalence was linked to masculine ideals, as we saw above. At one point near the end of the three year, Robinson had questioned Rickey about continuing his passive responses to insults and aggression. Rickey asked Robinson to abide a little longer, but Rickey promised that "the wraps will be off and you can be yourself" (Polner 2007, p.184). Here we glimpse the degree to which Robinson held a pragmatic nonviolent orientation – it was a temporary strategic means rather than a "way of life" as principled nonviolent adherents talk about. Robinson also admitted that given all the cruel racism he had encountered, "It is true that I had stored up a lot of hostility..." (Robinson 1995, p.79), and again, he explained the series of arguments and disputes he

got into in 1949, after the first three years had passed, in the same terms: “I had too much stored up inside” (Burns 1994). It is inconceivable that a Gandhi or King would talk about going back to be “themselves” after a nonviolent campaign, or “storing up hostility.” For principled nonviolent adherents, nonviolence is a way of life believed to drive humanity deeper towards truth and love, to self-knowledge, reconciliation with others, and liberation – at both personal and social levels.

Rickey’s mixed feelings about nonviolence are clearly revealed in his explanation of why he approved the end of Robinson’s nonviolent pledge. Rickey knew that Robinson was very competitive, believed in “swift retaliation for mistreatment,” and that the pressure of always being nonviolent had been “bugging” Robinson (Robinson 1995, p.78). Years later, Rickey explained his decision,

> I could see how the tensions had built up in two years and that this young man had come through with courage far beyond what I asked, yet, I knew that burning inside him was the same pride and determination that burned inside those Negro slaves a century earlier. I knew also that while the wisest policy for Robinson during those first two years was to turn the other cheek and not fight back, there were many in baseball who would not understand his lack of action. They could be made to respect only the fighting back, the things that are the signs of courage to men who know courage only in its physical sense. So I told Robinson he was on his own. Then I sat back happily, knowing that, with the restraints removed, Robinson was going to show the National League a thing or two. (pp.78-79)

This is a major footnote in Rickey’s rough theory of nonviolence, and again, the limitations of nonviolent action are linked in his mind to masculine ideals, “the signs of courage to men...” Rickey perceives that “many in baseball,” i.e., the mass public, did not understand Robinson’s nonviolence and perceived it only as “lack of action.” This is a big step away from Gandhian nonviolence/ theories of principled nonviolence – which assume claim to place trust in humanity and even enemies, such that they can always be “converted” through nonviolent action. It also shows that Rickey and Robinson

reinforced each other in their ambivalence about nonviolent strategy, and the tensions they perceived between nonviolence and hegemonic masculine norms – in their view, only "fighting back" would be "respected" by some people.

In one of his autobiographies, Robinson (1995) reiterated his deep ambivalence about the nonviolent approach he had taken, writing, "Not being able to fight back is a form of severe punishment. I was relieved when Mr. Rickey finally called me into his office and said, 'Jackie, you're on your own now. You can be yourself now'" (p.77). But very soon after Rickey released him from his nonviolent pledge, as Robinson began to speak out, in his words, to argue and protest against insults and injuries, Robinson discovered how strong were the racialized double standards (p.79). He had been a "martyred hero," but quickly became perceived by many whites as a "swellhead, a wise guy, an 'uppity' nigger" (p.79).

But what may be most important here in terms of nonviolent theory, is that Robinson's nonviolence enacted, in a very real sense, a midpoint between what Gandhi called the "nonviolence of the strong" and the "nonviolence of the weak." By the latter, Gandhi meant a form of nonviolence taken up by those who have no option of using violence, and undertake nonviolence only for pragmatic reasons, or those who are too afraid to use violence, and who thus, employ nonviolence out of cowardice. Gandhi conflated these two because in both cases, the reasons for undertaking nonviolence are pragmatic, not principled. However, the former case involves no fear or "moral weakness" and so Horsburgh (1968) rightly objects to lumping these two forms of nonviolence together (p.64). Of course, Robinson had no physical limitations preventing him from winning many a fist fight (and in this sense, his nonviolence was "the

nonviolence of the strong" in Gandhi's phrase), but his structural location in the racial hierarchy meant that if he used violence even once, his opportunity to participate in the lucrative white world of major league baseball would be swiftly withdrawn. These racialized double standards are the key reason why Robinson (1995) could characterize his nonviolent pledge as almost a "severe form of punishment" (p.77). In this sense, Robinson's later courage to "fight back" is not at all incompatible with Gandhian nonviolence, at least when it was limited to verbal anger and protest – which was the vast majority of the time. The racialized double standards persisting in the U.S., meant that if Robinson wished to pursue a baseball career, he needed to be "afraid" of fighting back, at least early on during his entry into the league. Moreover, such fear is commonplace in rigidly stratified caste systems. Thus, while traveling through the Jim Crow South, Robinson realized he had to "keep his cool" in order to protect he and his wife Rachel (Wilson 2010). As Rachel recalled: "My man had become the white South's 'boy' in order to keep us safe" (p.68)

Gandhi detested fear in any form, and this plays into his characterization of "nonviolence of the weak." But the Robinson case illuminates how fear is interlaced in a system of white supremacy. In any given fist-fight in the confines of a baseball game, Robinson had little reason to fear for his short-term personal safety, but his long-term safety was altogether a different issue. He also had reasons to fear for his economic well-being and career survival, as well as – more profoundly and heroically - his sense of responsibility for symbolically representing his race (a burden no one should have to care, but in racialized social systems it is commonplace). Thus, Robinson's nonviolent

dilemma was unique, linked to his location in the racial hierarchy and his role as a "trail blazer" (Robinson 1997 [1955], p.195).

I am contending that the uniqueness of Robinson's task explodes the distinction between pragmatic and principled nonviolence – a distinction that Gandhi often spoke of in terms of "nonviolence of the strong" and "nonviolence of the weak." Robinson was keenly aware of the racial double standards, and this is part of why his nonviolence takes the form of a mix of pragmatic and principled nonviolence – because after his three year nonviolent campaign, he vocally protested the double standards which forced upon him a "nonviolence of the weak." He described his situation after the end of his three year campaign, writing,

> I admit that I challenge umpires and tell off opposing players. But I'm no more aggressive in this respect than Ty Cobb or [here he lists four other players who 'kick up fusses all the time']...But if I do it, I'm stepping out of line. Many people think that a Negro, because he is a Negro, must always be humble, even in the heat of sport competition... (Robinson 1997 [1955], p.195)

Thus, there are both real and perceived contradictions in Rickey and Robinson's nonviolence, and some of the perceived contradictions are unwarranted. Nevertheless, such inconsistencies and racially loaded complexities may be a big part of why Robinson's story is not better remembered in terms of nonviolent ideals and strategy. Robinson's reputation for holding a temper is a topic that most biographers mention. After his three year pledge expired, Robinson became notoriously known as a feisty "hothead" who challenged other players and umpires and let his temper fly (Wilson 2010, p.135). Rickey even described Robinson as "instantly violent by natural disposition, immediately ready to counterattack..." (Polner 2007, p.153). Wilson (2010) defends Robinson by noting that "he never in his 12-year professional career used his fists in any

confrontation on the field" (p.135). However, this overlooks a case in which Robinson, angered over what he perceived to be Braves' pitcher Lew Burdette's racial slurs, threw a baseball into the Braves' dugout, and Robinson admitted to the press, "I aimed it right at Burdette's head. Lucky for him it missed" (NYT 1956). There were other cases where, luckily it seems, teammates physically held him back from a possible fist fight (e.g., Wilson 2010, p.124). In 1954, after Robinson was thrown out of a game for a comment to an umpire, he threw his bat into the stands behind the dugout – where it hit an usher and a woman also claimed to have a "nice bump" on her head as a result (McGowen 1954; NYT 1954, June 3). Robinson apologized and it was officially ruled an accident (NYT 1954, June 8), but "fans all around the league took this as one more out-of-control action by baseball's angry man and booed him for the rest of the season. Once a player's image was set, it was hard to escape" (Wilson 2010, p.139).

Nevertheless, aside from the single exception of the Burdette case, the "fights" Robinson took up were always with words, some yelling yes, but not physical violence. Robinson "never in his career resorted to fisticuffs" and he counseled newly arrived black players in the major leagues to adopt "Rickey's dictum, to which he still adhered: we don't fight" (Wilson 2010, p.127). And the significance or Robinson's choice to fight with words is worthy of pause, for to choose words is the essence of nonviolence. As Jean-Marie Muller has written, speaking is "characterized by the renunciation of violence" (Zizek p.2). We can also define both speaking and the renunciation of violence as quintessentially human, as what distinguishes us from animals: "it is actually the principles and methods of non-violence...that constitute the humanity of human beings, the coherence and relevance of moral standards based both on convictions and a sense of

responsibility,' so that violence is 'indeed a radical perversion of humanity'" (Muller cited in Zizek 2008b, p.2). This argument resonates with the view that 90 to 95% of all human activity is nonviolent or "unviolent" (Boulding 1999, p.14) and it presents a different nuance than Papini's reflections which would place nonviolence as a nearly impossible though heroic ideal.

Internally, both Rickey and Robinson seem to have held a mix of pragmatic and principled nonviolent orientations. Rickey was no pacifist, as he volunteered for combat duties in World War I. Robinson at least bought into Rickey's understanding of and justification for "turning the other cheek" (at least for three years), but little evidence exists of Robinson articulating a principled nonviolent position. Some examples of where he approached a principled nonviolent stance are found in his very public support and praise of Dr. King's activities and his objections to Malcolm X on the grounds that Malcolm's philosophy was based on hatred (Smith 1998) – a classic concern of principled nonviolence.

The relative uniqueness of Robinson's nonviolent task also deserves consideration. Most nonviolent activists enjoy solidarity with other activists undertaking similar risks and challenges, but Robinson was alone in a sea of players enjoying and taking for granted white privilege. Rickey did provide close mentoring and support, and though his teammates eventually become supportive, there were times when all of them failed to express solidarity – as when they ate in a restaurant while – at the request of the restaurant owner, Robinson and Roy Campanella (an African-American player who joined the Dodgers one year after Robinson) ate on the team bus (Polner 2007). When Campanella joined the team, they might have enjoyed solidarity, as Rickey had urged

Campanella to "follow the passive public approach taken by Robinson," but Robinson had already become somewhat bitter, and viewed Campanella as "just another Uncle Tom" who was unwilling to make sacrifices for his race (p.184).

Fifth, other complicating factors arise as well. Critics have often projected onto the narrative of the idea that Branch Rickey only cared about winning (Burns 1994). Rickey's idealism, intellectual development, and convictions about racial equality and nonviolent strategy have largely been neglected or dismissed as irrelevant. This is puzzling given numerous indicators of the depth of Rickey's idealism. For example, Rickey was so religiously committed as to refuse to play on Sundays during his own short-lived playing career in baseball (Polner 2007, p.46) – a move that cut starkly against the grain and was a risky career move for a marginal player (p.49). And while I have argued that the role of principled nonviolence as an ideal and a strategy are central (though often unnamed or only subconsciously recognized) to Robinson's heroism and success, other competing accounts may be offered.

Sixth, it may be that race is all Americans can see in the Robinson story, because of the salience of race in the U.S. Anzia and Berry (2011) have written of a "Jackie Robinson effect" in which minorities, women, and others subject to discrimination *must* outperform white males in order to obtain jobs and desirable promotions. Those who do "make it" often outperform white males in comparable roles, and this is because they would have never been selected for those role in the first place if they were not exceptional. For our purposes, the argument here is that Robinson would have never been selected to play in the major leagues unless he was far better than most white players, and better in every way too. The much heralded flaws in the black boxer Jack Johnson's

moral character are a case in point – they became a huge liability for his career (Zirin 2008, 44-45). Seeking to avoid a public relations challenge like Jack Johnson, Rickey was looking for a "clean-living family man whose character was above reproach" (Lowenfish 2007, p.357), a squeaky clean man "who lived an exemplary life off the field" (Wilson 2010, p.58). Every manager desires a player who is coachable, disciplined, mild-mannered/ not likely to get in fights, and in the 1940s at least – somewhat straight-laced/ morally upright (i.e., able to stay out of the newspapers with bad press). Robinson fit the role exceedingly well. Before Robinson, Rickey gave up on another black player when he found out he had syphilis (Polner 2007, p.151).

From this vantage point, the nonviolence of Robinson diminishes in importance, what was key was that he was exceptional in every way – as an athlete and in his character. And Robinson knew all of this. He knew he had to consistently perform at a high level on the field, and also consistently take the high road and avoid conflict, at least until he became accepted by the fans, his teammates and other players in the league (the great black baseball player Hank Aaron articulated this insight about Robinson quite well (see Anzia and Berry 2011, p.480n). Branch Rickey himself had told Robinson before the first season:

> Jackie, we've got no army. There's virtually nobody on our side. No owners, no umpires, very few newspapermen. And I'm afraid that many fans will be hostile. We'll be in a tough position. We can win only if we can convince the world that I'm doing this *because you're a great ballplayer, a fine gentleman*. (Dundas 2010)

And Gerald Early concurs,

> ...blacks saw that Robinson had to be twice as good, three times as good as a white player to even have a chance at the big leagues, that he had to 'earn' the respect of his white teammates in ways demanded of no white player. And this was what integration meant to many blacks. (Ward and Burns 1994, p.417)

In a sense, Robinson had no choice but to avoid fights, to be a "fine gentleman" in Rickey's phrase, and as a black man living with white supremacy and its double-standards (i.e., white privilege) every day. Quite apart from Branch Rickey, Robinson knew this both consciously and sub-consciously. Robinson, like all African-Americans who grew up under white supremacy, understood the racialized "conservative double-standard" on violence (Bell 1968), in which violence by whites is acceptable, but never by blacks.

The threat of being rejected for the slightest mis-step was a powerful constraining force. The incident, mentioned above, in which Roy Campanella and Robinson were refused service by a restaurant owner demonstrates the point. Robinson was fuming mad and Campanella tried to diffuse his anger, saying, "Let's not have any trouble, Jackie. This is the only thing we can do right now, unless we want to go back to them crummy Negro leagues" (Polner 2007, p.184). Of course, there were powerful incentives to not lash out in violence during his early years in the league. Nevertheless, this account need not deny a supportive role for the nonviolent ideals and strategy that Rickey articulated and urged upon Robinson, which resonated with Robinson's own religious faith, and which Robinson carried out amazingly well.

This version of the Robinson story also allows us to see how common nonviolence actually is. And in this sense, Robinson is not alone – as many, many other minority sports starts, artists, musicians, and professionals of various kinds also broke or partially broke into white institutions through patience, dignity, and moral courage in the face of the indignities of white supremacy.

The Robinson story, his rise as a subaltern sports star in a racist society, and his challenge to white supremacy/ second-class citizenship well illustrates key dynamics in philosopher Stephen Darwall's distinctions between "appraisal respect" and "recognition respect" (cited in Appiah 2010). As a professional athlete, Robinson was given the opportunity to display his athletic excellence – earning "appraisal respect" or "competitive honor" (p.176, p.13). Such displays of excellence, though they are not moral feats, can nonetheless help opponents see the dignity/ humanity of the Other. Many similar instances of this dynamic in the sporting world have probably played a crucial role in breaking down white supremacist and WASP ideology in the U.S. – including the African-American athletes Jessie Owens, Jack Johnson, and Joe Louis as well as Jim Thorpe (Native American), Hank Greenberg (Jewish), and Roberto Clemente (Puerto Rican), among many others. Perhaps even those who argue that the Russian people's love for the forbidden rock music of the Beatles played a role in bringing down the Soviet Union have a point (Woodhead 2009). These sports and musical figures displayed excellence, earning a kind of "competitive honor" or "appraisal respect," which opened the door to recognizing their humanity/ human dignity – what can be called "recognition respect" (Appiah 2010, p.176, p.13). However, the top dogs will still resist potential – even symbolic or psychological changes (i.e., cracks in the regime of symbolic violence) brought by the token hero's emergence. The top dogs are shamed by the token's feats and in shame they lash out, just as honor accrues to the underdogs by virtue of their identification with their token hero. After Jack Johnson defeated the white boxer Jim Jeffries, over 150 people were killed in race riots, many sparked by white lynch mobs attacking blacks (Zirin 2008, p.43). But Jack Johnson's refusal to condemn black

violence during the riots, which Booker T. Washington proded him to do (p.44), begins to illustrate how nonviolence can bring people together in a way that violence can not. Robinson never caused any race riots.

Consider another counterfactual – what if Robinson had spent the rest of his life theorizing nonviolence in some of the many newspaper columns (he had a weekly column for years), interviews and speeches he gave around the nation. He simply could have more fully explained the covenant he made with Branch Rickey, the ideals and strategic thinking behind it, explained how and why nonviolence "worked" in response to the physical and psychological aggression he encountered during his early years in the minor and major leagues. He did not do this. However, Robinson did offer frequent praise for Dr. King and in 1960, used his column in the *New York Post* to defend nonviolent activists conducting sit-ins just after President Truman had denounced them (Henry 1998, p.210). Moreover, Robinson's son fought in the Vietnam War, and when Dr. King came out against the Vietnam War, Robinson used his weekly newspaper column to criticize King's stance on the war. A lengthy phone conversation with King did not change Robinson's mind (Smith 1998). But eventually, Robinson did move closer to King's view of the Vietnam War, partly as the result of his eldest son's experiences fighting in the war (Wilson 2010). Again, a more consistent nonviolent stance in his later years would have likely fostered a much stronger collective memory of Robinson's nonviolence during the pivotal three-year experiment.

Important additional contradictions can be named which are indicative of Robinson's own apparent ambivalence about nonviolence. Aside from his enormous indirect influence, Robinson did do a great deal for the civil rights movement directly and

on the ground, even marching with King on several occasions. But here, Robinson (1995) clearly admitted his ambivalence about nonviolence, saying,

> As much as I loved him [King], I never would have made a good soldier in Martin's army. My reflexes aren't conditioned to accept nonviolence in the face of violence-provoking attacks. My immediate instinct under the threat of physical attack to me or those I love is instant defense and total retaliation. (p.211)

His claim to be temperamentally ill-suited for King's nonviolent demonstrations (Smith 1998) was re-iterated as he talked about the demonstrations in Birmingham:

> I'm not as brave as some of these little 9 and 10 year old kids in the South. I don't like these big teeth that I see on these [police] dogs, and I don't like to see these fierce expressions of the policemen in Birmingham, Alabama, and I don't like to read about pregnant women being poked in the stomach by policemen with their nightsticks, and I don't like to see young Negro kids of 7, 8, 9 years old being thrown across the street by the force of a fire hose. But I believe that I must go down and say to the people down there, thank you for what you're doing, not only for me and my children, but I believe for America. So I'm going down to do whatever I possibly can. (Burns 1994 V8)

When Robinson flew to Birmingham to support the demonstrations of Dr. King and the SCLC, Robinson downplayed the courage he was displaying, saying, "I don't like to be bitten by dogs, because I am a coward. I don't like to go to jail either, because, as I say, I am a coward. But we've got to show Martin Luther King that we are behind him" (NAACP).

While every nonviolent movement needs people to take a variety of different roles, Robinson's humility here strikes an ironic note. He claims he was "not as brave" as youth in the civil rights movement. Perhaps he is right to defer to the heroic self-suffering taken on by civil rights activists on the streets. Perhaps it is true that these activists took nonviolence to another level, though observers of Robinson's early years in professional baseball are unanimous in proclaiming his immense courage and bravery (Burns 1994). Using his celebrity status effectively, Robinson took up other tasks - raising funds for

churches destroyed by arsonists (Smith 1998), speaking to rallies and nightly meetings of activists (NYT 1958, September 20), as well as marching in some demonstrations with Dr. King (AP 1964, February 18; Herbers 1964).

A caveat. I do not mean to imply that the nonviolent strategy via Branch Rickey was the only important formative influence on Robinson. Indeed, other relationships and insights may be equally important. For instance, we know that the Rev. Karl Downs, Robinson's pastor in Pasadena, California played a significant role. What might Downs have taught Robinson? We have some suggestive evidence from an article Downs (1936) wrote in *The Crisis*: "Force, pressure, threats and the like are tests of true courage...Racial adjustment must be made through fearless, rational, comprehensive and cooperative ventures of both the Negro and white students..." (p.171). And, Downs counsels against slave-day myths that argued "'We must smile in massa's face and humble ourselves or else perish.' *No!* Racial respect cannot be accomplished this way!...*Courage instead of timidity!*" (p.187; emphasis in the original) In this advice, we glimpse the historical legacies of white supremacy and the potential racial undertones of Robinson's nonviolence, a layer of complications that certainly contributed to the stresses and strains of his three-year pledge.

An alternative textbook account. Following the example of Kohl's (1995) insightful analysis of textbook portraits of Rosa Parks, below I offer an alternative textbook account, necessarily short, which would begin to do justice to the key nonviolent dynamics and their ongoing social significance in the Jackie Robinson story:

> Jackie Robinson was not the first African-American to play in the major leagues of professional baseball. Decades earlier a few black players had briefly

played in the major leagues, but an agreement among white team owners emerged, effectively banning blacks through conformity to the racist conventions of white supremacy. Meanwhile, the Negro Leagues developed, where talented black players thrived on teams managed and owned by blacks. Some critics still argue that the integration of baseball should have occurred at the team level, because in this way, black managers and owners could have been invited into the league. Instead, to this day, the management and ownership of teams continues to be almost unanimously white (Ward and Burns 1994, p.413).

The general manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, Branch Rickey, had long been troubled by racial bigotry, and had deep streaks of idealism and religious faith, as well as pragmatism. That is, he wanted his baseball teams to win, and to sell lots of tickets to games – attracting fans of all races to the ballpark (on Rickey's pragmatism, see Zirin 2008, p.99; Austin 1997). Constantly reading books and making lists of still more historical and sociological books to read, Rickey undertook an intellectual search to understand more about the history of slavery and racism in the Americas. Rickey also read many books on Lincoln, kept a portrait of Abraham Lincoln on his office wall, and as a Methodist lay preacher, often read Christian literature. Rickey was taken by one book in particular, *The Life of Christ* by Giovanni Papini, which argued that Jesus taught nonviolence, and Jesus' teaching to "turn the other cheek" proposed a kind of brave and proud, defiant nonviolent resistance, which by occupying the moral high ground would shame and disarm oppressors. Other influences on Rickey also pointed him towards a nonviolent strategy of social change. For example, a

favorite essay of his was William James's "The Moral Equivalent of War," which argues for embracing forms of heroic nonviolent action.

Rickey began looking for a black baseball player who could play for his team and be the first to re-integrate the major leagues in the modern era. Rickey was impressed with reports of Robinson's skills as a baseball player, his religious faith and upright morals, as well as his reputation as a fighter with toughness and moral courage. He knew that while in the military, Robinson had refused to move to the back of a segregated army bus in Texas and then went to court to fight the charges of "conduct unbecoming an officer." When Robinson first met Rickey in his Brooklyn office, Rickey asked him if he was tough enough to "turn the other cheek," and though he knew Robinson was a Christian, Rickey explained just what he meant by reading from Papini's book. During their conversation, Robinson asked, "Mr. Rickey, do you want a ballplayer who's afraid to fight back?" Rickey countered, "I'm looking for a ballplayer with the guts *not* to fight back!"

Rickey then acted out a variety of scenarios where Robinson would likely be the target of racist taunts and violence, asking if Robinson could "turn the other cheek" in each case. Because Rickey knew Robinson would become the target of violent white bigotry, and because he believed that if Robinson lashed out in violence it would set back racial progress by decades, Rickey asked Robinson to make a three-year pledge of nonviolence. Rickey believed that nonviolence was the key to winning over whites and conquering their prejudices, and Robinson accepted the challenge.

Although the hatred, violence, and stress Robinson confronted was extreme, and persisted for years, Robinson endured with nonviolence and dignity. His excellence on the baseball field also helped win over the American public and fellow players alike. But by his own account, there were times when Robinson almost gave in to the temptation to lash out in violence, and wondered if a "real man" would or should. When his three-year pledge was up, Robinson began to engage in arguments on the field. But he almost always limited himself to using words, and in interviews, he often insightfully pointed to the hypocritical double-standards many whites judged him by. For years, Robinson also wrote a newspaper column which engaged important issues of the day, and was a consistent advocate for social issues as he saw them, though in many ways he evolved and became more critical of U.S. society and its failure to make more significant racial progress.

As the U.S. civil rights movement began to gain steam in the American South, Robinson lent his support to the nonviolent struggle and often marched with Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. As if to confirm Rickey's and Robinson's faith in nonviolence during their three-year pledge, years later, Dr. King expressed his own view that without Robinson's heroic steps into professional baseball, the civil rights movement would not have been possible.

It is one thing to ask whether the significant details of the Jackie Robinson story are accurately and vividly fleshed out in history textbooks. But it is another to argue that education must aim to instill humane values (e.g., Adorno's 1967 essay "Education After

Auschwitz" (Adorno 1998)), to promote nonviolence and a culture of peace. If we agree that the latter should be our goal, this is all the more reason for the Robinson story of nonviolence to assume a prominent place in our school textbooks and in our collective memory.

WHY NONVIOLENCE IS NEGLECTED IN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

The present analysis of state-approved history textbooks from around the world raises numerous theoretical questions. How do we explain the failure of nonviolence to compete in the collective memory? That is, how do we explain the "sin of omission" we have documented in history textbooks – their relative neglect of nonviolent campaigns? What is it about nonviolent movements which tend to lead to collective forgetting? Is violence inevitably more memorable and newsworthy because of deep, almost unconscious psychological forces? Is the link between war and the health of the state the reason that violence outcompetes nonviolent events? Is memory of nonviolent movements perceived as a threat to the health of the state, or to elite power? Is the failure of historians to more explicitly theorize historical events in general a big part of the problem? Is the failure of social movement leaders to more explicitly name and theorize nonviolence part of the problem?

Conventional Action Versus Nonviolent Action

The failure to name and categorize major mass nonviolent street actions as "nonviolent action" partly stems from a tendency of social movement participants as well as historians (and everyone in between) to view mass nonviolent actions as merely conventional action. When the action does not become categorized as specifically

nonviolent action, it is little wonder that history textbooks do not name the events as nonviolence in action. It has been noted that in Latin America, general strikes and mass street protests have rarely been perceived as "nonviolent" action (Becker 2003, Parkman 1990). In some advanced democracies, the "institutionalization of protest" has clearly moved many demonstrations and marches into the category of conventional action, as protesters acquire permits from city hall and police routinely observe with little interference (Meyer and Tarrow 1998).

However, the point here is that a great many social movements, nonviolent revolutions, leaders, and participants were guided by nonviolent ideology and nonviolent strategy, but this has been written out of the textbook accounts of these events. In other cases, social movement leaders may have failed to sufficiently articulate nonviolent strategy. Yet, as Schock (2003) points out, many leading scholars and strategists of nonviolent maintain that "campaigns of nonviolent action are likely to be more effective if people understand what the methods are and how they operate (e.g., Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Burrowes 1996; Lakey 1973; McCarthy 1990; and Sharp 1973; 1990)" (p.711).

Norway ranks relatively low in its national mean score on the Gallup World Poll question of "peaceful means alone," with 48% of respondents affirming peaceful means alone "will work" for oppressed groups. Yet, the most historically significant oppressed minority/ indigenous group in Norway, the Sami or Laplanders, won enormous victories for greater autonomy and human rights through legislation. For example, the Sami can now choose the Sami language as their first language in schools. These legal victories were bound up with other Sami protest campaigns which involved an extensive repertoire

of nonviolent tactics as documented by the Global Nonviolent Action Database (Lawrence 2011). But would the average Norwegian perceive this as "peaceful means"? Or, would this fail to be perceived as "peaceful means" or as "nonviolent" because it is understood as conventional action?

Loewen (2007) argues that many U.S. history textbooks "actually credit the government, almost single-handedly" for the progress made by the U.S. civil rights movement (p.239). According to Loewen, students reading these texts are likely to conclude that the civil rights movement was mostly about Presidents passing civil rights legislation, while the mobilization, courage, and sustained nonviolent protests of activists is heavily glossed over or even largely omitted. My point is that this emphasis on legislation is of course, conventional action, while the significance of mass nonviolent actions and diverse forms of creative protest is neglected. Essentially the same pattern was found in the Ghanaian text by Gadzepko (2005): At the climax of the independence narrative, rather than pointing to the role of mass noncooperation, the textbook emphasizes the role of British cooperation.

Principled Versus Pragmatic Nonviolence

The failure to name and categorize nonviolent actions as nonviolent partly stems from the tendency of social movement organizations and leaders to embrace pragmatic nonviolent ideology rather than principled nonviolence. I would contend that this is likely to result in the under-theorization of nonviolence within a movement. Hence, for example, Ira Sandperl, the main teacher of nonviolence at the Institute for the Study of Nonviolence (founded by the Quaker folk singer Joan Baez), says of anti-Vietnam protests in Berkeley in 1964, "Basically we wanted to turn an *un*violent movement into a

*non*violent one" (Didion 1968, p.52). By unviolent, Sandperl means belief in "nonviolence only as a limited tactic" (p.53). Conversely, the distinctive moral rhetoric of principled nonviolence clearly distinguishes it from conventional action, and also resonates with the moral values of major world religions (Eddy 2012).

The best memory outcomes are likely to occur when movement leaders invoke a nonviolent "memory template" (Eddy 2012) which aids interpretation (for social movement participants, opponents, journalists, and historians) – the Gandhian template is an obvious choice here, and many activists around the world have adopted it as they frame the strategies and tactics of their own movement for participants, opponents, and observers. The failure of Jackie Robinson to explicitly advocate principled nonviolence in his discourse, likely played a major role in how most textbooks have neglected to include the very clear nonviolent strategy which motivated Branch Rickey and Robinson during his first three years in the Major Leagues.

The collective forgetting of nonviolence may be fostered by the fact that nonviolent action is often a "weapon of the weak" or "nonviolence of the weak" (Gandhi's phrase for pragmatic nonviolence). That is, it is a method chosen because it is the only method available: Arms are lacking, or the use of arms would be suicidal. In such cases, nonviolent strategy may not even be consciously chosen, and so it is little wonder that it tends not to be theorized, recognized, or celebrated. For instance, in the case of the resisting Norwegian teachers, one of them has recalled, "Nowhere through all these discussions did the *idea* of nonviolent resistance come in. Instead of an idea, it developed as a way to work – a way to do something" (Sharp 2005, p.136).

Walter Wink (1987) found not just ambivalence or unformed opinions about nonviolence, but a lack of awareness among South African anti-apartheid activists that what they were doing could be properly classified as "nonviolent" action. They lacked theorization of nonviolent methods, language to articulate nonviolent strategy, and awareness of nonviolence as a distinct category, and this among activists who were successfully using a great variety of nonviolent methods. Similarly, in their massive bibliography of scholarship on nonviolent movements around the world, McCarthy and Sharp (1997) argue, "most of the human experiences identified here as 'nonviolent action' were never thought of in those terms by the people who undertook them" (p.xxxvi). I contend this outcome is much more common when social movement leaders and organizations embrace pragmatic nonviolence rather than principled nonviolence.

Moreover, seminal theorists of nonviolence like Sharp (1996, p.237) and George Lakey (1973, p.57) have argued that pragmatic nonviolence has been a much more significant factor than principled nonviolence in social movement history.

Violent Events Tend to Receive Narrative Privilege

Nonviolence is at risk for being viewed as a non-event, while violence fills the news and the history books. One version of this factor proposes that peace has "very limited" "aesthetic appeal" (Mariani 2009, p.102). In the humorist Garrison Keilor's version of this, which he frequently reiterates in his radio narratives (broadcast on National Public Radio) about his native snowbound Minnesota, he argues that you simply cannot tell stories about sunshine and happiness. Thus, suffering and tragedy enjoys a kind of narrative privilege. Likewise, Juhnke and Hunter (2004) propose that historians, teachers, and students "welcome the focus and drama that wars offer to the classroom,"

and this is more generally related to the notion that “violence often has a galvanizing or cathartic effect” (p.43).

Recent research shows that the rankings of U.S. presidents and their relative “greatness” by professional historians positively correlates with the number of U.S. war casualties during their presidency, even after controlling for 7 predictors: economic growth, years in office, years at war while in office, whether the president was assassinated (likely to boost heroic status), whether the president was a war hero, the president’s intelligence, and presence or absence of presidential scandals (Henderson and Gochenour 2012). Hence, it seems more war deaths produces “greater” presidents in the minds of historians.

The failure to categorize and name instances of nonviolent action as “nonviolence” is bound up with wider cultural forces which neglect the significance of nonviolent strategy. Nonviolent theorists have documented case studies of nonviolent resistance in a great many nations around the world. But scholars looking for nonviolent cases and outsiders in general bring a different lens to a culture and its history. Hence, they may project onto a nonviolent movement or event more significance than locals attach to it. I asked a professor from Norway about his recollections of Norwegian resistance to the Nazis. He mentioned the short-lived *violent resistance* as well as forms of resistance like working very slow. When I explained Gene Sharp’s (2005) celebration of the nonviolent resistance of Norwegian teachers, the professor confessed, “I never thought of teachers as leaders of resistance. I did not hear about that.” Such stories of nonviolent resistance are at risk for being lost from collective memory because of a general failure to recognize the significance and successes of nonviolent strategy.

Psychological and Epistemic Arguments - We Remember What Hurts

Another explanation can be found in the theory that there is a deep, epistemic connection between memory and suffering, pain, and trauma. Dostoyevsky (2003) wrote, "Suffering is the sole origin of consciousness" (p.262). Nietzsche (1967 [1887]) asked: "How can one create a memory for the human animal? How can one impress something upon this partly obtuse, partly flighty mind, attuned only to the passing moment, in such a way that it will stay there?" (p.60) Adopting an anthropological lens, Nietzsche's answer was that the "whole prehistory of man" relied on an assumed principle of "mnemotechnics": "If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to *hurt* stays in the memory" (p.61). This, writes Nietzsche, "is a main clause of the oldest (unhappily also the most enduring) psychology on earth" (p.61). Nietzsche continues,

> Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices of the first-born among them), the most repulsive mutilations (castration, for example), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults (and all religions are at the deepest level systems of cruelties) – all this has its origin in the instinct that realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics. (p.61)

Mary Daly (1978), the Catholic feminist theologian turned radical feminist philosopher, concurred as she argued that patriarchal religion and ritual engages in memory-creating through "mind/ spirit rape" (p.110). The argument is clear, if we were to engineer collective memories, a key principle of design is – to remember, to reproduce memory, make it *hurt*.

Anthropological analyses of rites of passage as well as patriarchal religion offer support for this notion. Mircea Eliade's study of manhood initiation rituals concluded that in dozens of cultures all over the world, the rite involves older men giving the boy a

painful wound, one meant to “reverberate out from a rich center of meaning” (Bly 1990, p.28). Robert Bly, a leader in the mytho-poetic men’s movement that emerged in the 1980’s, interpreted a host of world myths as he wrote, “A wound allows the soul or spirit to enter” (p.209). Likewise, Joseph Campbell contended that the most common means of gaining wisdom is we “suffer and gain wisdom gradually” (Dossey 1999, p.129).The theory that pain and memory are more deeply interlinked than other experiences may provide us one beginning point for explaining the comparative resonance achieved by violence and war in collective memory.

Hence, in an extension and application of this theory we could argue that nonviolent history tends to hurt and bleed less, and so if Nietzsche’s theory is correct, nonviolent action is virtually designed for forgetting. Our preoccupation with blood, pain and suffering is not just the province of history, religion, and the news (“if it bleeds, it leads”), but clearly extends into the preoccupations of professional psychology: “Journals in the field have published forty-five thousand articles in the last thirty years on depression, but only four hundred on joy” (Ehrenreich 2007, p.13).

A growing body of psychological research suggests that it is powerful emotions which make memories stick. Both positive and negative emotions can cement memory, but painful memories are especially likely to “haunt” consciousness, as we become preoccupied with accounting for and explaining traumatic events (Lemonick 2007). Similarly, some psychological research shows that negative events and behaviors tend to be remembered better (Skowronski and Carlston 1987), and to provoke more elaborate attributions (Hastie 1984, Schwarz and Clore 1983).

It is easy to see how the suffering of soldiers on the battlefield is designed for memory-creating, especially since the "moral status" of soldiers is routinely viewed as unassailable. Their "sacrifice," and noble duty on behalf of the nation is sacred. In fact, in the U.S. during the post-Vietnam era, the "support the troops" mantra is emblematic of an emergent "warrior ethics" in which war is routine, virtuous, unquestioned, and apolitical (Lucas and McCarthy 2005). That is, the reasons for conducting a particular war rapidly vanish in importance, all that matters is supporting the troops. While others in U.S. society suffer, such as the poor, their moral status is routinely questioned (i.e., as in the assertion that the poor are lazy) – a rhetorical means of obfuscating the structural violence that perpetuates their suffering. Guarding the memories of soldiers and their wars becomes a key sacred function of all of the state-sponsored mechanisms in space and time, notably, holidays and monuments, but also textbooks. All help to reproduce the civil religion.

The Problem is History Textbooks in General – They Need to Theorize

Nelson and Olin (1979) argue that, for history to become useful, historians need to become more consciously theoretical. Textbooks largely ignore theoretical and explanatory concerns (e.g., how or why nonviolent action/ military strategies can succeed). As a result, in history textbooks, it is "just one damn thing after another" (Loewen 2007, p.278), with little space given to developing context or explanations. This is why Loewen argues that history textbooks need to become more sociological, with explicit theoretical reflections on causal forces in history (p.342).

Comprehensive accounts of nonviolent action require some coverage of the sources of nonviolent ideals, as well as theories about *why* nonviolence works. But

secondary school history textbooks largely ignore the origins and development of ideas, ideals, ideologies, and values, as well as religious ideas. As we have seen, the nonviolent religious ideal embodied in Jesus's phrase "turn the other cheek," an ideal which plays a crucial role in the Jackie Robinson story, is completely ignored in textbook portraits.

The Problem is History Textbooks in General – No One Learns Within the Narratives

There is little to no "learning" documented inside the narrative arc of secondary school history textbooks, in general, or in biographical portraits contained within textbooks, in particular. For example, consider that most of the main leaders of the Black Panther Party Social eventually renounced violent methods, but this never appears in U.S. history textbooks. Actors enter the stage of history, play their role as politicians or activists, soldiers or generals, and exit never to be heard from again. Remorse about their violent actions or changes of heart almost never appear. Here again, the space and form constraints involved in telling history as the story of a nation, severely limits the human depth and accuracy of the effects violent events have on individual lives – on people who think, feel, mourn, believe, regret, hope, or have nightmares for the rest of their lives. This pattern overlaps with the pervasive failure of many textbooks to give "voice" (i.e., to quote social actors in their own words) to the historical figures covered.

Can textbook retellings of the Vietnam War be complete without noting Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's conclusion "well before leaving the Pentagon that the war was futile" and his public revelation late in life that the war was "wrong, terribly wrong" (Wiener 2009). Textbooks recount the "domino theory" as a motivation for the war, but they do not share McNamara's admission late in life that in applying the domino frame to Vietnam, it was: "a basic misunderstanding or misevaluation of the threat to our security

represented by the North Vietnamese…I am certain we exaggerated the threat." And, McNamara's misgivings extended to his participation in World War II, in which he played a supportive planning role in American firebombing of Japanese cities, a campaign which killed 900,000 Japanese civilians. McNamara recounts that his superior, General Curtis E. LeMay argued that if the U.S. lost the war, they would be prosecuted as war criminals for their role in the firebombing. In retrospect McNamara concurred – they were "behaving as war criminals," and he confessed the only reason such American actions were not categorized as "immoral" was because the U.S. won the war (Wiener 2009).

Textbooks praise General Douglas MacArthur as a "brilliant soldier" (e.g., Roden et al. 1984, p.603), but we never hear his words upon the death of Gandhi in January 1948: "The process of mass application of force to resolve contentious issues is fundamentally not only wrong, but contains within itself the germs of self-destruction….If civilization is to survive, men cannot fail eventually to adopt Gandhi's belief…." (Green 1978, p.vii). There is additional evidence that MacArthur appreciated nonviolent tactics, as he recognized the general strike as "so deadly a social weapon" it had to be banned in post-war Japan during the U.S. occupation which he oversaw (A.A.P. 1947, Feb. 1).

The Problem: Textbook Production Processes Result in Deeply Conservative Textbooks

The contested political process and corporate (i.e., private publishing house) interests which produce textbooks result in conservative/ patriotic texts which avoid controversy. Loewen (2007) has demonstrated this pervasive pattern in U.S. history textbooks, and Leahey (2010) has shown how the process results in textbooks which

"whitewash" the Vietnam War.It is worth noting that one of the few textbooks in the present sample to portray a nonviolent revolution relatively accurately, the El Salvador textbook, is a pdf distributed via the internet straight from the Ministry of Education, rather than through a publishing house. Perhaps eliminating the corporate publishing house "middle man" in this way can create space for more controversial historical events in national curriculums.

In most nations, the aim of textbook actors to avoid controversy has resulted in the avoidance of recent history, some of which may still carry fresh wounds. An interesting case in point concerns the Czech Republic, which recently celebrated the 20th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution (1989), a movement scholars claim as one of the most significant nonviolent revolutions since 1945 (Dudouet 2008,Stephan and Chenowith 2008). However, a young activist marked the occasion by writing a manifesto which argued that "many of his peers had no idea what was being celebrated…because recent history was glossed over in Czech history books" (Bilefsky 2009, p.A16).

In 1777, when Norway was still part of the Danish Kingdom, a Norwegian history textbook was published entitled *Great and Pleasant Deeds performed by Danes, Norwegians and Holstenians* (Lorentzen 1990). The title well names the tone of national history textbooks down to the present, with a patriotic emphasis on "great deeds" and an apolitical, or conservative emphasis on "pleasant deeds."

In the U.S., when a federally funded project, "National Standards for United States History" released its report in 1994, conservatives pounced on it for its multiculturalism, as well as for what they perceived as its overemphasis on the dark side and struggles of U.S. history, while departing from "a traditional approach to history that

emphasizes facts, dates, and events" (Leahey 2010, p.14). An op-ed by Lynne V. Cheney in the *Wall Street Journal* assessed the *National Standards* arguing that more emphasis should be given to Paul Revere, George Washington, Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, Thomas Edison, the Wright brothers, and J.P. Morgan; And, less emphasis should be given to McCarthyism, the KKK, the American Federation of Labor, the National Organization of Women, and Harriet Tubman (Cheney 1994). Cheney expresses panic that "The National Standards... concentrates on 'multiple perspectives' and on how the American Revolution did or did not serve the 'interests' of different groups" (p.A22). This is not the "tone of affirmation" that Cheney thinks appropriate (p.A22). On the heals of a Republican takeover of Congress in the midterm elections of 1994, the U.S. Senate voted 99-1 to censure the *National Standards* and withdraw federal funding (Leahey 2010). Textbook publishers and politicians should not take all of the blame however. Studies show that over 90% of teacher avoid controversial issues in the classroom (Loewen 2007, p.327).

Nonviolent struggles often reach deeper into the heart of social contradictions embedded in the status quo. Thus, adequate coverage of nonviolent movements will require delving into numerous critiques of society and power structures. Such negative tones are often avoided in textbooks. It has long been assumed that a key reason for rosy-colored views of national life is that textbook publishers and educators understand the function of textbooks as one of inculcating patriotism.

Frederic Jameson has argued that narrative always has a function: "it is a specific mechanism through which the collective consciousness represses historical contradictions" (Sarup 1993, p.179). Following this psychoanalytic metaphor, historical

narratives include the repression of "the political unconscious" (Jameson 1981). Building on Jameson, it can be said that historical texts utilize ideological frames, or what he terms "strategies of containment" (Sarup 1993, p.180). The interpreter's task becomes finding patterns which represent strategies of containment, by identifying "gaps or absences as specific signs of the way the text denies or represses history" (p.180). I argue that analysis of state-sponsored textbook narratives reveals that nonviolent action is such a gap and absence.

Nonviolent Action Threatens the Status Quo

A case can also be made that the omission of nonviolent action is straightforward: history texts reflect the hegemonic ideology of the ruling class and nonviolent action threatens the status quo. Wink (2003) argues that power elites simply do not want the mass public to know that nonviolent noncooperation and nonviolent resistance works (pp.53-54). Historical precedents are dangerous, remembering them and celebrating them even more dangerous. What is at stake here is recognition of a tool, a strategy and set of tactics, already existing in the toolbox of those who would mobilize for greater social justice. In a novel by Milan Kundera (1981), a character argues that the struggle against power "is the struggle of memory against forgetting" (p.3).

What we observe – and do not observe in history textbooks is akin to the well-known practice of state-owned radio stations in the Soviet bloc who played classical music during coups and uprisings, rather than report any news. Likewise, during the recent mass street protests in Turkey, "CNN Turk, the network's Turkish-language affiliate, was running a cooking show" (Cook and Koplow 2013, p.G4). For those who

would resist, but lack information or historical memory, textbooks serve to reproduce a knowledge crisis.

The Problem is Widespread Misperceptions of the Concept of "Nonviolence"

Wink (2003) argues that nonviolence has not been championed by mainstream society because the term itself is negative, and the concept is subject to confusion and easy dismissals (p.3). The problem is linked to predecessor terms for nonviolence, "passive resistance" and "pacifism," both of which imply passivity and have long resulted in confusion. Gandhi contended that the name "soul force" (the English translation of the Hindi word satyagraha) was the remedy for these problems, but as we saw in the Google Ngram analysis, this term for nonviolence has not caught on.

The easy dismissals and critiques of nonviolence are closely bound up with a long legacy of the co-optation of nonviolent religious values expressed in the sacred texts of the world religions, and the legitimation of "just war" doctrines by religious elites. In probably every major religious tradition, we can trace this pattern to interactions between theological traditions and the agendas of religious elites who in many empires and countries have either come from the power elite classes, sought alliances with the elites, or found other reasons for rationalizing and legitimating warfare, violence, and nationalism. Again, this factor overlaps with #7 above and the Marxist insight that "The ruling ideas of each age have always been the ideas of its ruling class" (Marx and Engels 1848, p.30), and education is captive to "the influence of the ruling class" (p.28).

Double Standards on Nonviolence

In every generation (and sometimes more often than this) nonviolence is widely viewed as discredited. This occurs whenever a nonviolent movement fails to achieve its

goals in a timely manner. This occurred throughout the U.S. civil rights movement, and recently as the nonviolent movements of the "Arab Spring" failed to achieve swift victories after those in Tunisia and Egypt. Wink (2003) links this double standard to the ideological hegemony of the ruling class, and citing evidence from Wolpin (1981), he refutes the double standard:

> If a single case can be shown where nonviolence doesn't work, nonviolence as a whole can then be discredited. No such rigorous standard is applied to violence, however, which regularly fails to achieve its goals. Close to two-thirds of all governments that assume power by means of coups d'état are ousted by the same means; only 1 in 20 post-coup governments give way to a civil government (p.54)

Inconsistencies Among Nonviolent Leaders As Well As Double Standards on Nonviolent Leaders

One reason for the underemphasis of nonviolence in textbooks might be linked to the lack of consistencies among prominent nonviolent adherents in their opposition to violence. Here we confront an unfair double-standard, as adherents of violence, generals, soldiers and so forth, act nonviolently most of the time, but those actions are not understood as undermining the legitimacy of violence.

I have argued that the mixed messages about the sufficiency of nonviolence articulated by figures such as Nkrumah and Jackie Robinson may have played some role in de-centering nonviolence from the pivotal narratives of their public lives. It is worth noting that Gandhi's real and perceived inconsistencies and contradictions on nonviolence/ violence have dogged the Gandhian memory template and the application of the Gandhian repertoire around the world down to today, supplying ample ammunition for his skeptics and detractors (Eddy 2012). Thus, social movement leaders like Nelson

Mandela have cited Gandhi's words or example as they attempt to justify turning *away* from nonviolent to violent methods (Eddy 2012).

Consider Emerson, who laid out an almost fully fledged nonviolent philosophy in his 1838 essay "War," but when the Civil War arrived he was a strong supporter of the Union Army (Mariani 2009, p.118n). William Lloyd Garrison, a leading proponent of abolitionism, nonviolence and passive resistance, decided to support Lincoln and the Union Army when the Civil War broke out. Clarence Darrow, the leading advocate of nonviolence in the U.S. before World War I (Lynd and Lynd 1995), became a vocal supporter of U.S. entry into WWI, though he later regretted it (Darrow 1932, pp.210-217). Reinhold Niebuhr, a leading American pacifist and Christian theologian endorsed U.S. entry into WWII. Niebuhr's rethinking of violence and war resulted in a form of "Christian realism" which has reportedly influenced President Obama's worldview. Bayard Rustin, a pivotal nonviolent organizer of the U.S. civil right movement and life-long pacifist Quaker, attracted attention for his refusal to condemn the Vietnam War out of strategic concerns and political compromises in his agenda to advance race relations in the U.S.

However, once again, we observe here a double standard – nonviolent leaders are perhaps unfairly held to a higher standard of consistency. When soldiers come home and do not kick the dog or do not hit their family members, we do not take notice. When General MacArthur praises Gandhi (above), or when a politician who has advocated war engages in diplomatic talk with the enemy (which occurs at the end of most conflicts), it is not taken as an argument against violent means of conflict resolution. The double standards in our perceptions of consistency and inconsistency are revealed in that it is

only when nonviolent adherents stray from strict nonviolence, that nonviolent ideology is understood as de-legitimized. The same lesson is not drawn when violent adherents refuse to be violent for moral or practical reasons.

As another example of a lack of consistency in nonviolent leaders and organizations, key players in the U.S. civil rights consciously shifted from principled nonviolence to pragmatic nonviolence and violent ideologies. Between 1964 and 1966, SNCC, one of the leading U.S. civil rights movement organizations, shifted "from a nonviolent, interracial, participatory democracy to a violent, black separatist, hierarchical organization" (Robnett 2002, p.266). SNCC leaders made a moral and pragmatic case against nonviolence, arguing that "Defending your home is dignity" and "a man has a right to defend himself" while employing anecdotes such as the following: when the Klan were shot at by black men in North Carolina, the Klan did not return (p.274). Similarly, CORE came to espouse self-defense including the "right of demonstrators to defend themselves when attacked" (Bell 1968, p.63). But SNCC and CORE's strategic moves away from nonviolence was a key factor in their loss of allies, funds, and organizational decline (McAdam 1999, p.210).

Group/ Party Politics Plays a Role in Shaping Memories

A case can also be made that group/ party politics plays a role in shaping memories of nonviolent movements, as well as tarnishing the memory of some nonviolent leaders for partisans. left-right ideological loyalties and the ongoing messiness and contentiousness of politics all play a role in how nonviolent movements and leaders, especially political leaders, are remembered, and who reveres them in collective memory. The Ministries of Education in most nations keep very tight control over curriculum and

textbook content. As power shifts to new political parties, new bureaucrats are appointed, and sometimes ideological slants and textbook omissions are glaring, as we saw in the case of Chile.

In addition, the longer a nonviolent leader is in the public spotlight, the more likely their image will be tarnished through the vicissitudes of political struggle. The untimely deaths of Dr. King and Gandhi may have done more to preserve the legacy of nonviolence than we know, though it is certainly possible they may have moved in directions of greater consistency in nonviolence. This was true of King in his last year. He was killed one year to the day after giving his famous anti-Vietnam War speech, his first significant public opposition to the war. Similarly, one wonders if the vaulted status of Rosa Parks is partly due to the fact that she went on to live most of her life relatively out of the public eye, which served to avoid tarnishing her legacy for the controversy avoiding textbooks.

Robinson's long and very public affiliation with the Republican party surely alienated many Democrats, as did his prominent spotlight as a weekly newspaper columnist, a venue where he often weighed in on political issues. In addition, Black radicals like Malcolm X had very public feuds with Robinson. Amiri Baraka has also written of Robinson in very harsh terms as a "race traitor" for leaving his team in the Negro Leagues and contributing to the destruction of the Negro Leagues, which had been a key source of black economic independence and pride. Baraka wrote,

> I don't want to get political and talk bad about 'integration.' Like what a straight-out trick it was. To rip off what you had in the name of what you ain't never gonna get. So the destruction of the Negro National League...to what must we attribute that? We're going to the big leagues. Is that what the cry was on those Afric' shores when the European capitalists and African feudal lords got together

> and palmed our future. ‘We’re going to the big leagues!’ (Ward and Burns 1994, p.413)

Robinson’s affiliation with the NAACP led to conflict as he came to see them as not progressive enough, and his refutation of the NAACP in 1967 likely alienated moderates (Wilson 2010, pp.155-156, p.174). Rickey was also a Republican and some say he entertained anti-Communist hysteria when it suited his agenda (Ward and Burns 1994, p.354; Lowenfish 2007, p.468). Robinson’s Congressional testimony on July 17, 1947 was perceived by many leftists as submitting to the worst of anti-Communist hysteria and as an attack on Paul Robeson. However, Robinson’s actual statement included strong critiques of Jim Crowism and white supremacy. In any case, this attack on Robeson alienated many radicals, leftists, and progressives - many of whom were civil rights movement allies and would very likely have become “memory entrepreneurs” for his nonviolent heroism. Later, Robinson denounced Dr. King’s antiwar stance on Vietnam. While Robinson adhered to conservative politics, it can still be argued that U.S. power elites co-opted Robinson, enlisting him to help fight the hegemon’s wars and ideological battles during the Cold War.

During his reign, Nkrumah’s socialist policies were a major source of internal CPP party conflict and wider domestic opposition (Gadzepko 2005, p.230). Indeed, Nkrumah had been charged in conspiratorial terms as a Communist since his UGCC days in 1948, soon after returning to Ghana (Assensoh 1989, p.168, pp.210-211; Gocking 2005, pp.91-92). He openly embraced socialist policies, articulated Marxist-Leninist ideology, and in 1957 publicly identified himself as a Marxist Socialist (Assensoh 1989, p.135). In this it seems he was deeply influenced by Paul Robeson’s Council on African Affairs, which Nkrumah participated in during his time living in the U.S. (pp.206-207).

In Ghana, Nkrumah's legacy in collective memory has been partly tied to the fortunes of his party, the CPP, which was banned after his rule ended, and resurged in the late 1990s even as Nkrumahist political factions petitioned and won the right to reclaim the CPP label (Gocking 2005, p.241, p.249). But it remains true that the CPP almost disappeared due to Nkrumah's overthrow, and his overthrow – which obviously tarnished his own historical legacy, was partly linked to Cold War era interventions by the U.S.

In Costa Rica, collective memories of Oscar Arias have been serious tarnished by his unpopular advocacy of neoliberal policies in his second term as President. My Costa Rican survey revealed that students who self-identify with Oscar Arias's political party, the National Liberation Party, listed him as a national hero 20% of the time compared to Costa Rican students who identified with another political party, who listed Arias as a hero only 9.1% of the time. Similarly, recent experimental research shows that college students self-identifying as either Democrats or Republicans perceive politicians guilty of inconsistent behavior as hypocrites 40% of the time if the politician belongs to the opposing party, but only 16% of the time if the politician belongs to their own party (NPR 2012, March 5). It seems, our social allegiances, our identification with a "tribe" deeply shapes our perceptions of virtue and vice in public figures.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This project endeavored to further our knowledge of "cultures of peace" and global patterns in the reproduction of nonviolent attitudes and collective memories of nonviolence. While new cross-national data sets (especially the GPI and Gallup World Poll) helped to facilitate this investigation, their weaknesses and limitations have been documented above. Importantly, it was shown that the replication of a Pew Global Attitudes survey question with a 4-point Likert scale explains much more variance in the violent/ nonviolent attitude indexes than the dichotomous Gallup World Poll questions, which raises questions about the Gallup method of using dichotomous questions. Moreover, it suggests that the Pew item serves as a better "keystone" indicator of violent/ nonviolent ideology. In addition, the shortcomings of the GPI emerged as we observed that the leading arms dealing nations and the U.S. with its "empire of bases" were not significantly penalized by the GPI scoring system.

One lesson of this analysis is that forcing diverse indicators into a single index can obscure more than it reveals. After all, over the years, the internal and external indexes of peace utilized by the GPI only obtain correlations as high as .4, and sometimes as low as .28 (see Table 125). While the GPI has not released national scores on their internal and external indices, the WPI offers the advantage of reporting three sub-indexes. On the WPI's 2009 Military sub-index, Costa Rica ranked very high (among the top 5 nations), but Costa Rica ranks lower on the other sub-indexes gauging levels of political and social peace.

Correlations and graphs of the subjective attitudinal poll data with the peace indexes (which utilize objective indicators) demonstrate that few nations rank highly in both the objective and subjective indicators. Germany and Japan are two nations that perform very well in a great many objective and attitudinal indicators of peace. This stimulates questions about whether experiences of utter defeat in war are tragically the most convincing and lasting way for nations to "learn" the ways of peace. However, both nations were also forced by the U.S. and the international community to adopt demilitarized structures and policies, possibly suggesting a significant role for "policy cues" and "elite cues" in reproducing peaceful attitudes. But neither Japan nor Germany perform well in some of the attitudinal indicators of peace, especially on the nonviolent efficacy item of the Gallup World Poll.

Analysis of the Gallup World Poll revealed that in only a few nations did national means meet high thresholds on the two "principled nonviolent" indicators including the just war ideology indicator ("military attacks on civilians are never justified") and the opposition to terrorism indicator, as well as the pragmatic nonviolence indicator ("peaceful means alone will work"). That is, we observed in the Gallup data that the accumulation of "peace capital" is quite specific, with a frequent disconnect between forms of principled and pragmatic nonviolence.

While the study employed numerous standard statistical tools, these tools themselves are limited, and concepts like peace and democracy as well as historical experiences often become grossly over-simplified when operationalized in dichotomous variables or even 10-point scales. Nevertheless, mindful of the manifold weaknesses of positivistic approaches, sociology pursues generalization in the hope that something new

can be learned about typical patterns, while pushing theoretical explanations forward. Cross-national data presents significant challenges, especially as we attempt to generalize across societies at different levels of development. Future regression analyses would do well to better specify types of wars (e.g., imperial, civil war, co-operative, etc.) and their effects in reinforcing violent/ nonviolent attitudes.

The emerging intellectual consensus is that on average, human civilization has become significantly more peaceful in the transition from pre-state societies to state societies (Goldstein 2011, Pinker 2011), though this conclusion specifies "more peaceful" in terms of proportional levels of violence. That is, the absolute numbers killed by war and murders became much higher in the 20th Century (though it has tapered steeply downward since the end of WWII), but the percentages killed were far lower than in previous centuries. The extreme rise in population growth helps to account for this. Thus, humanity remains in a relatively precarious position, as modern nations possess powerful death-dealing technologies and reproduce pro-violent ideological adherents who can be mobilized for war. But the spectacles of war and political violence can also deceive us, as detailed above, since evidence shows that more people around the world are murdered and far more people are killed by structural violence (e.g., lack of clean water). Partly for these reasons, the reproduction of nonviolent ideology has been the focus of this project, since nonviolent movements are needed to agitate for peace-as-social-justice, not only peace-as-the-absence-of-war (Kimball 1984). The thinking here is that adherence to nonviolent ideology may be thought of as a kind of pre-mobilized readiness to practice or support nonviolent action or other peaceful means, rather than violent means of pursuing justice or conflict resolution.

In contrast to Pinker's (2011) optimism about increasing levels of peace bound up with forces of modernity, the present study strikes a cautionary note. Correlational and regression analyses revealed that education, industrialization, wealth (GDP per capita), globalization, and democracy are associated with some surprising effects on nonviolent attitudes.

First, on average, education and several other forces of modernity do not cultivate confidence in pragmatic nonviolence, in fact, the opposite is the case. Indicators of icreasing levels of educational attainment and investment are correlated with declining confidence in nonviolent efficacy. But educational indicators are correlated with increases in peaceful attitudes on the state terrorism item. However, in the regression models, controlling for other factors, education is not a significant predictor of peaceful attitudes on the pragmatic nonviolent item or the state terrorism item.

In correlations, the following nation characteristics were associated with the most peaceful attitudes on the pragmatic nonviolence indicator: "primitive" historically predominant religious traditions, nations in the Sub-Saharan Africa, agrarian nations with a low GDP per capita, nations on the periphery of the world-system, and "partly free" nations with hybrid (not fully democratic) regimes. Likewise, in the regression models, as GDP per capita increases, confidence in nonviolence decreases.

Second, structural indicators of peace do not necessarily foster peaceful attitudes. We even saw that increasing freedoms, political rights, and civil liberties tend to be correlated with less peaceful attitudes on the pragmatic nonviolence item.

Third, it seems modern democracies are effective in socializing their citizens into "callous cruelty," double-standards on violence such that state violence is perceived as

legitimate (Elias 1997), as well as "moral disengagement" (Bandura 1990) from state military actions. In the regression models, controlling for other factors, increasing levels of democracy is significantly associated with less peaceful attitudes on the issue of military attacks on civilians.

Overall, forces of modernity were far more robustly correlated with the rejection of terrorism than with the rejection of state terrorism. This supports the frequent claim of Noam Chomsky that in the U.S. and other modern nations, Just War ideology has long been reduced to the tribalalistic view that violence is good if "we" use it, but when any other people use violence it is always "terrorism" and illegitimate. Principled stands against state terrorism are highest in the Middle East and North Africa – a region often under attack by their own governments, suggesting it is not the case that modernity reproduces robust ethical objections to violence (even those clearly violating international law), but rather experiences of state violence allowed respondents to take the perspective of hypothetical civilian victims. There is no significant correlation with indicators of Globalization and attitudes towards state terrorism. Though the sample size on this indicator was somewhat small, this raises doubts about Pinker's (2011) broad theorizing that cognitive and relational forms of cosmopolitanism, and openness to global markets (i.e., "gentle commerce") might cultivate peaceful attitudes. On the other hand, in the regression models, controlling for other variables, GDP per capita was associated with more peaceful attitudes on the state terrorism item, but in some models only weakly, and not always at the .05 level of significance. In some tension with the findings on democracy, this seems to suggest that on average, in *wealthy* democracies, citizens are slightly more likely to reject state terrorism as legitimate.

Fourth, history and collective memory matters: experiences of war and successful nonviolent campaigns can both lead to stronger nonviolent attitudes, at least in the short-term. Nations with recent nonviolent campaign successes do seem to "learn" that nonviolence "will work," but this memory diminishes over time (i.e., collective memory is short-lived). Thus, in the regression analysis, one of the strongest predictors of belief in pragmatic nonviolence was the "years since last nonviolent success" variable. Fifth, forms of principled (i.e., at the low threshold of Just War orientations) and pragmatic nonviolence are often distinct: nations that "learn" nonviolence will work do not "learn" that killing civilians is wrong (and vice versa).

While scholars have puzzled over the meaningfulness of public opinions, the present study contributes to this debate by documenting for the first time survey respondent ideological adherence to the spectrum of violent/ nonviolent ideologies theorized by Megoran (2008): militarism, political realism, just war, and nonviolence. It was revealed that Costa Ricans were significantly more peaceful than UO respondents on 48 out of 52 items. The potential for a "yea-saying" bias and "extreme response" bias among Hispanic respondents is tested. But rather than viewing this merely as a source of error, substantive cultural interpretations are offered. Regression analyses revealed that nationality was the single biggest predicter of nonviolent attitudes, with Costa Ricans significantly more peaceful. And, among other findings, Costa Ricans were significantly more likely to agree with pro-nonviolent quotations of Dr. King.

Factor analyses of each nation's data sets were independently used to construct indexes. Delimited indexes were constructed for the purposes of cross-national comparison. The results of exploratory factor analyses show that the Costa Rican sample

has almost 7 times more adherents of nonviolent ideology, and 3 times fewer adherents of militarism than the UO sample. About 32% of respondents in both nations were just war adherents. Only about 28% of respondents in each sample were "unspecified" in terms of violent/ nonviolent ideology. Thus, the majority did answer the core battery of 33 questions with coherence.

On the other hand, there are reasons to doubt the stability of many respondent's attitudes. Analysis of the U.S. survey identified a robust "elite cues" effect in a quasi-experimental section involving quotations by elite moral and political leaders. As evidence for the "elite cues" theory of opinion formation, it was found that in one subgroup, over 80% of respondents changed their minds (in response to an elite cue on the illegitimacy of targeting civilians in military attacks) in an experimental test embedded in the survey.

Joining the list of typical personality and demographic correlates of violent ideological leanings is the sports fan variable. This study found significant associations between violent ideological leanings and baseball fandom as well as the UO football fan variable, offering some support for Stempel's (2006) provocative findings as well as Chomsky's theories of a spectator sport-tribalism link. I suspect UO football fandom is a proxy indicator for integration into mainstream American culture in general, including generalized forms of American militarism. Meanwhile, those who are not UO football fans are more likely to embrace countercultural currents which are critical of mainstream culture including militarism. In support of these interpretations, the "conformity" value is associated with less peaceful scores on the militarism index (see Table 63).

It seems Costa Rica's structural and historical traditions of demilitarization play a decisive role in shaping nonviolent attitudes. Psychocultural explanations of violent/ nonviolent attitudes can also be linked to the finding that Costa Ricans value "universalism" more centrally (operationalized in terms of equality, multicultural tolerance, and ecological concern (see Appendix M)), while UO students value "power" more centrally (see Table 62). This may reflect the "emotional climate" of the two nations including predispositions for peace.

The survey revealed that a robust consensus (92%) of Costa Rican students said Costa Rica should not reintroduce a military force. Unlike Germany and Japan, Costa Rica's demilitarization process was entirely led by domestic military and political leaders. For over 65 years, Costa Rica has demonstrated that through reliance on international law, international organizations, and diplomacy, small nations can meet their security needs, even in a hostile region, even without a military. It is interesting to note that Costa Rica's "no standing army" policy embodies Thomas Jefferson's vision for the U.S., and it has allowed Costa Rica to prioritize education, health care, and a robust social safety net. Textbook analyses revealed significant pride and robust principled and pragmatic justifications for the policy of demilitarization.

Costa Rica was one of the nations meeting high thresholds in all three attitudinal indicators, ranking in the top 3 in the world. When analyzing the replication of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey item, "It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world," we see that Costa Ricans university students would rank very highly in the world, but we cannot be certain whether they are more or less peaceful on this item than the general Costa Rican population (see discussion of Figure 23 above).

Some of Costa Rica's imperfections in reproducing peace culture were documented, such as the lack of knowledge of nonviolent revolutions, and the lower confidence of university students in pragmatic nonviolence, as compared with the rest of the population. It was shown that Costa Rican textbooks fail to document cases of successful nonviolent campaigns in Costa Rican and Latin American history, as well as some key foundations of Costa Rica's national security plan (e.g., the Rio Treaty).

Analysis of the open-ended survey questionsconducted in both nations, revealed a serious scarcity of nonviolent capital, i.e., a lack of historical knowledge of nonviolent events. Over 72% of Costa Ricans and 83% of UO respondents could not name a successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution. Yet, many of these respondents claimed that nonviolent methods alone "will work" (the nonviolent efficacy question). In addition, respondents who reported knowledge of nonviolent revolutions did not differ from the rest of the sample on the nonviolent efficacy question. These are just two pieces of evidence documented in the present study which supports Althusser's (1971) notion that "ideology has no history" (p.160).

Results from an additional follow-up survey of UO students in 2012 (N=34) suggested that respondents may have been confused by the term "nonviolent revolution" in the original survey, or simply less knowledgeable about nonviolent revolutions than nonviolent campaigns/ movements. This second survey occurred after the "Arab Spring," which received widespread media coverage in the U.S. Given how recent the Arab Spring was, the absence of Tunisia in student lists and the extremely low reporting of Egypt (5.9%) is very surprising. It suggests students do not follow the news, or for some reason, did not perceive these as successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolutions. An

additional follow-up survey of UO students in early 2013 (N=61) revealed that 5% named Egypt and 0% listed Tunisia as cases of successful/ somewhat successful nonviolent revolution, but 15% named Egypt and 3% listed Tunisia as cases of successful/ somewhat successful *violent* revolution. In this survey, while 77% could not name nations with successful/ somewhat successful *nonviolent* revolutions, only 26% could not name nations with successful/ somewhat successful *violent* revolutions. However, scholars are now pointing out that many revolutions perceived as violent actually had crucially important nonviolent stages that did most of the heavy lifting, such as overthrowing corrupt regimes (Kurlansky 2006, Schell 2003). Again, all of this suggests that respondents lack sufficient intellectual capital/ antiwar knowledge to hold informed opinions about the prospects for effective nonviolent movements.

The textbook analysis supports the inference that collective memory of significant nonviolent campaigns is often spotty to non-existent, though some textbooks recounted the nonviolent campaigns relatively well (e.g., El Salvador). Several theoretical explanations were put forth to account for the omissions of nonviolent action from textbook content. The U.S. survey also suggests that collective memory processes have failed to reproduce antiwar knowledge for the Vietnam War among university students today, supporting the results of a recent nationally representative Gallup Poll (Dugan 2013), as well as Althusser's (1971) notion that "ideology has no history" (p.160). Gallup Poll data also documents how retrospective memories of U.S. Presidents is usually more positive than the ratings of contemporary Presidents. That is, as collective memory processes engage, "history is usually kinder to ex-Presidents" (Jones 2013). It seems the same is true of wars – as old wars are remembered more fondly by new generations than

by those who lived through them. This remains a significant puzzle for collective memory studies, but we can be sure this interacts with the hegemony of violent ideologies.

For decades the Gallup organization has documented the "most admired" Americans in yearly poll data, but the present study determines whether the characteristics of admired heroes might be associated with violent/ nonviolent ideology. In the Costa Rican sample, t-tests on the dummy variable "soldier hero" (i.e., respondents who listed a soldier as an admired national hero) revealed that there was no significant difference in attitudes between this group and the rest of the sample, on the Nonviolence Index or the Militarism Index, not even at the modest .1 level. Thus, at least in the case of Costa Rica, embracing soldiers as national historical heroes is not associated with violent ideological leanings or pro-military attitudes.

In the UO data, cross-tabulations revealed that almost 2/3rds of those listing King and Parks as heroes did affirm, earlier in the survey, that nonviolence "will work," while over 1/3 answered that nonviolence "will NOT work." Thus, it seems that about 1/3 of respondents listed King and Parks as heroes while disavowing or failing to recognize the strategic efficacy of nonviolence. Among other possible interpretations, this contradiction suggests a degree of respondent ignorance about their biographies (e.g., failure to "learn" from King's biography/ praxis that nonviolence can work) or the modern "fragmentation" of consciousness (Habermas 1987) as contradictory ideals and beliefs are held within the self. In the UO data, when respondents who listed King and/ or Parks as heroes was used to create a dummy variable and this variable was entered into a regression equation, it

was significant (at the .05 level), and positively associated with peaceful scores on the Nonviolence Index.

Nevertheless, in the two forms of the elite quotes section of the survey, I found suggestive evidence that some U.S. respondents reacted against King's harsh criticism of U.S. militarism, as King's critique, as if provoking a patriotic backlash, tilted some respondents towards higher levels of agreement with Obama's pro-violent quotes. Additional evidence from two questions, including one on whether the U.S. military's use of unmanned drones is "brave" and a second on the role of the U.S. military in the world, suggests that roughly 15-20% of UO respondents were unwilling to mount virtually any critique of the U.S. military. This offers evidence of a brand of patriotism which Marty (1958) likened to "Americanized state Shinto" (p.21).

No nation is a utopian Shangri-La, as every nation faces historical struggles and challenges in the pursuit of peace and justice. The global distribution of violent and nonviolent ideologies are likely to interact with structural and geopolitical factors and play a role in how nations pursue their interests and ideals in the community of nations. But if we are to find ways to increasingly transcend the "tragedy of culture" (the failure to learn and assimilate), to acknowledge the unity of means and ends, and to affirm our common humanity, we would do well to tell the history of triumphant nonviolent social action around the world, and to seal it in collective memory. As Thomas Merton (1967), a Trappist monk and leading advocate of nonviolence in the 1960s said, "...nonviolent action must establish itself in the minds and memories of modern [people] not only as *conceivable* and *possible*, but as a *desirable alternative* to what [they] now consider the only realistic possibility: namely political technique backed by force" (p.20).

APPENDIX A

U.S. SURVEY

Notes: Sources of borrowed/ modified survey questions appear in brackets [ ]. This survey was conducted in an Introduction to Sociology class at the University of Oregon in the Fall of 2010. The surveys were completed online through the Qualtrics survey program. There were four versions of the survey: for males and females (in order to replicate the Schwartz Values Survey questions which use gender-specific pronouns), and with two forms randomly assigned (in one nonviolent quotes appear first, in the other pro-violent quotes appear first). The survey version reproduced here is for females, with pro-violent quotes appearing first in the elite quotes section.

Survey of Attitudes Toward Conflict and Conflict Resolution Methods

I1 (Instruction #1) This survey takes about 30 to 35 minutes to complete. You will receive extra credit in your SOC 204 class for completing the survey. This survey is confidential. Your name will never appear in any data report or publication of this survey. Since your name (and email address) will be automatically separated from the data, the researcher and your professor will never know how you answered the questions. The purpose of this survey is to improve our understanding of opinions relating to personal and social conflicts, violence and nonviolence, war and peace, political and military actions. Your participation is voluntary, and you should feel free to decline to participate. If you agree to participate - please continue reading:

I2 By answering the survey questions below, you acknowledge that you are providing your consent to participate. I, hereby certify that I am AT LEAST 18 YEARS OLD and that I agree to participate in this survey conducted by Matthew Eddy, a graduate student in Sociology at the University of Oregon. I understand that my participation is voluntary; that I do not have to answer any of the questions, and that I am free to withdraw from participation in this survey at any time. I understand that I can skip any question or questions that I feel uncomfortable with.I understand that choosing to participate or withdraw from participation will in no way impact my relationship with this university, any professor, or the researcher.

I3 If you do NOT know your answer to a question, you may SKIP IT and leave it unanswered. Please check the circle that matches your opinion for each question below.

[Notes: 1) The parenthetical notes of explanation in Q4 and Q6 did not appear in the original Gallup World Poll questions. Pre-testing revealed that these clarifications were necessary for some students. As Gallup World Poll questions were conducted one on one between interviewers and respondents, it is likely that such minor explanations sometimes occurred in those surveys informally. 2) Many questions below are replications or modifications of survey questions that have been previously tested and validated in cross-national or U.S. surveys. Where applicable, the sources are noted after the question below. These source references did not appear in the original surveys. See Appendix D below for the sources of the 34 items of Q9.]

Q4 Some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion? (Civilians = unarmed men, women, and children who are NOT participating in a violent conflict)
Never justified (1); Sometimes justified (2) *[Source: Gallup World Poll 2008]*

Q5 Some people think for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion?
Never justified (1); Sometimes justified (2) *[Source: Gallup World Poll 2008]*

Q6 Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can improve their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods). Others do NOT believe that peaceful means alone will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups. Which do you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful means alone will NOT work?
Will work (1); Will NOT work (2) *[Source: Gallup World Poll 2008]*

I7 Below are conflicts in which two adult male strangers might engage in a fist fight. Tell me whether you would approve of the use of punching in each situation.
Q7_1 Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who was drunk and bumped into the man and his wife on the street? Yes (1); No (2)
Q7_2 Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who had hit the man's child after the child accidentally damaged the stranger's car? Yes (1); No (2)
Q7_3 Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who had broken into the man's house? Yes (1); No (2)
Q7_4 Would you approve of a policeman punching an adult male citizen who said vulgar and obscene things to the policeman? Yes (1); No (2)
[Source of the Q7 questions: General Social Survey 2008, Q235 & Q236]

I8 Below, several actions are described. Tell me whether you think the action can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. Check the number that matches your opinion:

Never Justifiable (1)	(2)	(3)	Rarely Justifiable (4)	(5)	(6)	Sometimes Justifiable (7)	(8)	(9)	Always Justifiable (10)

Q8_1 For a man to beat his wife *[Source: World Values Survey 2005]*
Q8_2 Political assassinations *[Source: World Values Survey 1990; European Values Survey 1999, 1990, 1981]*
Q8_3 The use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information *[Source: Pew Survey of U.S. in October 2005]*
Q8_4 For the police to beat a crowd of nonviolent protesters who refuse to leave the streets
Q8_5 Killing in self-defense *[Source: World Values Survey 1990 & earlier EVS]*

Q9 Do you strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3), or strongly disagree (4) with the following statements about punishment, violence, nonviolence, militaries and war?
Q9_1 A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her family.
Q9_2 A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her property.
Q9_3 There are situations in which a woman is justified in slapping her husband in the face.
Q9_4 There are situations in which a man is justified in slapping his wife in the face.
Q9_5 Corporal punishment (spanking) is necessary to bring up children properly.
Q9_6 Military discipline develops good character in youth.
Q9_7 War brings out the best qualities in men.

Q9_8 Many of our nation's greatest heroes are soldiers.
Q9_9 When people suffer under a dictator, a violent revolution is necessary and justified.
Q9_10 Using violence to pursue political goals is NEVER justified.
Q9_11 War breeds disrespect for human life.
Q9_12 It is better to forgive your enemies and work for peace with justice than to be a good soldier.
Q9_13 It is better to disobey orders and think for yourself than to be a good soldier.
Q9_14 Military discipline injures self-respect and individuality.
Q9_15 There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources through war because nations should protect their own economic security and interests.
Q9_16 When the goal is liberation from tyranny or oppression, war can be necessary and justified.
Q9_17 Because freedom and justice may be more important than peace, war may be necessary and although regrettable, it is the lesser of two evils.
Q9_18 Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) often fails and war between nations becomes necessary.
Q9_19 The Biblical command against killing does NOT apply to warfare.
Q9_20 There is NO conceivable justification for war.
Q9_21 The evils of war are greater than any possible benefits.
Q9_22 It is the moral duty of the individual to refuse to participate in any way in any war, no matter what the cause.
Q9_23 We should honor the heroes of nonviolence more than those who used violence.
Q9_24 In nations on the verge of civil war, nonviolent movements are likely to be more successful in increasing long-term peace and justice than using violence.
Q9_25 If armed conflict between individuals and cities can be outlawed, it is possible to outlaw armed conflict between nations - perhaps through the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.
Q9_26 Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) and nonviolent methods can always work to solve international disputes.
Q9_27 If the goal is peace, peaceful methods must be used because we can NOT separate the means (methods) from the ends (goals).
Q9_28 Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow dictators.
Q9_29 We should object to wars when nations try to seize territory or natural resources.
Q9_30 We should support disarmament efforts (efforts to reduce the number of weapons manufactured and held by militaries and armed groups around the world).
Q9_31 The death penalty should be used for a person convicted of murder.
Q9_32 It is necessary to fight terrorism by military means (methods).
Q9_33 It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world.
Q9_34 Now, please answer the last question (Q9_33) the way you think most people in your nation would answer it.
[see Appendix D below for the sources of the 34 items of Q9]

Q10 People vary in their opinion of how the U.S. military impacts the rest of the world. In your opinion, does the U.S. military act as the world’s heroic policeman, or as the armed forces of a self-interested empire, or something in between? The U.S. military acts as…

(1) the world's heroic policeman who helps keep the peace, and furthers freedom and democracy.	(2)	(3)	(4) Something in between	(5)	(6)	(7) the armed forces of a self-interested empire that dominates and exploits the world, and mostly serves wealthy and powerful interests in the U.S.

Q11 People vary in their opinions about U.S. involvement in recent wars. In your opinion, were the following wars just and worthy causes deserving of U.S. military involvement?

		Yes, a just war (1)	Somewhat just (2)	No, NOT a just war (3)
Q11_1	Vietnam War (1955 – 1975)	□	□	□
Q11_2	Iraq War (2003 to present)	□	□	□
Q11_3	Afghanistan War (2001 to present)	□	□	□

Q12 The U.S. military has used a variety of strategies to attack enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq, including bombing campaigns conducted by predator drones (un-manned aircraft) and dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet (beyond the reach of enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan who lack anti-aircraft technology). Rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

		Strongly Agree (1)	Agree (2)	Disagree (3)	Strongly Disagree (4)
Q12_1	Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is a smart strategy.	□	□	□	□
Q12_2	Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is morally justified.	□	□	□	□
Q12_3	Dropping bombs from airplanes flying at 40,000 feet is brave.	□	□	□	□
Q12_4	Using predator drones to drop bombs is a smart strategy.	□	□	□	□
Q12_5	Using predator drones to drop bombs is morally justified.	□	□	□	□
Q12_6	Using predator drones to drop bombs is brave.	□	□	□	□

Q13 Below, different opinions about violence and war are expressed by various leaders. Please check your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement. [Answers: strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3), or strongly disagree (4)]

[Form A appears below with pro-violent elite quotes first]
Q13_1 "There will be times when nations, acting individually or in concert, will find the use of [military] force not only necessary but morally justified." – President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech
Q13_2 "The nonviolence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or possible in every circumstance." – President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech
Q13_3 "The USA has helped underwrite [support] global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest – because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity. So yes, the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace." – President Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech
Q13_4 "Violence is not the monopoly of the exploiters and as such the exploited can use it too and, moreover, ought to use it when the moment arrives." – Che Guevera (1963)
Q13_5 "Our soldiers must have a relentless hatred of the enemy; a people without hatred cannot vanquish a brutal enemy." – Che Guevera (1967)
Q13_6 "Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong." – President George W. Bush (2002)
Q13_7 "I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its stupidity…There is not glory in battle worth the blood it costs…When people speak to you about a preventive war, you tell them to go fight it. After my experience, I have come to hate war…War settles nothing." – Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. Army General and 34th President of US (from 1953-1961)
Q13_8 "People who dismiss the concepts of dialogue, diplomacy, and negotiation as a waste of time are the biggest challenge to people who work for peace…I do believe that the U.S. tends to resort to military force too quickly." – Oscar Arias Sanchez, Costa Rican President (2005) and Nobel Peace Prize winner
Q13_9 "When war, as in these days in Iraq, threatens the fate of humanity, it is ever more urgent to proclaim that only peace is the road to follow to construct a more just and united society. Violence and arms can never resolve the problems of man." – Pope John Paul II (2003)
Q13_10 "It is my conviction that killing under the cloak of war is nothing but an act of murder." – Albert Einstein
Q13_11 "Violence is impractical because it is a descending spiral ending in destruction for all. The old law of an eye for an eye leaves everybody blind…Violence is immoral because it thrives on hatred rather than love. It destroys community and makes brotherhood impossible. Violence ends by defaulting itself. It creates bitterness in the survivors and brutality in the destroyers." – Martin Luther King, Jr. (1958)
Q13_12 "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones." – Martin Luther King, Jr. in his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech
Q13_13 "[The USA] is the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today." – Martin Luther King, Jr. 1967 ["purveyor" means supplier, distributer]

Q14 *[Form B – with nonviolent elite quotes first]*

Coding Table. Order of questions in Form A and Form B

Order of quotes in Form A	Quote	Order of quotes in Form B
Q13_1	Obama: military force morally justified	Q14_12
Q13_2	Obama: nonviolence of Gandhi and King not practical	Q14_11
Q13_3	Obama: the USA underwrites global security	Q14_13
Q13_4	Che: violence monopoly	Q14_9
Q13_5	Che: hatred	Q14_10
Q13_6	Bush: Targeting innocent civilians is wrong	Q14_4
Q13_7	Eisenhower: I hate war	Q14_2
Q13_8	Oscar Arias: diplomacy/ U.S. resorts to military force too quickly	Q14_6
Q13_9	Pope John Paul II: violence can never resolve problems	Q14_7
Q13_10	Einstein: war is murder	Q14_5
Q13_11	King: violence is a descending spiral	Q14_3
Q13_12	King: violence never brings permanent peace	Q14_1
Q13_13	King: USA greatest purveyor of violence	Q14_8

Q15 What is your gender? Male (1); Female (2)

I16 Here I briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is not like you. Check the answer that shows how much the person in the description is like you.

Q17 How much like you is this person?
[Answers: Very much like me (1), Like me (2), Somewhat like me (3), A little like me (4), Not like me (5), Not like me at all (6)]
Q17_1 Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her. She likes to do things in her own original way.
Q17_2 It is important to her to be rich. She wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.
Q17_3 She thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. She believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.
Q17_4 It's important to her to show her abilities. She wants people to admire what she does.
Q17_5 It is important to her to live in secure surroundings. She avoids anything that might endanger her safety.
Q17_6 She likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. She thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.
Q17_7 She believes that people should do what they're told. She thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.
Q17_8 It is important to her to listen to people who are different from her. Even when she disagrees with them, she still wants to understand them.
Q17_9 It is important to her to be humble and modest. She tries not to draw attention to herself.
Q17_10 Having a good time is important to her. She likes to "treat" herself.
Q17_11 It is important to her to make her own decisions about what she does. She likes to be free and not depend on others.

Q17_12 It's very important to her to help the people around her. She wants to care for their well-being.
Q17_ 13 Being very successful is important to her. She hopes people will recognize her achievements.
Q17_ 14 It is important to her that the government ensure her safety against all threats. She wants the government to be strong so it can defend its citizens.
Q17_ 15 She looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She wants to have an exciting life.
Q17_ 16 It is important to her always to behave properly. She wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
Q17_17 It is important to her to get respect from others. She wants people to do what she says.
Q17_18 It is important to her to be loyal to her friends. She wants to devote herself to people close to her.
Q17_19 She strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to her.
Q17_20 Tradition is important to her. She tries to follow the customs handed down by her religion or her family.
Q17_21 She seeks every chance she can to have fun. It is important to her to do things that give her pleasure.
[Source: Q17 & Q19 are replications of the Schwartz Value Survey incorporated in the World Values Survey]

I18 Instructions (as above for Schwartz Values Survey)
Q19 Schwartz Values Survey – for male respondents (as above, except with male pronouns)

I20 Please consider some different forms of political action that people can take, and check whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never (under any circumstances) do it. Please check the answers that match your choices.
Q21 This is a form of political action that I (have done, might do, would never do):
Q21_1 Signing a petition
Q21_2 Joining in boycotts (refusing to buy products from unjust corporations or nations)
Q21_3 Attending legal and lawful demonstrations
Q21_4 Joining strikes at a workplace
Q21_5 Occupying buildings or factories, or barricading streets
Q21_6 Damaging things like breaking windows, removing road signs, etc.
Q21_7 Use personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police
Q21_8 Attending an anti-war demonstration
Q21_9 Attending a school related demonstration
[Source: I20 and the items in Q21 are adapted from the World Values Survey]

I22 Below are statements of opinion on a variety of social issues. You will probably find that you feel positively towards some statements and negatively towards others, to varying extents. Please check the term that matches your feeling (negative, neutral, or positive) about each statement.
Q23 How do you feel about each statement?
[Answers: very negative (1), negative (2), slightly negative (3), neutral (4), slightly positive (5), positive (6), very positive (7)]
Q23_1 Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
Q23_2 It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
Q23_3 To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
Q23_4 Inferior groups should stay in their place.
Q23_5 Group equality should be our ideal.
Q23_6 We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

Q23_7 Increased social equality.
Q23_8 We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.
[Source: Social Dominance Orientation – 8-item scale as developed and tested by Pratto et al. (1994)]

Q24 How many years old are you? Age:
(1) 18-29; (2) 30-39; (3) 40-49; (4) 50-59; (5) 60-69; (6) 70-79; (7) 80 or over

Q25 People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:
(1) Upper class; (2) Upper middle class; (3) Lower middle class; (4) Working class; (5) Lower class

Q26 What kind of place or places did you live during most of your years in junior high/ middle school and high school?
(1) big city; (2) suburbs; (3) small city; (4) rural area; (5) a mix; (6) other

Q27 Have you ever been in the military?
(1) Yes; (2) No

Q28 Have either of your parents ever been in the military?
(1) Yes; (2) No

Q29 In political matters, people talk of the "left" (liberal) and the "right" (conservative). How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
(1) Far left (very liberal); (2) Left (liberal); (3) Moderate; (4) Right (conservative); (5) Far right (very conservative)

Q30 How interested would you say you are in politics?
(1) Very interested; (2) Somewhat interested; (3) Not very interested; (4) Not at all interested

Q31 Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? *[Source: U.S. Census 2010]*
(1) No, not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin
(2) Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano
(3) Yes, Puerto Rican
(4) Yes, Cuban
(5) Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (for example, Argentinian, Colombian, Dominican, Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, Spaniard, and so on)

Q32 What is your race? (Check one or more boxes) *[Source: U.S. Census 2010]*
(1) White
(2) Black, African American, or Negro
(3) American Indian or Alaska Native
(4) Native Hawaiian
(5) Other Pacific Islander (for example, Fijian, Tongan, and so on)
(6) Asian Indian
(7) Chinese
(8) Filipino
(9) Japanese
(10) Korean
(11) Vietnamese

(12) Other Asia (for example, Hmong, Laotian, Thai, Pakistani, Cambodian, and so on)
(13) Some other race

Q33 How proud are you to be an American?
(1) Very proud; (2) Quite proud; (3) Not very proud; (4) Not at all proud; (5) I am not American

Q34 Have you ever been punched or beaten by another person? (1) No; (2) Yes *[Source: General Social Survey 2008, Q233]*

Q35 Did this happen to you as a child or as an adult? (1) Child; (2) Adult; (3) Both *[Source: General Social Survey 2008, Q233A]*

Q36 How many times would you guess this has happened to you?
(1) Once; (2) 2 or 3 times; (3) 4 or more times; (4) Not sure *[Source: General Social Survey 2008, Q233B]*

I37 Below are 5 questions that test your knowledge of history. You may find that you do NOT know the answers to some or most of them. Please type in your responses if you know the answers, or if you think you know part of the answer. If you do not know, please check "Don't know."

Q38 Can you name the nation that most of the September 11th airplane hijackers were citizens of?
(1) Yes, the nation was:
(2) Don't know

Q39 Can you name from 1 to 4 of the biggest (and most powerful) allies of the United States during World War II?
(1) Yes, the biggest allies of the U.S. during World War II were:
(2) Don't know

Q40 Gandhi was a leader of nonviolent protest movements that achieved some degree of success in two different nations (on two different continents). Can you name these two nations that he personally lived in and led nonviolent protest movements in?
(1) Yes, the two nations were:
(2) Don't know

Q41 Can you name nations that have had successful, or somewhat successful, nonviolent revolutions in the 20th and 21st centuries (from 1900 through to this year in 2010)? (Please name as many as you can remember.)
(1) Yes, these nations include:
(2) Don't know

Q42 Can you please list about 2 to 5 heroes of U.S. history that you admire and respect the most?
(1) Yes, they include:
(2) Don't know

Q43 Which political party do you tend to vote for?
(1) Republican
(2) Democrat
(3) Green Party
(4) Libertarian Party

(5) Constitution Party
(6) Other (you can type your party in below if you wish:)
(7) I do not vote
(8) None

Q44 How patriotic are you? Would you say extremely patriotic, very patriotic, somewhat patriotic, or not especially patriotic?
(1) extremely patriotic; (2) very patriotic; (3) somewhat patriotic; (4) not especially patriotic

Q45 People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the rest of the world. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement about how you see yourself?
Q45_1 I see myself as a world citizen. [Answers: (1) Strongly Agree; (2) Agree; (3) Disagree; (4) Strongly Disagree]

Q46 Which major have you chosen, or if not yet sure, which major are you thinking of choosing?
(1) sociology
(2) psychology
(3) pre-med
(4) pre-law
(5) business
(6) engineering
(7) physics
(8) computer science
(9) education
(10) journalism
(11) performing arts or fine arts
(12) Other humanities or social sciences (English, ancient and modern languages, history, religion, political science, anthropology, economics, etc.)
(13) Other life sciences, natural sciences, or earth sciences (chemistry, biology, math, geology, etc.)
(14) Other

I47 People have different experiences with sports in American culture. I would like to ask you a few questions about your experiences with sports.
Q48 Did you play sports while you were in high school?
(1) Yes
(2) No

Q49 Please click every sport you played in high school – whether for a school team or as a club sport:
Q49_1 football
Q49_2 volleyball
Q49_3 basketball
Q49_4 baseball
Q49_5 softball
Q49_6 soccer
Q49_7 running/ track and field
Q49_8 lacrosse
Q49_9 ice hockey
Q49_10 tennis
Q49_11 golf

Q49_12 cheerleading
Q49_13 dance team
Q49_14 water polo
Q49_15 swim team
Q49_16 crew/ rowing
Q49_17 wrestling
Q49_18 boxing
Q49_19 martial arts
Q49_20 rugby
Q49_21 rock climbing
Q49_22 cross-country skiing
Q49_23 alpine skiing or snowboarding
Q49_24 ultimate frisbee
Q49_25 cycling
Q49_26 Other

Q50 When the UO football team wins, how do you feel?
(1) great/ excited/ very happy
(2) happy
(3) somewhat happy
(4) mostly indifferent
(5) I do NOT care at all if they win or lose

Q51 Can you select the correct last names for the current UO quarterback, star running back, and field goal kicker (IN THAT ORDER)? [Qualtrics starting coding answers at 3]
(3) Polk, Price, Folk
(4) Price, Polk, Folk
(5) James, Thomas, Beard
(6) Thomas, James Beard
(7) Brehaut, Franklin, Forbath
(8) Luck, Taylor, Jones
(9) Taylor, Luck, Whitaker
(10) Masoli, Jones, Kahut

Q52 Below, I list several different kinds of sports and sporting events. Please tell me – how often do you watch each sport on television or the internet? [Answers: Often (1); Sometimes (2); Rarely (3); Never (4)]
Q52_1 Major League Baseball
Q52_2 NFL Football
Q52_3 College Football
Q52_11 NBA Basketball
Q52_12 College Basketball
Q52_13 NASCAR Auto Racing
Q52_14 Tennis
Q52_15 Golf
Q52_16 Soccer
Q52_17 Indy (Indianapolis 500-Style) Auto Racing
Q52_18 Figure Skating
Q52_19 the Olympics
Q52_20 Extreme Sports like Skateboarding
Q52_21 Boxing

I53 Finally, below are a few questions about your religious beliefs.
Q54 Do you belong to a religious tradition?
(1) Yes; (2) No

Q55 In case you do belong to a religious tradition, answer which one.
(1) None
(2) Atheist/ Agnostic
(3) I am spiritual, not religious
(4) Catholic
(5) African-American Protestant
(6) Conservative Protestant (for example: Evangelical, Baptist, Southern Baptist, Missouri Synod Lutheran, Presbyterian Church in America, Nondenominational, Independent, Bible Church, Bible Believing, Charismatic, Full Gospel, Pentecostal, Assembly of God, Four Square, Vineyard Fellowship, Holiness, Presbyterian/ Reformed, Church of Christ, Church of God, Nazarene, Calvary Chapel, Fundamentalist, other Baptist, other Lutheran, Free Methodist, other Methodist, Missionary Church, other evangelical or fundamentalist)
(7) Mainline Protestant (for example: Presbyterian (PCUSA), United Methodist, Lutheran (ELCA), United Church of Christ (UCC), Disciples of Christ, Congregationalists, Episcopalian, or other liberal Protestant)
(8) Quaker or Friends, Mennonite, or Brethren
(9) Unitarian Universalist
(10) Christian Science
(11) Mormon
(12) Seventh Day Adventist
(13) Jehovah's Witness
(14) Jewish
(15) Buddhist
(16) Hindu
(17) Muslim
(18) Native American
(19) Pagan or Wiccan
(20) Other religion (type in below):

Q55_TEXT Other religion (type in below)

Q56 Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?
(1) More than once a week
(2) Once a week
(4) Once a month
(5) Only on special holy days
(3) Once a year
(7) Less often
(6) Never or Practically never
[Source: World Values Survey; Note: Qualtrics coded answer values out of order]

Q57 Here are four statements about the Bible, and I'd like you to tell me which is closest to your own view.
(1) The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word

(2) The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word
(3) The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by men

Q58 Do you consider yourself to be a Christian?
(1) Yes
(2) No [branch in computer program; those answering "No" are sent to Q61]

Q59 When it comes to your religious identity, would you say you are a Pentecostal, fundamentalist, evangelical, mainline, or liberal Protestant, or do none of these describe you?
(1) Pentecostal
(2) fundamentalist
(3) evangelical
(4) mainline Protestant
(5) liberal Protestant
(6) Catholic
(7) other Christian
(8) none of these

Q60 Do you consider yourself a "born-again" Christian?
(1) Yes
(2) No
(3) Don't know

Q61 If you would like to share any comments about the survey, please type them here:
(1) Yes, I'd like to say:
(2) I do not wish to type any comments

I62 If you have any questions about the survey you may contact Matthew Eddy (meddy@uoregon.edu), the advisor, Professor Michael Dreiling (dreiling@uoregon.edu), or The Office of Human Subjects at the University of Oregon (human_subjects@orc.uoregon.edu).

APPENDIX B

COSTA RICA SURVEY

Form B (pro-nonviolent quotes appear first). Survey is translated into English (actual survey was conducted in Spanish; see Appendix C below for Spanish version)

Opinion Survey

This survey has been put together by Matthew Eddy, a graduate student in Sociology at the University of Oregon (USA). The survey should take about 30 minutes to complete.

This opinion survey is confidential. If you choose to participate, your name will never appear in any report or publication of this survey. Please do NOT put your name on it.

The purpose of this survey is to collect opinions relating to personal and social conflicts, violence and nonviolence, war and peace, political and military actions. Most of the questions in this survey have been asked to people around the world, as researchers seek to understand how people think and feel about these issues.

Your participation is voluntary, you should feel free to decline to participate. There is no immediate personal benefit for participation. However, your participation will help researchers better understand public opinions about conflict and conflict resolution.

If you agree to participate – please continue reading:

I, hereby consent to participate in this study directed by Matthew Eddy, a graduate student in Sociology at the University of Oregon (USA).

By answering the survey questions below, I acknowledge that I am providing my consent to participate. I certify that I am at least 18 years old and that I agree to participate in this research project.

I understand that my participation is voluntary; that I do not have to answer any of the questions, and that I am free to withdraw from participation in this survey at any time. I understand that I can skip any question or questions that I feel uncomfortable with.

I also understand that choosing to participate or withdraw from participation will in no way impact my relationship with this university, any professor, or the researcher.

If I have any questions about this research project, I may contact Matthew Eddy at (541) 579-1591, or via e-mail: meddy@uoregon.edu. I may also contact the advisor, Professor Michael Dreiling via e-mail: dreiling@uoregon.edu. I may also contact The Office for Protection of Human Subjects at the University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon (USA) 97403, (541) 346-2510, or via e-mail: human_subjects@orc.uoregon.edu, if I have questions regarding my rights as a research subject.

[code: CR_M_NV] [Note: Costa Rica ("CR") Survey for Males ("M") (for gender-specific Schwartz Values section), Form B (with nonviolent ("NV") quotes appearing first)]

Directions: Please do NOT put your name on this survey.
If you do NOT know your answer to a question, you may skip it and leave it unanswered.
Please circle the answer that matches your opinion for each question below.

[Q4 in data set] 1. Some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion? (Civilians = unarmed men, women, and children who are not participating in a violent conflict)
Never justified Sometimes justified
1 2
2. Some people think for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion?
Never justified Sometimes justified
1 2
3. Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can improve their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods). Others do NOT believe that peaceful means alone will work to improve the situation for such oppressed groups. Which do you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful means alone will NOT work?
Will work Will NOT work
1 2

4. Below are conflicts in which two adult male strangers might engage in a fist fight. Tell us whether you would approve of the use of punching in each situation.
a. Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who was drunk and bumped into the man and his wife on the street? □ Yes □ No

b. Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who had hit the man's child after the child accidentally damaged the stranger's car? □ Yes □ No

c. Would you approve of a man punching an adult male stranger who had broken into the man's house?
□ Yes □ No

d. Would you approve of a policeman punching an adult male citizen who said vulgar and obscene things to the policeman? □ Yes □ No

5. Below, several actions are described. Tell us whether you think the action can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. Please circle the number that matches your opinion:

	Never Justifiable			Rarely Justifiable		Sometimes Justifiable			Always Justifiable	
a. For a man to beat his wife	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
b. Political assassinations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
c. The use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
d. For the police to beat a crowd of nonviolent protesters who refuse to leave the streets	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
e. Killing in self-defense	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

6. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements (circle your answer) about punishment, violence, nonviolence, militaries and war:

	Strongly agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree
a. A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her family.	1	2	3	4
b. A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her property.	1	2	3	4
c. There are situations in which a woman is justified in slapping her husband in the face.	1	2	3	4
d. There are situations in which a man is justified in slapping his wife in the face.	1	2	3	4
e. Corporal punishment (spanking) is necessary to bring up children properly.	1	2	3	4
f. Military discipline develops good character in youth.	1	2	3	4
g. War brings out the best qualities in men.	1	2	3	4
h. Many of our nation's greatest heroes are soldiers.	1	2	3	4
i. When people suffer under a dictator, a violent revolution is necessary and justified.	1	2	3	4
j. Using violence to pursue political goals is <u>NEVER</u> justified.	1	2	3	4
k. War breeds disrespect for human life.	1	2	3	4
l. It is better to forgive your enemies and work for peace with justice than to be a good soldier.	1	2	3	4
m. It is better to disobey orders and think for yourself than to be a good soldier.	1	2	3	4
n. Military discipline injures self-respect and individuality.	1	2	3	4
o. There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources through war because nations should protect their own economic security and interests.	1	2	3	4
p. When the goal is liberation from tyranny or oppression, war can be necessary and justified.	1	2	3	4
q. Because freedom and justice may be more important than peace, war may be necessary and although regrettable, it is the lesser of two evils.	1	2	3	4
r. Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) often fails and war between nations becomes necessary.	1	2	3	4
s. The Biblical command against killing does <u>NOT</u> apply to warfare.	1	2	3	4

	Strongly agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree
t. There is <u>NO</u> conceivable justification for war.	1	2	3	4
u. The evils of war are greater than any possible benefits.	1	2	3	4
v. It is the moral duty of the individual to refuse to participate in any way in any war, no matter what the cause.	1	2	3	4
w. We should honor the heroes of nonviolence more than those who used violence.	1	2	3	4
x. In nations on the verge of civil war, nonviolent movements are likely to be more successful in increasing long-term peace and justice than using violence.	1	2	3	4
y. If armed conflict between individuals and cities can be outlawed, it is possible to outlaw armed conflict between nations – perhaps through the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.	1	2	3	4
z. Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) and nonviolent methods can always work to solve international disputes.	1	2	3	4
aa. If the goal is peace, peaceful methods must be used because we can <u>NOT</u> separate the means (methods) from the ends (goals).	1	2	3	4
bb. Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow dictators.	1	2	3	4
cc. We should object to wars when nations try to seize territory or natural resources.	1	2	3	4
dd. We should support disarmament efforts (efforts to reduce the number of weapons manufactured and held by militaries and armed groups around the world).	1	2	3	4
ee. The death penalty should be used for a person convicted of murder.	1	2	3	4
ff. It is necessary to fight terrorism by military means (methods).	1	2	3	4
gg. It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world.	1	2	3	4
hh. Now, please answer the last question (gg) the way you think most people in your nation would answer it.	1	2	3	4

11. Below, different opinions about violence and war are expressed by various leaders. Please circle your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement. [Form B]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
1. "When war, as in these days in Iraq, threatens the fate of humanity, it is ever more urgent to proclaim that only peace is the road to follow to construct a more just and united society. Violence and arms can never resolve the problems of man." - Pope John Paul II (2003)	1	2	3	4
2. "Any human order to kill must be subordinate to the law of God which says, 'Thou shalt not kill.' No soldier is obliged to obey an order contrary to the law of God." – Archbishop Oscar Romero (El Salvador, 1980)	1	2	3	4
3. "People who dismiss the concepts of dialogue, diplomacy, and negotiation as a waste of time are the biggest challenge to people who work for peace… I do believe that the U.S. tends to resort to military force too quickly." - Oscar Arias Sánchez, Costa Rican President (2005)	1	2	3	4
4. "With popular, non-violent mobilization, always committed to non-violence, that's when lots of good ideas and proposals begin to emerge from below (the people)." – Subcomandante Marcos of the Zapatistas (Chiapas, Mexico, 2006)	1	2	3	4
5. "We consider it unethical to approve of any measures to secure the victory of a revolution. We do NOT believe that the end (goal) justifies the means (method)." – Subcomandante Marcos (Chiapas 2001)	1	2	3	4
6. "The first task for any new politics is to recognize that there are differences between us all and that in light of this, we [should] aspire to a politics of tolerance and inclusion." - Subcomandante Marcos	1	2	3	4
7. "It is a cowardly thought, that of killing others. Whom do you suppose to free by assassination?...Those who will rise to power by murder will certainly not make the nation happy." – Gandhi (1922)	1	2	3	4
8. "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones." – Martin Luther King, Jr. (U.S.) in his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech	1	2	3	4
9. "The non-violence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or possible in every circumstance." - U.S. President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech	1	2	3	4

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
10. "There will be times when nations…will find the use of [military] force not only necessary but morally justified." - U.S. President Barack Obama in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech	1	2	3	4
11. "Violence is not the monopoly of the exploiters and as such the exploited can use it too and, moreover, ought to use it when the moment arrives." – Che Guevera (1963)	1	2	3	4
12. "Our soldiers must have a relentless hatred of the enemy; a people without hatred cannot vanquish a brutal enemy." – Che Geuvera (1967)	1	2	3	4
13. "War [that involves] the violent destruction of an oppressive and inhuman regime, is more than justified if its aim is the creation of a society where men live in peace with each other." - Father Ernesto Cardenal (Nicaragua, 1981)	1	2	3	4

Note: The order of questions in Q12/ Form A (pro-violent quotes appear first) differed as detailed in the table below.

Coding Table. Order of questions in Form A (pro-violent quotes appear first) and Form B (nonviolent quotes appear first), with top row appearing first and bottom row appearing last.

Order of quotes in Form A	Quote	Order of quotes in Form B
Q12_1	Che: violence monopoly	Q11_11
Q12_2	Che: hatred	Q11_12
Q12_3	Obama: There will be times when military force morally justified	Q11_10
Q12_4	Obama: nonviolence of Gandhi and King not practical	Q11_9
Q12_5	Father Ernesto Cardenal: justified war	Q11_13
Q12_6	King: violence never brings permanent peace	Q11_8
Q12_7	Gandhi: killing is cowardly	Q11_7
Q12_8	Oscar Arias: diplomacy	Q11_3
Q12_9	Papa Juan Pablo II: violence can never resolve problems	Q11_1
Q12_10	Romero: Thou shalt not kill	Q11_2
Q12_11	Marcos: non-violent mobilization	Q11_4
Q12_12	Marcos: end does not justify the means	Q11_5
Q12_13	Marcos: tolerance and inclusion	Q11_6

8. Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is not like you. Circle the answer that shows much the person in the description is like you.

HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON?	Very much like me	Like me	Some-what like me	A little like me	Not like me	Not like me at all
a. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way.	1	2	3	4	5	6
b. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.	1	2	3	4	5	6
d. It's important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.	1	2	3	4	5	6
e. It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.	1	2	3	4	5	6
f. He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.	1	2	3	4	5	6
g. He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.	1	2	3	4	5	6
h. It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.	1	2	3	4	5	6
i. It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself.	1	2	3	4	5	6
j. Having a good time is important to him. He likes to "treat" himself.	1	2	3	4	5	6
k. It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free and not depend on others.	1	2	3	4	5	6
l. It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being.	1	2	3	4	5	6
m. Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognize his achievements.	1	2	3	4	5	6

HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON?	Very much like me	Like me	Some what like me	A little like me	Not like me	Not like me at all
n. It is important to him that the government ensure his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.	1	2	3	4	5	6
o. He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life.	1	2	3	4	5	6
p. It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	1	2	3	4	5	6
q. It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says.	1	2	3	4	5	6
r. It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him.	1	2	3	4	5	6
s. He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.	1	2	3	4	5	6
t. Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family.	1	2	3	4	5	6
u. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure.	1	2	3	4	5	6

9. Please consider some different forms of political action that people can take, and check whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never (under any circumstances) do it. Please put a check √ in the boxes of your choices.

	Have done	Might do	Would never do
a. Signing a petition	□	□	□
b. Joining in boycotts	□	□	□
c. Attending lawful demonstrations	□	□	□
d. Joining unofficial strikes	□	□	□
e. Occupying buildings or factories, or barricading streets	□	□	□
f. Damaging things like breaking windows, removing road signs, etc.	□	□	□
g. Use personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police	□	□	□
h. An anti-war demonstration	□	□	□
i. A school related demonstration	□	□	□

10. Below are statements of opinion on a variety of social issues. You will probably find that you feel positively towards some statements and negatively towards others, to varying extents. Please circle the term that matches your feeling (negative, neutral, or positive) about each statement.

	very negative	negative	slightly negative	neutral	slightly positive	positive	very positive
a. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d. Inferior groups should stay in their place.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e. Group equality should be our ideal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
f. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
g. Increased social equality.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
h. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

To conclude, please answer the following questions about you. Place a check √ by your answer.

11. Sex: □ **Male** □ **Female**

12. How old are you? Age:

□ 18-29
□ 30-39
□ 40-49
□ 50-59
□ 60-69
□ 70-79
□ 80 or over

13. People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:

□ Upper class
□ Upper middle class
□ Lower middle class
□ Working class
□ Lower class
□ Don´t know

14. Have you ever been in the military?: □ **Yes** □ **No**

15. In political matters, people talk of the "left" (liberal) and the "right" (conservative). How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

□ Far left (very liberal)
□ Left (liberal)
□ Moderate
□ Right (conservative)
□ Far right (very conservative)
□ Don't know

16. How interested would you say you are in politics?

□ Very interested
□ Somewhat interested
□ Not very interested
□ Not at all interested

17. Do you belong to a religious denomination?

□ **Yes** □ **No**

18. In case you do belong to a religious denomination, answer which one.

□ Catholic
□ Evangelical
□ Other:_____
□ None

19. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?
□ More than once a week
□ Once a week
□ Once a month
□ Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days
□ Other specific holy days
□ Once a year
□ Less often
□ Never practically never

20. How proud are you to be Costa Rican?
□ Very proud
□ Quite proud
□ Not very proud
□ Not at all proud

21. Translator mistake, the question read: Have you been beaten or hit, or have you hit someone at some time in your life? [*Translator mistake – the question was supposed to read: Have you ever been punched or beaten by another person?*]
□ No ⟶ GO TO QUESTION 22
□ Yes ↓

IF YES:
A. Did this happen to you as a child or as an adult?
□ Child
□ Adult
□ Both

B. How many times would you guess this has happened to you?
□ Once
□ Two or three times
□ Four or more times
□ Not sure

22. Below are 5 questions that test your knowledge of history. You may find that you do not know the answers to some or most of them. Please write in your responses if you know the answers, or if you think you know part of the answer. If you do not know please check "Don't know."
a. Can you name some nations that supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (in 2003) by sending soldiers from their own military forces?
□ Yes, some of the nations were:_____
_____
□ Don't know
b. Che Guevera was part of armed revolutionary groups in several nations, can you name some or all of them?
□ Yes, the nations were:_____
□ Don't know

c. Gandhi was a leader of nonviolent protest movements that achieved some degree of success in two different nations (on two different continents). Can you name these two nations that he personally lived in and led nonviolent protest movements in?
□ Yes, the nations were:_____
□ Don't know

d. Can you explain what Gandhi's concept of satyagraha means?
□ Yes, it means:_____
□ Don't know

e. Can you name nations that have had successful, or somewhat successful, nonviolent revolutions in the 20th and 21st centuries (from 1900 through to this year in 2010)? (Please name as many as you can remember.)
□ Yes, these nations include:_____
_____
□ Don't know

23. Which political party do you tend to vote for?_____

24. Can you please list about 2 to 5 heroes of your nation's history that you admire and respect the most?_____

25. Do you think Costa Rica should bring back a national military force?
□ Yes
□ No
□ Maybe
□ Don't know

26. What is your race/ ethnicity?
□ Mestizo
□ White
□ Black/ Afro-Caribbean
□ Amerindian
□ Chinese
□ Other:_____

27. What nation were your parents born in Costa Rica? □ Yes □ No
If no, where were they born? _____

28. If you have any comments about the survey, please write them here:

APPENDIX C

COSTA RICA SURVEY IN SPANISH

Encuesta de opinión

Esta encuesta ha sido elaborada por Matthew Eddy, un estudiante graduado en sociología de la Universidad de Oregon (Estados Unidos). Se requieren unos 30 minutos para completar esta encuesta.

Esta encuesta de opinión es confidencial. Si elige participar, su nombre nunca aparecerá en cualquier informe o publicación de este estudio. Por favor no coloque su nombre en ella.

El propósito de esta encuesta es recopilar opiniones relacionadas a las personas y conflictos sociales, la violencia y la no violencia, la guerra y la paz, acciones políticas y militares. La mayoría de las preguntas en esta encuesta se les hecho a personas en todo el mundo, ya que los investigadores buscan entender cómo la gente piensa y siente acerca de estos problemas.

Su participación es voluntaria, usted debe sentirse libre de negarse a participar. No hay ningún beneficio personal inmediato por la participación. Sin embargo, su participación ayudará a los investigadores comprender mejor las opiniones públicas sobre el conflicto y resolución de conflictos.

Si acepta participar – por favor, continúe leyendo:

Por la presente doy mi consentimiento de participar en este estudio dirigido por Matthew Eddy, un estudiante graduado en sociología de la Universidad de Oregon (Estados Unidos).

Al responder a las siguientes preguntas del cuestionario, reconozco que estoy dando mi consentimiento para participar. Yo certifico que tengo por lo menos 18 años de edad y que estoy de acuerdo en participar en este proyecto de investigación.

Entiendo que mi participación es voluntaria; que no tengo que responder a cualquier pregunta, y que soy libre de retirarme de la participación en esta encuesta en cualquier momento. Entiendo que yo puedo omitir cualquier pregunta o preguntas con las que me sienta incómodo.

También entiendo que elegir participar o que retirarme mi participación en esta encuesta no impactará de ninguna forma mi relación con esta Universidad, cualquier profesor o el investigador.

Si yo tengo cualquier pregunta acerca de este proyecto de investigación, yo puedo contactar a Matthew Eddy por el número de teléfono siguiente (541) 579-1591, o a través de su correo electrónico: meddy@uoregon.edu. También puedo contactar al consejero, el profesor Michael Dreiling a través de su correo electrónico: dreiling@uoregon.edu. También puedo contactar a la Oficina para la protección de sujetos humanos en la Universidad de Oregon, Eugene, Oregon (Estados Unidos) 97403, por el número de teléfono (541) 346-2510, o a través del correo electrónico: human_subjects@orc.uoregon.edu, si tengo preguntas sobre mis derechos como un sujeto de investigación.

[code: CR_M_NV] [Note: Costa Rica (“CR”) Survey for Males (“M”) (for gender-specific Schwartz Values section), Form B (with nonviolent (“NV”) quotes appearing first)]

<u>Instrucciones:</u> Por favor <u>NO</u> coloque su nombre en esta encuesta. Si <u>NO</u> sabe su respuesta a una de las preguntas, <u>puede pasar a la próxima pregunta y dejarla sin contestar.</u> Por favor, haga un círculo en la respuesta que coincida con su opinión para cada pregunta a continuación.

1. Algunas personas piensan que a veces se justifica que los militares busquen sus objetivos civiles y los maten, mientras que otros piensan que ese tipo de violencia nunca está justificada. ¿Cuál es su opinión?
   (Civiles: Hombres, mujeres o niños desarmados que no participan en ningún conflicto violento)

   Nunca se justifica A veces se justifica.
   1 2

2. Algunas personas piensan que para una persona individual (civil) o un pequeño grupo de personas busquen sus objetivos civiles y los maten, es algo justificado, mientras que otros piensan que ese tipo de violencia nunca está justificada. ¿Cuál es su opinión?

   Nunca se justifica A veces se justifica.
   1 2

3. Algunas personas creen que los grupos que son oprimidos y están sufriendo injusticias pueden mejorar su situación por medios solamente pacíficos (métodos de resistencia no violentos). Otros NO creen que solamente los medios pacíficos funcionarán para mejorar la situación de esos grupos oprimidos. ¿Qué cree usted, que únicamente los medios pacíficos funcionarán o que los medios pacíficos por sí solos no funcionarán?

   Funcionarán No funcionarán
   1 2

4. **A continuación hay conflictos en los que dos hombres adultos que no se conocen podrían participar en una pelea a puñetazos. Díganos si aprobaría el uso de puñetazos en cada una de las siguientes situaciones.**

a. ¿Aprobaría usted que un hombre de puñetazos a otro hombre extraño adulto quien estaba borracho y choca con el hombre y su esposa en la calle?
   □ Sí □ No

b. ¿Aprobaría usted que un hombre de puñetazos a otro hombre extraño adulto que había golpeado al hijo del hombre después de que el niño había dañado accidentalmente el carro del extraño?
   □ Sí □ No

c. ¿Aprobaría usted que un hombre de puñetazos a otro hombre extraño adulto que se había metido en casa del hombre?
   □ Sí □ No

d. ¿Aprobaría usted que un policía de puñetazos a un ciudadano (hombre) adulto quien le dijo cosas vulgares y obscenas al policía?
   □ Sí □ No

5. A continuación, se describen varias acciones. Díganos si usted piensa que la acción siempre se puede justificar, nunca se puede justificar, o algo entre las dos. Por favor, circule el número que coincida con su opinión:

a. Que un hombre le de golpes a su esposa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
b. Asesinatos políticos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
c. El uso de la tortura con los sospechosos de terrorismo para obtener información importante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
d. Que la policía golpee a un grupo de personas que protestan pacíficamente y se rehúsan a dejar las calles	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
e. Matar en defensa propia	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

6. Está usted totalmente de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo o totalmente en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases (circule su respuesta) acerca del castigo, la violencia, la no violencia, ejércitos y la guerra:

	Totalmente de acuerdo	De acuerdo	En desacuerdo	Totalmente en desacuerdo
a. Una persona tiene el derecho de matar para defender a su familia.	1	2	3	4
b. Una persona tiene el derecho de matar para defender su propiedad.	1	2	3	4
c. Hay situaciones en las se le justifica a una mujer que le dé una cachetada (golpe con la mano abierta) a su marido en la cara.	1	2	3	4
d. Existen situaciones en las que se le justifica a un hombre que le dé una cachetada (golpe con la mano abierta) a su esposa en la cara.	1	2	3	4
e. Castigos corporales (le dé golpes) si es necesario para criar a los niños correctamente.	1	2	3	4
f. La disciplina militar desarrolla un buen carácter en los jóvenes.	1	2	3	4
g. La guerra saca las mejores cualidades de los hombres.	1	2	3	4
h. Muchos de los más grandes héroes de nuestra nación son militares.	1	2	3	4
i. Cuando la gente sufre bajo un dictador, la revolución violenta es necesaria y justificada.	1	2	3	4
j. El uso de la violencia para conseguir objetivos políticos <u>NUNCA</u> se justifica.	1	2	3	4
k. La guerra genera una falta de respeto por la vida humana.	1	2	3	4
l. Es mejor perdonar a tus enemigos y trabajar por la paz con justicia que ser un buen soldado.	1	2	3	4
m. Es mejor desobedecer las órdenes y pensar por sí mismo, que ser un buen soldado.	1	2	3	4
n. La disciplina militar lastima el autoestima y la individualidad.	1	2	3	4
o. No hay nada malo con apoderarse de territorio o de los recursos naturales a través de la guerra debido a que las Naciones deben proteger sus propios intereses y su seguridad económica.	1	2	3	4
p. Cuando la meta es la libertad de la tiranía o la opresión, la guerra puede ser necesaria y justificada.	1	2	3	4
q. Porque la libertad y la justicia pueden ser más importantes que la paz, la guerra puede ser necesaria y aunque lamentable, es el menor de dos males.	1	2	3	4
r. La diplomacia (negociaciones entre líderes) a menudo falla y la guerra entre las Naciones se convierte en necesaria.	1	2	3	4
s. El mandamiento bíblico contra el asesinato <u>no</u> se aplican a la guerra.	1	2	3	4

	Totalmente de acuerdo	De acuerdo	En desacuerdo	Totalmente en desacuerdo
t. <u>NO</u> existe justificación concebible para la guerra.	1	2	3	4
u. Los males de la guerra son mayores que los posibles beneficios.	1	2	3	4
v. Es un deber moral de la persona negarse a participar de alguna manera en cualquier guerra, no importa qué la causa.	1	2	3	4
w. Nosotros debemos honrar a los héroes de la no violencia más que aquellos que utilizan la violencia.	1	2	3	4
x. En las Naciones al borde de la guerra civil, los movimientos pacíficos tienden a tener más éxito en el aumento de la paz a largo plazo y la justicia que el uso de la violencia.	1	2	3	4
y. Si los conflictos armados entre los individuos y las ciudades pueden ser evitados, es posible evitar el conflicto armado entre las Naciones – quizás a través de las Naciones Unidas y la Corte Internacional de justicia.	1	2	3	4
z. La diplomacia (negociaciones entre líderes) y los métodos no violentas siempre pueden trabajar para resolver las controversias internacionales.	1	2	3	4
aa. Si la meta es la paz, se deben utilizar métodos pacíficos, porque <u>NO</u> podemos separar el significado de (métodos) de las (metas).	1	2	3	4
bb. Los métodos de resistencia no violentos pueden funcionar para derrocar a los dictadores.	1	2	3	4
cc. Nos deberíamos oponernos a las guerras, cuándo las naciones intentan aprovechar el territorio o los recursos naturales.	1	2	3	4
dd. Nosotros debemos apoyar los esfuerzos de desarme (esfuerzos para reducir la fabricación de armas y obtenidas por los ejércitos y grupos armados alrededor del mundo).	1	2	3	4
ee. Debe utilizarse la pena de muerte para una persona declarada culpable de asesinato.	1	2	3	4
ff. Es necesario combatir contra el terrorismo con medios militares (métodos).	1	2	3	4
gg. Algunas veces es necesario utilizar la fuerza militar para mantener el orden en el mundo.	1	2	3	4
hh. Ahora, por favor responda la última pregunta (gg) de la forma en que piensa que la mayoría de la gente en su nación respondería.	1	2	3	4

7. A continuación, diferentes opiniones sobre la violencia y la guerra son expresadas por varios líderes. Por favor, circule el número según su nivel de estar de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con cada frase.

	Totalmente de acuerdo	De acuerdo	En desacuerdo	Totalmente en desacuerdo
a. "Cuando la guerra, como en estos días en Irak, amenaza el destino de la humanidad, es cada vez más urgente proclamar que sólo la paz es el camino a seguir para construir una sociedad más justa y solidaria. La violencia y las armas no pueden nunca resolver los problemas del hombre"- Papa Juan Pablo II (2003)	1	2	3	4
b. "Cualquier orden para matar a un humano debe ser subordinada a la Ley de Dios que dice, 'No mataras.' Ningún soldado está obligado a obedecer una orden contraria a la Ley de Dios."– Arzobispo Oscar Romero (El Salvador, 1980)	1	2	3	4
c. "Las personas que piensan que los conceptos de diálogo, diplomacia y negociación son como un desperdicio de tiempo son el mayor desafío para las personas que trabajan por la paz… Yo creo que los Estados Unidos tiende a recurrir a la fuerza militar demasiado rápido."- Oscar Arias Sánchez, Ex presidente de Costa Rica (2005)	1	2	3	4
d. "Con la movilización popular no violenta, siempre comprometida con la no violencia, que es cuando muchas buenas ideas y propuestas comienzan a surgir desde abajo (del pueblo)." – Subcomandante Marcos de los Zapatistas (Chiapas, México, 2006)	1	2	3	4
e. "Nos parece poco ético aprobar las medidas para asegurar la victoria de una revolución. Nosotros NO creemos que el fin (la meta) justifica los medios (los método)." – Subcomandante Marcos (Chiapas 2001)	1	2	3	4
f. "La primera tarea de cualquier nueva política es reconocer que existen diferencias entre nosotros todos y que la luz de esto, [debería] aspirar a una política de la tolerancia e inclusión." - Subcomandante Marcos	1	2	3	4
g. "Es un pensamiento cobarde, el de matar a otros. ¿A los que se supone que usted liberará por asesinato?... Quienes crecen en el poder por asesinato, desde luego, no hará a la nación feliz." – Gandhi (1922)	1	2	3	4
h. "La violencia nunca trae paz permanente. No soluciona ningún problema social: simplemente crea nuevos y más complicados. "-Martin Luther King, Jr. (Estados Unidos) en su discurso de aceptación del Premio Nobel de la paz de 1964	1	2	3	4

i. “La no violencia practicada por hombres como Gandhi y Martin Luther King, pueden no haber sido prácticas o posible en cada circunstancia.” – Barack Obama, Presidente de Estados Unidos en su discurso de aceptación del Premio Nobel de la paz de 2009	Totalmente de acuerdo 1	De acuerdo 2	En desacuerdo 3	Totalmente en desacuerdo 4
j. “Habrán momentos cuando las naciones… encontrarán el uso de la fuerza [militar] no solamente necesaria pero moralmente justificada." - Barack Obama, Presidente de Estados Unidos en su discurso de aceptación del Premio Nobel de la paz de 2009	1	2	3	4
k. “La violencia no es el monopolio de los explotadores y como tal los explotados pueden utilizarla y, por otra parte, deberían utilizarla cuando llegue el momento." – Che Guevara (1963)	1	2	3	4
l. “Nuestros soldados deben tener un odio implacable al enemigo; un pueblo sin odio no puede derrotar un enemigo brutal.” – Che Guevara (1967)	1	2	3	4
m. “La guerra [que involucra] la destrucción violenta de un régimen opresivo e inhumano, está más que justificada si su objetivo es la creación de una sociedad donde los hombres viven en paz entre sí."-Padre Ernesto Cardenal (Nicaragua, 1981)	1	2	3	4

8. A continuación se presenta una breve descripción de algunos tipos de personas. Por favor lea cada descripción y piense en cuánto cada una de estos tipos de personas es o no es igual que usted. Circule la respuesta que muestra qué tanto la persona en la descripción es igual que usted.

¿QUÉ TANTO ES COMO USTED ES ESTA PERSONA?	Se parece mucho a mí	Se parece a mí	Se parece algo a mí	Se parece un poco a mí	No se parece a mí	No se parece nada a mí
a. Tener nuevas ideas y ser creativo son importante para él. Le gusta hacer las cosas a su manera.	1	2	3	4	5	6
b. Es importante para él ser rico. Él quiere tener mucho dinero y cosas caras.	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. Piensa que es importante que todo el mundo sea tratado de la misma manera. Él cree que todos deben tener igual oportunidades en la vida.	1	2	3	4	5	6
d. Para él es importante mostrar sus habilidades. Él quiere que gente admire lo que él hace.	1	2	3	4	5	6
e. Para él es importante vivir en un entorno seguro. Él evita cualquier cosa que pueda poner en peligro su seguridad.	1	2	3	4	5	6
f. Le gustan las sorpresas y está siempre buscando hacer nuevas cosas. Piensa que es importante hacer muchas cosas diferentes en la vida.	1	2	3	4	5	6
g. Él cree que las personas deberían hacer lo que se les manda. Cree que debería obedecerlas normas siempre aunque nadie les vea.	1	22	33	44	55	66
h. Para él es importante escuchar a las personas que son diferentes a él. Aunque no esté de acuerdo con ellos, él aún quiere entenderlos.	1	2	3	4	5	6
i. Para él es importante ser humilde y modesto. No intenta llamar la atención.	1	2	3	4	5	6
j. Para él es importante divertirse. Le gusta "darse" caprichos.	1	2	3	4	5	6
k. Para él es importante tomar sus propias decisiones sobre lo qué hace. Le gusta ser libre y no depender de los demás.	1	2	3	4	5	6
l. Para él es muy importante ayudar a la gente a su alrededor. Él quiere cuidar del bienestar de otros.	1	2	3	4	5	6

¿QUÉ TANTO ES COMO USTED ES ESTA PERSONA?	Se parece mucho a mí	Se parece a mí	Se parece algo a mí	Se parece un poco a mí	No se parece a mí	No se parece nada a mí
m. Para él es importante tener éxito. Él espera que la gente reconozca sus logros.	1	2	3	4	5	6
n. Para él es importante que el Gobierno garantice su seguridad contra todo tipo de amenazas. Él quiere que el estado sea fuerte, para que pueda defender a sus ciudadanos.	1	2	3	4	5	6
o. Él busca aventuras y le gusta tomar riesgos. Él quiere tener una vida emocionante.	1	2	3	4	5	6
p. Para él es importante siempre comportarse. Él quiere evitar hacer cualquier cosa que la gente diría que es un error.	1	2	3	4	5	6
q. Para él es importante hacerse respetar de los demás. Él quiere que las personas hagan lo que él dice.	1	2	3	4	5	6
r. Para él es importante ser fiel a sus amigos. Él quiere dedicarse a personas cercanas a él.	1	2	3	4	5	6
s. Él cree firmemente que las personas deben cuidar de la naturaleza. Cuidar el medio ambiente es importante para él.	1	2	3	4	5	6
t. Para él las tradiciones son importantes. Él intenta seguir las costumbres dictadas por su religión o su familia.	1	2	3	4	5	6
u. Busca cualquier ocasión para divertirse. Es importante para él hacer cosas que le den placer.	1	2	3	4	5	6

9. Por favor considere algunas formas diferentes de acción política que las personas pueden tomar y quiero que me diga si realmente ha hecho cualquiera de estas cosas, si podría hacerlo, o nunca lo haría (bajo ninguna circunstancia). Por favor ponga una marca de verificación √ en los cuadros de su elección.

	Lo ha hecho	Podría hacerlo	Nunca lo haría
a. Firmar una petición	□	□	□
b. Solidarizarse con boicots	□	□	□
c. Participar en manifestaciones legales	□	□	□
d Solidarizarse con huelgas no oficiales	□	□	□
e. Ocupación de edificios, fábricas o barricadas en la calle.	□	□	□
f. Dañar cosas como romper ventanas, tumbando la señalización vial, etc..	□	□	□
g. Utilizar violencia personal al enfrentar a otros manifestantes o a la policía	□	□	□
h. Manifestación contra la guerra	□	□	□
i. Una manifestación relacionada con una escuela	□	□	□

10. A continuación se presentan las frases de opinión sobre una variedad de asuntos sociales. Probablemente encontrará que usted se siente positivamente hacia algunas frases y negativamente hacia otras, en diversos grados. Por favor, circule el número en la frase que coincida con su sentimiento (negativo, neutral o positivo) acerca de cada frase.

	Muy negativo	Nega-tivo	Ligera-mente negativo	Neutral	Ligera-mente positivo	Positivo	Muy positivo
a. Algunos grupos de personas son simplemente inferiores a otros grupos.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b. Está bien si algunos grupos tienen más de una oportunidad en la vida que otros.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c. Para salir adelante en la vida, a veces es necesario pasar por encima de otros grupos.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d. Los grupos inferiores deben permanecer en su lugar.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e. El grupo de igualdad debe ser nuestro ideal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
f. Debemos hacer todo lo posible para igualar las condiciones para los diferentes grupos.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
g. Mayor igualdad social.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
h. Tendríamos menos problemas si tratáramos a personas con más igualdad.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Para concluir, por favor, conteste las siguientes preguntas acerca de usted. Coloque un marca √ de verificación para su respuesta.

11. Sexo: □ Masculino □ Femenino

12. Edad: ¿Cuántos años tiene?

□ 18-29 □ 30-39 □ 40-49 □ 50-59
□ 60-69 □ 70-79 □ 80 o más

13. Las personas a veces se describen a sí mismas como pertenecientes a la clase trabajadora, la clase media, la clase alta o clase de baja. Se describiría usted mismo como pertenecientes a la:

□ Clase alta
□ Clase media alta
□ Clase media baja
□ Clase trabajadora
□ Clase baja
□ No sabe

14. ¿Ha estado alguna vez en el ejército?: □ **Sí** □ **No**

15. En los asuntos políticos, la gente habla de la "izquierda" (liberal) y la "derecha" (conservador). ¿Cómo colocaría sus opiniones sobre esta escala, en términos generales?

□ Extrema izquierda (muy liberal)
□ Izquierda (liberal)
□ Moderado
□ Derecha (conservador)
□ Extrema derecha (muy conservador)
□ No sabe

16. ¿Qué tan interesado diría que está usted en la política?

□ Muy interesado
□ Algo interesado
□ No muy interesado
□ Para nada interesados

17. ¿Pertenece a un grupo religioso?

□ **Sí** □ **No**

18. En el caso de que usted pertenezca a un grupo religioso, responda a cuál de ellos.

□ Católico
□ Evangélico
□ Otro: _____
□ Ninguno

19. Además de bodas, funerales y bautizos, ¿con qué frecuencia asiste a los servicios religiosos estos días?

□ Más de una vez por semana
□ Una vez a la semana
□ Una vez al mes
□ Sólo en los días de festividades, Navidad y Pascua
□ Otros días específicos de festividades
□ Una vez al año
□ Menos frecuente
□ Nunca o Nunca prácticamente

20. ¿Qué tan orgullosos se siente de ser [nacionalidad]?

□ Muy orgulloso
□ Algo orgulloso
□ No muy orgulloso
□ Para nada orgulloso

21.a. ¿Ha sido golpeado o ha golpeado a otra persona alguna vez en su vida?

□ No → VAYA a la pregunta 22
□ Sí ↓

Si sí:

b. ¿Esto le sucedió a usted cuando era niño o adulto?

□ Niño
□ Adultos
□ Ambos

c. ¿Cuántas veces le ha sucedido esto a usted?

□ Una vez
□ Dos o tres veces
□ Cuatro o más veces
□ No estoy seguro

22. A continuación tenemos 5 preguntas que evaluaran su conocimiento en historia. Tal vez se dé cuenta de que no sabe las respuestas para algunas o todas estas preguntas. Por favor escriba si sabe la respuesta, o si usted piensa que sabe parte de la respuesta. Y si no sabe la respuesta por favor coloque una marca en "No sé la respuesta."

a. ¿Puede nombrar algunas naciones que apoyaron a los Estados Unidos en la invasión de Irak (en el 2003) al mandar soldados de sus fuerzas militares?

□ Sí, Algunas de las naciones fueron:

_____

_____

□ No sé la respuesta.

b. ¿El Che Guevara fue parte de unos grupos armados revolucionarios en algunas naciones, puede nombrar alguno de estos grupos o todos ellos?

□ Sí, Algunas de los grupos fueron:

_____

□ No sé la respuesta.

c. Gandhi fue un líder de movimientos de resistencia no violentos que alcanzaron algunos grandes logros en dos naciones diferentes (en dos continentes diferentes). ¿Puede nombrar estas dos naciones en las que él personalmente vivió y lidero los movimientos de resistencia no violentos?

□ Sí las naciones fueron: _____

□ No sé la respuesta.

d. ¿Puede explicar qué significa el concepto satiagraja de Gandhi?

□ Sí, sé que significa:

_____

□ No sé la respuesta.

e. ¿Puede usted nombrar las naciones que han tenido movimientos revolucionarios pacíficos o de resistencia no violentos exitosos o algo exitosos en el siglo 20 y el siglo 21 (desde 1900 hasta este año 2010)? (Por favor nombre tantos como pueda recordar.)

□ Sí, estas naciones incluyen:_____

_____

□ No sé la respuesta.

23. ¿A favor de cuál partido político tiende a votar usted?:

_____

24. ¿Puede nombrar de 2 a 5 héroes de la historia de su nación, a los que usted más admire y respete?_____

25. ¿Crees usted que Costa Rica debe tener nuevamente una fuerza militar nacional?

□ Sí
□ No
□ Tal vez
□ No sé

26. ¿Cuál es su raza o etnicidad?

□ Mestizo
□ Blanco/caucásico
□ Negro/Afro-Caribeño
□ Indígenas especifique _____
□ Chino
□ ¿Otra raza o etnicidad?:_____

27. ¿Nació usted o alguno de sus padres fuera de Costa Rica? □ Sí □ No

¿Si sí, en dónde? _____

28. Si le gustaría escribir cualquier comentario sobre la encuesta, por favor hágalo aquí:

APPENDIX D

VARIABLE CODING OF CORE VIOLENT/ NONVIOLENT

INDICATORS AND QUESTION SOURCES

Table 1. Core Questions: Categorizing Items by Violent/ Nonviolent Indicators

Item (question) and category and/ or variable indicator	**Question** - *Below are questions in which "Disagree" (3) or "Strongly Disagree" (4) are the peaceful answers (these questions are positively worded for violent orientations)*	**Costa Rica survey & UO survey variable name for this item**	**Source of question** (Author= question written by author)
(a) self-defense (family)	a. A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her family.	Q9_1	McAlister et al. 1999, 2001
(b) self-defense (property)	b. A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her property.	Q9_2	McAlister et al. 1999, 2001
(c) domestic violence (F on M)	c. There are situations in which a woman is justified in slapping her husband in the face.	Q9_3	McAlister et al. 1999
(d) domestic violence (M on F)	d. There are situations in which a man is justified in slapping his wife in the face.	Q9_4	McAlister et al. 1999
(e) corporal punishment	e. Corporal punishment (spanking) is necessary to bring up children properly.	Q9_5	McAlister et al. 1999
(f) militarism	f. Military discipline develops good character in youth.	Q9_6	my re-write of #1 in Droba 1931
(g) militarism	g. War brings out the best qualities in men.	Q9_7	from #1 in Gundlach in Stagner 1942
(h) militarism	h. Many of our nation's greatest heroes are soldiers.	Q9_8	my re-write of #11 in Gundlach in Stagner 1942
(i) just war	i. When people suffer under a dictator, a violent revolution is necessary and justified.	Q9_9	Author
(o) realpolitiks	o. There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources through war because nations should protect their own economic security and interests.	Q9_15	Author
(p) just war	p. When the goal is liberation from tyranny or oppression, war can be necessary and justified.	Q9_16	my re-wording of #41 from Droba 1931
(q) just war	q. Because freedom and justice may be more important than peace, war may be necessary and although regrettable, it is the lesser of two evils.	Q9_17	my re-wording of #13 from Droba 1931
(r) realpolitiks	r. Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) often fails and war between nations becomes necessary.	Q9_18	Author

(s) Judeo-Christian sanction	s. The Biblical command against killing does NOT apply to warfare.	Q9_19	from #10 in Gundlach in Stagner 1942
(ee) death penalty (myth of redemptive violence)	ee. The death penalty should be used for a person convicted of murder.	Q9_31	Slight revision of U.S. Gallup poll
(ff) realpolitiks	ff. It is necessary to fight terrorism by military means (methods).	Q9_32	World Values Survey (asked only in Algeria)
(gg) realpolitiks	gg. It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. [*This question comes from the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, with a slight modification of the words used in the 4-point Likert scale (i.e., Pew used "completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree").]*	Q9_33	Q22g in Pew Global Attitudes Project survey 2007
OMIT ITEM BELOW from some analyses – social desirability bias control [no alpha test on]:			
(hh) view of culture's embrace of realpolitiks [no alpha test on]	hh. Now, please answer the last question (gg) the way you think most people in your nation would answer it.	Q9_34	Author
Below are questions in which "Strongly Agree" (1) or "Agree" (2) are the peaceful answers (these questions are positively worded for agreement by nonviolent orientations). **[QUESTIONS BELOW ARE REVERSE CODED, so that peaceful answers score and graph as "3"&"4"]**			
(j) Principled nonviolence (*adherents of militarism, realpolitiks, just war, and pragmatic nv will disagree*)	j. Using violence to pursue political goals is NEVER justified.	Q9_10	slight revision of World Values Survey 1995
(k) Principled nonviolence/ against militarism	k. War breeds disrespect for human life.	Q9_11	from #26 in Gundlach in Stagner 1942
(l) Principled nonviolence/ against militarism	l. It is better to forgive your enemies and work for peace with justice than to be a good soldier.	Q9_12	my revision of #4 in Hasan and Khan 1988
(m) Against militarism	m. It is better to disobey orders and think for yourself than to be a good soldier.	Q9_13	Author
(n) Against militarism	n. Military discipline injures self-respect and individuality.	Q9_14	from #4 in Droba 1931
(t) Principled nonviolence/ against just war	t. There is NO conceivable justification for war.	Q9_20	from #35 in Droba 1931
(u) Principled nonviolence/ against just war	u. The evils of war are greater than any possible benefits.	Q9_21	from #24 in Gundlach in Stagner 1942
(v) Principled nonviolence/ against just war	v. It is the moral duty of the individual to refuse to participate in any way in any war, no matter what the cause.	Q9_22	from #8 in Droba 1931

(w) Principled nonviolence/ against militarism	w. We should honor the heroes of nonviolence more than those who used violence.	Q9_23	my revision of question in Elliot 1980
(x) Nonviolence	x. In nations on the verge of civil war, nonviolent movements are likely to be more successful in increasing long-term peace and justice than using violence.	Q9_24	Author
(y) Principled nonviolence/ against realpolitiks	y. If armed conflict between individuals and cities can be outlawed, it is possible to outlaw armed conflict between nations - perhaps through the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.	Q9_25	my revision of #32 in Droba 1931
(z) Principled nonviolence/ against realpolitiks	z. Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) and nonviolent methods can always work to solve international disputes.	Q9_26	Author
(aa) Principled nonviolence	aa. If the goal is peace, peaceful methods must be used because we can NOT separate the means (methods) from the ends (goals).	Q9_27	Author
(bb) Pragmatic nonviolence (key indicator distinguishing pragmatic nv from violent orientations)	bb. Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow dictators.	Q9_28	Author
(cc) Against realpolitiks	cc. We should object to wars when nations try to seize territory or natural resources.	Q9_29	Author
(dd) Against realpolitiks	dd. We should support disarmament efforts (efforts to reduce the number of weapons manufactured and held by militaries and armed groups around the world).	Q9_30	Author
From questions earlier in survey:			
Just war	Military targeting of civilians (question was dichotomous & neutrally worded)	Q4	Gallup World Poll
Just revolution (Just war)	Targeting of civilians in terrorism (question was dichotomous & neutrally worded)	Q5	Gallup World Poll
Pragmatic nonviolence	Do peaceful means alone work? (question was dichotomous & neutrally worded)	Q6	Gallup World Poll

APPENDIX E

FACTOR ANALYSIS METHDOLOGY

Costa Rica data – Principal Axis Exploratory Factor Analysis: Items Loading on Factors
Notes: 3 factors were extracted; .3 was utilized as a cut off on item loadings; R = Reverse coded; Respondent answer choices on all items: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; With reverse coding, peaceful answers become coded "3" and "4" on all items. Below are the items loading on each factor and utilized in constructing indexes based on each factor.

Table 1. Factor 1: Nonviolence

Item category	Item	Question # (R = Reverse coded)
1. Principled nonviolence: political violence never justified	j. Using violence to pursue political goals is NEVER justified.	Q9_10 R
2. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: war breeds disrespect for humanity	k. War breeds disrespect for human life.	Q9_11 R
3. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: better to forgive and work for peace than to be a soldier	l. It is better to forgive your enemies and work for peace with justice than to be a good soldier.	Q9_12 R
4. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: no justification for war	t. There is NO conceivable justification for war.	Q9_20 R
5. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: evils of war outweigh benefits	u. The evils of war are greater than any possible benefits.	Q9_21 R
6. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: moral duty to refuse to participate in any war	v. It is the moral duty of the individual to refuse to participate in any way in any war, no matter what the cause.	Q9_22 R
7. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: we should honor nonviolent heroes more than violent	w. We should honor the heroes of nonviolence more than those who used violence.	Q9_23 R
8. Nonviolence: nonviolent movements more successful	x. In nations on the verge of civil war, nonviolent movements are likely to be more successful in increasing long-term peace and justice than using violence.	Q9_24 R
9. Principled nonviolence/ against realpolitiks: armed conflict could be outlawed	y. If armed conflict between individuals and cities can be outlawed, it is possible to outlaw armed conflict between nations - perhaps through the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.	Q9_25 R
10. Principled nonviolence/ against realpolitiks: diplomacy and nonviolence can always work	z. Diplomacy (negotiations between leaders) and nonviolent methods can always work to solve international disputes.	Q9_26 R
11. Principled nonviolence: if goal is peace, must be unity of means and ends	aa. If the goal is peace, peaceful methods must be used because we can NOT separate the means (methods) from the ends (goals).	Q9_27 R
12. Pragmatic nonviolence: nonviolence can overthrow dictators	bb. Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow dictators.	Q9_28 R
13. Against realpolitiks: support disarmament	dd. We should support disarmament efforts (efforts to reduce the number of weapons manufactured and held by militaries and armed groups around the world).	Q9_30 R

Table 2. Factor 2: Militarism

1. Militarism: military discipline develops character	f. Military discipline develops good character in youth.	Q9_6
2. Militarism: war develops best qualities in men	g. War brings out the best qualities in men.	Q9_7
3. Militarism: many of our greatest heroes are soldiers	h. Many of our nation's greatest heroes are soldiers.	Q9_8
4. Against militarism: better to disobey/ think for self than to be a good soldier	m. It is better to disobey orders and think for yourself than to be a good soldier.	Q9_13 R
5. Against militarism	n. Military discipline injures self-respect and individuality.	Q9_14 R
6. Realpolitiks: military methods needed to fight terrorism	ff. It is necessary to fight terrorism by military means (methods).	Q9_32
7. Realpolitiks: military force need to maintain order in world	gg. It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world.	Q9_33

Table 3. Factor 3: Just War

1. Self-defense: right to kill to defend family	a. A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her family.	Q9_1
2. Self-defense: right to kill to defend property	b. A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her property.	Q9_2
3. Just war: against dictator	i. When people suffer under a dictator, a violent revolution is necessary and justified.	Q9_9
4. Just war: of liberation	p. When the goal is liberation from tyranny or oppression, war can be necessary and justified.	Q9_16
5. Just war: lesser of two evils	q. Because freedom and justice may be more important than peace, war may be necessary and although regrettable, it is the lesser of two evils.	Q9_17

Table 4. Factor loadings of individual items on the 5 factors: Costa Rica data (country-specific analysis)

Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Uniqueness
Q9_1	-0.0300	-0.0461	0.6296	0.6283
Q9_2	-0.1018	0.0938	0.6180	0.5914
Q9_3	-0.1494	0.2120	0.2834	0.8540
Q9_4	0.0101	0.0921	0.2272	0.9228
Q9_5	-0.0922	0.2369	0.1448	0.9141
Q9_6	0.0119	0.6485	0.0693	0.5349
Q9_7	0.1665	0.5944	-0.0637	0.5608
Q9_8	0.0530	0.5416	0.0408	0.6603
Q9_9	0.1419	-0.0901	0.4232	0.8064
Q9_10	0.3269	-0.0091	-0.0609	0.8999
Q9_11	0.4256	0.1517	-0.1030	0.7587
Q9_12	0.5908	0.0746	-0.0425	0.6180
Q9_13	0.0104	0.4189	-0.3281	0.8141
Q9_14	0.2370	0.4217	-0.2832	0.7134
Q9_15	0.2317	0.1875	0.0959	0.8419
Q9_16	0.1685	0.0191	0.5634	0.6037
Q9_17	0.2569	0.0073	0.5624	0.5529
Q9_18	0.1890	0.1633	0.2733	0.7822
Q9_19	0.1613	-0.0144	0.1561	0.9426
Q9_20	0.4506	0.1710	0.1773	0.6140
Q9_21	0.4478	0.1428	0.0820	0.6930
Q9_22	0.5081	0.0286	0.1598	0.6657
Q9_23	0.5325	0.0769	-0.0237	0.6809
Q9_24	0.4455	0.0360	-0.0029	0.7869
Q9_25	0.6185	-0.2135	0.0488	0.6793
Q9_26	0.6175	-0.2018	0.0562	0.6770
Q9_27	0.5761	0.0831	0.0247	0.6115
Q9_28	0.3651	0.1976	-0.0050	0.7663
Q9_29	0.1720	0.1862	0.0924	0.8803
Q9_30	0.5438	0.0991	-0.0356	0.6570
Q9_31	-0.1374	0.2395	0.2573	0.8562
Q9_32	-0.1595	0.4503	0.2906	0.6742
Q9_33	-0.0253	0.5309	0.2561	0.5676

Notes: Factor 1 = Nonviolence; Factor 2 = Militarism; Factor 3 = Just War

UO data – Principal Axis Exploratory Factory Analysis: Items Loading on Factors

Notes: 5 factors were extracted; .3 was utilized as a cut off on item loadings; R = Reverse coded; Respondent answer choices on all items: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree; With reverse coding, peaceful answers become coded "3" and "4" on all items. Below are the items loading on each factor and utilized in constructing indexes based on each factor.

Table 5. Factor 1: Militarism

Item category	Item	Question # (R = Reverse coded)
1. Militarism: military discipline develops character	(f) "Military discipline develops good character in youth."	Q9_6
2. Militarism: war develops best qualities in men	(g) "War brings out the best qualities in men."	Q9_7
3. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: war breeds disrespect for humanity	(k) "War breeds disrespect for human life."	Q9_11 R
4. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: better to forgive and work for peace than to be a soldier	(l) "It is better to forgive your enemies and work for peace with justice than to be a good soldier."	Q9_12 R
5. Against militarism: better to disobey/ think for self than to be a good soldier	(m) "It is better to disobey orders and think for yourself than to be a good soldier."	Q9_13 R
6. Against militarism: military discipline injures self-respect	(n) "Military discipline injures self-respect and individuality."	Q9_14 R

Table 6. Factor 2: Nonviolence

Item category	Item	Question # (R = Reverse coded)
1. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: we should honor nonviolent heroes more than violent	(w) "We should honor the heroes of nonviolence more than those who used violence."	Q9_23 R
2. Nonviolence: nonviolent movements more successful	(x) "In nations on the verge of civil war, nonviolent movements are likely to be more successful in increasing long-term peace and justice..."	Q9_24 R
3. Principled nonviolence/ against realpolitiks: armed conflict could be outlawed	(y) "…it is possible to outlaw armed conflict between nations – perhaps through the UN and the International Court of Justice."	Q9_25 R
4. Principled nonviolence/ against realpolitiks: diplomacy and nonviolence can always work	(z) "Diplomacy…and nonviolent methods can always work to solve international disputes."	Q9_26 R
5. Principled nonviolence: if goal is peace, must be unity of means and ends	(aa) "If the goal is peace, peaceful methods must be used because we can NOT separate the means (methods) from the ends (goals)."	Q9_27 R
6. Pragmatic nonviolence: nonviolence can overthrow dictators	(bb) "Nonviolent methods can work to overthrow dictators."	Q9_28 R

Table 7. Factor 3: Interpersonal Violence

Item category	Item	Question #
1. Self-defense: right to kill to defend family	(a) "A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her family."	Q9_1
2. Self-defense: right to kill to defend property	(b) "A person has the right to kill to defend his/ her property."	Q9_2
3. Domestic violence: wife slapping husband can be justified	(c) "There are situations in which a woman is justified in slapping her husband in the face."	Q9_3
4. Domestic violence: husband slapping wife can be justified	(d) "There are situations in which a man is justified in slapping his wife in the face."	Q9_4
5. Corporal punishment: spanking children is necessary	(e) "Corporal punishment (spanking) is necessary to bring up children properly."	Q9_5

Note: Two items loading on this factor were conceptually distinct, hence, in order to "clean" the index these items were omitted in the construction of an "interpersonal violence" index: Q9_9 (i) Just war: "When people suffer under a dictator, a violent revolution is necessary and justified." (in the previous pcf factor analysis, this item loaded on the just war factor but it was cross-loading and not above .5, the cut-off which was utilized in the pcf factor analysis); Q9_15 (o) Realpolitiks: "There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources through war because nations should protect their own economic security and interests."

Table 8. Factor 4: "Just War" (and "Just Revolution")

Item category	Item	Question # (R = Reverse coded)
1. Just war: of liberation	(p) "When the goal is liberation from tyranny and oppression, war can be necessary and justified."	Q9_16
2. Just war: lesser of two evils	(q) "Because freedom and justice may be more important than peace, war may be necessary and although regrettable, it is the lesser of two evils."	Q9_17
3. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: no justification for war	(t) "There is NO conceivable justification for war."	Q9_20 R
4. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: evils of war outweigh benefits	(u) "The evils of war are greater than any possible benefits."	Q9_21 R
5. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: moral duty to refuse to participate in any war	(v) "It is the moral duty of the individual to refuse to participate in any way in any war, no matter what the cause."	Q9_22 R

Table 9. Factor 5: Realpolitiks

Item category	Item	Question #
1. Militarism: hero-system	(h) "Many of our nation's greatest heroes are soldiers."	Q9_8
2. Realpolitiks: diplomacy often fails and war becomes necessary	(r) "Diplomacy often fails and war between nations becomes necessary."	Q9_18
3. Death penalty: justified for murder	(ee) "The death penalty should be used for a person convicted of murder."	Q9_31
4. Realpolitiks: military methods needed to fight terrorism	(ff) "It is necessary to fight terrorism by military means (methods)."	Q9_32
5. Realpolitiks: military force need to maintain order in world	(gg) "It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world."	Q9_33

Note: Although the death penalty item is conceptually distinct, especially since it deals with a different level and arena for violence, it was retained because it was conceived as falling within a general instrumental attitude towards violence, and an instance of embracing the "myth of redemptive violence" (Wink 1992) somewhat like realpolitiks does. However, technically, in the realpolitiks orientation, war is outside the sphere of ethical reflection. Including the death penalty item also raised the Cronbach's alpha coefficient above the acceptable cut-off level of .6 to .6172. Admittedly, the items loading on this factor do not capture the distinctive hard-edge of national interest in the Realpolitiks position such as was operationalized in the item: "o. There is nothing wrong with nations seizing territory or natural resources through war because nations should protect their own economic security and interests." However, item "o" loaded on Factor 3, "Interpersonal Violence" (see Note above) – suggesting that attitudes justifying self-defense, domestic violence, and corporal punishment tend to overlap with attitudes affirming national self-interest in the realpolitiks position. Had the items been arranged in a different order, these items may have been more likely to correlate. Clearly, the order of items matters, and makes our empirical task difficult. By looking at the question numbers in the far right-hand column above, we can observe potential cases of auto-correlation (i.e., items correlating partly because of their proximity to one another) among the items loading on each of the 5 factors. However, many of the items were grouped by ideological orientation in the survey's format (see Appendix D), and this was deemed justified in order to make the survey-taking experience less taxing and confusing, especially since the subject matter is relatively complex.

Table 10. Factor loadings of individual items on the 5 factors: UO data (country-specific analysis)

Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5	Uniqueness
Q9_1	-0.2507	-0.0178	0.6067	0.1421	0.2040	0.5845
Q9_2	0.0047	0.0354	0.6227	-0.0038	0.0963	0.5753
Q9_3	0.2062	-0.2437	0.4151	0.0930	-0.0888	0.7311
Q9_4	0.1437	-0.0337	0.3036	-0.0834	-0.3784	0.7769
Q9_5	0.1627	0.1675	0.4302	-0.1117	-0.1364	0.7042
Q9_6	0.3766	-0.1016	0.2366	0.0281	0.1278	0.7136
Q9_7	0.3139	0.0465	0.2893	-0.0471	0.0408	0.7286
Q9_8	0.0938	0.0267	0.0555	0.0960	0.4207	0.7371
Q9_9	-0.1821	0.1568	0.4568	0.2672	-0.0107	0.6545
Q9_10	0.0176	0.1262	0.2806	0.1858	-0.2721	0.7906
Q9_11	0.6233	-0.0043	-0.0688	0.1335	-0.0174	0.6045
Q9_12	0.5274	0.1227	-0.0369	0.0685	0.0507	0.6169
Q9_13	0.4517	0.0258	-0.1530	0.0110	0.0945	0.7772
Q9_14	0.4844	-0.0012	-0.0863	0.1176	-0.0348	0.7700
Q9_15	0.2981	0.0138	0.3567	-0.1713	0.1670	0.6537
Q9_16	-0.1116	-0.0798	0.1984	0.5727	0.1292	0.5896
Q9_17	0.1433	-0.0908	0.0785	0.5550	0.1459	0.5859
Q9_18	0.0410	-0.0201	0.2519	-0.0329	0.4017	0.7429
Q9_19	0.2413	-0.0372	0.2423	0.0713	0.1468	0.7773
Q9_20	0.1095	0.1014	-0.0321	0.6529	0.0527	0.4695
Q9_21	0.3305	0.1670	-0.0404	0.4114	-0.0539	0.5910
Q9_22	0.0507	0.2907	-0.1797	0.3998	0.0272	0.6853
Q9_23	0.1835	0.3855	-0.1293	0.0248	0.2554	0.6287
Q9_24	0.0397	0.5404	0.0307	-0.1827	0.0437	0.6976
Q9_25	0.1250	0.4460	0.0101	0.1739	-0.0766	0.6676
Q9_26	-0.0835	0.5506	-0.0543	0.1262	0.0312	0.6782
Q9_27	0.1364	0.4505	0.1107	0.1268	-0.0027	0.6175
Q9_28	-0.0713	0.5102	0.1793	0.0677	-0.1230	0.6985
Q9_29	0.1489	0.2515	-0.0608	-0.0521	0.0735	0.8762
Q9_30	0.2810	0.2621	0.0756	-0.1521	0.0733	0.7523
Q9_31	-0.0467	0.2447	0.2831	-0.0857	0.3051	0.7342
Q9_32	0.0810	-0.0698	0.1315	0.2102	0.5273	0.5763
Q9_33	0.1080	0.1268	0.1002	0.2412	0.3532	0.6317

Notes: Factor 1 = Militarism; Factor 2 = Nonviolence; 3= Interpersonal Violence; 4 = Just War; 5 = Realpolitiks

APPENDIX F

INTERITEM CORRELATIONS AND RELIABILITIES

Tables of Costa Rican Attitude Indexes: Interitem Correlations and Reliabilities

Table 1. Factor 1: Nonviolence Index

Items	Correlations											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1. Principled nonviolence: political violence never justified												
2. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: war breeds disrespect for humanity	.32											
3. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: better to forgive and work for peace than to be a soldier	.20	.32										
4. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: no justification for war	.25	.24	.30									
5. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: evils of war outweigh benefits	.19	.22	.35	.46								
6. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: moral duty to refuse to participate in any war	.11	.15	.28	.41	.36							
7. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: we should honor nonviolent heroes more than violent	.21	.19	.37	.22	.29	.32						
8. Nonviolence: nonviolent movements more successful	.19	.09	.24	.27	.25	.28	.29					
9. Principled nonviolence/ against realpolitiks: armed conflict could be outlawed	.15	.19	.26	.28	.28	.18	.28	.18				
10. Principled nonviolence/ against realpolitiks: diplomacy and nonviolence can always work	.15	.14	.32	.21	.26	.21	.26	.27	.38			
11. Principled nonviolence: if goal is peace, must be unity of means and ends	.20	.16	.32	.34	.30	.30	.33	.32	.32	.37		
12. Pragmatic nonviolence: nonviolence can overthrow dictators	.02	.07	.27	.21	.16	.16	.33	.24	.30	.33	.42	
13. Against realpolitiks: support disarmament	.20	.23	.30	.24	.30	.34	.31	.33	.32	.22	.34	.23

Reliability (Cronbach's alpha) = .81

Table 2. Factor 2: Militarism Index

Items	Correlations					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1. Militarism: military discipline develops character						
2. Militarism: war develops best qualities in men	.46					
3. Militarism: many of our greatest heroes are soldiers	.40	.45				
4. Against militarism: better to disobey/ think for self than to be a	.16	.20	.15			

good soldier						
5. Against militarism	.43	.22	.19	.34		
6. Realpolitiks: military methods needed to fight terrorism	.40	.19	.22	.14	.17	
7. Realpolitiks: military force need to maintain order in world	.45	.31	.30	.08	.21	.54

Reliability (Cronbach's alpha) = .72

Table 3. Factor 3: Just War Index

Items	Correlations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. Self-defense: right to kill to defend family				
2. Self-defense: right to kill to defend property	.55			
3. Just war: against dictator	.26	.25		
4. Just war: of liberation	.32	.25	.26	
5. Just war: lesser of two evils	.34	.25	.30	.54

Reliability (Cronbach's alpha) = .71

Tables of UO Attitude Indexes: Interitem Correlations and Reliabilities

Table 4. Factor 1: Militarism Index

Items	Correlations				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. Militarism: military discipline develops character					
2. Militarism: war develops best qualities in men	.36				
3. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: war breeds disrespect for humanity	.19	.27			
4. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: better to forgive and work for peace than to be a soldier	.26	.19	.39		
5. Against militarism: better to disobey/ think for self than to be a good soldier	.19	.14	.24	.37	
6. Against militarism: military discipline injures self-respect	.21	.04	.34	.19	.25

Reliability (Cronbach's alpha) = .65

Table 5. Factor 2: Nonviolence Index

Items	Correlations				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. Principled nonviolence/ against militarism: we should honor nonviolent heroes more than violent					
2. Nonviolence: nonviolent movements more successful	.33				
3. Principled nonviolence/ against realpolitiks: armed conflict could be outlawed	.28	.24			
4. Principled nonviolence/ against realpolitiks: diplomacy and nonviolence can always work	.25	.25	.26		
5. Principled nonviolence: if goal is	.26	.28	.37	.29	

peace, must be unity of means and ends					
6. Pragmatic nonviolence: nonviolence can overthrow dictators	.25	.25	.34	.19	.26

Reliability (Cronbach's alpha) = .69

Table 6. Factor 3: Interpersonal Violence Index

Items	Correlations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. Self-defense: right to kill to defend family				
2. Self-defense: right to kill to defend property	.47			
3. Domestic violence: wife slapping husband can be justified	.30	.28		
4. Domestic violence: husband slapping wife can be justified	.07	.15	.28	
5. Corporal punishment: spanking children is necessary	.21	.24	.21	.20

Reliability (Cronbach's alpha) = .62

Table 7. Factor 4: "Just War" (and "Just Revolution") Index

Items	Correlations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. Just war: of liberation				
2. Just war: lesser of two evils	.44			
3. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: no justification for war	.41	.44		
4. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: evils of war outweigh benefits	.23	.36	.51	
5. Principled nonviolence/ against just war: moral duty to refuse to participate in any war	.24	.29	.38	.25

Reliability (Cronbach's alpha) = .73

Table 8. Factor 5: Realpolitiks Index

Items	Correlations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. Militarism: our soldiers are greatest heroes				
2. Realpolitiks: diplomacy often fails and war becomes necessary	.22			
3. death penalty: should be used for murder	.17	.19		
4. Realpolitiks: military methods needed to fight terrorism	.26	.29	.36	
5. Realpolitiks: military force need to maintain order in world	.28	.24	.23	.37

Reliability (Cronbach's alpha) = .62

APPENDIX G

NOTE ON OMISSIONS FROM SAMPLES

Fifteen respondents of the UO survey were deleted from the sample on the basis of their answer "I am not American" on Question 33 ("How proud are you to be an American?"). Many of these 15 respondents also indicated "I don't vote" on Q43 ("Which political party do you tend to vote for?"), perhaps supporting the inference that they are not U.S. citizens. Although the survey could have included a question which asked if respondents are U.S. citizens, it was thought that some students may be illegal residents and nervous about answering the question honestly. The omission of these 15 respondents was guided by the need to target U.S. citizens in accordance with the overall purpose of the survey – to measure how American identities and socialization in U.S. culture affects attitudes. Q33 is an imperfect but justifiable proxy measure which attempted to weed out citizens of other nations. In hindsight, a better method of identifying non-U.S. citizens could have been devised.

Similarly, a handful of respondents in the Costa Rican survey were omitted because on the question, "How proud are you to be Costa Rican?" respondents indicated they were citizens of other nations (i.e., foreign exchange students), not citizens of Costa Rica.

APPENDIX H

SECOND-ORDER FACTOR ANALYSES

In each data set, second-order/ higher-order factor analyses were conducted on the original correlation matrix, i.e., the primary or first-order factors (Gorsuch 1983). This was deemed appropriate because of the relatively strong correlations among many of the first-order factors in the original correlation matrix, suggesting that some generalization (and perhaps further data organization and reduction to a single factor) is possible. Higher-order factors "reduce accuracy for an increase in the breadth of generalization" (p.240). There is nothing inherently preferable or more important in higher-order factors, as both first and second-order factors aid in understanding the data (Cattell 1966c, Gorsuch 1983). Interpretations of second-order factors are post-hoc and subject to error as they are "based upon the interpretations of the first-order factors that are, in turn, based upon the interpretations of the variables" (Gorsuch 1983, p.245).

Table 1. UO data: Correlation Matrix of First-Order Factors

	f1 militarism	f2 nonviolence	f3 interpersonal violence	f4 just war	f5 realpolitiks
f1 militarism	1.0000				
f2 nonviolence	0.5884	1.0000			
f3 interpersonal violence	0.4535	0.2601	1.0000		
f4 just war	0.2780	0.4065	0.3349	1.0000	
f5 realpolitiks	0.4590	0.3398	0.2322	0.2671	1.0000

Table 2. UO data: Second-Order Factor of First-Order Factors

First-Order Factors	Second-Order Factor (1 factor extracted)
f1 militarism	.811
f2 nonviolence	.690
f5 realpolitiks	.525
f3 interpersonal violence	.505
f4 just war	.490

Note: Extraction method: principal axis factoring

Table 3. Costa Rica data: Correlation Matrix of First-Order Factors

	f1 nonviolence	f2 militarism	f3 just war
f1nonviolence	1.0000		
f2 militarism	0.5219	1.0000	
f3 just war	0.2619	0.4540	1.0000

Table 4. Costa Rica data: Second-Order Factor of First-Order Factors

First-Order Factors	Second-Order Factor (convergence on 1 factor)
f2 militarism	.939
f1 nonviolence	.554
f3 just war	.481

Note: Extraction method: principal axis factoring

APPENDIX I

CODING IDEOLOGICAL ADHERENTS

Costa Rica data

Because three factors emerged in the exploratory factor analysis of the Costa Rican data, three ideological adherent categories were coded based on these three factors (which were used to construct indexes): militarism, just war, and nonviolence. Because of reverse coding, answers of "1" and "2" represent pro-violent answers on all of the items. Likewise, because of reverse coding, pro-nonviolent answers on all of the indexes consist of "3" and "4" (2.5 is the mid-point) – with "4" representing the strongest level of agreement with the nonviolent attitude, or the strongest level of disagreement with the violent attitude depending on the phrasing of the item. Thus, a respondent who averages a "4" on the nonviolence index, the just war index, and the militarism index is a respondent who consistenly gave the strongest pro-nonviolent answers on each of those collections of items. The Stata programming appears below:

```
gen nv_adherents = 0
replace nv_adherents = 1 if  nonviolence >=3 & militarism >=3 & justwar >=3

gen mil_adherents = 0
replace mil_adherents = 1 if militarism <= 2.5

gen justwar_adherents = 0
replace justwar_adherents = 1 if justwar <= 2.5 & mil_adherents != 1 & Q4==1
```

I coded mil_adherents and justwar_adherents this way because anyone who agreed with the militarism items would be likely to also agree with the just war items, but since militarism is a more hard-core position (insofar as attitudes towards violence are concerned), militarism adherents were coded first and classified separately from the just war adherents.

UO data

Five factors (which were used to construct indexes) emerged through the exploratory factor analysis of the Costa Rican data. However, the "interpersonal violence" factor engages a different level of violence than the political level which is the primary focus of this analysis. Hence, four ideological adherent categories were coded: militarism, realpolitiks, just war, and nonviolence. The Stata programming appears below:

```
gen nv_adherents = 0
replace nv_adherents = 1 if  nonviolence >= 3 & militarism >=3 & justwar >=3 & realpolitiks >=3

gen mil_adherents =0
replace mil_adherents = 1 if militarism <= 2.5

gen realpol_adherents =0
replace realpol_adherents = 1 if realpolitiks<= 2.5 & mil_adherents != 1 & Q9_15 < 3

gen justwar_adherents =0
replace justwar_adherents = 1 if justwar <= 2.5 & mil_adherents != 1 & realpol_adherents != 1 & Q4==1
```

I coded mil_adherents, realpol_adherents, and justwar_adherents this way because anyone who agreed with the militarism items would be likely to also agree with the just war items, but since militarism is a more hard-core position, I separated those people out from the realpolitiks and just war positions. Likewise, realpolitiks adherents would be likely to also agree with the just war

items, but since realpolitiks is a more hard-core position, I separated those people out from the just war position. In other words, I followed Megoran (2008) in theorizing militarism as the more extreme/ hard-core position, followed by realpolitiks as the 2nd most hard-core position (insofar as attitudes towards violence are concerned), and finally, just war was conceived as a middle position.

Two departures from the factor analysis results were made for strong theoretical reasons. First, it was decided that pro-violent responses (codes of "1" or "2") on the Q9_15 item represent the heart of the realpolitiks ideology. Hence, it had to be included even though this item did not load with the factor identified as "realpolitiks." Adding "& Q9_15 <3" to the end of the realpol_adherents code above (as opposed to an earlier code which ommitted this stipulation only) resulted in a large shift downward in the number of respondents identified as realpolitiks adherents: from 142 adherents to 35 adherents. Of course, this also resulted in a much larger number of just war adherents. However, the just war adherent code initially ommitted the stipulation "& Q4==1." This resulted in 150 respondents being coded as just war adherents.

Secondly, it was decided, again for solid theoretical reasons, that a crucial indicator of the just war position involves affirming constraints against targeting and killing civilians. Hence, "& Q4==1" was added to the end of the code. This stipulation resulted in a shift downward from 150 to 127 respondents identified as just war adherents. This means that an additional 23 respondents would have been coded as just war adherents if they had agreed that targeting and killing civilians is "never justified." Because they did not provide that answer, these 23 respondents were sorted into the pool of ideologically undifferentiated respondents. Likewise, for the same reason (i.e., "& Q4==1" was added to the original code formula for "justwar_adherents") 13 respondents in the Costa Rican sample were sorted from the just war position into the pool of ideologically undifferentiated respondents.

Note that in both the UO and Costa Rica data sets Q4 was not included in the factor analyses (and hence, Q4 did not load on the just war factor). Only the Q9 questions were included in the factor analysis. All of the Q9 questions involved a 4-point Likert scale, whereas the Q4 question was dichotomous (sometimes justified/ never justified). Hence, again, this addition was made to the code for purely theoretical reasons (i.e., any definition of the just war position should include this constraint), rather than empirical reasons (i.e., as would be the case if the Q4 item loaded on the just war factor).

APPENDIX J

PEACE INDICATORS FROM SMALLER CROSS-NATIONAL POLLS

Table 1. Rank orders of subjectively peaceful nations, percent who "strongly agree" or "agree" (rank #1 is most peaceful).

"War is neccessary to settle differences between countries"	"Gov. should negotiate with groups using violence"	Gun scale – gun makes home/ person safer	Killing Others is justifiable scale	"Democracy is the best political system"	"In some occasions, dictatorship is good"
1) 3.8 Spain	1) 84 **El Salvador**	1) 15.3 Brazil (Rio)	1) 23.35 Spain	1) 87.5 **Costa Rica**	1) 5.3 **El Salvador**
2) 4.4 **Costa Rica**	2) 78.7 Brazil (Rio)	2) 15.7 Spain	2) 37.75 **Costa Rica**	2) 85.9 **USA** (Texas)	2) 6.5 **Costa Rica**
3) 6.8 **El Salvador**	3) 78.4 Venezuela	3) 16.25 **El Salvador**	3) 39.55 **USA** (Texas)	3) 83.3 Spain	3) 7.9 Spain
4) 7.3 Chile	4) 71.9 **Costa Rica**	4) 18.3 Brazil (Salvador)	4) 40.9 **El Salvador**	4) 73.3 **El Salvador**	4) 8.1 **USA** (Texas)
5) 9.1 Colombia	5) 70.8 Brazil (Salvador)	5) 21.9 Colombia	5) 44 Brazil (Rio)	5) 67.6 Brazil (Salvador)	5) 9.3 Brazil (Salvador)
6) 9.6 Brazil (Rio)	6) 59.2 Chile	6) 22.85 Chile	6) 46.03 (Chile)	6) 62.7 Venezuela	6) 11.8 Chile
7) 11.2 Brazil (Salvador)	6) 59.2 Spain	7) 24.25 Venezuela	7) 47.85 Brazil (Salvador)	7) 62.3 Brazil (Rio)	7) 19.1 Brazil (Rio)
8) 12.5 Venezuela	7) 58.7 Colombia	8) 26.65 **Costa Rica**	8) 53.58 Venezuela	8) 61.3 Chile	8) 23.3 Venezuela
9) 23.7 **USA** (Texas)	8) 55.8 **USA** (Texas)	9) 28.05 **USA** (Texas)			

Note: The samples were only drawn from cities: Madrid (Spain), San Jose (Costa Rica), San Salvador (El Salvador), Santiago (Chile), Cali (Colombia), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Salvador de Bahia (Brazil), Caracas (Venezuela), Austin and Houston, Texas (USA). The "Gun" scale included 2-items: 1) Gun in home makes home safer; 2) Carrying a gun makes a person safer. The nation-level Cronbach's alpha (reliability coefficients) for the Gun scale ranged from .65 to .86. The "Killing Others" scale included 4-items: 1) Right to kill to defend family; 2) Right to kill to defend property; 3) OK to kill a person who threatens the community; 4) OK to kill rapist of a child. The nation-level alphas for this scale ranged from .64 to .72 (Orpinas 1999). Data source: McAlister, Orpinas, and Velez (1999), Orpinas (1999).

Table 2. Rank orders of subjectively peaceful nations, percent who "strongly agree" or "agree" (rank #1 is most peaceful).

"Justification of family violence" items		
"Corporal punishment is necessary for children"	"Sometimes is justified: men slap wife"	"Sometimes is justified: women slap husband"
1) 5.1 **Chile**	1) 3.4 **Costa Rica**	1) 5.4 Spain
2) 6.3 Spain	2) 4.9 **El Salvador**	2) 5.7 Brazil (Salvador)
3) 8.5 Venezuela	3) 4.9 Spain	3) 6.5 **El Salvador**
4) 10.2 Brazil (Rio)	4) 5.0 Brazil (Rio)	4) 7.3 **Costa Rica**
5) 15.2 **El Salvador**	5) 5.6 Brazil (Salvador)	5) 8 Brazil (Rio)
6) 15.8 **Costa Rica**	6) 6.9 **Chile**	6) 9.7 **Chile**
7) 25.3 Brazil (Salvador)	7) 8.3 Venezuela	7) 14.5 Venezuela
8) 33.5 Colombia	8) 11.0 Colombia	8) 28.8 **USA** (Texas)
9) 36.4 **USA** (Texas)	[item not included in USA survey]	[item not included in Colombia survey]

Note: The samples were only drawn from cities: Madrid (Spain), San Jose (Costa Rica), San Salvador (El Salvador), Santiago (Chile), Cali (Colombia), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Salvador de Bahia (Brazil), Caracas (Venezuela), Austin and Houston, Texas (USA). The researchers (McAlister et al 1999, Orpinas 1999) grouped these 3 items together thematically, but did not combine into a scale or report alpha tests of internal consistency. Data source: McAlister, Orpinas, and Velez (1999), Oripinas (1999).

APPENDIX K

SURVEY OF NONVIOLENT CAPITAL/ HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE

[conducted Winter Term, 2013, UO Sociology course]

Instructions: *The questions below are taken from opinion surveys that have been conducted in many nations around the world.* ***Please answer each question in order, and do not go back and change any answers. Please circle your answer. All answers will be kept confidential.***

1. Some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion? (Civilians = unarmed men, women, and children who are NOT participating in a violent conflict)
Never justified (1) Sometimes justified (2)

2. Some people think for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion?
Never justified (1) Sometimes justified (2)

3. Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and are suffering from injustice can improve their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods). Others do NOT believe that peaceful means alone will work to improve the situation for oppressed groups. Which do you believe, peaceful means alone will work, or peaceful means alone will NOT work?
Will work (1) Will NOT work (2)

Instructions: ***Many of the questions below are very difficult for the average citizen and you are not expected to be able to answer all of them. Please circle your answer, and write-in as you are able. All answers will be kept confidential. Thank you very much for your help in conducting this research!***

4. Can you name some oppressed groups who were suffering from injustice and who improved their situation by peaceful means alone (nonviolent methods)? (Please name as many as you can remember.)
(1) Yes, these groups include:_____
_____
(2) Don't know

5. Can you name nations that have had successful, or somewhat successful, nonviolent revolutions in the 20th and 21st centuries (from 1900 through 2012)? (Please name as many as you can remember.)
(1) Yes, these nations include:_____
_____
(2) Don't know

6. Can you name nations that have had successful, or somewhat successful, violent revolutions in world history? (Please name as many as you can remember.)
(1) Yes, these nations include:_____
_____
(2) Don't know

7. Can you name specific wars when violent methods have "worked" in resolving conflicts in world history? (Please name as many as you can remember.)
(1) Yes, these nations include:_____
_____
(2) Don't know

8. Can you name cases where diplomacy (negotiation between leaders) "worked" in resolving conflicts in world history? (Please name as many as you can remember.)
(1) Yes, these cases include:_____
_____
(2) Don't know

9. Can you name an international treaty (or several treaties) that you think ensures a more peaceful world? (Please name as many as you can remember.)
(1) Yes, these treaties include:_____
_____
(2) Don't know

10. Can you name an international organization (or several organizations) that you think ensures a relatively more peaceful world? (Please name as many as you can remember.)
(1) Yes, these include:_____
_____
(2) No

11. Again, some people think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Can you name a case where targeting and killing civilians was justified?
(1) Yes, a case was:_____
(2) No, I can't think of a specific case
(3) I don't think that can be justified

APPENDIX L

GALLUP WORLD POLL METHODOLOGY ON "DON'T KNOW"/

"DEPENDS" ANSWERS

The Gallup World Poll methodology report explains: "Most items have a simple dichotomous ("yes or no") response set to minimize contamination of data because of cultural differences in response styles and to facilitate cross-cultural comparisons" (GWP 2009, p.3). But a methodological complication arises concerning the dichotomous phrasing of the questions, versus the actual number of answer options. All three of the violent/ nonviolent questions are phrased as dichotomous choices, and it seems additional answer responses were not initially read out as answer options. Nevertheless, as respondents answered items in the Gallup World Poll, it seems they were told or came to understand that on some items they had the option of answering "depends," "don't know," or "refused to answer." Of course, according to international standards, the latter is a required option in human subjects protocols. Moreover, if a respondent had trouble making up their minds, it seems likely that survey givers might have offered additional answer options which the survey designers were willing to accept and code.

On the military attacks on civilians item, the only exceptions to this pattern seems to be in Tunisia, where no respondents were listed as answering "depends," and in 6 nations (DRC (Kinshasa), Yemen, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Mozambique, and Liberia) where 0% of respodents were listed as answering "don't know/ refused to answer." It is possible that in some of these cases, rounding eliminated evidence of the less than ½ of 1% of respondents who answered "don't know"/ "refused to answer," but given the proprietary nature of the data (only topline data is available) it is impossible to know at the present time. In any case, in several nations, the percentage of respondents answering "depends" is much higher than in the rest of the cross-national sample – suggesting perhaps that respondents in those nations were made more aware that "depends" was always an answer option, or even that it was cued as an answer option on these particular items.

On the peaceful means alone "will work"/ "will not work" item, "depends" was not accepted or coded as an answer option, but "don't know"/ "refused to answer" were options that were coded. However, in Ivory Coast, Malawi, and Uganda 0% were coded as responding "don't know"/ "refused." Conversely, in Ukraine close to 25% of respondents were coded as "don't know"/ "refused."

APPENDIX M

SCHWARTZ VALUES INDICES

Values	Items in Index
Conformity	7. She believes that people should do what they're told. She thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.
	16. It is important to her always to behave properly. She wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
Tradition	9. It is important to her to be humble and modest. She tries not to draw attention to herself.
	20. Tradition is important to her. She tries to follow the customs handed down by her religion or her family.
Benevolence	12. It's very important to her to help the people around her. She wants to care for their well-being.
	18. It is important to her to be loyal to her friends. She wants to devote herself to people close to her.
Universalism	3. She thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. She believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.
	8. It is important to her to listen to people who are different from her. Even when she disagrees with them, she still wants to understand them.
	19. She strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to her.
Self-Direction	1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her. She likes to do things in her own original way.
	11. It is important to her to make her own decisions about what she does. She likes to be free and not depend on others.
Stimulation	6. She likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. She thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.
	15. She looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She wants to have an exciting life.
Hedonism	10. Having a good time is important to her. She likes to "treat" herself.
	21. She seeks every chance she can to have fun. It is important to her to do things that give her pleasure.
Achievement	4. It's important to her to show her abilities. She wants people to admire what she does.
	13. Being very successful is important to her. She hopes people will recognize her achievements.
Power	2. It is important to her to be rich. She wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.
	17. It is important to her to get respect from others. She wants people to do what she says.
Security	5. It is important to her to live in secure surroundings. She avoids anything that might endanger her safety.
	14. It is important to her that the government ensure her safety against all threats. She wants the government to be strong so it can defend its citizens.

APPENDIX N

EXPLANATION OF DUMMY CODES

Table 1. Dummy variables in UO data

1. male (versus female) (Q15)
2. white (versus non-white) (Q32)
3. Hispanic (Q31)
4. black (Q32)
5. upper classes (Q25, those claiming membership in "upper middle class" or "upper class")
6. rural (Q26, location of residence during junior high/ middle school and high school)
7. Republican party (versus non-Republicans) (Q43)
8. Democratic party (versus non-Democrats) (Q43)
9. Politically interested (Q30, those answering 1 or 2 were coded as "politically interested")
10. Knowledgeable of nonviolent revolutions (Q41, those answering by naming 1, 2, 3 or more correct historical nonviolent revolutions were coded "1," everyone else was coded "0")
11. religious (Q54: Do you belong to a religious tradition?)
12. Christian (Q58: Do you consider yourself to be a Christian)
13. Catholic (Q55)
14. evangelical (Q59)
15. attenders (Q56, those who attend religious services once a month or more)
16. born again (Q60; indicator of conservative/ evangelical Christianity)
17. Biblical literalist (Q57; indicator of conservative Christianity)
18. moderates and conservatives (versus liberals; Q29, self-identified ideology)
19. military parents (Q28: Have either of your parents ever been in the military?)
20. athletes (Q48: Did you play sports while you were in high school?)
21. sports fan (respondents who answered "1" ("great/ excited/ very happy") on Q50: When the UO football team wins, how do you feel?)
22. Majors 1-10

Table 2. Dummy codes in Costa Rica data

1. male (versus female) (Q13)
2. white (versus non-white) (Q43)
3. Mestizo (versus white; see Note1 below) (Q43)
4. upper classes (Q23, those claiming membership in "upper middle class" or "upper class")
5. PLN party (versus non-PLN; see Note 2 below) (Q40)
6. PAC party (versus non-PAC) (Q40)
7. liberal (versus non-liberals) (Q25; see Note 3)
8. politically interested (Q26, those answering 1 or 2 were coded as "politically interested")
9. Knowledgeable of nonviolent revolutions (Q41, those answering by naming 1, 2, 3 or more correct historical nonviolent revolutions were coded "1," everyone else was coded "0")
10. religious (Q27: Do you belong to a religious denomination?)
11. Catholic (Q28)
12. evangelical (Q28)
13. attenders (Q29, those who attend religious services once a month or more)
14. UCR student (Q48)
15. U Latina student (Q48)
16. U Hispanoamericana student (Q48)
17. Majors 1-9

Note 1: Because most repondents listed their race/ ethnicity as either white or Mestizo, and there were so few racial minorities, the Mestizo dummy code's comparison group is only whites. That is, racial minorities like blacks and Chinese were coded as missing data in the Mestizo dummy variable only.
Note 2: A high % of respondents claimed no party affiliation. This was expected, since political parties have often lacked saliance for voters in Costa Rica (Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz 1999, p.71). To accomodate this context, the dummy code for PLN included those who left this question blank (i.e., "missing data") in the code of "0" (zero), the non-PLN code. Those who claimed identification with PLN were coded "1." The same procedure was followed for the PAC code.
Note 3: Because the majority of respondents answered Q25 by claiming themselves as "moderates," and relatively few claimed themselves as "conservatives," the best dummy code seemed to be "liberals."

APPENDIX O

GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2009, 2011, 2012 INDICATORS

Indicator (Changes in GPI indicators are noted by year)	Weight (1 to 5) [weights adjusted in 2012]
INTERNAL PEACE	60%
EXTERNAL PEACE	40%
1. Perceptions of criminality in society	4 [3]
2. Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people	3
3. Number of homicides per 100,000 people	4
4. Number of jailed population per 100,000 people	3
5. Ease of access to weapons of minor destruction	3
6. Level of organized conflict (internal)	5
7. Likelihood of violent demonstrations	3
8. Level of violent crime	4
9. Political instability	4
10. Respect for human rights (2009)/ Level of disrespect for human rights (Political Terror Scale) (2011, 2012)	4
11. Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons, as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people	2
12. Potential for terrorist acts (2009, 2011)/ Terrorist Acts (2012)	1 [2]
13. Number of deaths from organized conflict (internal)	5
14. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP	2
15. Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people	2
16. Funding for UN peacekeeping missions	2
17. Aggregate number of heavy weapons per 100,000 people	3
18. Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people	3
19. Military capability/sophistication	2
20. Number of displaced people as a percentage of the population	4
21. Relations with neighbouring countries	5
22. Number of external and internal conflicts fought: 2002-07 (GPI 2009)/ 2003-08 (GPI 2011)/ 2004-09 (GPI 2012)	5
23. Estimated number of deaths from organized conflict (external)	5

Notes: In the GPI's from previous years, "Level of distrust in other citizens" was used instead of indicator #1 above. Also, "UN Deployments 2007-08 (percentage of total forces)" was used in the GPI 2008 instead of indicator #16 above. Arguably, the new indicator is biased as it privileges wealthy nations (on the other hand, the old indicator may have been biased as it privileged the handful of poor nations who have traditionally supplied a disproportionate number of UN peacekeepers partly because the poverty in these nations prompts men to serve as mercenaries). Unfortunately, the GPI 2009 also dropped an indicator of militarism used in the GPI 2008: "Non-UN Deployments 2007-08 (percentage of total forces)." Dropping this indicator privileges the U.S. by ignoring the large numbers of U.S. troops deployed abroad.

APPENDIX P

TESTING CORRELATES OF NONVIOLENT ATTITUDES

Table 1. Concepts and Measures (for Testing Correlates of Nonviolent Attitudes in Gallup World Poll data)

Variable (n=sample size)	[Variable Name] Definitions, Coding, and Sources
Gallup World Poll (3 questions)	Source: Gallup World Poll internet data. Surveys were conducted primarily in 2008 and 2009, but in some nations they were conducted in 2007. For a full list of survey dates for the data used in the present study, see Appendix R. This data set is proprietary, with the 2005 to 2010 data set available for $285,000. As the present study was concluding, the 2005-2006 data set became available to academics for $5,000. However, topline data has been free to the public on the Gallup World Poll web page. One limitation is that some of the web-posted data comes from earlier waves (see Appendix R).
Nonviolence Will Work (n=136)	[nv_willwork_2_15_2010] % of citizens in nation affirming peaceful means alone "will work"; Source: Gallup World Poll internet data (2008-2009), retrieved 2/15/2010.
State Terrorism: military attacks on civilians (n=131)	[percent_mil_neverjust_2_26_2010] % of citizens in nation affirming military attacks on civilians "never justified"; Source: Gallup World Poll internet data (2008-2009), retrieved 2/26/2010 .
Terrorism: individual attacks on civilians (n=130)	[indneverjust_2_16_2010] % of citizens in nation affirming individual attacks on civilians "never justified"; Source: Gallup World Poll internet data (2008-2009), retrieved 2/16/2010.
Global Peace Index 2009 score (n=120)	[gpi2009] Most peaceful score: 1.202; Least peaceful score: 3.341; Source: Institute for Economics and Peace
Transformed GPI 2009 score (n=120)	[transgpi2009] Tansformed GPI score was calculated by 4 – x (where x = each nation's GPI2009 score). Most peaceful score: 2.798; Least peaceful score: .659
Global Peace Index 2012 score (n=128)	[gpi2012] Most peaceful score: 1.113; Least peaceful score: 3.392; Source: Institute for Economics and Peace
Transformed GPI 2012 score (n=128)	[transgpi2012] Tansformed GPI score was calculated by 4 – x (where x = each nation's GPI2012 score). Most peaceful score: 2.887; Least peaceful score: .608
World Peace Index 2009 score (n=122)	[WPI2009] Most peaceful score: 93.5; Least peaceful score: 34.7; Source: World Peace Forum
World Peace Index 2012 score (n=122)	[WPI2012] Most peaceful score: 91.5; Least peaceful score: 37.8; Source: World Peace Forum
World Peace Index decade (2001-2010) average score (n=122)	[WPIdecade_avg] Note: This average was calculated because the scores of several nations were relatively volatile in one or more years during the decade.
Political Peace Index (WPI 2012) (n=122)	[POL2012] Sub-index of the WPI; Most peaceful score: 98.8; Least peaceful score: 12.9; Source: World Peace Forum
Military-Diplomatic Peace Index (WPI 2012) (n=122)	[MIL2012] Sub-index of the WPI; Most peaceful score: 90.2; Least peaceful score: 27.7 for Syria (South Sudan (not in current sample) is even lower at 21.7); Source: World Peace Forum
Socio-Economic Peace Index (WPI 2012) (n=122)	[SOC2012] Sub-index of the WPI; Most peaceful score: 92.1; Least peaceful score: 19.5; Source: World Peace Forum
Positive Peace Index (GPI 2012) (n=99)	[PPI2012] Positive Peace Index 2012; Most peaceful score: 1.17; Least peaceful score: 4.016; Source: Global Peace Index 2012 report; Institute for Economics and Peace

Transformed Positive Peace Index (GPI 2012) (n=99)	[transPPI2012] Transformed Positive Peace Index; calculated by 5 – x (where x = each nation's Positive Peace Index 2012 score); Most peaceful score: 3.83; Least peaceful score: .984
Type of Society (n=134)	[typesociety] "Postindustrial Societies" (coded "1") were defined, following Norris and Inglehart (2004), as the 21 most affluent states, ranking with a Human Development Index (HDI) score over .898 (Source: the 1998 HDI in the UNDP Human Development Report for 2000). "Industrial Societies" (coded "2") were defined as the nations with a moderate HDI (ranging from .740 to .886). "Agrarian societies" (coded "3") were defined as the nations with lower levels of development as indicated by a low HDI (below .740). Because the Palestinian Territories (coded "2") and Liberia (coded "3") were not included in the Human Development Report, they were coded based on GDP per capita PPP (measured in "current international $") and GDP per capita (measured in "constant 2000 US$"), in 1998 World Bank data. [Although the Gallup World Poll data was retrieved in early 2010 (and data was largely collected in 2009 and 2008), the 1998 date of this socio-economic data was deemed appropriate since cultural change is likely to have significant time lags.]
Type of society reverse-coded (n=134)	[reversetypesociety] The "typesociety" variable above, reverse coded (4 – typesociety). 1=Agrarian; 2=Industrial; 3=Post-industrial
Type of Economy (n=133)	[type_econ] Types: 1=Low GDP per capita; 2= Medium; 3= High GDP per capita; Source: Norris (2009) data from World Bank 2007 (3-category level of GDP per capita in PPP (purchasing power parity) 2006)
Region (n=136)	[region_code] 1=Western Europe, Canada & U.S.; 2= Eastern Europe & Central Asia; 3= Middle East & North Africa; 4= South & East Asia & Oceana; 5= Latin America; 6= Sub-Saharan Africa
Civilizations (n=130)	[Nine_civilizations] (1) Western Christianity (2) Muslim (3) Orthodox (Russian and Greek) (4) Latin American (5) Sinic/Confucian (6) Japanese (7) Hindu (8) Buddhist (9) Sub-Saharan Africa Source: These codes build on Norris and Inglehart (2004, pp.138-141), who draw from Huntington's (1996) theorizing on distinct civilizations. Notes: Based on Huntington's coded map (pp.26-27) and additional research, the following nations were deemed as unique or too diverse and historically complex to code as belonging to any one civilization: Guyana, Haiti, Israel, Kosovo, the Philippines, and Trinidad and Tobago. In any case, we must take seriously critiques of Huntington, such as one articulated by Chalmers Johnson (2001): "Talking about the 'clash of civilizations' is a way of evading responsibility for the 'blowback' that US imperial projects have generated" (p.14).
Historically Predominant Major Religions (n=135)	[typereligion] Protestant (1), Catholic (2), Orthodox Christian (3), Buddhist/ Eastern (4), Muslim (5), Hindu (6), Jewish (7), Other (indigenous beliefs, animism) (8). Sources: States classified by the historically predominant (plurality) religion, derived from the *Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year* 2001 by Alesina et al. (2003) and Norris and Inglehart (2004, pp.46-47). Notes: For states not included in Norris and Inglehart's (2004) data set, the coding is based on the major religion (adhered to by the largest population) according to the CIA. *The World Factbook, 2012*. (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency). Retrieved November 10, 2012.

	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html#af The CIA vaguely coded the following countries as predominantly "Christian": Botswana, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Malawi, and Zambia. Thus, Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001, Vol.2, pp.623-648) was consulted to produce more specific codes: all of these African nations were reported to be predominantly Protestant (including Protestants, Pentecostal-Charimatics, and Evangelicals), except for the Republic of Congo which is predominantly Roman Catholic. All of these are standard reference sources widely used in the literature (Norris and Inglehart 2004, p.44).
Secularization (n=66)	[Secularization] 1= Most people religious; 2 = Moderate; 3 = Most people secular; Source: Norris and Inglehart, World Values Survey data, coded in Norris (2009).
World-system position (n=115)	[worldsystempos] 1= Periphery; 2= Semiperiphery; 3= Core; Source: Clark and Beckfield (2009)
Democracy/ Regime Type #1 (n=134)	[regimetype] 1= Authoritarian regimes; 2= Hybrid regimes; 3= Flawed democracies; 4=Full democracies; Source: *Democracy Index 2010* by Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy measure #2 (n=134)	[DemIndex2010score] Democracy Index 2010 Overall Score; 10 = Highly functioning; 0= Poorly functioning; Source: *Democracy Index 2010* by Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy measure #3 (n=134)	[PolCulture2010] Political Culture Index; 10 = Highly functioning; 0= Poorly functioning; Source: *Democracy Index 2010* by Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy measure #4 (n=134)	[CivLib2010] Civil Liberties Index; 10 = High degree of civil liberties; 0= Nonexistent civil liberties; Source: *Democracy Index 2010* by Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy/ Regime Type #5 (n=132)	[FreedomHouse2008] 1= Not free; 2= Partly free; 3= Free; Source: Norris and Inglehart (2009) data from Freedom House 2008
Democracy/ Regime Type #6 (n=136)	[FreedomHouse2012] 1= Not free; 2= Partly free; 3= Free; The ratings reflect global events from January 2, 2011, through December 31, 2011; Source: Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House
Democracy measure #7 (n=136)	[PolRights2012] Political Rights Index; codes 1-7 (1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating); Source: Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House
Transformed Political Rights Index (n=136)	[transPolRights2012] calculated by 8 – x (where x = each nation's Political Rights Index 2012 score)
Democracy measure #8 (n=136)	[CivLib2012] Civil Liberties Index; codes 1-7 (1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating); Source: Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House
Transformed Civil Liberties Index (n=136)	[transCivLib2012] calculated by 8 – x (where x = each nation's Civil Liberties Index 2012 score)
Democracy measure #9 (n=136)	[Elect_Democracy] Dummy variable – rated/ not rated as an "electoral democracy" by Freedom House; Codes: 1=Yes, an electoral democracy; 0=No; Source: Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House
Education measure #1 (n=126)	[Literacy_rate_adult] Source: World Bank data 2009; Note: If data was lacking for the year 2009, World Bank data was used, if available, for the years 2005 – 2010. World Bank data on literacy is obtained from UNESCO, which estimates that all *developed* countries have a literacy rate of more than 95% (http://data.worldbank.org/about/faq/specific-data-series; Retrieved November 14, 2012). Moreover, since several middle-income nations (e.g., Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, and Ukraine) with data reported over 99% literacy, developed countries missing data were coded as 99%. The figures for Azerbaijan and Sudan came from the 2010 UN Human Development Report.
Education measure #2 (n=132)	[Mean_yrs_school] Mean years of schooling; Source: UN Human Development Report 2010

Education measure #3 (n=126)	[primary_enrol_ratio_net] Primary school enrollment ratio, net (% of primary school-age population), Data refer to the most recent year available during the period 2001-2009; Source: UN Human Development Report 2010
Education measure #4 (n=109)	[secondary_enrol_ratio_net] Secondary school enrollment ratio, net (% of secondary school-age population), Data refer to the most recent year available during the period 2001-2009; Source: UN Human Development Report 2010
Education measure #5 (n=122)	[enroll_tertiary_percentgross] School enrollment, tertiary (% gross); The total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving. Note: If data was lacking for 2009, data refer to the closest year available between the years 2004-2011. In the cases of Egypt and Laos, data was available for 2008 and 2010, so this was averaged to produce an estimated 2009 figure. Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, in World Bank World Development Indicators
Education measure #6 (n=112)	[pop_with_secondary_ed] Population with at least secondary education (% ages 25 and older), 2010; Source: UN Human Development Report 2010
Education measure #7 (n=124)	[educ_percent_govt_spent] Public spending on education, total (% of government expenditure); 2009 data; where data lacking in 2009, data comes from closest year available between 2000-2010; in a few cases, data was present for 2008 and 2010, so this was averaged to produce an estimated 2009 figure; Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, in World Bank World Development Indicators
Education measure #8 (n=127)	[educ_spent_percent_GDP] Current education spending as a % of GDP; 2009 data; where data lacking in 2009, data comes from closest year available between 2000-2010; in a few cases, data was present for 2008 and 2010, so this was averaged to produce an estimated 2009 figure; Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, in World Bank World Development Indicators
Education measure #9 (n=101)	[pupil_teacher_ratio] Pupil-teacher ratio (number of pupils per teacher); Data refer to the most recent year available between 2005-08; The pupil-teacher ratio data from Chad (176.2) and Central African Republic (100.2) were ommitted because they are such clear outliers – more than double the ratios of virtually all of the other nations. Source: UN Human Development Report 2010
Education measure #10 (n=126)	[males_w_secondary_ed] Male population with at least secondary education (% ages 25 and older); Source: UN Human Development Report 2011
Cosmopolitanism measure #1 (n=78)	[cbindex] Cosmopolitanism Index; This index is constructed by adding the standardized (i.e., each component is equally weighted) Media Freedom Index, the Globalization Index (see below), and per capita GDP; Source: Norris and Inglehart (2009)
Cosmopolitanism measure #2 (n=78)	[GlobIndex2005] Globalization Index; The KOF Index of Globalization, 1970-2005 (for methods see http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/); The 100-point index is constructed from two dozen variables measuring three dimensions: 1) social globalization (the spread of personal contact, information flows, and cultural proximity); 2) economic globalization (the long-distance flow of goods, investment capital, and commercial services, as well as restrictions through import berriers, taxes, and tariffs); and 3) political globalization (measured by integration with international intergovernmental organizations, the number of embassies based in a country, and national engagement in UN peace missions); Source: Norris and Inglehart (2009, p.312)
Urbanization measure #1 (n=135)	[percent_urban_pop] Urban population (% of total population); Source: World Bank data 2009; Note: World Bank data was lacking for Taiwan, so the data on Taiwan comes from the Population Reference Bureau (2010).
Urbanization measure #2 (n=133)	[per_urban_cia2010] Urban population (% of total population); Source: CIA World Factbook 2010
Urbanization measure #3 (n=134)	[Urban_population] Total number of urban residents; Source: World Bank data 2009

Urbanization measure #4 (n=134)	[Ruralpopulation_percent_of_total] Rural population (% of total population); Source: World Bank data 2009
Urbanization measure #5 (n=135)	[Population_density] Population density (people per sq. km of land area); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #1 (n=123)	[GenderInequalIndex_UN2011] Gender Inequality Index; Sweden ranks #1 with an index score of .049; Chad ranks last, #145, with an index score of .735; Source: UN Human Development Report 2011
Measure of female empowerment #2 (n=128)	[percent_parliaments_female] Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #3 (n=134)	[adol_fertility] Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #4 (n=135)	[Birth_rate_perthousand] Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #5 (n=135)	[fertility_rate] Fertility rate, total (births per woman); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #6 (n=134)	[Ratio_female_to_male_labor_parti] Ratio of female to male labor participation rate (%); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #7 (n=134)	[Labor_participation_fem_over15] Labor participation rate, female (% of female participation ages 15+); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #8 (n=54)	[percent_females_in_total_nonagri] Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (% of total nonagricultural employment); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #9 (n=70)	[Literacy_rate_adult_female] Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15 and above); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #10 (n=70)	[Literacy_rate_youth_females15_24] Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15-24); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #11 (n=70)	[Ratio_youngliterate_fem_to_males] Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #12 (n=111)	[Ratio_female_to_male_primary_enr] Ratio female to male primary enrollment (%); Ratio of female to male primary enrollment is the percentage of girls to boys enrolled at primary level in public and private schools; Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #13 (n=81)	[Totalenroll_primary_female_perce] Total enrollment, primary school, female (% net); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #14 (n=91)	[Primary_completion_rate_female] Primary completion rate, female (% of relevant age group); Primary completion rate. Female is the total number of new female entrants in the last grade of primary education, regardless of age, expressed as percentage of the total female population of the theoretical entrance age to the last grade of primary. This indicator is also known as "gross intake rate to the last grade of primary." The ratio can exceed 100% due to over-aged and under-aged children who enter primary school late/early and/or repeat grades; Source: World Bank data 2009

Measure of female empowerment #15 (n=42)	[Progression_to_secondary_female_] Progression to secondary school, female (%); Transition from primary (ISCED 1) to secondary (ISCED 2), general programmes (%). Female is the number of new female entrants to the first grade of secondary education (general programmes only) in a given year, expressed as a percentage of the number of female pupils enrolled in the final grade of primary education in the previous year; Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #16 (n=97)	[Ratio_female_to_male_secondary_e] Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment (%); Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment is the percentage of girls to boys enrolled at secondary level in public and private schools; Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #17 (n=101)	[Secondary_ed_percent_female] Secondary education, pupils (% female); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #18 (n=95)	[enroll_secondary_female_percentg] School enrollment, secondary, female (% gross); Gross enrollment ratio. Secondary. All programmes. Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition. Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #19 (n=66)	[enroll_secondary_female_percentn] School enrollment, secondary, female (% net); Net enrollment rate. Secondary. All programmes. Total is the ratio of children of the official secondary school age who are enrolled in secondary school to the population of the official secondary school age. Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #20 (n=125)	[females_w_second_ed] Female population with at least secondary education (% ages 25 and older); Source: UN Human Development Report 2011
Measure of female empowerment #21 (n=97)	[Ratio_girls_to_boys_primary_n_se] Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #22 (n=88)	[Ratio_fem_to_male_tertiary_enrol] Ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment (%); Source: World Bank data 2009
Measure of female empowerment #23 (n=88)	[enroll_tertiaryfemale_percentgro] School enrollment, tertiary, female (% gross); Source: World Bank data 2009
Structural measure of militarism #1 (n=131)	[percent_labor_soldiers] Armed forces personnel (% of total labor force); Source: World Bank data 2009
Structural measure of militarism #2 (n=131)	[total_soldiers] Armed forces personnel, total; Source: World Bank data 2009
Structural measure of militarism #3 (n=105)	[Military_expenditure_percent_gov] Military expenditure (% of central government expenditure); 2009 data; Where data lacking in 2009, data comes from closest year available between 2000-2010; In a few cases, data was present for 2008 and 2010, so this was averaged to produce an estimated 2009 figure; Source: SIPRI Yearbook in World Bank data
Structural measure of militarism #4 (n=128)	[Military_expenditure_percentGDP] Percent of GDP devoted to military spending; 2009 data; Where data lacking in 2009, data comes from closest year available between 2000-2010; In a few cases, data was present for 2008 and 2010, so this was averaged to produce an estimated 2009 figure; Source: SIPRI Yearbook in World Bank data

Structural measure of militarism #5 (n=132)	[perGDP_mil_spend_CIA2010] Percent of GDP devoted to military spending in 2010; Source: CIA World Factbook
Structural measure of militarism #6 (n=128)	[Military_expenditure_currentLCU] Military expenditure (current local currency units (LCU)); 2009 data; Where data lacking in 2009, data comes from most recent year available between 2000-2008; Source: SIPRI Yearbook in World Bank data
Structural measure of militarism #7 (n=133)	[percapita_mil_spending] Per capita military expenditure (US$); Note that the following nations had a value of 0 on this measure because they are demilitarized: Costa Rica, Panama, Haiti, Iceland, and Hong Kong; However, Costa Rica is described as having a per capita expenditure of US $43 for "paramilitary (police) forces" (Time 2012, p.249); Panama is described as having a per capita expenditure of US $66 for "paramilitary" forces (p.391); Haiti is listed as including only police and UN peacekeepers (p.298); Iceland is described as having "no military" but "coast guard (paramilitary) personnel" with a per capita expenditure of US$109 (p.303); Hong Kong residents are "exempted from military service" and no per capita expenditure is listed (p.301); Source: Time 2012/ Encyclopaedia Britannica
Structural factors: size of population (n=135)	[WB_Population_total] Population, total; Source: World Bank data 2009
Structural factors: population in millions (n= 135)	[pop_in_millions_CIA2011] Population, total (in millions); Source: CIA World Factbook 2011
Structural factors: youth bulge proxy (n=134)	[proxyyouth_bulge] Population ages 0-14 (% of total population); This data from 1994 (i.e., data has a 15 year lag) was used as a proxy indicator for youth bulges at the time of the Gallup World Poll data (collected around 2009); Source: World Bank data 1994
Structural factors: youth bulge (n=134)	[youth_bulge] Population ages 15-29 (% of total population); data comes from 2005 to 2009; Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica (Time 2012)
GDP per capita (n=130)	[GDPpercapitaPPPconstant2005inter] GDP per capita in PPP (purchasing power parity) in constant 2005 international dollars; Source: World Bank data 2009; Note: An "international dollar would buy in the cited country a comparable amount of goods and services a US dollar would buy in the United States" (World Bank website, retrieved November 2012). http://data.worldbank.org/about/faq/specific-data-series
Log of GDP per capita PPP (n=130)	[lnGDPpercapita]
GNI per capita (n=129)	[GNIpercapitaPPPcurrentinternat] GNI per capita in PPP in current international dollars; Source: World Bank data 2009; Note: GNI (gross national income) was formerly referred to as GNP (gross national product)
State Reach (n=113)	[statereach] State reach is measured by an index including road density, telephone density, and the percentage of the population living in urban areas (2006 data); Source: Holtermann (2012)
History of major nonviolent campaigns by nation (1900 – 2009) (n=136)	[Rnv_success_in_last100yrs] A major nonviolent campaign "success" since 1900 (coded "1" if present; "0" if absent); Source: Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and online *Global Nonviolent Action Database* (GNAD), retrieved February 2013
Dummy: Limited nonviolent success since 1900 (1900 – 2009) (n=136)	[Rlimitednvsuccess_in_last100yrs] Nations coded as experiencing major nonviolent campaigns with "limited success" since 1900 (coded "1" if present; "0" if absent); Source: Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and online *Global Nonviolent Action Database* (GNAD), retrieved February 2013

Dummy: Two or more nonviolence successes since 1900 (1900 – 2009) (n=136)	[Rtwo_or_more_nvsuccesses] Two or more major nonviolent campaigns achieving "success" since 1900 years (coded "1" if present; "0" if absent); Source: Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and online *Global Nonviolent Action Database* (GNAD), retrieved February 2013
Year last successful nonviolent campaign ended (1900 – 2009) (n=136)	[Ryr_last_successfulnv_movt_ended] Year last successful nonviolent campaign ended (1900 – 2009). Those with no successful nonviolent campaigns were initially coded as 1900. In a second set of tests, these nations were coded as missing data.
Years since successful nonviolent campaign (n=136)	[Ryrs_since_lastnvsuccess] This variable is based on the above variable, as the following subtraction was conducted: 2009 – (Ryr_last_successfulnv_movt _ended).
Nonviolent history (n=136)	[Rnv_movt_history] 1 = nations with 2 or more nonviolent successes 2= nations with 1 nonviolent "success" only 3= nations with nonviolent movements achieving "limited success" only (nations experiencing major successful nonviolent campaigns were excluded) 4= no major nonviolent movements achieving even "limited success" Source: Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and online *Global Nonviolent Action Database* (GNAD), retrieved February 2013
Dummy: Nonviolent success since 1988 (n=136)	[Rnvsuccess_since1988] (coded "1" if present; "0" if absent); Source: Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and online *Global Nonviolent Action Database* (GNAD), retrieved February 2013
Dummy: Nonviolent success since 1998 (n=136)	[Rnvsuccess_since1998] (coded "1" if present; "0" if absent); Source: Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and online *Global Nonviolent Action Database* (GNAD), retrieved February 2013
Number of years at war since 1945 (to 2009) (n=136)	[war_years] Number of years at war (cumulative and non-consecutive) since 1945 (to 2009). Statistics are rough estimates based on the simple rounding off of each conflict start date and end date by yearly increments, based on start and end date statistics which are described by year only in the Marshall (2012) dataset. Hence, any conflict starting and ending in the same year is coded as one year at war. But if a conflict started in 1945 (any month) and ended in 1946 (any month), the subtraction procedure would also give us an estimate of one year at war (i.e., 1946 (end date) – 1945 (start date) = 1 year), even though it is obviously possible the time period was closer to two years, depending on the months involved. Hence, the data is fuzzy in the sense that for each war event we are either rounding up or rounding down by a few months with each coding. Nevertheless, this coding procedure was considered defensable, and saved a great deal of time (more accurate codes would be possible for teams of researchers using the Correlates of War dataset). There is another imprecision in the data in that some nations like India have had multiple conflicts going on at once, and in order to save time, the coding method simply added each conflict together cumulatively. Hence, if a nation had two simulataneous conflicts between 1945 and 1955, this would count as 20 years at war. Thus, nations like the Philippines are penalized/ overcounted as a result of waging two conflicts at once. Likewise for India, the total number of years at war during this period (1945 to 2009), if each war duration is added together, is 129 years. Since 64 is the number of years between 1945 and 2009, any nation with more than 64 total years at war was coded as "64." Again, this coding procedure was considered defensable, since it gives us one indicator of a nation's ability or inability to avoid or resolve conflicts over time, measured in years.

	Again, there is an obvious imprecision in start date and end date information for each war/ conflict since it does not include the month. Since Gallup World poll data was collected in most nations between 2008 and 2009, and data from a few nations was collected in 2007, conflicts that began after the polling date (see Appendix T) in each respective nation were not included in the count of years at war. For simplicity and comparability, 2009 was taken to be the end date of the "number of years at war" variable data point. Again, if a war started in 2007, 2008, 2009 or after, and this war start came after the Gallup World Poll survey date in that country, it was not counted. In no cases did this result in a nation at war in 2007-2009 being counted as a nation at peace for additional years because, coincidentally, all of the nations at war in 2007-2009 (past the date of the Gallup World poll survey in each respective country) were involved in long-standing conflicts, many of which extended into 2011 and beyond. Moreover, virtually all of the nations that *began* new wars in 2007-2009, began very small wars and were already experiencing other prolonged wars. Similarly, no nations were treated as if they had engaged in 1 or 2 extra years of war that they did not ultimately engage in. For example, the Central African Republic survey was conducted in 2007. This nation has had a war from 2005 to 2011+, but (for simplicity and comparability) the war end date was coded at 2009. This means that in a few cases like Central African Republic and Chad, the Gallup opinion survey was treated as if conducted in 2009, after 1 or 2 additional years of war. But in all cases, these wars were ongoing and in most cases longstanding over many years or decades. Thus, the distorting effects of coding irregularities would seem to be, on average, very small. For our purposes, a distortion would be present if for some reason, those additional years of war somehow generated a strong shift in public opinions. For a macro, cross-national analysis, such data problems were considered very minor. Source: Marshall (2012)
Total number of years at peace since 1945 (to 2009) (n=136)	[peace_years] Total number of years at peace (non-consecutive) since 1945 (to 2009). This statistic is based on the variable above, calculated through subtraction as follows: 64 - (number of years at war since 1945) = peace years; [64 is the number of years between 1945 and 2009]. Source: Marshall (2012)
Year last war ended (1945 to 2009) (n=136)	[year_last_war_ended] The year in which the nation's last war ended, if fought, during the period 1945 to 2009. Those with ongoing wars were coded 2009. Those with no wars were coded as 1945. Source: Marshall (2012)
Number of consecutive years of peace since last war ended (1945 to 2009) (n=136)	[years_since_war] Number of consecutive years of peace since last war ended (1945 to 2009). This variable is based on the above variable, calculated through subtraction as follows: 2009 - (Year last war ended) = years since war. Source: Marshall (2012)
Dummy: Historically peaceful nations (n=136)	[historically_peaceful] Nations with no wars between 1945 and 2009 were coded as "1." Other nations coded as "0."; Source: Marshall (2012)
Dummy: War prone nations (n=136)	[war_prone] Nations with more than 40 years of war (using the "war_years" variable above) between 1945 and 2009 were coded as "1." Other nations coded as "0."; Source: Marshall (2012)
Casualty counts (1945 to 2009) (n=136)	[casualties] Overall, for simplicity and comparability, 2009 was taken to be the end date of the casualty count data. If a war started in 2009 or after, it was not included in the casualty count data. Because the Marshall (2012) data includes casualty counts through 2011, and these counts were adopted in the present study, there is some imprecision in the data (i.e., people killed in 2009-2011 were counted as if they had already been killed before the opinion poll in 2009 for example). But it was not considered problematic since all of the casualty counts extending into 2011 were part of long-standing, multi-year conflicts that began long before 2009. Hence, the effect of casualty counts on attitudes would likely

	have already had the chance to form and solidify, though turning points in conflicts and attitudes are always possible. Another source of imprecision in the data is seen in the casualty counts for international conflicts. In most cases, Marshall (2012) lists casualties only for one nation (itemized by nation), but for some minor international conflicts he lists total killed (including casualties to the enemy or enemy population). For example, in both the U.S. and Panama casualty counts, he lists 1,000 deaths under the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama. Less than 50 U.S. soldiers were killed in the invasion, but an estimated 1,000 to 4,000 Panamanians were killed. Source: Marshall (2012)
Human Development Index (HDI) 2010 (n=131)	[HDI2010] The HDI is an index of the potential human development that could be achieved if there was no inequality in a society; Source: UN Human Development Report 2010
Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) 2010 (n=116)	[InequalHDI2010] The inequality-adjusted human development index; The IHDI is the *actual* level of development, taking into account inequality; Under perfect equality, the HDI and IHDI would be equal; Source: UN Human Development Report 2010
Overall loss (%) in potential due to inequality (n=116)	[lossHDI2010] The "Loss (%)," the difference between the HDI and the Inequality-adjusted HDI expressed as a percentage, indicates the loss in potential human development due to inequality. Source: UN Human Development Report 2010
Income inequality 2000-2010 (n=121)	[Gini2000_2010] Income Gini coefficient 2000 – 2010; The range is from 16.8 to 74.3, with the higher number representing more inequality; Japan, Norway, and Sweden are all at about 25, while the U.S. has a score of 40.8 ;Source: UN Human Development Report 2010
Average Annual Temperature (F) (n=134)	[avg_temp] Average Annual Temperature (in Farenheit) for the nation; Source: www.weatherbase.com
Average Annual High Temperature (F) (n=133)	[avg_hightemp] Average Annual High Temperature (in Farenheit) for the nation; Source: www.weatherbase.com
Mountainous terrain (n=124)	[mount] The proportion of a nation's terrain which is mountainous. This measure takes into account not only altitude but also plateaus and rugged uplands. Source: Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
Natural log of mountainous terrain (n=124)	[lnmount2] In natural log transformations, Stata transforms 0 to missing data, 1 to 0, and numbers between 0 to 1 into negative numbers. In the "mount" variable, since some nations were originally coded with a 0, some were coded with 1, and some were coded with values between 1 and 0, and in order to avoid missing data and negative numbers, the "mount2" variable was created in this way: mount2 = 1 + mount; Then, a natural log transformation of the mount2 variable was conducted.
Ethnic Fractionalization (n=133)	[ethnic_fract] Ethnic fractionalization is a measure of ethnic heterogeneity within the nation; 0= "complete homogeneity"; 1= "complete heterogeneity" (Alesina et al. 2003, p.166); Source: Alesina et al. (2003)
Language Fractionalization (n=131)	[lang_fract] Language fractionalization is a measure of linguistic heterogeneity within the nation; 0= "complete homogeneity"; 1= "complete heterogeneity" (Alesina et al. 2003, p.166); Source: Alesina et al. (2003)
Religion Fractionalization (n=134)	[rel_fract] Religion fractionalization is a measure of religious heterogeneity within the nation; 0= "complete homogeneity"; 1= "complete heterogeneity" (Alesina et al. 2003, p.166); Source: Alesina et al. (2003)
Ethnic dominance: share of the population in the largest ethnic group (n=136)	[plural] Percent of population in largest group. Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003); The variables "plural" and "second" were coded together. In cases where data was missing for one of the variables, the TIME Almanac (2013) was utilized to furnish data on both variables. The CIA World Factbook 2013 provided data on Palestine (West Bank; Gaza Strip data not available).

Ethnic polarization: share of the population in the second largest ethnic group (n=136)	[second] Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003); The variables “plural” and “second” were coded together. In cases where data was missing for one of the variables, the TIME (2013) Almanac was utilized to furnish data on both variables. The CIA World Factbook 2013 provided data on Palestine (West Bank; Gaza Strip data not available).

APPENDIX Q

CORRELATIONS OF PEACE INDEXES WITH GALLUP WORLD POLL (2010) ITEMS

	% military attacks on civilians never justified	% terrorism never justified	% non-violence will work	Trans GPI 2009	Trans GPI 2012	WPI 2009	WPI 2012	WPI dec-ade avg	Trans PPI 2012	POL 2012	MIL 2012
% military attacks on civilians never justified	1.0										
% terrorism never justified	.8315****	1.0									
% nonviolence will work	.0026	-.121	1.0								
TransGPI2009	.1911*	.2604**	-.2272*	1.0							
TransGPI2012	.1686	.2643**	-.2544**	.9537****	1.0						
WPI2009	.1582	.2541**	-.2429**	.8035****	.8091****	1.0					
WPI 2012	.1762	.2773**	-.2644**	.8122****	.8460****	.9389****	1.0				
WPI decade avg	.1938*	.3047***	-.2317*	.8123****	.8176****	.9710****	.9537****	1.0			
TransPPI2012	.1145	.3368***	-.2941**	.7432****	.7580****	.8132****	.8560****	.8684****	1.0		
POL 2012	.0968	.1918*	-.2055*	.7490****	.7961****	.8742****	.8953****	.8856****	.7313****	1.0	
MIL 2012	.1413	.0043	-.0185	.5115****	.5303****	.5389****	.5737****	.5202****	.2586*	.4231****	1.0
SOC 2012	.1699	.3611****	-.3239***	.5379****	.5204****	.6381****	.7226****	.6707****	.7518****	.4751****	.0378

Notes: Tests of significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; Sources: Gallup World Poll; Global Peace Index; World Peace Index

APPENDIX R

DATE OF SURVEYS FOR GALLUP WORLD POLL DATA

Afghanistan Oct_2009
Algeria Sep_2009
Angola Sep_2008
Argentina Aug_2009
Armenia Jul_2009
Australia Jun_2008
Austria Apr_2008
Azerbaijan Aug_2009
Bahrain May_2009
Bangladesh May_2009
Belarus Jul_2009
Belgium Jun_2008
Belize Oct_2007
Benin Aug_2008
Bolivia Aug_2009
Botswana Jul_2008
Brazil Sep_2009
Burkina Faso Apr_2008
Burundi Aug_2009
Cambodia Jun_2009
Cameroon Apr_2009
Canada Sep_2008
Cen African Repub Nov_2007
Chad Nov_2008
Chile Sep_2009
Colombia Aug_2009
Comoros Mar_2009
Dem Repub Congo Jun_2007
Repub Congo Sep_2008
Costa Rica Aug_2009
Cote dIvoire Apr_2009
Cyprus May_2009
Czech Repub Jun_2007
Denmark Apr_2008
Djibouti Sep_2008
Dominican Repub Nov_2008
Ecuador Sep_2009
Egypt Aug_2009
El Salvador Jul_2009
Estonia Jul_2009
Ethiopia May_2008
Finland Apr_2008
France Jun_2008
Georgia May_2009
Germany Jan_2009
Ghana Jul_2009
Greece Oct_2009
Guatemala Jul_2009
Guinea Dec_2007
Guyana Oct_2007
Haiti Dec_2008
Honduras Jul_2009
Hong Kong Nov_2008
Hungary Jun_2009
Iceland Dec_2008
India Jul_2008
Indonesia May_2009
Iran May_2008
Iraq Aug_2009
Ireland Apr_2008
Israel Oct_2008
Italy Jun_2008
Japan Aug_2009
Jordan Oct_2009
Kazakhstan Aug_2009
Kenya Apr_2009
South Korea Sep_2008
Kosovo Oct_2008
Kuwait Aug_2009
Kyrgyzstan Jul_2009
Laos Aug_2008
Latvia Aug_2009
Lebanon Aug_2009
Liberia May_2008
Lithuania Aug_2009
Luxembourg Jan_2009
Madagascar Aug_2008
Malawi Sep_2009
Malaysia Jul_2009
Mali Jun_2008
Malta Jan_2009
Mauritania Sep_2009
Mexico Aug_2009
Moldova Jul_2009
Mongolia Oct_2008
Morocco Jul_2009
Mozambique Jun_2008
Namibia Sep_2007
Nepal Jul_2009
Netherlands Jun_2008
New Zealand Jun_2008
Nicaragua Jul_2009
Niger Jun_2009
Nigeria Aug_2009
Norway Jun_2008
Pakistan May_2009
Palestinian Ter Aug_2009
Panama Aug_2009
Paraguay Aug_2009
Peru Aug_2009
Philippines Jun_2009
Poland Jan_2009
Portugal Oct_2008
Qatar Mar_2009
Romania Apr_2009
Russia Jun_2009
Rwanda Aug_2009
Saudi Arabia Aug_2009
Senegal Jun_2009
Sierra Leone Jun_2008
Singapore Jun_2009
Slovenia May_2009
South Africa Apr_2009
Spain Apr_2008
Sri Lanka Jun_2009
Sudan Aug_2009
Sweden Apr_2008
Syria Sep_2009
Taiwan Oct_2008
Tajikistan Aug_2009
Tanzania Jul_2008
Thailand Sep_2008
Togo Aug_2008
Trin and Tobago Oct_2008
Tunisia Aug_2009
Turkey Jul_2008
Uganda Jun_2009
Ukraine May_2009
UK Jun_2008
USA Aug_2008
Uruguay Aug_2009
Venezuela Aug_2009
Vietnam May_2009
Yemen Sep_2009
Zambia Jun_2008
Zimbabwe Jul_2009

APPENDIX S

OLS UNSTANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS FOR REGRESSION OF NONVIOLENT EFFICACY ITEM (GALLUP WORLD POLL) ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Independent variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Log GDP per capita	-4.585*** (.916)	-5.916*** (1.103)	-6.943*** (1.485)	-7.760*** (1.563)	-7.226** (1.488)	-6.711** (1.509)	-7.087*** (1.508)	-5.798*** (1.014)	-7.260*** (1.458)
Population total	-1.61 (9.68)	-1.51 (1.03)	-1.21 (1.00)	-1.18 (9.99)	-1.23 (9.97)	-1.06 (9.95)	-1.14 (9.86)	-1.92* (9.27)	-1.32 (9.89)
Years since war	.005 (.048)	-.050 (.080)	-.060 (.077)	-.064 (.078)	-.073 (.077)	-.146 (.089)	-.153† (.088)		-.161† (.087)
(Revised) Years since last nonviolent success	-.081*** (.023)	-.076*** (.023)	-.064** (.023)	-.067** (.023)	-.068** (.023)	-.061** (.023)	-.065** (.023)	-.079*** (.023)	-.062** (.023)
Historically peaceful (dummy)		1.867 (4.189)	3.963 (4.090)	4.522 (4.109)	4.966 (4.118)	5.073 (4.088)	5.537 (4.056)		5.671 (4.031)
War prone (dummy)		2.384 (5.004)	1.140 (4.864)	1.688 (4.857)	.538 (4.851)	7.346 (6.323)	7.60 (6.263)		7.187 (6.232)
Casualties		-5.86* (2.74)	-5.08† (2.66)	-5.39* (2.68)	-4.75† (2.66)	-3.89 (2.69)	-4.66† (2.70)		-4.16 (2.71)
DemIndex2010score		.936 (.696)	.706 (.678)	.599 (.688)	.864 (.682)	.890 (.677)	.656 (.683)		
Population density			-.004** (.001)	-.004*** (.001)	-.004** (.001)	-.004** (.001)	-.004*** (.001)		-.004*** (.001)
Percent urban population			.117 (.073)	.128† (.073)	.113 (.073)	.087 (.074)	.105 (.074)		.106 (.073)
Ethnic fractionalization				-6.875 (4.731)					
Religious fractionalization					-6.741 (4.368)	-6.542 (4.337)	-5.992 (4.306)		-6.092 (4.252)
Peace years						.213† (.128)	.202 (.127)		.195 (.126)
second (share of pop in 2nd largest ethnic group)							-17.749† (9.794)		-17.122† (9.682)
CivLib2010								1.046† (.532)	.849 (.547)
N	130	129	129	128	129	129	129	129	129
Adj R^2	.2633	.2931	.3444	.3517	.3520	.3616	.3739	.2943	.3818
High VIF (Mean VIF)	1.39 (1.20)	4.03 (2.13)	4.04 (2.32)	4.32 (2.31)	4.09 (2.24)	5.42 (2.71)	5.43 (2.62)	1.69 (1.35)	5.43 (2.59)

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; † = p≤ .10; * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .01; *** = p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests); The dependent variable is the national means for the nonviolent efficacy item (Gallup World Poll 2010): % "will work; The "revised" nonviolent history data comes from Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), the online *Global Nonviolent Action Database* (GNAD), and a few additional cases.

APPENDIX T

CROSS-NATIONAL GENDER GAPS IN NONVIOLENT ATTITUDES

Figure 1. Gender gaps at nation-level on “military attacks on civilians never justified” item (Gallup World Poll 2008-2009)



Note: Percentage difference by sex (nation-level data)

Figure 2. Gender gaps: Nations where *female* mean more peaceful than male mean by 5% or greater on "military attacks on civilians never justified" item (Gallup World Poll 2008-2009)



Figure 3. Gender gaps: Nations where *male* mean more peaceful than female mean by 4% or greater on "military attacks on civilians never justified" item (Gallup World Poll 2008-2009)



Figure 4. Gender gaps at the nation-level on “peaceful means alone will work” item (Gallup World Poll 2008-2009)



Figure 5. Gender gaps: Nations where *female* mean more peaceful than male mean by 5% or greater on "peaceful means alone will work" item (Gallup World Poll 2008-2009)



Figure 6. Gender gaps: Nations where *male* mean more peaceful than female mean by 4% or greater on "peaceful means alone will work" item (Gallup World Poll 2008-2009)



APPENDIX U

GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2008 – NATION SCORES AND RANKS

Rank/ Country/ Score

1 Iceland 1.176
2 Denmark 1.333
3 **Norway** 1.343
4 New Zealand 1.350
5 Japan 1.358
6 Ireland 1.410
7 Portugal 1.412
8 Finland 1.432
9 Luxembourg 1.446
10 Austria 1.449
11 Canada 1.451
12 Switzerland 1.465
13 Sweden 1.468
14 **Germany** 1.475
15 Belgium 1.485
16 Slovenia 1.491
17 Czech Republic 1.501
18 Hungary 1.576
19 **Chile** 1.576
20 Slovakia 1.576
21 Uruguay 1.606
22 Netherlands 1.607
23 Hong Kong 1.608
24 Romania 1.611
25 Oman 1.612
26 Bhutan 1.616
27 Australia 1.652
28 Italy 1.653
29 Singapore 1.673
30 Spain 1.683
31 Poland 1.687
32 South Korea 1.691
33 Qatar 1.694
34 **Costa Rica** 1.701
35 Estonia 1.702
36 France 1.707
37 Vietnam 1.720
37 Malaysia 1.721
39 Latvia 1.723
40 **Ghana** 1.723
41 Lithuania 1.723
42 UA Emirates 1.745
43 Madagascar 1.770
44 Taiwan 1.779
45 Kuwait 1.786
46 Botswana 1.792
47 Tunisia 1.797
48 Panama 1.797
49 United Kingdom 1.801
50 Mozambique 1.803
51 Laos 1.810
52 Cyprus 1.847
53 Zambia 1.856
54 Greece 1.867
55 Gabon 1.878
56 Argentina 1.895
57 Bulgaria 1.903
58 Tanzania 1.919
59 Nicaragua 1.919
60 Croatia 1.926
61 Libya 1.927
62 Cuba 1.954
63 Morocco 1.954
64 Equatorial Guinea 1.964
65 Jordan 1.969
66 Bosnia & Herz. 1.974
67 China 1.981
68 Indonesia 1.983
69 Egypt 1.987
70 Paraguay 1.997
71 Senegal 2.011
72 Kazakhstan 2.018
73 Malawi 2.024
74 Bahrain 2.025
75 Syria 2.027
76 Rwanda 2.030
77 Namibia 2.042
78 Bolivia 2.043
79 Albania 2.044
80 Peru 2.046
81 Burkina Faso 2.062
82 Dom. Repub. 2.069
83 Moldova 2.091
84 Ukraine 2.096
85 Serbia 2.110
86 Bangladesh 2.118
87 Macedonia 2.119
88 Mongolia 2.155
89 **El Salvador** 2.163
90 Brazil 2.168
91 Cambodia 2.179
92 Cameroon 2.182
93 Mexico 2.191
94 Belarus 2.194
95 Papua New Guinea 2.224
96 Jamaica 2.226
97 **USA** 2.227
98 Trinidad & Tobago 2.230
99 Mali 2.238
100 Ecuador 2.274
101 Azerbaijan 2.287
102 Turkmenistan 2.302
103 **Guatemala** 2.328
104 Honduras 2.335
105 Iran 2.341
106 Yemen 2.352
107 India 2.355
108 Saudi Arabia 2.357
109 Haiti 2.362
110 Angola 2.364
111 Uzbekistan 2.377
112 Algeria 2.378
113 Philippines 2.385
114 Uganda 2.391
115 Turkey 2.403
116 South Africa 2.412
117 Congo (Brazz.) 2.417
118 Thailand 2.424
119 Kenya 2.429
120 Mauritania 2.435
121 Ethiopia 2.439
122 Cote d' Ivoire 2.451
123 Venezuela 2.505
124 Zimbabwe 2.513
125 Sri Lanka 2.584
126 Myanmar 2.590
127 Pakistan 2.694
128 DRC 2.707
129 Nigeria 2.724
130 Colombia 2.757
131 Russia 2.777
132 Lebanon 2.840
133 North Korea 2.850
134 Cen. African Rep. 2.857
135 Chad 3.007
136 Israel 3.052
137 Afghanistan 3.126
138 Sudan 3.189
139 Somalia 3.293
140 Iraq 3.514

APPENDIX V

PARALLELS BETWEEN INDICATORS IN GPI 2012 AND WPI 2012

GPI 2012 Indicators	WPI 2012 Indicators	WPI 2012 Sub-Index Indicators		
		Political	Military-diplomatic	Socio-economic
1. Perceptions of criminality in society				
2. Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people				
3. Number of homicides per 100,000 people				
4. Number of jailed population per 100,000 people				
5. Ease of access to weapons of minor destruction				
6. Level of organized conflict (internal)	X (WPI measures much longer historical trajectories)	X		
7. Likelihood of violent demonstrations	X (WPI measures coups or riots in previous year)	X		
8. Level of violent crime				
9. Political instability	X	X		
10. Level of disrespect for human rights (Political Terror Scale)	X (WPI also measures external respect for human rights: treaties signed)	X	X	
11. Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons, as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people				
12. Terrorist acts	X	X		
13. Number of deaths from organized conflict (internal)	X (WPI measures much longer historical trajectories)	X		
14. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP	X		X	
15. Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people	X		X	
16. Funding for UN peacekeeping missions				
17. Aggregate number of heavy weapons per 100,000 people				
18. Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people				
19. Military capability/sophistication				
20. Number of displaced people as a percentage of the population				
21. Relations with neighbouring countries	X		X	
22. Number of external and internal conflicts fought: 2003-08	X (WPI measures much longer historical trajectories)	X	X	
23. Estimated number of deaths from organized conflict (external)	X (WPI measures much longer historical trajectories)		X	

Notes: X=close or rough parallel present. The most up-to-date indexes for both the WPI and GPI were selected for comparison. In the WPI 2012, the list of indicators was slightly refined, as some previously used indicators deemed insighificant were deleted. The WPI's Socio-economic sub-index involves indicators that are much closer to "positive peace" than the GPI attempts to measure. However, in 2012, the GPI also released a separate Positive Peace Index for the first time.

APPENDIX W

WPI 2012 INDICATORS

WPI 2012 Sub-Index Indicators		
Political	Military-diplomatic	Socio-economic
Frequency of civil wars in 1945-1979 (0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice or more)	Frequency of Wars in 1945-1979 (0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice or More)	Ecological and Social Safety in 2011 (Occurrence of major accidents, incidents, disasters) (0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice or more)
Size of casualties from civil wars in 1945-1979 (0=Less than 1/10,000 per population; 1= 1/10,000 or more)	Size of casualties from wars in 1945-1979 (0=None or less than 1/10,000 per population; 1= 1/10,000 or more)	Unemployment Rate (0=Minimum – 1=Maximim)
Frequency of civil wars in 1980 and afterward (0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice or more)	Site of Wars in 1945-1979 (0=No War or in Foreign Territory; 1=Domestic Territory or Same Continent)	Inflation Rate (0=Minimum – 1=Maximim)
Size of casualties from civil wars in 1980 and afterward (0=Less than 1/10,000 per population; 1= 1/10,000 or more)	Victory or Defeat from Wars in 1945-1979 (0=No War or Victory; 1=Defeat)	Multidimensional Poverty Index (0=Minimum – 1=Maximim) [UNDP Human Development Report 2010-2011]
Political Conflicts such as Coup d'état or Riots since 1945 (0=None since 1945; 1=Occurred from 1945-1979; 2=Occurred from 1980 and afterward)	Frequency of Wars in 1980 and afterward (0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice or More)	Income Inequality: GINI Index (0=Minimum – 1=Maximim) [UNDP Human Development Report 2011]
Democratization: Political Rights Protection (0=very bad – 6=very good) [Freedom House data]	Size of casualties from wars in 1980 and after (0=None or less than 1/10,000 per population; 1= 1/10,000 or more)	Gender Inequality: Gender Inequality Index (0=Minimum – 1=Maximim) [UNDP Human Development Report 2010-2011]
Democratization: Freedom of citizens (0=very bad – 6=very good) [Freedom House data]	Site of Wars in 1980 and afterward (0=No War or in Foreign Territory; 1=Domestic Territory or Same Continent)	Human Development Index reflecting Income, Education and Health (0=Minimum – 1=Maximim) [UNDP Human Development Report 2011]
UNDP Human Rights Index (0=very bad – 4=very good)	Victory or Defeat from Wars in 1980 and after (0=No War or Victory; 1=Defeat)	
Ratified International Conventions (0=None – 9=All Nine)	Experience of Colonial Rule (0=No; 1=Yes)	
Political Transparency (0=very bad – 10=very good, very transparent) [Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2011]	Year of the Formation of Independent State (0=Before 20th century; 1=1900-1949; 2= 1950 and afterward)	
Civil Wars in 2011 (0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice or More)	Nation's Power (0=Superpower; 1=International Power; 2=Regional Power; 3=Others)	
Political Conflicts such as Coup d'état or Riots in 2011 (0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice or More)	Number of Neighboring States (0=None; 1=One; 2=Two or More)	

Political Settlements or Policies to Resolve Domestic Conflicts in 2011 (0=None; 1=Reached)	Relations with Neighboring Powers: Number of Neighboring States with Equal or Superior Status (0=None; 1=One; 2=Two or More)	
	Number of Natioons in Enduring Rivalry (0=None; 1=One or More)	
	Potential Territorial Dispute (0=None; 1=One or More)	
	Ratio of Military Expenditure over GDP (0=Minimum value – 1=Maximum value)	
	Military Force per Population (0=Minimum value – 1=Maximum value)	
	International Treaties against Weapons of Mass Destruction and its Experiments (0=None; 0.5=Signature, Non-ratification; 1=One Convention; 2=Two Conventions; 3=All)	
	All-out Wars in 2011: Occurrence and Location (0=None; 1=Occurred in non-neighboring states; 2=Occurred in neighboring states)	
	Use of Force Other than Wars, or Acts of Violence in 2011 (0=None; 1=Once; 2=Twice or more, and/ or strong conflicts)	
	Peace Enhancing Events (Treaties, Arms Reduction, etc.) in 2011 (0=None; 1=Made)	

Notes: While many of the indicators above incorporate important historical factors lacking from the GPI, some of the coding schemes are relatively crude. To take one example, for the indicator "Victory or Defeat from Wars in 1980 and after," nations that experienced no war are conflated with those that experienced victory as both receive a code of "0." Yet, a victory in a war can have enormous consequences, including cultivating beligerant attitudes in the population. To take another example, the size of casualties are reduced to only two categories. For information on how the variables are standardized and the indexes calculated, see the WPI 2012 report available online.

APPENDIX X

OLYMPIC COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS

The 205 “countries” recognized by the International Olympic Committee as National Olympic Committees and their three-letter abbreviations. Kosovo lacks an official abbreviation, but was assigned “KVO” for this study. An asterisk (*) denotes a territory and not an independent country (Retrieved 2/14/2012 from http://geography.about.com/od/countryinformation/a/olympiccodes.htm)

Afghanistan - AFG
Albania - ALB
Algeria - ALG
American Samoa* - ASA
Andorra - AND
Angola - ANG
Antigua and Barbuda - ANT
Argentina - ARG
Armenia - ARM
Aruba* - ARU
Australia - AUS
Austria - AUT
Azerbaijan - AZE
The Bahamas - BAH
Bahrain - BRN
Bangladesh - BAN
Barbados - BAR
Belarus - BLR
Belgium - BEL
Belize - BIZ
Bermuda* - BER
Benin - BEN
Bhutan - BHU
Bolivia - BOL
Bosnia and Herzegovina - BIH
Botswana - BOT
Brazil - BRA
British Virgin Islands* - IVB
Brunei - BRU
Bulgaria - BUL
Burkina Faso - BUR
Burundi - BDI
Cambodia - CAM
Cameroon - CMR
Canada - CAN
Cape Verde - CPV
Cayman Islands* - CAY
Central African Republic - CAF
Chad - CHA
Chile - CHI
China - CHN
Colombia - COL
Comoros - COM
Congo, Republic of the - CGO
Congo, Democratic Republic of the - COD
Cook Islands* - COK
Costa Rica - CRC
Cote d'Ivoire - CIV
Croatia - CRO
Cuba - CUB
Cyprus - CYP
Czech Republic - CZE
Denmark - DEN
Djibouti - DJI
Dominica - DMA
Dominican Republic - DOM
East Timor (Timor-Leste) - TLS
Ecuador - ECU
Egypt - EGY
El Salvador - ESA
Equatorial Guinea - GEQ
Eritrea - ERI
Estonia - EST
Ethiopia - ETH
Fiji - FIJ
Finland - FIN
France - FRA
Gabon - GAB
The Gambia - GAM
Georgia - GEO
Germany - GER
Ghana - GHA
Greece - GRE
Grenada - GRN
Guam* - GUM
Guatemala - GUA
Guinea - GUI
Guinea-Bissau - GBS
Guyana - GUY
Haiti - HAI
Honduras - HON
Hong Kong* - HKG
Hungary - HUN
Iceland - ISL
India - IND
Indonesia - INA
Iran - IRI
Iraq - IRQ
Ireland - IRL
Israel - ISR
Italy - ITA
Jamaica - JAM
Japan - JPN
Jordan - JOR
Kazakhstan - KAZ
Kenya - KEN
Kiribati - KIR
Korea, North (PDR of Korea) - PRK
Korea, South - KOR
Kuwait - KUW
Kyrgyzstan - KGZ
Laos - LAO
Latvia - LAT
Lebanon - LIB
Lesotho - LES
Liberia - LBR
Libya - LBA
Liechtenstein - LIE
Lithuania - LTU
Luxembourg - LUX
Macedonia - MKD
(Officially: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
Madagascar - MAD
Malawi - MAW
Malaysia - MAS
Maldives - MDV
Mali - MLI
Malta - MLT
Marshall Islands - MHL
Mauritania - MTN
Mauritius - MRI
Mexico - MEX
Federated States of Micronesia - FSM
Moldova - MDA
Monaco - MON
Mongolia - MGL
Montenegro - MNE
Morocco - MAR
Mozambique - MOZ
Myanmar (Burma) - MYA
Namibia - NAM
Nauru - NRU
Nepal - NEP

Netherlands - NED
Netherlands Antilles* - AHO
New Zealand - NZL
Nicaragua - NCA
Niger - NIG
Nigeria - NGR
Norway - NOR
Oman - OMA
Pakistan - PAK
Palau - PLW
Palestine* - PLE
Panama - PAN
Papua New Guinea - PNG
Paraguay - PAR
Peru - PER
Philippines - PHI
Poland - POL
Portugal - POR
Puerto Rico* - PUR
Qatar - QAT
Romania - ROU
Russian Federation - RUS
Rwanda - RWA
Saint Kitts and Nevis - SKN
Saint Lucia - LCA
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines - VIN
Samoa - SAM
San Marino - SMR
Sao Tome and Principe - STP
Saudi Arabia - KSA
Senegal - SEN
Serbia - SRB
Seychelles - SEY
Sierra Leone - SLE
Singapore - SIN
Slovakia - SVK
Slovenia - SLO
Solomon Islands - SOL
Somalia - SOM
South Africa - RSA
Spain - ESP
Sri Lanka - SRI
Sudan - SUD
Suriname - SUR
Swaziland - SWZ
Sweden - SWE
Switzerland - SUI
Syria - SYR
Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) - TPE
Tajikistan - TJK
Tanzania - TAN
Thailand - THA
Togo - TOG
Tonga - TGA
Trinidad and Tobago - TRI
Tunisia - TUN
Turkey - TUR
Turkmenistan - TKM
Tuvalu - TUV
Uganda - UGA
Ukraine - UKR
United Arab Emirates - UAE
United Kingdom (Great Britain) - GBR
United States - USA
Uruguay - URU
Uzbekistan - UZB
Vanuatu - VAN
Venezuela - VEN
Vietnam - VIE
Virgin Islands* - ISV
Yemen - YEM
Zambia - ZAM
Zimbabwe – ZIM

APPENDIX Y

NONVIOLENT INDEX

NV Index Rank/ Mean/ Nation	indneverjust	nvworks	milneverjust
1) 84.3333 Tunisia	92	68	93
2) 82 Finland	94	68	84
82 Spain	93	62	91
3) 80.6667 Georgia	81	82	79
4) 80.3333 Liberia	80	84	77
5) 79.3333 Mauritania	84	69	85
6) 78.6667 Uruguay	83	72	81
7) 76.6667 Greece	82	80	68
8) 76 Paraguay	86	59	83
9) 75.6667 Hungary	86	62	79
10) 75.3333 Argentina	83	65	78
11) 75 Iraq	90	45	90
75 Egypt	86	53	86
12) 74.6667 Kazakhstan	77	76	71
74.6667 Costa Rica	76	73	75
13) 73.3333 Nicaragua	76	71	73
14) 73 Ghana	74	73	72
15) 72.6667 Madagascar	67	85	66
16) 72.3333 Philippines	71	79	67
72.3333 Japan	94	33	90
17) 72 Kenya	81	63	72
72 Burundi	79	65	72
18) 71.6667 Chile	80	61	74
71.6667 Mali	82	66	67
19) 71 Ireland	79	65	69
20) 70.6667 Sweden	79	59	74
70.6667 Sierra Leone	70	76	66
21) 70.3333 Australia	88	55	68
70.3333 Estonia	80	53	78
70.3333 Zimbabwe	85	46	80
22) 70 Latvia	80	57	73
23) 69.6667 Indonesia	81	51	77
69.6667 Lebanon	95	57	57
24) 69.3333 Austria	82	48	78
69.3333 Burkina Faso	78	54	76
69.3333 Ecuador	74	60	74
69.3333 Morocco	74	62	72
25) 69 Armenia	72	72	63
69 Canada	82	61	64
26) 68.3333 Germany	84	48	73
68.3333 Colombia	78	64	63
27) 68 Pakistan	66	73	65
28) 67.3333 Repub of Korea	85	45	72
67.3333 Saudi Arabia	72	44	86
67.3333 Russian Fed	70	63	69

29) 67 El Salvador	71	59	71
67 Norway	84	48	69
30) 66.3333 Niger	70	70	59
66.3333 Palestine	76	42	81
66.3333 Peru	76	52	71
31) 65.3333 Netherlands	88	47	61
65.3333 Algeria	79	42	75
65.3333 Italy	78	54	64
65.3333 Ukraine	68	61	67
65.3333 Nigeria	71	62	63
32) 65 Romania	75	50	70
33) 64.6667 Namibia	68	56	70
34) 64.3333 Turkey	64	61	68
35) 64 Chad	66	60	66
36) 63.6667 Bolivia	68	54	69
63.6667 Benin	59	76	56
37) 63.3333 Brazil	71	55	64
63.3333 Belarus	69	56	65
38) 63 Mexico	68	56	65
63 Dem Rep Congo (Kins.)	67	58	64
63 Laos	87	20	82
39) 62.6667 South Africa	67	61	60
40) 62.3333 Senegal	66	64	57
62.3333 Denmark	81	47	59
62.3333 Malaysia	74	38	75
41) 61 Zambia	64	57	62
42) 60.6667 New Zealand	75	49	58
43) 59.3333 Panama	64	54	60
59.3333 Uganda	59	53	66
59.3333 Azerbaijan	58	58	62
59.3333 USA	76	54	48
44) 58.6667 Dominican Republic	61	60	55
45) 58.3333 Guatemala	59	60	56
58.3333 Iran	70	38	67
46) 58 Belize	65	45	64
58 Repub of Moldova	60	65	49
47) 57.6667 France	74	37	62
48) 57 Mongolia	61	58	52
57 Cameroon	55	60	56
49) 56.6667 Lithuania	66	42	62
50) 56 Kyrgyzstan	44	77	47
56 UK	71	52	45
56 Sri Lanka	82	39	47
51) 55 Poland	68	37	60
52) 54.6667 Belgium	63	46	55
53) 53.3333 Botswana	58	57	45
54) 52.3333 Honduras	53	50	54
55) 50 Israel	73	33	44
56) 48.3333 Central African Repub	32	76	37
57) 46 Djibouti	31	58	49

58) 45.3333 Czech Republic	62	25	49
59) 44 Thailand	65	28	39
60) 43.6667 Vietnam	63	8	60
61) 42.3333 India	48	40	39
62) 41 Singapore	53	24	46
63) 38.6667 Guyana	41	46	29
64) 37.3333 Bangladesh	28	73	11
65) 36 Cambodia	24	54	30
66) 34.6667 Nepal	8	84	12

NOTE: indivneverjust = % citizens affirming individual attacks on civilians “never justified”; nvworks = % citizens affirming peaceful means alone “will work”; milneverjust = % citizens affirming military attacks on civilians “never justified”; nvmean = mean % of citizens affirming nonviolent attitudes [This is the average of the three Gallup World Poll 2008 questions, referred to here as the “Nonviolent Index”]; Note that during the course of this study, the Gallup World Poll released their own “Violence Index” based on the same data. *Data source*: Gallup World Poll 2008

Figure 1. WPI 2012 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010)



Figure 2. GPI 2012 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010)



Figure 3. GPI 2009 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010)



Figure 4. MIL2009 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010)



Figure 5. MIL2012 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010)



Figure 6. WPI2009 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010)



Figure 7. WPI Decade Average and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010)



Figure 8. POL2012 and Nonviolent Index (Gallup World Poll 2010)



APPENDIX Z

GRAPHING INDICATORS OF PEACEFUL NATIONS

Figure 1. Graphing Mean Attitudes Towards Terrorism and Military Force



Note: For the Pew item: "% Disagree" = Respondents who answered "Disagree" + Respondents who answered "Strongly Disagree"; If Costa Rican student results from the present survey sample could be graphed above, they would rank slightly more peaceful than Argentina (ARG) on both indicators as 41% of Costa Rican students Disagreed that "Military force is sometimes necessary" (replication of the Pew question); 90% of Costa Rican students affirmed that "individual attacks on civilians are never justified" (Gallup question). This would make Costa Rica one of the top 5 most peaceful nations above, if the indicators were weighted equally. However, we established in Chapter 5 that Costa Rican University students' mean score was +14% more peaceful than the general population of Costa Rica on the "individual attacks" item.

Figure 2. Graphing GPI Scores By Mean Attitudes Towards Military Force



Figure 3. Graphing GPI Scores By Mean Attitudes on State Terrorism



Figure 4. Graphing GPI Scores By Mean Attitudes on State Terrorism



Figure 5. GPI Scores By Mean Attitudes on Pragmatic Nonviolence



APPENDIX AA

UNSTANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS FOR OLS REGRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (OBJECTIVE/ SUBJECTIVE PEACE INDICATORS)

Variable	Cluster Bomb Signatory States		Landmine Treaty States Parties		CNTBT States Parties		ICC States Parties	
	B (*t*)	Adj. R^2	B (*t*)	Adj. R^2	B (*t*)	Adj. R^2	B (*t*)	Adj. R^2
milneverjust	6.34* (1.99)	.0306	5.18 (1.38)	.0095	4.54 (.96)	-.0008	1.63 (.49)	-.0082
nvworks	4.21 (1.43)	.0111	7.19* (2.12)	.0359	6.59 (1.54)	.0143	6.51* (2.19)	.0389
GPI 2008	.14 (1.52)	.0136	.24* (2.24)	.0410	.58*** (4.68)	.1816	.36*** (3.95)	.1344
population in millions	-53.50 (-1.97)	.0297	-77.42* (-2.46)	.0512	-24.55 (-0.61)	-.0068	-57.47* (-2.06)	.0336
% urban	1.86 (0.40)	-.0090	2.49 (0.46)	-.0084	11.00 (1.65)	.0180	5.20 (1.10)	.0023

Notes: N=95; Unstandardized regression coefficient; Numbers in parentheses are *t*-statistics; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; **** = p < .0001; ICC = International Criminal Court; CNTBT = Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; The GPI score for each nation was transformed (GPI score X (-1) + 4) so that the most peaceful countries in the GPI have the highest scores (with 3 the most peaceful score and 0 the least peaceful score possible); In each case, the treaty (binary or "dummy" variable) was used as the independent variable. Independent variables were entered in one at a time (rather than in multiple regressions); "nvworks" = % of respondents affirming that peaceful means alone will work for oppressed groups; "milneverjust" = % of respondents affirming that military attacks on civilians are never justified; "States Parties" = states that have completed ratification or accession. In the case of the Cluster Bomb Treaty (which opened for signature in December of 2008) there are 108 signatory states, but only 69 states parties (nations that have ratified the treaty). It was decided to use signatory states in the Cluster Bomb regression because the treaty has entered into force and presumably, most of the signatory states will eventually ratify it. Moreover, nations signing a treaty help to create international norms and consensus even if domestic politics present barriers and result in long struggles to ratify a treaty. The Land Mine Treaty opened for signature in 1997, but now that it has entered into force "states may no longer sign it, rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession" (ICBL 2012). When the regression was run on the ratifying nations of the Cluster Bomb treaty, only the GPI 2008 variable is significant and it is significant at the .01 level. The CNTBT has not yet entered into force because key nations have not yet ratified it. Sources: Gallup World Poll 2008; UN 2012, ICBL 2012, CTBTO 2012, ICC 2012

APPENDIX BB

U.S. AS OUTLIER

Figure 1. GPI 2008 Rank by Type of Society with Trendline



Notes: 1= Postindustrial; 2=Industrial; 3=Agrarian; Sources: Norris and Inglehart (2004, p.247); GPI 2008

Figure 2. GPI 2008 Rank by Type of State



Notes: 1=older democracy; 2=newer democracy; 3=semi-democracy; 4=non-democratic; Sources: Norris and Inglehart (2004, pp.248-249); GPI 2008

Figure 3. GPI 2008 Rank by World-System Position



Notes: 1=core; 2=semi-periphery; 3=periphery; Sources: Boswell and Dixon (1990); GPI 2008

Figure 4. GPI 2008 Rank by War Proneness



Notes: N=44; In this data set, "years of periodic wars and on-going insurgencies are counted in half-year increments and added to totals of more conventional conflicts" (Sullivan 1991, p.46); Source: Sullivan (1991)

APPENDIX CC

PEACE INDICATORS FROM THE LARGEST CROSS-NATIONAL POLLS

Table 1. Rank orders of subjectively peaceful nations: national percentages of peaceful attitudes as measured by the largest cross-national polls. [case studies are in **bold**]

2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey		2005 World Values Survey		
Sometimes military force is necessary to maintain order in the world (% "Mostly disagree" and "Completely disagree")	Sometimes military force is necessary to maintain order in the world (% "Completely disagree")	Non-military priorities (% NOT assigning "strong defense" as 1st or 2nd priority of their nation)	Willing to fight for country (% claiming NOT willing to fight)	Domestic violence (% saying that for a man to beat his wife is "never justified")
1) 59 Egypt	1) 29 Egypt	1) 97.2 Andorra	1) 75.4 Japan	1) 96.4 Andorra
2) 58 Jordan	1) 29 Jordan	2) 91.7 Slovenia	2) 62.8 Iraq	2) 96.3 Argentina
2) 58 **Germany**	1) 29 **Germany**	3) 91.3 **Germany**	3) 62.6 **Germany**	3) 93.6 Canada
3) 53 South Korea	2) 25 Bulgaria	4) 91.2 Sweden	4) 58.1 Andorra	4) 92.5 Sweden
4) 51 Slovakia	3) 24 Tanzania	4) 91.2 Uruguay	5) 56.6 Italy	5) 91 Italy
4) 51 Bulgaria	4) 23 Slovakia	5) 89.2 Switzerland	6) 55.4 Spain	6) 90.8 France
5) 50 Ethiopia	5) 22 Argentina	6) 87.9 Netherlands	7) 52.4 Netherlands	7) 90.7 Australia
6) 44 Ukraine	6) 19 Uganda	7) 86.5 Italy	8) 46.9 Uruguay	7) 90.7 Georgia
7) 40 Argentina	6) 19 Palestine Ter.	8) 84.6 Guatemala	9) 41.6 **Chile**	8) 90.5 Colombia
7) 40 Uganda	7) 18 Ethiopia	9) 83.6 Mexico	10) 40.4 Argentina	9) 89.5 Netherlands
8) 38 Lebanon	8) 17 Ukraine	10) 82.7 Peru	11) 39.6 Canada	10) 89 Poland
9) 37 Poland	9) 15 France	11) 80.9 **Norway**	12) 39.4 Bulgaria	11) 88.5 Indonesia
10) 36 Czech Republic	9) 15 Lebanon	11) 80.9 **Chile**	13) 38.9 France	12) 88.3 **Chile**
11) 35 **Chile**	10) 14 Czech Republic	11) 80.9 France	14) 38.8 Serbia	13) 88.1 **Norway**
12) 34 Japan	11) 13 South Korea	12) 80.1 Canada	15) 38.5 UK	14) 87.7 Spain
12) 34 Tanzania	12) 12 **Chile**	13) 79.5 Spain	16) 38.2 Brazil	15) 87.6 UK
12) 34 Palestine Ter.	12) 12 Malaysia	14) 78.3 **New Zealand**	17) 37.1 **New Zealand**	16) 86.5 Jordan
13) 33 France	12) 12 Morocco	15) 77.8 Moldova	18) 36.9 **USA**	17) 85 **USA**
14) 32 Malaysia	13) 11 Poland	16) 76 Serbia	19) 36.4 S. Africa	18) 83.4 Brazil
14) 32 Bolivia	13) 11 **Ghana**	17) 75.9 Bulgaria	20) 35.6 Australia	19) 82.9 Finland
15) 31 Russia	14) 10 Sweden	18) 74.2 Trinidad & Tob.	21) 35.2 Zambia	20) 82.2 Russia
16) 29 **Ghana**	14) 10 Canada	19) 74 Poland	22) 34.1 Switzerland	21) 81.3 Slovenia
17) 28 China	14) 10 Bolivia	20) 72.8 Argentina	23) 32.3 Romania	22) 80.8 Trinidad & Tob.
17) 28 Britain	14) 10 Russia	21) 72 Finland	24) 31.9 Trinidad & Tob.	23) 80.7 Switzerland
18) 27 Spain	14) 10 Kuwait	22) 71.7 S. Korea	25) 31.8 Moldova	24) 80.4 Uruguay
18) 27 Canada	14) 10 Kenya	23) 70.7 UK	26) 30.7 Ukraine	25) 79.4 Romania
18) 27 Peru	15) 9 Peru	24) 70.4 Romania	27) 30.4 Guatemala	26) 79.3 Vietnam
18) 27 Venezuela	15) 9 Britain	25) 69.7 Brazil	28) 30.1 Georgia	27) 78.1 Turkey
19) 26 Senegal	15) 9 Spain	26) 68.9 Japan	29) 27.3 S. Korea	28) 78 Cyprus
20) 25 Mexico	15) 9 Nigeria	27) 68.5 Ukraine	30) 25.5 Slovenia	29) 77.6 Ethiopia
21) 24 Kenya	15) 9 Senegal	28) 68.1 S. Africa	31) 25.0 Poland	30) 76.8 Mexico
21) 24 Mali	16) 8 South Africa	29) 66.7 Taiwan	32) 24.5 Mexico	31) 76.6 Taiwan
22) 23 Indonesia	16) 8 Japan	30) 66.4 Ethiopia	33) 23.1 Morocco	32) 75.2 China
22) 23 Nigeria	16) 8 Ivory Coast	31) 65.5 Burkina Faso	33) 23.1 Ethiopia	33) 74.9 Japan
23) 22 Israel	16) 8 Venezuela	32) 64 Iran	34) 22.9 Peru	34) 74.6 S. Korea
23) 22 Italy	17) 7 Mali	33) 61.8 Zambia	35) 20.7 Malaysia	35) 74 Iran
23) 22 South Africa	17) 7 Indonesia	34) 61.2 Vietnam	36) 19.9 Egypt	36) 73.8 Bulgaria
23) 22 Ivory Coast	17) 7 Italy	35) 60.2 Morocco	37) 19.1 Cyprus	37) 72.8 Moldova

24) 21 Morocco	18) 6 **USA**	36) 59.8 India	38) 18.7 Iran	38) 72.4 Ukraine
24. 21 Sweden	18) 6 Turkey	37) 59.4 Australia	39) 18.6 India	39) 71.6 **Germany**
25) 20 **USA**	18) 6 China	38) 57.7 **Ghana**	40) 16.7 Russia	40) 66.6 Morocco
26) 19 Turkey	19) 5 Brazil	39) 57.2 Indonesia	41) 15.7 Finland	41) 63.1 S. Africa
27) 16 Kuwait	19) 5 Mexico	40) 54 Malaysia	42) 14.7 Burkina Faso	42) 61.2 India
28) 15 Brazil	20) 4 Israel	41) 51.6 Turkey	43) 14.2 Sweden	43) 60.1 **Ghana**
29) 14 Pakistan	20) 4 Bangladesh	42) 51.2 Mali	44) 13.5 Taiwan	44) 50.2 Rwanda
30) 11 Bangladesh	21) 3 Pakistan	43) 51 China	45) 13.1 China	45) 48.5 Burkina Faso
31) 10 India	21) 3 India	44) 49.1 Russia	46) 12.4 **Norway**	46) 45.2 Serbia
		45) 47.1 Cyprus	47) 11.8 Mali	47) 43.3 Malaysia
		46) 44.9 Thailand	48) 10.9 **Ghana**	48) 37.9 Mali
		47) 43 Jordan	49) 10.1 Thailand	49) 37.5 Thailand
		48) 38.3 Egypt	50) 7.7 Indonesia	50) 31.8 Zambia
		49) 36.3 **USA**	51) 6.2 Jordan	
		50) 32.9 Georgia	52) 4.8 Rwanda	
		51) 32.4 Rwanda	53) 4.6 Vietnam	
			54) 2.8 Turkey	

Note: Case studies in **bold**.

APPENDIX DD

CROSS-NATIONAL SAMPLE OF GOVERNMENT-APPROVED SECONDARY SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

Chile

Montero, Verónica Méndez, Carolina Santelices Ariztía, Rodrigo Martínez Iturriaga, and Isidora Puga Serrano. 2009. *Historia, Geografía, y Ciencias Sociales (2° Educación Media).* Santiago, Chile: Santillana del Pacífico S.A. de Ediciones.

Rivas, Marina Loreto Donoso, Lucía Victoria Valencia Castañeda, Daniel Palma Alvarado, Rolando Eugenio Álvarez Vallejos. 2006. *Historia y Ciencias Sociales (2° Educación Media – Años 2007 y 2008).* Santiago, Chile: Santillana del Pacífico S.A. de Ediciones.

Costa Rica

Bolaños Herrera, Raquel, Emilia Gamboa Escalante, and German Vasquez Agüero. 2010. *Estudios Sociales 10*. San José, Costa Rica: BIS Costa Rica S.A. [**Textbook A**]

Bolaños Herrera, Raquel, Emilia Gamboa Escalante, and German Vasquez Agüero. 2010. *Estudios Sociales 11*. San José, Costa Rica: BIS Costa Rica S.A. [**Textbook B**]

Ortiz Estrada, Gustavo, Maria Norys Naranjo Obando, and Gilbert Vargas Ulate. 2008. *Nuevos Horizontes 10-11*. San José, Costa Rica: Eduvisión. [**Textbook F**]

Quirós Morales de Vallejos, Angela. 2010. *Fichas de Estudios Sociales 10*. 2010. San José, Costa Rica: Litografia e Imprenta LIL. [**Textbook C**]

Quirós Morales de Vallejos, Angela. 2009. *Fichas de Estudios Sociales 10-11*. 2009. San José, Costa Rica: Litografia e Imprenta LIL. [**Textbook D**]

Quirós Morales de Vallejos, Angela. 1998. *Temario, Activadades y Practicas de Estudios Sociales Para Bachillerato 10-11*. San José, Costa Rica: Litografia e Imprenta LIL. [**Textbook G**]

Ulate, Gilbert Vargas, Carol Gonzalez Diaz, Warner Ruiz Chaves, Gustavo Ortiz Estrada, and Maria Norys Naranjo Obando. 2010. *Continentes 11*. San José, Costa Rica: Eduvisión. [**Textbook E**]

El Salvador

Ministerio de Educación [MINED]. 2009. *Historia 2 El Salvador* [Formato digital]. Plan Nacional de Educación 2021. San Salvador, El Salvador: www.mined.gob.sv.

Germany

(Texts utilized in secondary schools in the Rheinland-Pfalz region)

Bahr, Frank (ed.). 2011. *Horizonte II: Geschichte fur die Sekundarstufe II in Hessen; Von der Amerikanischen Revolution bis zum Nationalsozialismus*. Braunschweig, Germany: Westermann.
[Horizons II: History for secondary education in Hesse, From the American Revolution to the Nazis.]

Sellen, Albrecht. 2010. *Geschichte 2: Kurz & Klar*. Stuttgart, Germany: Ernst Klett Verlag.
[History 2: Short & Clear]

Ghana

Gadzepko, Seth Kordzo. 2005. *History of Ghana Since Pre-History*. Accra, Ghana: Excellent Publishing and Printing.

Prah, Isaac Kwesi. 2010. *Government* (3rd ed.). For Senior Secondary Schools (Designed for
Senior High Schools), Based on WASSCE Syllabus. Takoradi, Ghana: Saint Francis Press.

Guatemala

Editora Educativa (EE). 2011? [no date, but curriculum in use in schools in 2011]
Estudios Sociales 1 (Nueva Edició), Primero Básico, Séptimo Grado. Ciclo de Educación Básica. Guatemala City, Guatemala: Editora Educativa.

Editora Educativa (EE). 2011b?. [no date, but curriculum in use in schools in 2011]
Ciencias Sociales 2, Segundo Básico. Ciclo de Educación Básica. Guatemala City, Guatemala: Editora Educativa LA MARCA.

Editora Educativa (EE). 2011c?. [no date, but curriculum in use in schools in 2011]
Ciencias Sociales 3, Tercero Básico. Ciclo de Educación Básica. Guatemala City, Guatemala: Editora Educativa LA MARCA.

Norway

Abrahamsen, Olav Arild, Ståle Dyrvik, May-Brith Ohman Nielsen, and Andreas Aase. 2008.
Portal:Nyere Historie (Verdenshistorie og Norgeshistorie Etter 1750). Oslo, Norway: Bokmål/ Det norske Samlaget.

Figved, Paul B., Kåre Fossum, and Per Aarrestad. 1976. *Historie 3: Grunnbok for 9. skoleår*. Oslo, Norway: Bokmål/ J.W. Cappelens Forlag AS.

Grimnes, Øhren, Eriksen, Wiig, Ertresvaag, Eliassen, and Skovholt. 2008. *Tidslinjer 2: Verden og Norge (Historie Vg3)*. Oslo, Norway: Bokmål/ H. Aschehoug & Co. (W. Nygaard).

United States

Appleby, Joyce, Alan Brinkley, Albert S. Broussard, James M. McPherson, and Donald A. Ritchie. 2005. *The American Vision* [Florida Vision]. New York: McGraw Hill.

Ayers, Edward L., Robert D. Schulzinger, Jesus F. de la Teja, and Deborah Gray White. 2009. *American Anthem*. Austin, Texas: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Bass, Herbert J., George A. Billias, and Emma Jones Lapsansky. 1979. *Our American Heritage*. Morristown, New Jersey: Silver Burdett.

Bidna, David B., Morris S. Greenberg, and Jerold H. Spitz. 1971. *We the People: A History of the United States of America* (Teacher's Edition). Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath.

Bragdon, Henry W. and Samuel P. McCutchen. 1961. *History of a Free People*. New York: Macmillan.

Brady, Marion and Howard Brady. 1977. *Idea and Action in American History*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Clark, Thomas D. (ed.). 1960. *Freedom's Frontier: A History of Our Country*. Chicago: Lyons and Carnahan.

Conlin, Joseph R. 1985. *A History of the United States: Our Land, Our Time* (Annotated Teacher's Edition). San Diego: Coronado Publishers.

Danzer, Gerald A., J. Jorge Klor de Alva, Louis E. Wilson, and Nancy Woloch. 1999. *The Americans: Reconstruction through the 20th Century* (Teacher's Edition). Evanston, Illinois: McDougal Littell.

Davidson, James West and Mark H. Lytle. 1984. *The United States: A History of the Republic*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Davidson, James West, and Mark H. Lytle. 1990. *The United States: A History of the Republic*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Davidson, James West and Michael B. Stoff. 1998. *The American Nation* (Annotated Teacher's Edition). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

DiBacco, Thomas V., Lorna C. Mason, and Christian G. Appy. 1991. *History of the United States*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Faragher, John Mack, Mari Jo Buhl, Daniel Czitrom, and Susan H. Armitage. 2004. *Out of Many: A History of the American People* (Brief Fourth Edition). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education.

FEP. 1971. *Perspectives in United States History* (Teacher's Edition). San Francisco: Field Educational Publications, Inc.

Garcia, Jesus, Donna M. Ogle, C. Frederick Risinger, and Joyce Stevos. 2005. *Creating America: A History of the United States* (Teacher's Edition). Evanston, Illinois: McDougal Littell.

Garraty, John A. 1982. *American History* (Teacher's Edition). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Garraty, John A. 1991. *The Story of America* (Annotated Teacher's Edition). Chicago: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich/ Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Giese, James R., Matthew T. Downey, and Mauricio Mazon. 1999. *The American Century: A History of the U.S. in Modern Times* (Teacher's Edition). Belmont, California: West Educational Publishing.

Goldman, Emma. 1910. "Anarchism: What It Really Stands For," pp.45-47, reprinted in *Nonviolence in America: A Documentary History* (revised ed.). Staughton Lynd and Alice Lynd (eds.). 1995. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books.

Graff, Henry F. 1986. *America: The Glorious Republic, Vol.2: 1877 to the Present*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Graff, Henry F., and Paul Bohanna. 1978. *The Promise of Democracy*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Graff, Henry F., and John A. Krout. 1961. *The Adventure of the American People*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Jacobs, William Jay. 1973. *Search for Freedom: America and Its People* (Annotated Teacher's Edition). New York: Macmillan.

Jones, Jacqueline, Peter H. Wood, Thomas Borstelmann, Elaine Tyler May, and Vicki L. Ruiz. 2008. *Created Equal: A Social and Political History of the United States* (Brief Second Edition). New York: Pearson Education.

Jordan, Winthrop D., Miriam Greenblatt, and John S. Bowes. 1985. *The Americans: The History of a People and a Nation*. Evanston, Illinois: McDougal, Littell & Company.

Lapsansky-Werner, Emma J., Peter B. Levy, Randy Roberts, and Alan Taylor. 2008. *United States History* (New Jersey edition). Boston: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Leinwand, Gerald. 1975. *The Pageant of American History*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Lowman, Michael R., George Thompson, and Kurt Grussendorf. 1996. *United States History in Christian Perspective: Heritage of Freedom.* Pensacola, Florida: Beka.

May, Ernest R. 1985. *A Proud Nation* (Teacher's Edition). Evanston, Illinois: McDougal, Littel & Company.

Norton, Mary Beth, David M. Katzman, Paul D. Escott, Howard P. Chudacoff, Thomas G. Paterson, and William M. Tuttle, Jr. 1998. *A People and a Nation: A History of the United States, Vol.II: Since 1865*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Pauline, Lawrence J. 1977. *Our America*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Ritchie, Donald A., Margaret Altoff, and Richard Wilson. 1985. *Heritage of Freedom: History of the United States.* New York: Macmillan.

Roden, Philip, Bruce Kraig, Robynn L. Greer, and Betty M. Bivins. 1984. *Life and Liberty: An American History*. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company.

Sandler, Martin W., Edwin C. Rozwenc, and Edward C. Martin. 1971. *The People Make a Nation*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Todd, Lewis Paul and Merle Curti. 1977. *Rise of the American Nation* (Heritage Edition). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Ver Steeg, Clarence L. and Richard Hofstadter. 1971. *A People and a Nation*. New York: Harper & Row.

Wood, Leonard C., Ralph H. Gabriel, and Edward L. Biller. 1979. *America: Its People and Values* (2nd ed. revised). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

APPENDIX EE

COVERAGE OF HISTORICAL EPISODES IN COSTA RICAN TEXTBOOKS

Episode [Summary of Analysis]	**Textbook A:** Estudios Sociales 10 (2011)	**Textbook B:** Estudios Sociales 11 (2011)	**Textbook C:** Fichas de Estudios Sociales 10 (2010)	**Textbook D:** Fichas de Estudios Sociales 10 & 11 (2009)	**Textbook E:** Continentes 11 (2010)	**Textbook F:** Nuevos Horizontes 10 & 11 (2008)	**Textbook G:** Temario, Actividades y Practicas de Estudios Sociales 10 & 11 (1998)
Death penalty abolished by Tomas Guardia (1882) [Minimal coverage; Motivations unclear; Opportunity missed to celebrate human rights policies]	NA	Mentioned in one sentence with little comment on significance or reason for it: "Manifestations of Liberalism.... General Tomas Guardia (1870-1876, 1877-1882)... Abolition of the death penalty (1882)" (p.77).	NA	NA	Covered in one sentence in a text box of Guardia's accomplish-ments: "Abolished the death penalty in 1882" (p.94).	"During the dictatorship, Guardia did not honor the individual rights and liberties of Costa Ricans and he favored political subservience; nevertheless, because of his wife's influence he abolished the death penalty" (p.306).	NA
Overthrow of the dictator Tinoco (1919), partly through nonviolent protest and nonviolent direct action [3 texts fail to cover; 1 text vaguely mentions overthrow by a "popular movement"; only 1 text covers the nonviolent protests]	NA	Not covered. The omission is glaring. Tinoco is reduced to one sentence: "Flores was unseated by a coup d'état in 1917, led by his Minister of War, Frederico Tinoco" (p.80).	NA	Not covered. The omission is glaring. Tinoco is reduced to one sentence: "[The gold standard] was eliminated during the Tinoco government (1917-1919)" (p.251).	Not covered. There is no hint that Tinoco was ever overthrown. The text explains how Tinoco rose to power through a coup d'état and "exercised a dictatorial government, since he took over political and military powers" (p.104).	Some of the factors contributing to Tinoco's overthrow are covered, including the nonviolent demonstrations and direct action (p.319). Several details are omitted. Namely, the *decisive* role of the nonviolent protests is obscured and the grievances and motivations for the protests are not clarified by the text.	Event barely covered. The brief textbook style obscures the role of nonviolent protests: "...Tinoco... exercised a dictatorship from 1917 to 1919. Tinoco was overthrown by a popular movement of workers and the middle class" (p.181).

Social Guarantees legislation passed in 1941, 1942, and 1943 [Text B has a conserv-ative por-trait; Texts E and F, D and G offer celebratory portraits]	NA	The reforms are linked to Rerum Novarum, but the reforming leaders are given less voice (quoted less) and at times, the presentation of the reforms is neutral rather than celebratory (p.93)	NA	Follows verbatim Textbook G (pp.264-267). They are published by the same publisher.	Often follows verbatim Textbook F (they are published by the same publisher).	Unlike other texts, it highlights suffering and poverty that "demanded urgent reforms from the State" (p.333). In this text the reforms are linked to the term "Christian socialism" (p.333). The safety net is strongly praised.	Social safety net is strongly praised and grounded in the Rerun Novarum, and advocacy by President Calderon and Archbishop Sanabria (p.195).
"Arms Down Strike" and pivotal women's march and occupation (1947) [4 out of 5 (80%) of the texts do not cover the women's march and occupation; only 1 text covers the events satis-factorily]	NA	Motives, women leaders, and outcome of the strike as well as the pivotal 8,000 strong women's march and occupation are satisfactorily covered (p.96).	NA	This account clarifies and specifies some issues better than Textbook B, but the women's march and occupation are ommitted (p.270).	The "Arms Down Strike" is briefly described as "a national stopage where commerce and banks closed their doors to demand electoral guarantees from the government; primarily, to accept the declarations made by the electoral Tribunal" (p.124). The women's march and occupation are ommitted.	Strike mentioned briefly: Picado faced "a national strike in which commercial traders and banks closed their doors to demand electoral guarantees of the government" (p.337). The women's march and occupation are ommitted. The text clarifies that the Arms Down Strike agreements were violated by the Congress on February 28, 1948, when Congress annulled the presidential elections over against the ruling of the electoral Tribunal who had declared Ulate the winner (p.338).	On p.200, this text repeats verbatim the account given in Textbook D (not surprisng since they were produced by the same publisher).

Is abolition of the army (1948) celebrated? Are rationales given for abolition of army? (e.g., Rio Treaty, OAS, principled and pragmatic norms) [5 out of 6 texts highly praise abolition for both principled and pragmatic reasons; only 1 out of 6 texts clarifies the Rio Treaty as part of Costa Rica's security plan]	NA	Abolition is strongly praised and endorsed for both principled and pragmatic reasons (p.110, p.149). The Rio Treaty (p.192) and OAS (p.193) are only criticized, on the grounds that the U.S. has compromised their missions. Examples of how the Rio Treaty and OAS have helped Costa Rica's security are not mentioned here.	Abolition is strongly praised and endorsed for both principled and pragmatic reasons (p.96). The OAS and Rio Treaty are both critiqued and praised (p.148), but its important role in Figueres' security plan/ history of Costa Rica is never mentioned.	Abolition is strongly praised and endorsed for both principled and pragmatic reasons (pp.272, 279-280). But historical trend of small army is also noted (repeated verbatim from Textbook G). No coverage of Rio Treaty or OAS.	Abolition is strongly praised and endorsed for both principled and pragmatic reasons (pp.128-129). Often follows verbatim Textbook F (they are published by the same publisher). This is the only text that covers Rio Treaty as part of Costa Rica's security plan (p.303). The OAS is vaguely praised (p.304), but its track record is not covered.	Abolition is strongly praised and endorsed for both principled and pragmatic reasons (p.341). The OAS is praised for promoting peace and security (p.174), but the Rio Treaty is never mentioned, and historical examples of OAS role not linked to the discussion .	Abolition is portrayed as relatively insignificant and merely "symbolic because in reality, after the fall of Tinoco's dictatorship, the army was a small force" (p.202). No coverage of Rio Treaty or OAS, except for passing reference to OAS as helping Costa Rica in 1948 invasion (p.202).
Invasions of 1948 and 1955 from Nicaragua [Only 1 out of 5 texts covers the 1955 invasion; 4 out of 5 texts cover the 1948 invasion, but none mention Rio Treaty, and only 2 mention OAS and U.S. role]	NA	The 1948 attack is covered, but intervention by OAS and U.S. is not mentioned (p.98). The 1955 attack is not mentioned.	NA	This text repeats verbatim (p.272) the account given in Textbook G (not surprisng since they were produced by the same publisher). The 1955 attack is not mentioned.	Both invasions are very briefly covered (p.125). In neither case does the text explain how Costa Rica defended itself.	Not covered	1955 is not covered. Details are vague: "In December 1948 Calderon invaded Costa Rica from Nicaragua, but he failed due to intervention by the OAS, the U.S. and even from Somoza" (p.202).
President Monge's 1983 Proclamation of Costa Rican Perpetual Neutrality [5 out of 6 texts cover; 4 texts link it to idealistic/ human rights motives; little context given]	Monge's Proclama-tion is depicted as strengthen-ing democatiza-tion in region (p.204).	Monge's Proclamation is depicted as a "fundamental contribution" to Central American peace (p.142).	NA	Monge's Proclamation is linked to a history of Costa Rican leaders who "have proclaimed the necessity of peaceful coexistence" (p.279)	Monge's Proclama-tion is only linked to a pragmatic outcome: it helped "internation-al assistance to return to the country" (p.174).	In one section, this text repeats verbatim (p.378) the account given in Textbook E. But text also links Proclamation to an ideal: "respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples" (p.135).	Not covered; it could have appeared in the sub-chapter on Nicaragua pp.122-4.

Depiction of Chile's nonviolent overthrow of Pinochet [All 4 texts covering Chile's Pinochet era and the aftermath fail to depict the nonviolent movement to overthrow Pinochet.]	No nonviolent protest movement is described. Briefly depicts 1988 referendum on Pinochet's continued rule and 1989 election (p.198). Changes in Chile linked to elections only.	NA	No nonviolent protest movement is described. Pinochet's rule described and the 1989 election (p.204).	NA	NA	No nonviolent protest movement is described. Briefly depicts 1988 referendum on Pinochet's continued rule and 1989 election (p.223). Changes in Chile linked to elections only, not mass nonviolent resistance.	On pp.120-121, this text repeats verbatim (with a few minor differences) Textbook C's account (not surprisng since they were produced by the same publisher).
1994 Panama & Haiti disband armies [covered in only 1 out of 7 texts; Opportunity missed to celebrate diffusion of Costa Rican peace model]	Not covered.	Not covered.	Not covered.	Not covered.	Not covered.	Not covered.	Covered very briefly (p.124).
2003-2004 Coalition of the Willing and lawsuit against the President of Costa Rica [all 6 texts fail to cover how the Iraq War impacted Costa Rica.]	The U.S.- led Iraq War is covered (pp.146-147), but its impact on Costa Rican politics is ommitted.	Not covered (but Chechnia in 2006 is covered (p.187), and Israel-Gaza in 2005 (p.189).	The U.S.- led Iraq War is covered (pp.146-147), but its impact on Costa Rican politics is ommitted.	The U.S.- led Iraq War is briefly covered (p.106), but its impact on Costa Rican politics is ommitted.	Not covered (but Israel-Gaza conflict of 2008-2009 covered).	The U.S.- led Iraq War is covered extensively (pp.157-160), but its impact on Costa Rican politics is ommitted.	NA

Notes: "NA" = Not applicable because the textbook does not cover this period. "Not covered" = the textbook neglects to include this episode despite the fact that the text covers this period in-depth.

APPENDIX FF

NETWORK INFLUENCES ON NONVIOLENCE OF RICKEY & ROBINSON, 1945-1948



Notes: One-way arrows indicate influences via written word. One-way arrows with dashes indicate lectures heard by Rickey, but degree of influence on issue of nonviolence unknown. Two-way arrows denote personal friendship or mentor-mentee relationship (in the case of Jane Addams and Gandhi, and Gandhi and Tolstoy, and Booker T. Washington and Tolstoy these ties were limited to personal correspondence). Striped two-way arrows denotes probable or very probable mentoring or influence specifically on the subject of nonviolence, but no explicit evidence was found to support this. Dotted two-way arrows denotes possible influence on nonviolence, but no evidence has been found. For documentation of network ties, see Appendix I.

APPENDIX GG

DOCUMENTING NETWORK TIES OF BRANCH RICKEY

The main nonviolent influences on Rickey appear to be Jesus via the Gospels, Papini's interpretation of Jesus, the William James essay "The Moral Equivalent of War," said to be "one of Rickey's favorite essays" (Lowenfish 2007, p.375), and the writings of and his friendship with Frank Tannenbaum.

Papini, an Italian philosopher and literary figure, led a very unusual life and eventually underwent a religious conversion to Catholicism. But in 1904 he met William James in Rome, at the International Congress of Psychology: "This marked the beginning of an intense correspondence between the two thinkers" (Lachs and Talisse 2004, p.562). According to Lowenfish (2007), Papini also became a student of William James at Harvard (p.375).

Rickey's personal relationship with Clarence Darrow is another probable link to nonviolence. Darrow was a leading proponent of nonviolence, and had written several books on the subjct. Clarence Darrow and Jane Addams, both strong advocates for peace and nonviolence, had a personal friendship (Library of Congress 1907). Specific evidence of a mentoring relationship on the issue of nonviolence includes the following. In Jane Addams's Hull-House library it was observed that she autographed her name inside the front cover of the book Tolstoy's *The Christian Teaching* (a translated version published in 1898), but on the opposite page is "the bookplate of Clarence Darrow, indicating that it was a gift of the famous lawyer and friend of Hull-House" (Cracraft 2012, p.22 n.20). This piece of physical evidence suggests that Darrow may have played a role in cultivating Addams's interest in Tolstoy, a leading figure in nonviolent ideologies during this period in U.S. history.

In the preface of his book, *Resist Not Evil*, Darrow (1902 [1972]) writes that his book was "inspired by the writings of Tolstoy" who placed "the doctrine of non-resistance upon a substantial basis" (p.7). The quote on the title page of Darrow's book is from Jesus on turning the other cheek (Mt. 5:38-39). But as Darrow makes clear in his autobiography as well as in his Foreword to the 1925 edition of *Resist Not Evil*, his confidence in nonviolence, or in "man's" [sic] potential to "reach a state of non-resistance" (p.xxxv) dissipitated during World War I. Nevertheless, he maintained in the 1925 Foreword, "In spite of this change of view I am convinced that this book in the main is true..." (p.xxxv).

In 1907, while he was at Ohio Wesleyan University, Rickey heard a lecture by Jane Addams (Polner 2007, p.50). The lecture did not address nonviolence, but it is possible that Rickey might have, at least to some degree, followed her peacemaking career thereafter, as she was frequently in the national spotlight as a leading pacifist. Rickey was no pacifict, as in 1918, he volunteered for combat duties in World War I (p.75). Although it seems his direct experiences of war in World War I might have pushed him somewhat closer to a rejection of war (see Polner 2007, p.76), to my knowledge, this is entirely conjectural. Rickey's main link to Addams would be indirect, through his personal contact with Darrow.

Jane Addams' understanding of nonviolence was deeply influenced by Tolstoy's writings, and Gandhi as well (Addams 1931). She and Gandhi maintained a personal correspondence, and she traveled to India but Gandhi was in prison and she could only visit his ashram (Gilsenan 2001). She also traveled to Russia and personally met with Tolstoy (Elshtain 2002, p.204).

In addition, Tolstoy and Booker T. Washington engaged in personal correspondence (Saul and McKinzie 1997, p.180). In 1907, while he was at Ohio Wesleyan University, Rickey heard a lecture by and helped to host Booker T. Washington's visit to campus (Polner 2007, p.50). Booker T. Washington, perhaps the most significant African-American leader and educator from 1895 until his death in 1915, embraced pacifism and denounced the Spanish-American War

and WWI. Though this side of Washington is largely neglected today, his pacifism was well known within the U.S. peace movement, and in 1913 "he was invivted to give a keynote address on peace and disarmament before the Fourth Annual Peace Congress in St. Louis" (Stanfield 1993, p.49). Booker T. Washington's Christian grounding in nonviolence has been briefly explored by Beck (1996). Hence, it is possible the Rickey might have heard Washington discuss pacifism and nonviolence at some point during his trip to Ohio Wesleyan.

The evidence that William James and Jane Addams influenced one another on the issue of nonviolence is found in the fact that they "shared the platform" at the International Peace Congress in Boston in 1904 (Cracraft 2012, p.75). James's important concept of a "moral equivalent of war" was "probably borrowed from Addams (p.75).

Frank Tannenbaum had been a young activist with the IWW and as a result of his leadership of a direct action of homeless men, demanding shelter, was sentenced to a year in prison (Yeager 2011). He soon befriended a pioneering prison reformer named Tom Mott Osborne, and became a mentee of Osborne (Yeager 2011). Tannenbaum eventually became an academic, a researcher of prison conditions and advocate of reforms, and also researcher/ advocate in Latin American politics, race and the history of slavery in the Americas, and labor unions. Tannenbaum theorized and spoke out against cruelty in prisons (p.182). Obsborne had very strong connections through blood and family friendships to famous liberal Quaker nonviolent activists and abolitionists, including the pacifist activists Lucretia Coffin Mott (the sister of Osborne's grandmother; Lucretia was a famous Quaker preacher, but Osborne's grandmother was a Quaker activist as well) and William Lloyd Garrison (Osborne's uncle was William Lloyd Garrison, Jr.). As a youth, Osborne and his family often visited with the Motts and Garrisons (Chamberlain 1935, pp.32-33). Moreover, Osborne deeply admired his Quaker ancestors: "He studied their careers and their philosphy, and could quote verbatim numerous passages from their written works" (p.34). Osborne was not a pacifist (see pp.373-374, where after joining the Navy as director of a prison, he proposed that his convicts fight in WWI; and all four of his sons were in the military as well (p.368)), but he did strongly oppose U.S. imperialism in the Philippines and as a result was denounced for not supporting the troops (p.409). Tannenbaum admired Osborne so much he wrote a biography on him, in which he compares Osborne to Saint Francis of Assissi, for his compassion and love of prisoners (Tannenbaum 1933, p.291), Osborne's practical and applied efforts in humanitarian prison reform and personal encouragment of prisoners led one prisoner to call him "God's delegate of hope" (p.308). It is probable that the personal contact between Tannenbaum and Osborne included discussions about nonviolent methods of conflict resolution, especially as concerned prison reforms. In any case, Tannenbaum (1921) clearly has inculcated nonviolent convictions and a nonviolent vision of social change by the time he wrote *The Labor Movement: Its Conservative Functions and Social Consequences*. In this book, he argues that the labor movement "makes progress pragmatic rather than violently revolutionary" (p.175). He characterizes the labor movement as a path to avoiding violent revolutions, which are a "crude method of physical struggle and suffering" and a "crude process of social adjustment" (p.167). He argues against "the survival of the fittest" doctrine and points to "the poverty of the economic theory of competition, of struggle and of belief that men live by friction rather than by cooperation" (p.171). In his view, the labor movement "functions by reducing human friction, by the elimination of individual competition, by making the interest of one the interests of all on an ever larger scale" (p.171). One can hear in this some similarities to the take-home message Rickey derived from Tannenbaum's book *Slave and Citizen*, and his conversations with Tannenbaum on how to overcome racism in the U.S.

Emma Goldman worked with Clarence Darrow on a legal case (Gornick 2011, p.95). In addition, Frank Tannenbaum came into personal contact with Emma Goldman during his days as a young activist in New York City: "he apparently spent hours in Goldman's office of *Mother Earth*, and she was quite fond of him" (Yeager 2011, p.179). In terms of their thinking about nonviolent strategy/ ideals, we can consider the potential influence of Goldman on Darrow and

Tannenbaum as a cautionary tale. While Emma Goldman was never a pacifist, after the failed assassination attempt on Henry Frick which she and her partner Alexander Berkman had planned, she wrote on the importance of maintaining the unity of ends and means in social movement struggles (Ferguson 2011, p.296) – a classic theme of Gandhian nonviolence. Goldman repeatedly argued that anarachist philosophy was opposed to violence and publicly spoke out against violence (Gornick 2011, pp.48-49; Ferguson 2011, p.296). But she also expressed ambivalence on violent tactics. It is simply unknown how she argued concerning violent militant actions in the many "backroom planning sessions" she participated in (Gornick 2011, p.49). Gornick (2011) argues that after the Frick assassination attempt, Goldman "never again...endorsed political assassination, but neither would she condemn it...The question of political violence was one of the few that led Emma into a strategic quandry" (pp.48-49). In her autobiography, Goldman (2006) records her thoughts at the time of planning Berkman's assassination attempt: "...did not the ends justify the means? Our end was the sacred cause of the oppressed...Yes, the end in this case justified the means" (pp.61-62). In light of Frick's violence and injustice against unionized steel workers during the Homestead strike, it seems Goldman never stopped believing that Berkman's assassination attempt was justified (p.49). Berkman himself waffled on the value of his violent act (Gornick 2011, p.48), but he was deeply disillusioned when the main anarchist paper in the U.S., the *Freiheit*, quickly denounced his "propoganda by deed," as "useless...even harmful since the masses do not as yet understand us and our motives" (Berkman 2011, p.87). Soon after, and on account of this, Goldman physically attacked Johann Most, the editor of *Freiheit*, with a horse whip – outraged partly because she had heard Most "scores of times call for acts of violence" (Goldman 2006, p.73). Berkman did later argue that because a kind of political false consciousness is so deep in America, no American would approve of assassinating political autocrats here. Due to our democratic patina, political leaders are not preceived as an "enemy of the people" (Berkman 1912, p.417). Writing about the recent assassination of President McKinley, Berkman wrote, America's version of democratic tyranny "cannot be reached with a bullet," yet Berkman continued to argueu that his own assasination attempt – which aimed at economic tyrants rather than political - was "significant and educational" (p.417). Yet, in addition to the obvious counter-argument that false consciousness is just as pervasive in the environment of U.S. capitalism, this smacks of denial in the face of the evidence that Berkman's assassination attempt provoked a widespread conservative backlash against the Homestead strikers and sympathy for Frick.

In this way, Goldman's example may have served as a cautionary tale for leftists and radicals considering violent tactics in subsequent years. And, towards the end of her life, in 1928, Goldman wrote to Berkman that she would consider adopting the nonviolence of Gandhi and Tolstoy: "I feel violence in whatever form never has and probably never will bring constructive results" (Lynd and Lynd 1995, p.45).

REFERENCES CITED

Aalberg, Toril. 2003. *Achieving Justice: Comparative Public Opinion on Income Distribution.* Boston: Brill.

A.A.P. 1947. "MacArthur Bans General Strike." *The Sydney Morning Herald* (Australia), February 1, p.1.

Aas, Solveig. 1986. *Costa Rican Demilitarization Revisited* (PRIO Report 9/86). Oslo, Norway: International Peace Research Institute.

Abrahms, Max. 2006. "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." *International Security* 31(2): 42-78.

Abrahms, Max. 2012. "Bin Laden Realized the Truth: Terrorism Against Civilians Failed." *The Baltimore Sun*, reprinted in *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, OR), May 27, p.G1.

Acker, Joan .2012. "A Feminist's Work is Never Done." Interview of Joan Acker by Jennifer L. Pierce. *Contexts* 11(2): 8-9.

Ackerman, Peter and Christopher Kruegler. 1994. *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Ackerman, Peter and Jack DuVall. 2000. *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Adams, D. 2000. "Toward a global movement for a culture of peace." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 6:259-266.

Adams, Marilyn Jager. 2010. "Advancing Our Students' Language and Literacy: The Challenge of Complex Texts." *American Educator* 34 (4):3-11, 53. Washington, D.C.: American Federation of Teachers.

Aday, L.A., G.Y. Chiu, and R. Anderson. 1980. "Methodological issues in health care surveys of the Spanish heritage population." *American Journal of Public Health* 70(4): 367-374.

Addams, Jane. 1931 [2002]. “Tolstoy and Gandhi.” *Christian Century*, Vol.48, November 25. Reprinted in Jean Bethke Elshtain (ed.). *The Jane Addams Reader*. New York: Basic Books.

Addo, Ebenezer Obiri. 1997. *Kwame Nkrumah: A Case Study of Religion and Politics in Ghana.* Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.

Adorno, Theodor W., E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D.J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Norton.

Adorno, Theodor W. 1998a. “Opinion Delusion Society,” pp.105-122 in *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords.* Henry W. Pickford (Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press.

Adorno, Theodor W. 1998. “Education After Auschwitz,” pp.191-204 in *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords.* Henry W. Pickford (Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press.

AFP (Agence France-Presse). 2000, December 10. “In Upset, Ghana's Opposition Is Winning National Elections” *The New York Times*, p.36.

AFP (Agence France-Presse). 2000, December 31. “First Peaceful Power Shift Is Welcomed by Ghanaians.” *The New York Times*, p.12.

Agee, Philip. 1975. *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*. New York: Stonehill.

Agee, Philip. 1991. “Inside the Company: CIA Diary.” Lecture at Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado. April 30. www.alternativeradio.org

AI (Amnesty International). 2012. “Death penalty: Countries abolitionist for all crimes.” http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/countries-abolitionist-for-all-crimes retrieved 2/1/2012

Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. “Fractionalization.” *Journal of Economic Growth* 8:155-194.

Alexander, Charles C. 1984. *Ty Cobb*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Alexander, Robert J. 2009. *International Labor Organizations and Organized Labor in Latin America and the Caribbean.* Santa Barbara, California: Praeger.

Alford, Roger P. 2008. “The Nobel Effect: Nobel Peace Prize Laureates as International Norm Entrepreneurs.” *Virginia Journal of International Law* 49(1):61-153.

Alinsky, Saul D. 1971. *Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals*. New York: Random House.

Allal, Amin and Florian Kohstall. 2010. “Opposition within the State: Governance in Egypt,Morocco, and Tunisia,” pp.181-204. In Holger Albrecht (ed.). *Contentious Politics in the Middle East: Political Opposition Under Authoritarianism.* Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida.

Allerbeck, Klaus R. 1977. “Analysis and Inference in Cross-National Survey Research.” Pp.373-402 in Alexander Szalai and Riccardo Petrella (Eds.). *Cross-National Comparative Survey Research: Theory and Practice.* Elmsford, New York: Pergamon Press.

Altbach, Philip G. 1991. “Textbooks: The International Dimension.” Pp.242-258 in Michael W. Apple and Linda K. Christian-Smith (eds.). *The Politics of the Textbook.* New York: Routledge.

Althusser, Louis. 1971. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. (Ben Brewster, trans.). New York: Monthly Review Press.

Alvarez-Rivera, Manuel. 2010. Costa Rica Election Results. www.electionresources. org/cr

Ameringer, Charles D. 1978. *Don Pepe: A Political Biography of José Figueres of Costa Rica*. Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press.

Ameringer, Charles D. 1982. *Democracy in Costa Rica*. New York: Praeger.

Ammerman, Nancy Tatom. 1987. *Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern World*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

Amnesty International (AI). 2004. Singapore – The Death Penalty: A Hidden Toll of Executions. January.

Anderson, Royce. 2004. “A Definition of Peace.” *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 10(2):101-116.

Andrew, Anne (U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica). 2010. “Costa Rica is Positioned to Play a Leadership Role in the Agenda for the Americas.” May 19 speech, San Jose. http://costarica.usembassy.gov/sp20100519_amcham3.html

Ankersmit, Frank. 2012. *Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Annan, Kofi. 2012. *Interventions: A Life in War and Peace*. New York: Penguin.

ANS (The American National Election Studies). 2004. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies.

Anzia, Sarah F. and Christopher R. Berry. 2011. “The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswoman Outperform Congressmen?” *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3): 478-493.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2006. *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. New York: Norton.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2010. *The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Arnove, Robert F., Stephen Franz, Kimberly Morse, and Carlos Alberto Torres. 1997. “Education and Development,” pp.271-294 in Richard S. Hillman (ed.). *Understanding Contemporary Latin America*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Aron, Arthur, Elaine N. Aron, and Elliot J. Coups. 2005. *Statistics for the Behavioral and Social Sciences: A Brief Course*, 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Assensoh, A.B. 1989. *Kwame Nkrumah of Africa: His Formative Years and the Beginning of His Political Career, 1935-1948*. Devon, UK: Stockwell.

Associated Press (AP). 1954? “Nehru Calls for Nonviolence.” (Newspaper clipping, unknown publication; date of this article could not be verified, but Nehru made very similar comments in an article by Reuters, printed in the *New York Times*, “Nehru for Nonviolence: Cites Gandhi’s Doctrine as the Solution of Atomic Age,” April 19, 1954, p.2.

Associated Press (AP). 1964. “3 Negro Leaders To Join Appeal for Kentucky Bill.” *New York Times*, February 18, p.18.

Associated Press (AP). 1971. “Allende Hits Nixon’s Remark on Cuba Ties.” *Los Angeles Times*, February 28.

Associated Press (AP). 2010. “Clash Over Ulster Road.” *New York Times*, July 13, p.10.

Associated Press (AP). 2010. “Costa Rica Denounces Alleged Nicaraguan Incursion.” November 2.

Associated Press (AP). 1984, January 19. Uruguay’s Capital Paralyzed by Strike. *New York Times*, p.A7.

Austin, John R. 1997. “A Method for Facilitating Controversial Social Change in Organizations: Branch Rickey and the Brooklyn Dodgers.” *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 33(1): 101-118.

Babington, Charles. 1999, March 11. “Clinton: Support for Guatemala Was Wrong.” *Washington Post*, p.A1.

Bacevich, Andrew. 2005. *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced By War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bachman, J.G. and P. O’Malley. 1984. “Black-White Differences in Self-Esteem: Are They Affected by Response Styles?” *American Journal of Sociology* 90: 624-639.

Baker, William D. and John R. Oneal. 2001. “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership? The Nature and Origins of the ‘Rally ‘Round the Flag’ Effect.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(5): 661-687.

Baker-Fletcher, Garth. 1993. *Somebodyness: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Theory of Dignity*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Bandura, Albert. 1990. “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement.” Pp.161-191 in Walter Reich (ed.). *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Bandura, Albert. 1996. “Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71: 364-374.

Barker, Greg. 2004. *Ghosts of Rwanda*. Boston: Frontline, WGBH (PBS)/ BBC and Silverbridge. Official transcript. www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/script.html

Barnard, Annette L. 1987. Book review of Joseph P. Farrell’s “The National Unified School in Allende’s Chile.” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 19(2): 452-454.

Bar-Tal, Daniel. 1998. “The Rocky Road Toward Peace: Beliefs on Conflict in Israeli Textbooks.” *Journal of Peace Research* 35(6): 723-742.

Bar-Tal, Daniel, Eran Halperin, and Joseph de Rivera. 2007. “Collective Emotions in Conflict Situations: Societal Implications.” *Journal of Social Issues* 63(2):441-460.

Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Barrett, David B., George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson (eds.). 2001. *World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative survey of churches and religions in the modern world. Vol.2: The world by segments: religions, peoples, languages, cities, topics*. 2nd ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Barrett, George. 1957. “‘Jim Crow He’s Real Tired.’” *The New York* Times, March 3, p.196.

Barrionuevo, Alexi. 2010a. “In Chile Voting, Fears of the Right's Ties to the Pinochet Era May Lead to an Upset.” *The New York Times*, January 17, p.A12.

Barrionuevo, Alexi. 2010b. “Conservative Businessman Wins a Runoff Vote for Chile's Presidency.” *The New York Times*, January 18, p.A4.

Barrionuevo, Alexei. 2010c. “A Serene Advocate for Chile’s Disappeared.” *The New York Times*, January 23, p.A9.

Basabe, Nekane and Jose Valencia. 2007. “Culture of Peace: Sociocultural Dimensions, Cultural Values, and Emotional Climate.” *Journal of Social Issues* 63(2):405-419.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1995. *Life in Fragments*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2008. *Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers?* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2013. *Moral Blindness: The Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Books.

BBC. 2001. "Che Guevara photographer dies." May 26.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1352650.stm

Beck, Sanderson. 1996. "Booker T. Washington and Character Education at Tuskegee Institute 1881-1915." http://www.san.beck.org/BTW.html Retrieved March 1, 2012

Becker, Marc. 2003. "Nonviolent Insurrection in Ecuador: The 1944 Glorious May Revolution." Paper for Peace History Society's Third International Conference, "Peace Work: The Labor of Peace Activism, Past, Present, and Future," April 25-27, 2003, Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant, Michigan.

Beckman, Tad. 1996. "Introduction to the Great Basin Region." www4.hmc.edu:8001/humanities/basin/gb-intro.htm 1/13/2012 retrieved

Bell, Inge Powell. 1968. "Status discrepancy and the radical rejection of nonviolence." *Sociological Inquiry* 38(1), 51-64.

Bellah, Robert. 1967. "Civil Religion in America." *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 96(1):1-21.

Bellah, Robert. 2000. "Flaws in the Protestant Code: Some Religious Sources of America's Troubles." *Ethical Perspectives* 7(4):288-299.

Bellah, Robert. 2006. "Flaws in the Protestant Code: Theological Roots of American Individualism." Pp.333-349 in Robert N. Bellah and Steven M. Tipton (eds.). *The Robert Bellah Reader*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Bellah, Robert, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. 1985. *Habits of the Heart*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Belt, Don. 1993. "Sweden: In Search of a New Model." *National Geographic* 184(2): 2-35.

Berger, Peter. 1967. *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. New York: Doubleday.

Berger, Thomas U. 1998. *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Berkman, Alexander. 1912. *Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist*. New York: Mother Earth Publishing.

Berkman, Alexander. 2011. "A Few Words as to My Deed." Pp.79-89 in Miriam Brody and Bonnie Buettner (eds.). *Prison Blossoms: Anarchist Voices from the American Past*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Berman, Sheri. 2003. "Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society." *Perspective on Politics* 1, no.2: 257-72.

Berton, Pierre. 1980. *The Invasion of Canada, Vol. 1: 1812-1813*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Bharadwaj, L.K. 1998. "Principled versus Pragmatic Nonviolence." *Peace Review*10: 79-82.

Bhattacharya, Suryatapa. 2012, January 27. "Millions Gather in New Delhi for Parade." www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/millions-gather-in-new-delhi-for-parade BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion). 2009. Annual Report 2008/ 2009. Bonn, Germany: www.bicc.de

Biesanz, Mavis Hiltunen, Richard Biesanz, and Karen Zubris Biesanz. 1999. *The Ticos: Culture and Social Change in Costa Rica.* Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bilefsky, Dan. 2009. "Celebrating Revolution With Roots In a Rumor: For Czechs, Legacy Is Not Yet Certain." *The New York Times*, November 18, p.A16.

Bird, L.A. 1984. *Costa Rica: The Unarmed Democracy*. London: Sheppard.

Birmingham, David. 1998. *Kwame Nkrumah: The Father of African Nationalism*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Bishop, George F. 1976. “The Effect of Eduation on Ideological Consistency.” *The Public Opinion Quarterly 40*(3): 337-348.

Blackwell, Alice Stone. 1922, November 2. “British Rule in Disturbed India: Reply to a Defender of the Government.” *The Christian Register: Journal of Liberal and Applied Christianity,* Vol. 101(4) (Boston, Massachusettes), pp.1052-1054.

Blanchflower, David G. and Richard B. Freeman. 1992. “Unionism in the United States and Other Advanced OECD Countries.” *Industrial Relations* 31(1): 56-79.

Blaxter, Loraine, Christina Hughes, and Malcolm Tight. 2001. *How to Research* (2nd ed.). Philadelphia: Open University Press.

Blee, Kathleen M. 2002. *Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Blum, William. 1995. *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II*. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press.

Bly, Robert. 1990. *Iron John: A Book About Men*. New York: Random House.

Boehnke, Klaus and Shalom H. Schwartz. 1997. “Fear of War: Relations to Values, Gender, and Mental Health in Germany and Israel.” *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 3(2): 149-165.

Bonds, Eric. 2011. “The Knowledge-Shaping Process: Elite Mobilization and Environmental Policy.” *Critical Sociology* 37(4): 429-446.

Bonnefoy, Pascale. 2012, June 11. “Hundreds Protest Screening of Pro-Pinochet Film in Chile.” The *New York Times*, p.A7.

Bord, Richard J. and Robert E. O’Connor. 1997. “The Gender Gap in Environmental Attitudes: The Case of Preceived Vulnerability to Risk.” *Social Science Quarterly* 78: 803-40.

Boswell, Terry and William J. Dixon. 1990. “Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross-National Analysis.” *American Sociological Review* 55: 540-559.

Boulding, Elise. 2000. *Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press.

Boulding, Kenneth E. 1999. "Nonviolence and Power in the Twentieth Century," Pp.9-17 in Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher (eds.). *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective.* Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1972. "Public Opinion Does Not Exist," pp.124-130. In Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegelaub (eds.). 1979. *Communication and Class Struggle, Vol. 1: Capitalism, Imperialism*. New York: International General.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2003. *Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market 2*. (Loïc Wacquant, trans.). New York: The New Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre and Loic J. D. Wacquant. 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bowman, Kirk. 2004. "Democracy on the Brink: The First Figueres Presidency," Pp.175-182 in Steven Palmer and Iván Molina (eds.). *The Costa Rica Reader: History, Culture, Politics*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Bradburn, Norman, Seymour Sudman, and Brian Wansink. 2004. *Asking Questions: The Definitive Guide to Questionnaire Design*. San Francisco: Wiley & Sons.

Brady, Henry E., and Paul M. Sniderman. 1985. "The Attitude Attribution: A Group Basis for Political Reasoning." *American Political Science Review* 79:1061-78.

Branas, Charles C., Therese S. Richmond, Dennis P. Culhane, Thomas R. Ten Have, and Douglas J. Wiebe. 2009. "Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession and Gun Assault." *American Journal of Public Health* 99(11): 2034-2040.

Braun, Michael. 2003. "Errors in Comparaative Survey Research: An Overview." pp.137-142 in Janet A. Harkness, Fons J.R. Van de Vijver, and Peter Ph. Mohler. *Cross-Cultural Survey Methods*. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

Braungart, Richard G. and Margaret M. Braungart. 1974. "Protest Attitudes and Behavior Among College Youth: A U.S. Case Study. *Youth & Society* 6(2): 219-248.

Braungart, Richard G. 1984. "Historical Generations and Generation Units: A Global Pattern of Youth Movements." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 12:113-135.

Bremer, Stuart, J. David Singer, Urs Luterbacher. 1973. “The Population Density and War Proneness of European Nations, 1816-1965.” *Comparative Political Studies* 6(3): 329-348.

Breslin, Jimmy. 2011. *Branch Rickey*. New York: Penguin.

Bretton, Henry L. 1966. *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Brinkley, Douglas. 2000. *Rosa Parks*. New York: Viking.

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2004. “UN chief’s Rwanda genocide regret.” March 26. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/3573229.stm. Retrieved 6/3/2011.

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2007. “Morales defends Bolivia changes.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6958186.stm Retrieved 12/20/2011

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2012, January 4. “Pinochet ‘dictatorship’ textbook row erupts in Chile.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-16420413

Brown, Alyssa and Frank Newport. 2013. “In U.S., 65% Support Drone Attacks on Terrorists Abroad.” March 25. Gallup Poll. www.gallup.com/poll/161474/support-drone-attacks-terrorists-abroad.aspx?version=print

Brysk, Alison. 2005. “Global Good Samaritans? Human Rights Foreign Policy in Costa Rica.” *Global Governance* 11(4): 445-466.

Buhaug, Halvard. 2010. “Climate not to blame for African civil wars.” *PNAS* 107(38): 16477-16482.

Buono, Richard A. Dello, and José Bell Lara. 2006. “Introduction: Neoliberal Crises and the Resurgent Left in Latin America.” *Critical Sociology* 32(1):9-15.

Burke, Kenneth. 1959. *Attitudes Toward History* (2nd ed.). Los Altos, California: Hermes Publications.

Burke, Marshall, Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, John A. Dykema, and David B. Lobell. 2009. “Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa.” *PNAS* 106(49): 20670-20674.

Burns, Ken. 1994. *Baseball: A Film*. Florentine Films and the Public Broadcasting Service.

Burns, Stewart. 2004. *To the Mountaintop (Martin Luther King Jr.’s Sacred Mission to Save America: 1955-1968).* San Francisco: HarperCollins.

Burris, Val. 2008. “From Vietnam to Iraq: Continuity and Change in Between-Group Differences in Support for Military Action.” *Social Problems* 55(4):443-479.

Burroughs, Jim. 1988. *Costa Rica: Child in the Wind* [Film]. New York: WNET/ Seven League Productions.

Burrowes, R. J. 1996. *The strategy of nonviolent defense: A Gandhian approach*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Burton, Guy. 2012. “Hegemony and Frustration: Education Policy Making in Chile under the Concertación.” *Latin American Perspectives 39*(4): 34-52.

Buruma, Ian. 1994. *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux.

Bush, George W. 2002. *Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy West Point, New York* [Speech], The White House, June 1. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html., p. 3.

Butler, Judith. 2010. *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* New York: Verson

Calvino, Italo. 1984. “The Adventure of a Poet,” pp.283-290. *Difficult Loves*. Trans. by William Weaver, Archibald Colquhoun, and Peggy Wright. New York: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich.

Camus. 2011. The dissent of man - A UK region 2 DVD review of Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media. www.dvdoutsider.co.uk/ dvd/reviews/m/manufacuring_ Consent.html Retrieved 5/15/2011.

Caprara, Gian Vittorio, Shalom Schwartz, Cristina Capanna, Michele Vecchione, and Claudio Barbaranelli. 2006. “Personality and Politics: Values, Traits, and Political Choice.” *Political Psychology* 27(1): 1-28.

Caprioli, Mary and Mark A. Boyer. 2001. “Gender, Violence, and International Crisis.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(4): 503-518.

Card, David and Gordon B. Dahl. 2011. “Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126(1):103-143.

Carlier, Louise. 2010. “Cosmopolitanism: from urban experience to politics.” *International Social Science Journal 61*: 445-456.

Carlson, A. Cheree. 1986. “Gandhi and the Comic Frame: ‘Ad Bellum Purificandum.’” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 72:446-455.

Carlos Flores, Juan. 1989. *Cultural Value Differences in Arguments between Presidents Ronald Reagan and Oscar Arias* (Master’s Thesis). Portland State University, Portland, Oregon, USA.

Carmines, Edward G., and James H. Kuklinski. 1990. “Incentives, Opportunities, and the Logic of Public Opinion in American Political Representation.” In John A. Ferejohn and James H. Kuklinski, eds., *Information and Democratic Processes*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Carter, April, Howard Clark, and Michael Randle. 2006. *People Power and Protest Since 1945: A Bibliography of Nonviolent Action.* London: Housmans Bookshop Limited.

Cattell, Raymond B. 1966a. “The Scree Test for the Number of Factors.” *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 1: 245-276.

Cattell, Raymond B. 1966b. “The Meaning and Strategic Use of Factor Analysis,” pp.174-243, in Raymond B. Cattell (ed.). *Handbook of Multivariate Experimental Psychology*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Cattell, Raymond B. 1966c. “Higher order factor structures and reticular vs. hierarchical formulae for their interpretation.” In C. Banks and P.L. Broadhurst (eds.). *Studies in Psychology*. London: University of London Press.

Ceadel, Martin. 1987. *Thinking About Peace and War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Centre de Amigos para la Paz. 2010, December. "Pronouncement against Invasion and the Military Courts." http://amigosparalapaz.org. Retrieved August 19, 2010.

Chamberlain, Rudolph W. 1935. *There Is No Truce: A Life of Thomas Mott Osborne*. New York: MacMillan.

ChartsBin. 2011. Current Worldwide Homicide/Murder Rate. ChartsBin statistics collector team. Retrieved May 7, 2013 from http://chartsbin.com/view/1454

Chatfield, Charles. 1972. "Introduction," pp.vii-xxxiv in Clarence S. Darrow. *Resist Not Evil*. Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith.

Chatterjee, S., A. Hadi, and B. Price. 2000. *Regression Analysis by Example*, 3rd ed. New York: Wiley.

Cheney, Lynne V. 1994, October 20. "The End of History." *The Wall Street Journal*, p.A22.

Chenoweth, Erica. 2008. *Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes* (N.A.V.C.O. 1.0). Codebook to accompany Summer 2008 article in *International Security*. Updated June 20, 2008.

Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Chernus, Ira. 2004. *American Nonviolence: The History of An Idea*. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis.

Chomsky, Noam. 1990. "If the Nuremberg Laws were Applied…" www.chomsky.info/talks/1990----.htm Retrieved 11/3/2011

Chomsky, Noam. 1992. *What Uncle Sam Really Wants*. Tucson, Arizona: Odonian Press.

Chomsky, Noam. 1992b. *Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media* [Film]. Mark Achbar and Peter Wintonick (Directors). Zeitgeist Films.

Chomsky, Noam. 1999. "The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo." *In These Times*, September 19, pp.7-11.

Chomsky, Noam. 2008. “Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right.” *Monthly Review* 60(4), September. Retrieved from monthlyreview.org/2008/09/01

Chomsky, Noam. 2012. “Unconventional Wisdom.” Interviewed by David Barsamian. January 20. www.alternativeradio.org

Choucri, Nazli. 1974. *Population Dynamics and International Violence*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books.

Churchill, Ward. 1998. *Pacifism As Pathology*. Winnipeg, Canada: Arbeiter Ring.

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). 2012, January 26. “Country Comparisons: Military Expenditure.” *CIA World Factbook*. www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html?countryName=Costa%20Rica&countryCode=cs&regionCode=cam&rank=156#cs Retrieved 1/26/2012

CIA. 2012. *CIA World Factbook*. www.cia.gov

Clark, Rob and Jacon Beckfield. 2009. “A New Trichotomous Measure of World-system Position Using the International Trade Network.” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 50(1): 5-38.

Coatsworth, John H. 2005. “United States Interventions: What For?” *Revista: Harvard Review of Latin America*, March 21. www.drclas.harvard.edu/publications/revistaonline/spring-summer-2005/united-states-interventions

Cobb, Ty and Al Stump. 1961. *My Life in Baseball: The True Record*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company.

Cochran, Kathryn McNabb. 2008. “Public Opinion and Civilian Casualties in the Iraq War,” Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, March.

Cohen, David K. 2010. “Learning to Teach Nothing in Particular.” *American Educator* 34(4):44-46, 54. Washington, D.C.: American Federation of Teachers.

Cohen, Ronald. 1986. “War and War Proneness in Pre- and Postindustrial States.” Pp.253-267 in Mary LeCron Foster and Robert A. Rubinstein (eds.). *Peace and War: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books.

Cohn, Ellen G. 1990. “Weather and Crime.” *The British Journal of Criminology* 30(1): 51-64.

Cohrs, J. Christopher and Barbara Moschner. 2002. “Antiwar Knowledge and Generalized Political Attitudes as Determinants of Attitude Toward the Kosovo War.” *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 8(2):139-155.

Coleman, Joseph. 2006. “Japan takes more steps away from postwar pacifism.” The Associated Press reprinted in *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, Oregon), December 16, p.A10.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and grievance in civil war.” *Oxford Economic Papers 56*: 563-595.

Collins, Randall. 1974. “Three Faces of Cruelty: Towards a Comparative Sociology of Violence.” *Theory and Society* 1(4): 415-440.

Collins, Randall. 2008. *Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Conan, Neal. 2011. “The 'Darkhorse' Battalion And Wartime Sacrifice.” Talk of the Nation, November 22. National Public Radio. Official Transcript. www.npr.org/2011/11/22/142661874/the-darkhorse-battalion-and-wartime-sacrifice retrieved 11/28/2011

Converse, Philip E. 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” pp.206-261 in David E. Apter (ed.). *Ideology and Discontent*. New York: The Free Press.

Contexts. 2008. “Myth Busting: Jihadists Don’t Need Smarts.” *Contexts* 7(3): 4.

Cook, Steven and Michael Koplow. 2013, June 9. “A Hollow Democracy.” *The Register-Guard* (reprinted from *Foreign Policy* magazine), pp.G1, G4.

Corcoran, E., C. Nellemann, E. Baker, R. Bos, D. Osborn, H. Savelli (eds.). 2010. *Sick Water? The central role of wastewater management in sustainable development.* A Rapid Response Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme, UN-HABITAT, GRID-Arendal. www.grida.no

Cortright, David. 2008. *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Costello, Anna B. and Jason W. Osborne. 2005. "Best Practices in Exploratory Factor Analysis: Four Recommendations for Getting the Most From Your Analysis." *Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation* 10(7): 1-9. Available online: http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=10&n=7

Courlander, Harold. 1987. *The Fourth World of the Hopis: The Epic Story of the Hopi Indians As Preserved In Their Legends and Traditions*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Creedman, Theodore S. 1977. *Historical Dictionary of Costa Rica* (Latin American Historical Dictionaries, No.16). Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press.

Cronin, Audrey K. 2009. *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

CTBTO (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization). 2012. Signature and Ratifications. www.ctbto.org/tiles/pdf/CTBTO-Map-2012-03-21-World.pdf Retrieved March 21, 2012.

Cummings, David A. 2006. *Demilitarization: Is It Worth It?* (Master's Thesis). Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Curtis, Adam. 2004. *The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear* [film]. UK: BBC Two.

Daily Mail. 2012. "'These kids don't expect to lead a full life': Fears for Chicago teens as fatal shootings in city outnumber US troops killed in Afghanistan." June 19. www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2161690/Chicago-crime-More-people-shot-dead-Chicago-killed-duty-Afghanistan.html#ixzz2A9s8UaWx

Dalton, R. J. 2002. *Citizen Politics*. New York: Chatham House.

Daly, Mary. 1978. *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Darrow, Clarence S. 1902 [1972]. *Resist Not Evil*. Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith.

Darrow, Clarence S. 1972. “Foreword to the 1925 Edition,” p.xxxv in Clarence S. Darrow. *Resist Not Evil*. Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith.

Darrow, Clarence S. 1932. *The Story of My Life*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

Darrow, Clarence S., and Arthur M. Lewis. 1911. *Marx versus Tolstoy: A Debate*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company.

Davidov, Eldad, Peter Schmidt, and Shalom H. Schwartz. 2008. “Bringing Values Back In: The Adequacy of the European Social Survey to Measure Values in 20 Countries.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72(3): 420-445.

Davidson, Basil. 1989. *Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Davidson, Debra and William Freudenburg. 1996. “Gender and Environmental Risk Concern: A Review and Analysis of Available Research.” *Environment and Behavior* 28: 302-39.

Davis, Nancy J., and Robert V. Robinson. 1996. “Are the Rumors of the War Exaggerated? Religious Orthodoxy and Moral Progressivism in America.” *American Journal of Sociology* 102: 756-87.

Davis, O. L., Jr. 1992. “Religion in School History Textbooks: Evidence of Neglect and Agendas for Reform.” Pp.61-70 in John G. Herlihy (ed.). *The Textbook Controversy: Issues, Aspects and Perspectives*. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation.

Day, Daniel Droba and O.F. Quackenbush. 1942. “Attitudes Toward Defensive, Cooperative, and Aggressive War.” *The Journal of Social Psychology* 16: 11-20.

Delanty, Gerard. 1997. “Habermas and Occidental Rationalism: The Politics of Identity, Social Learning, and the Cultural Limits of Moral Universalism.” *Sociological Theory* 15: 30-59.

Dellinger, Dave. 1970. *Revolutionary Nonviolence: Essays by Dave Dellinger*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

Delli Carpini, Michael X. and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Denslow, William R. and Harry S. Truman. 1957 [2004]. *10,000 Famous Freemasons from A to J*, Part One. Whitefish, Montana: Kessinger Publishing.

de Rivera, Joseph. 1992. "Emotional climate: Social structure and emotional dynamics." In K.T. Strongman, (Ed.), *International Review of Studies on Emotion* (pp.197-218). New York: John Wiley & Sons.

de Rivera, Joseph. 2004. "A Template for Assessing Cultures of Peace." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 10(2): 125-146.

de Rivera, Joseph and Darío Páez. 2007. "Emotional Climate, Human Secruity, and Cultures of Peace." *Journal of Social Issues* 63(2):233-253.

de Rivera, Joseph, Rahael Kurrien, and Nina Olsen. 2007. "The Emotional Climate of Nations and Their Culture of Peace." *Journal of Social Issues* 63(2):255-271.

Dey, Eric L. 1997. "Undergraduate Political Attitudes: Peer Influence in Changing Social Contexts." *The Journal of Higher Education* 68(4): 398-413.

Didion, Joan. 1968. *Slouching Towards Bethlehem*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Diener, Ed and William Tov. 2007. "Subjective Well-Being and Peace." *Journal of Social Issues* 63(2):421-440.

DiMaggio, Paul J., John Evans, and Bethany Bryson. 1996. "Have Americans' Attitudes Become More Polarized?" *American Journal of Sociology* 102: 690-755.

Divale, W.T. 1974. "Migration, external warfare and matrilocal residence." *Behavior Science Research* 9: 75-133.

Doob, Leonard W. 1968. "Tropical Weather and Attitude Surveys." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 32(3): 423-430.

Donovan, David. 2012. "Viewpoint: Counter-insurgency lessons from Vietnam." September 18. www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19634728

Dossey, Larry. 1999. *Reinventing Medicine*. San Francisco: Harper.

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. 2003. *Notes from Underground, The Double and Other Stories*. Constance Garnett (Trans.). New York: Barnes & Noble.

Dowley, Kathleen M. and Brian D. Silver. 2000. "Subnational and National Loyalty: Cross-National Comparisons." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 12(4):357-371.

Dowling, William C. 1984. *Jameson, Althusser, Marx: An Introduction to the Political Unconscious*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Downs, Karl E. 1936. "Timid Negro Students!" *The Crisis: A Record of the Darker Races* Vol. 43(No. 6), June, pp. 171, 187.

Downes, Alexander B. and Kathryn McNabb Cochran. 2008. "Targeting Civilians to Win? Examining the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization in Interstate War." Presented at a Workshop at the Center for Advanced Study, Stanford University, May 22-23.

Dreiling, Michael. 2012. Personal communication.

Droba, D. D. 1931. "A Scale of Militarism-Pacifism." *The Journal of Educational Psychology* 22: 96-111.

Dudouet, Véronique. 2008. "Nonviolent Resistance and Conflict Transformation in Power Asymmetries." In *The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin, Germany: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. www.berghof-handbook.net/

Duffy, Michael. 2007. "What a Surge Really Means." *Time*, January 15, pp.26-31.

Dugan, Andrew. 2013. "On 10th Anniversary, 53% in U.S. See Iraq War as Mistake." Gallup Poll. www.gallup.com/poll/161399/10th-anniversary-iraq-war

Dundas, Steven. 2010. "Jackie Robinson and Dr. Martin Luther King: They Changed America" [blog]. http://padresteve.wordpress.com/2010/01/18/jackie-robinson-and-dr-martin-luther-king-they-changed-america/ Retrieved 1/14/2011

Durán, Manuel and Margery Safir. 1981. *Earth Tones: The Poetry of Pablo Neruda*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Durham, William. 1979. *Scarcity and Survival in Central America: The Ecological Origins of the Soccer War*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Durkheim, Emile. 1915. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Earl, Jim. 2008. "Weird About Sports: Football's Lessons Contradict Higher Education." *The Eugene Weekly* (Eugene, Oregon). www.eugeneweekly.com/2007/08/16/coverstory.html

Economist. 2007. "Give peace a rating: An index of pacifism." *The Economist*, June 2, p.64.

Eddy, Matthew P. 2006. Interviews conducted for Master's Project. University of Oregon, Sociology Department.

Eddy, Matthew P. 2011. "Freedom Summer Abroad: Biographical Pathways and Cosmopolitanism Among International Human Rights Workers." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 31: 209-258.

Eddy, Matthew P. 2012. "When Your Gandhi Is Not My Gandhi: Memory Templates and Limited Violence in the Palestinian Human Rights Movement." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 34: 185-211.

Eddy, Matthew P. Forthcoming. "'We Have to Bring Something Different to this Place': Principled and Pragmatic Nonviolence Among Accompaniment Workers." *Social Movement Studies*.

Eddy, Mathew P. and Michael Dreiling. 2013. Documentary film footage collected for *A Bold Peace: Costa Rica's Path of Demilitarization*. Costa Rica.

Ehrlich, Paul R. and Anne H. Ehrlich. 1996. *Betrayal of Science and Reason: How Anti-Environmental RhetoricThreatens Our Future*. Washington, DC: Island.

Ehrenreich, Barbara. 1997. *Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Ehrenreich, Barbara. 2007. *Dancing in the Streets: A History of Collective Joy*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Eisenhower, Dwight. 1953, April 16. "The Chance for Peace." www.edchange.org/multicultural/speeches/ike_chance_for_peace.html

EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit). 2008. "The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2008."

Elacqua, Gregory, Dante Contreras, Felipe Salazar, and Humberto Santos. 2011. "Private School Chains in Chile: Do Better Schools Scale Up?" Policy Analysis No. 682. Cato Institute. www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/private-school-chains-chile-do-better-schools-scale

Eland, Ivan. 2009. "Why Most Counterinsurgency Wars Fail." November 11. www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2659

Eldar, Akiva. 2006. "Putting back the Green Line - once we find it." www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/putting-back-the-green-line-once-we-find-it-1.206551. Retrieved 2/9/2011.

Elias, Robert. 1997. "A Culture of Violent Solutions," pp.117-147 in Jennifer Turpin and Lester R. Kurtz (eds.). *The Web of Violence: From Interpersonal to Global.* Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Elliott, Gregory C. 1980. "Components of Pacifism: Conceptualization and Measurement." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24(1): 27-54.

Ellner, Steve. 2006. "Venezuela: Defying Globalization's Logic," pp.93-104 in Teo Ballvé and Vijay Prashad (eds.). *Dispatches from Latin America: On the Frontiers Against Neoliberalism.* Cambridge: Massachusetts: South End Press.

Ellwood, W. 2001. *The No-Nonsense Guide to Globalisation*. London: Verso.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 2002. *Jane Addams and the Dream of American Democracy: A Life*. New York: Basic Books.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke (ed.). 2002b. *The Jane Addams Reader*. New York: Basic Books.

Ember, M., and Ember, C.R. 1971. “The conditions favoring matrilocal versus patrilocal residence.” *American Anthropologist* 73: 571-594.

Erasmus, Zimitri. 2010. “Contact Theory: Too Timid for ‘Race’ and Racism.” *Journal of Social Issues* 66(2): 387-400.

Erskine, Hazel. 1973. “The Polls: Pacifism and the Generation Gap.” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 36(4): 616-627.

Eugene Weekly (EW). 2011. “Would Eugene Cops Pepper Spray Protesters?” *Eugene Weekly* (Eugene, Oregon), November 23, p.7.

Esty, Daniel C., Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Pamela T. Surko, Alan N. Unger, and Robert S. Chen. 1998. *State failure task force report: Phase II findings.* McLean, Virginia: Science Applications International Corporation.

Eyerman, Ron and Andrew Jamison. 1991. *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach*. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Falkner, David. 1995. *Great Time Coming: The Life of Jackie Robinson, From Baseball to Birmingham.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Farrell, Joseph. 1986. *The National Unified School in Allende’s Chile: The Role of Education in the Destruction of a Revolution*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” *American Political Science Review 97*(1): 75-90.

Feaver, Peter and Christopher Gelpi. 2004. *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Feldman, Stanley. 2003. “Values, Ideology, and the Structure of Political Attitudes.” Pp.477-508 in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (eds.). *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Felson, Richard B. 2010. “Gun Cultures or Honor Cultures? Explaining Regional and Race Differences in Weapon Carrying.” *Social Forces* 88(3):1357-1378.

Fenton, J. H. and G. Gleason. 1969. “Student power at the University of Massachussetts: a case study.” University of Massachusetts: Bureau of Government Research.

Ferguson, Kathy E. 2011. *Emma Goldman: Political Thinking in the Streets*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Fernandez-Armesto, Felipe. 2003. *The Americas: A Hemispheric History*. New York: Random House.

Fernández-Dols, José-Miguel, Pilar Carrera, Alejandra Hurtado de Mendoza, and Luis Oceja. 2007. “Emotional Climate as Emotion Accessibility: How Countries Prime Emotions.” *Journal of Social Issues* 63(2):339-352.

Ferris, Kerry and Jill Stein. 2010. *The Real World: An Introduction to Sociology* (2nd ed.). New York: W. W. Norton.

Finkelstein, Norman G. 2008. “Resolving the Israel-Palestinian Conflict: What we can learn from Gandhi.” Tans Lecture, Maastricht University, Netherlands. November 13. www.normanfinkelstein.com/maastricht-university-talk-the-israel-palestine-conflict-what-we-can-learn-from-gandhi/. Retrieved June 16, 2009.

Fitch, Bob and Mary Oppenheimer. 1966. *Ghana: End of an Illusion*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Fitzgerald, Amy J., Linda Kalof, and Thomas Dietz. 2009. “Slaughterhouses and Increased Crime Rates: An Empirical Analysis of the Spillover From ‘The Jungle’ Into the Surrounding Community.” *Organization & Environment* 22(2): 158-184.

Foley, Erin and Barbara Cooke. 1996. *Costa Rica*. New York: Marshal Cavendish Benchmark.

Foster, Mary LeCron and Robert A. Rubinstein (eds.). 1986. *Peace and War: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books.

Fox, Jonathan. 2004. *Religion, Civilization, and Civil War: 1945 Through the New Millennium.* Lanham, Maryland: Lexington.

Fox, Lauren. 2011. “UO ranks high for student drug, alcohol use.” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, Oregon), June 4, p.A1.

Friedman, Thomas. 2013. “Climate change is unseen player in Arab politics.” *The New York Times* reprinted in *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, Oregon), March 5, p.A9.

Frank, Robert H., Thomas Gilovich, and Dennis T. Regan. 1993. “Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7: 159-171.

Franz, Michael (Interviewed by Brian Naylor). 2012. “Between Touchdowns And Triple Jumps, Politicians Are Popping Up On Sports TV.” All Things Considered, NPR, July 12. www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=156684477

Freedom House. 2010. Singapore – country profile. www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/2010/singapore?page=22&country=7915&year=2010

Fromm, Erich. 1965. *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Avon Books.

Fry, Douglas P. 2006. *The Human Potential for Peace: An Anthropological Challenge to Assumptions about War and Violence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Funk, Robert W. et al. 1993. *The Five Gospels: The Search for the Authentic Words of Jesus*. New York: Macmillan.

Galtung, Johan. 1995. “Nonviolence and Deep Culture: Some Hidden Obstacles,” pp.81-94 in Manmohan Choudhuri and Ramjee Singh (eds.). *Mahatma Gandhi: 125 Years*. Varanasi, India: Gandhian Institute of Studies and Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan.

Galtung, Johan. 1981. “Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace.” *Journal of Peace Research* 18(2):183-199.

Galtung, Johan. 1997. “Is There a Therapy for Pathological Cosmologies?” Pp.187-205, in Jennifer Turpin and Lester R. Kurtz (eds.). *The Web of Violence: From Interpersonal to Global.* Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Gamson, William A. 1975. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press.

Gamson, Z. F., J. Goodman, and G. Gurin. 1967. “Radicals, moderates and by-standers during a university protest.” Presented at August 1967 meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco.

Gandhi, M. K. 1928. *Satyagraha in South Africa*. Navajivan, Ahmedabad, India.

Gandhi, M. K. 1999. *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 98 volumes (Electronic Book). New Delhi, Publications Division Government of India, 98 volumes. www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/cwmg.html.

Gandhi, M.K. 2008. *Mahatma Gandhi: The Essential Writings*. Judith M. Brown (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gandhi, Rajmohan. 2008. *Gandhi: The Man, His People, and the Empire*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gat, Azar. 2006. *War in Human Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

Geller, Adam. 2013. "Hitler Joins Gun Debate, But History Is In Dispute." *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, Oregon), p.A1, A7.

Gentile, Gian. 2012. Comments on SWJ Blog Post, February 5. "Counterinsurgency: A New Doctrine's Fading Allure" by Bing West. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/counterinsurgency-a-new-doctrines-fading-allure

Gier, Nick. 2013. "Three Principles of Civil Disobedience: Thoreau, Gandhi, and King." www.webpages.uidaho.edu/ngier/civil.htm

Gilbert, Bil. 1989. *God Gave Us This Country: Tekamthi and the First American Civil War*. New York: Atheneum.

Gillespie, Charles Guy. 1991. *Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gillmaj, Mikael and Donald Granberg. 1993. "Should We Take Don't Know for an Answer?" *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 57(3): 348-357.

Gilsenan, Tom. 2001. "Peacemakers and Friends: Jane Addams and Gandhi." www.mkgandhi.org/adamsgandhi.htm Retrieved march 4, 2012

Gladstone, Rick. 2012, July 28. "U.N. Misses Its Deadline For Arms Pact." *New York Times*, p.A4.

Global Peace Index. 2008. *Methodology, Results & Findings*. St. Leonards, Australia: Institute for Economics and Peace. Retrieved from www.visionofhumanity.org

Gocking, Roger S. 2005. *The History of Ghana*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Goldman, Emma. 2006. *Living My Life* (Abridged). New York: Penguin.

Goldstein, Joshua S. 2011. *Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide.* New York: Penguin Group/ Dutton.

Goldstone, Jack A. 2002. "Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict." *Journal of International Affairs* 56(1):3-22.

Gorsuch, Richard L. 1983. *Factor Analysis*, 2nd ed. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Gorenberg, G. (2009, April 6). "The missing Mahatma: Searching for a Gandhi or a Martin Luther King in the West Bank." *The Weekly Standard*, 14(28).

Gornick, Vivian. 2011. *Emma Goldman: Revolution as a Way of Life*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Graff, Henry F. 1986. *America the Glorious Republic, Volume 2: 1877 to the Present*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Gramsci, Antonio 1971. *Selections from Prison Notebooks*. London: New Left Books.

Green, Martin. 1978. *The Challenge of the Mahatmas*. New York: Basic Books.

Greene, Aleza Spalter, Elizabeth Tighe, Regina Conti, and Leonard Saxe. 1991. "Attitudes about War: Implications of the War with Iraq." *Contemporary Social Psychology* 15(4):153-160.

Greenwald, Glenn. 2013. "US military says King would be proud of its weapons." Guardian (UK) online, January 22. www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/ jan/22/martin-luther-king-military-weapons

Gregg, Benjamin. 2003. *Thick Moralities, Thin Politics: Social Integration Across Communities and Belief*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Griffen, William L. and John Marciano. 1979. *Teaching the Vietnam War*. Monclair, New Jersey: Allanheld/ Osmun.

Grussenford, Jeannie, Alfred McAlister, Patrick Sandstrom, Lina udd, and Theodore C. Morrison. 2002. "Resisting Moral Disengagement in Support for War: use of the 'Peace Test' Scale Among Student Groups in 21 Nations." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 8(1): 73-83.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 2000. "Ethnic warfare on the wane." *Foreign Affairs* 79: 52-64.

GWP (Gallup World Poll). 2009. "World Poll Methdology." July, pdf document (94 pages). Gallup, Inc.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1987. *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol. 2 *Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hacohen, Malachi Haim. 2000. *Karl Popper, The Formative Years, 1902-1945: Politics and Philosophy in Interwar Vienna*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Haidt, Jonathan. 2012a, June 1. "How Do Conservatives and Liberals See the World?" Interviewed by Bill Moyers. Moyers and Company, PBS. Full transcript. billmoyers.com/episode/encore-how-do-conservatives-and-liberals-see-the-world/

Haidt, Jonathan. 2012b. *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion*. New York: Pantheon.

Halle, Nils H. 1966. "Social Position and Foreign Policy Attitudes: A Comparative Study of France, Norway and Poland." *Journal of Peace Research* 3(1): 46-74.

Halman, Loek. 1995. "Is there a moral decline? A cross-national inquiry into morality in contemporary society." *International Social Science Journal* XLVII(3): 419-440.

Hamilton, Lawrence C. 2003. *Statistics with Stata: Updated for Version 7*. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Group.

Hansel, Lisa and Jennifer Dubin (eds.). 2010. "Common Core Curriculum: An Idea Whose Time Has Come." *American Educator* 34 (4):2. Washington, D.C.: American Federation of Teachers.

Hardiman, David. 2003. *Gandhi in his time and ours: The global legacy of his ideas*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Harkness, Janet. 2003. "Questionnaire Translation." Pp.35-67 in Janet A. Harkness, Fons J.R. Van de Vijver, and Peter Ph. Mohler. *Cross-Cultural Survey Methods*. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

Hasan, Qamar and Shamsur Rehman Khan. 1988. Gandhian Personality (Non-Violence) Scale. Pp.32-35 in Dinyar M. Pestonjee, ed. *Second Handbook of Psychological and Social Instruments*. New Delhi: Concept.

Hastie, R. 1984. "Causes and effects of causal attribution." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 46, 44–56.

Hawthorne, Amy. 2004. "Is Civil Society the Answer?" Carnegie Papers no.44 (March):1-24. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.

Heath, Anthony, Jean Martin, and Thees Spreckelsen. 2009. "Cross-National Comparability of Survey Attitude Measures." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 21(3): 293-315.

Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Cchange and Civil War, 1916-1992." *American Political Science Review* 95 (March): 33-48.

Hegre, Håvard and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(4): 508-535.

Hess, Gregory D., and Athanasios Orphanides. 2001. "War and Democracy." *Journal of Political Economy 109*(4): 776-810.

Hedges, Chris. 2003. *What Every Person Should Know About War*. New York: Free Press.

Hedges, Chris. 2009. *Empire of Illusion: The End of Literacy and the Triumph of Spectacle*. New York: Nation Books.

Hedges, Chris. 2010. *Death of the Liberal Class*. New York: Nation Books.

Hedges, Chris. 2012. “Capitalism’s ‘Sacrifice Zones.’” Interviewed by Bill Moyers, Moyers & Company, television program (PBS). July 20 episode. Transcript retrieved from billmoyers.com/wp-content/themes/billmoyers/transcript-print.php?post=10998

Hegre, Håvard and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(4): 508-535.

Heidler, David S. and Jeanne T. Heidler (eds.). 1997. *Encyclopedia of the War of 1812*. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO.

Hellevik, Ottar. 2002. “Age Differences in Value Orientation – Life Cycle or Cohort Effects?” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 14(3):286-302.

Henderson, David and Zachary Gochenour. 2012. “War and Presidential Greatness.” Working Paper Series. Retrieved from Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029774#1859389

Henry, Patrick. 1998. “Kareem’s Omission? Jackie Robinson, Black Profile in Courage.” Pp.205-213 in Joseph Dorinson and Joram Warmund (eds.). *Jackie Robinson: Race, Sports, and The American Dream*. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe.

Herbers, John. 1964. “37 More Jailed in St. Augustine: Negroes Arrested at Church and Restaurant Sit-Ins.” *New York Times*, June 15, p.23.

Hickey, Donald R. 1995. *The War of 1812: A Short History*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Hillerbrand, Dylan. 2012. “Costa Rican merchants and bankers strike for electoral reform (Huelga de brazos caidos), 1947.” Global Nonviolent Action Database. nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu

Hilton, James. 1933 [1990]. *Lost Horizon*. Pleasantville, New York: Reader’s Digest.

Hirsch, E.D., Jr. 2010. “Beyond Comprehension: We Have Yet to Adopt a Common Core Curriculum That Builds Knowledge Grade by Grade – But We Need To.” *American Educator* 34 (4):30-36. Washington, D.C.: American Federation of Teachers.

Hitlin, Steven and Jane Allyn Piliavin. 2004. “Values: Reviving a Dormant Concept.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 359-393.

Hofstede, G. 2001. *Culture's Consequences* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Høivik, Tord and Solveig Aas. 1981. "Demilitarization in Costa Rica: A Farewell to Arms?" *Journal of Peace Research* 18(4): 333-351.

Holmes, Dan. 2004. *Ty Cobb: A Biography*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Holtermann, Helge. 2012. "Explaining the Development-Civil War Relationship." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29(1): 56-78.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1995. "Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict," pp.290-313 in Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas (eds.). *World Security: Challenges for the New Century*, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1999. *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Hood, Roger and Carolyn Hoyle. 2008. *The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Hook, Glenn D. 1988. "The Erosion of Anti-Militaristic Principles in Contemporary Japan." *Journal of Peace Research* 25(4):381-394.

Horsburgh, H.J.N. 1968. *Non-Violence and Aggression: A Study of Gandhi's Moral Equivalent of War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Howe, Richard Herbert. 1978. "Max Weber's Elective Affinities: Sociology Within the Bounds of Pure Reason." *American Journal of Sociology* 84(2): 366-385.

Hudson, Alex. 2011. "Robot wars still a long way off." news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/9604610.stm Retrieved 12/20/2011

Hui, C. H., & Triandis, H. C. 1989. "Effects of culture and response format on extreme response style." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 20: 296-309.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

ICBL (International Campaign to Ban Landmines). 2012a. “States Parties (Mine Ban Treaty).” www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Parties Retrieved February 9, 2012.

ICBL (International Campaign to Ban Landmines). 2012b. “States Not Party (Mine Ban Treaty).” www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Not-Party Retrieved February 9, 2012.

ICC (International Criminal Court). 2012. “The States Parties to the Rome Statute (creating the International Criminal court).” www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states +parties/ Retrieved March 21, 2012.

IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace). 2007a. *Methodology, Results & Findings (GPI 2007).* St. Leonards, Australia: Global Peace Index. www.visionofhumanity.org.

IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace). 2007b. *Peace and Sustainability: Cornerstones to Survival in the 21st century (GPI 2007).* St. Leonards, Australia: Global Peace Index. www.visionofhumanity.org.

IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace). 2008a. *Methodology, Results & Findings (GPI 2008).* St. Leonards, Australia: Global Peace Index. www.visionofhumanity.org.

IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace). 2008b. *Discussion Paper: The Study of Industries that Prosper in Peace – the ‘Peace Industry’ (GPI 2008).* St. Leonards, Australia: Global Peace Index. www.visionofhumanity.org.

IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace). 2009a. *Methodology, Results & Findings (GPI 2009).* St. Leonards, Australia: Global Peace Index. www.visionofhumanity.org.

IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace). 2009b. *Peace, its Causes and Economic Value (GPI 2009).* St. Leonards, Australia: Global Peace Index. www.visionofhumanity.org.

Ilcan, Suzan and Lynne Phillips. 2006. “Governing Peace: Global Rationalities of Security and UNESCO’s Culture of Peace Campaign.” *Anthropologica* 48:59-71.

Ienaga, Saburo. 1994. “The Glorification of War in Japanese Education.” *International Security* 18(3): 113-133.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture Shift In Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker. 2000. "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values." *American Sociological Review* 65:19-51.

Inglehart, Ronald and Marita Carbalio. 1997. "Does Latin America Exist? (And is There a Confucian Culture?): A Global Analysis of Cross-Cultural Differences." *PS: Political Science & Politics*, March: 34-46.

Inglehart, Ronald, Miguel Basañez, and Alejandro Moreno. 1998. *Human Values and Beliefs:A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook (Political, Religious, Sexual, and Economic Norms in 43 Societies: Findings from the 1990-1993 World Values Survey)*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Inglehart, R., Basañez, M., Díez-Medrano, J., Halman, L., and Luijkx, R. 2004. *Human beliefs and values*. Mexcio: S.XXI.

Inkles, A. 1969. "Making men modern: on the causes and consequences of individual change in six developing countries." *American Journal of Sociology* 75: 208-225.

Inkles, A. 1983. *Exploring Individual Modernity*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Inwood, J. F. J. (2009). "Contested Memory in the Birthplace of a King: A Case Study of Auburn Avenue and the Martin Luther King Jr. National Park. *Cultural Geographies* 16: 87-109.

IRIN. 2006. "CAR: Rebels claim seizure of second town." November 10. www.irinnews.org/report/61531/car-rebels-claim-seizure-of-second-town

Jameson, Frederic. 1981. *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. London: Methuen.

Jasper, James M. 1997. *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jelen, Ted G., Sue Thomas, and Clyde Wilcox. 1994. “The gender gap in comparative perspective: Gender differences in abstract ideology and concrete issues in Western Europe.” *European Journal of Political Research* 25:171-186.

Jessup, Everett Colgate. 1940. *War or Sport: An Endeavor to Contribute to a Point of View to the Present Widespread Discussion on the Organization and Maintenance of Peace*. Roslyn, New York.

Johnson, Chalmers. 2001. “Blowback.” *The Nation*. October 15. Pp.13-15.

Jones, Jeffrey M. 2012. “Record-High 40% of Americans Identify as Independents in '11.” Gallup Poll. www.gallup.com/poll/151943/record-high-americans-identify-independents.aspx

Jones, Jeffrey M. 2013. “History Usually Kinder to Ex-Presidents.” April 25. Gallup Poll. www.gallup.com/poll/162044/history-usually-kinder-presidents.aspx?utm_source=alert&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=syndication&utm_content=morelink&utm_term=Politics

Jonson, Bengt (Director). 2000. *A World Without Weapons* (Peace and Conflict Resolution, Part 1). [DVD] Produced by SEBRA FILM for NBV SWEDEN. Distributor: Falls Church, Virginia: Landmark Media Inc.

JSHCM (Juan Santamaria Historical and Cultural Museum). 2012. Juan Santamaria coloring book. www.museojuansantamaria.go.cr/Sala%20de%20Juegos/pintando_juan.html Retrieved 3/27/2012

Juhnke, James C. and Carol M. Hunter. 2001. *The Missing Peace: The Search for Nonviolent Alternatives in United States History.* Kitchener, Ontario: Pandora Press.

Kagda, Sakina and Barbara Cooke. 2006. *Norway*. New York: Marshall Cavendish Benchmark.

Kakkad, Dhruvi. 2005. *Belief Systems, Value Priorities, and Social Dominance Orientation as Predictors of Nonviolent Orientations*. Doctoral Dissertation. Forham University, New York.

Kaplowitz, Stan. 1973. “An Experimental Test of a Rationalistic Theory of Deterence.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17:535-572.

Karatnycky, Adrian and Peter Ackerman. 2005. *How Freedom is Won: From Civic Struggle to Durable Democracy.* Washington, DC: Freedom House.

Kegley, Charles W., Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond. 1999. *How Nations Make Peace.* New York, New York: Worth/ St. Martin's Press.

Kelley, Jonathan and John Braithwaite. 1990. "Public Opinion and the Death Penalty in Australia." *Justice Quarterly* 7(3): 529-563.

Kennard, Alan. 1958. *Ghana is born: 6th March 1957*. London: Newman Neame Limited.

Kenner, Robert (Producer and Director). 2000. *John Brown's Holy War*. WGBH Educational Foundation, American Experience.

Kenner, Robert (Producer and Director). 2005. *Two Days in October* (Official Transcript). American Experience in association with Wisconsin Public Television, Playtone Productions, and the BBC. www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/twodays/filmmore/pt.html Retrieved 11/28/2011.

Kentor, Jeffrey. 2004. "Quantifying Hegemony in the World-Economy." In *Globalization, Hegemony & Power: Antisystemic Movements and the Global System*, edited by T. Reifer. Paradigm Publishers.

Kettle, Martin and Jeremy Lennard. 1999, March 11. "Clinton Apology to Guatemala." *The Guardian* (UK). www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/mar/12/jeremylennard.martinkettle

Kick, Edward L., Laura A. McKinney, Steve McDonald, and Andrew Jorgenson. 2009. "A Multiple-Network Analysis of the World System of Nations, 1995-1999." Unpublished manuscript.

Killen, Patricia O'Connell and Mark Silk (eds.). 2004. *Religion and Public Life in the Pacific Northwest: The None Zone*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kim, Mikyoung. 2008. "Peace or Peace Movement? Hiroshima Memory Debates and Political Compromises." *Journal of International and Area Studies* 15(1):61-78.

Kimball, Jeffrey. 1984. "The Causes of War and the Teaching of Peace History." *Peace & Change* 9(4): 69-73.

King, Martin Luther, Jr. 1957. “Birth of a New Nation.” April 7. Sermon in Montgomery, Alabama. www.famousquotes.me.uk/speeches/Martin_Luther_King/2.htm Retrieved 6/20/2011.

King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1958). *Stride Toward Freedom*. New York: Harper & Row.

King, Martin Luther, Jr. 1967. “Beyond Vietnam -- A Time to Break Silence.” April 4. Riverside Church, New York City. www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ mlkatimetobreak silence.htm. Retrieved 8/26/2011.

King, Martin Luther, Jr. 1963/ 2000. *Why We Can’t Wait*. New York: Penguin.

King, Martin Luther, Jr. 1998. *The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr*. Edited by Clayborne Carson. New York: Time Warner.

Klare, Michael T. 2001. *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. New York: Metropolitan.

Koenigsberg, Richard A. 2009. *Nations Have the Right to Kill: Hitler, the Holocaust and War*. New York: Library of Social Science.

Kohl, Herbert. 1995. *Should We Burn Babar? Essays on Children’s Literature and the Power of Stories.* New York: The New Press.

Kohn, M. C. 1969. *Class and Conformity: A Study in Values*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kohut, Andrew. 2012, May 11. “Pew Poll: More Americans Support Gay Marriage.” National Public Radio, Morning Edition. www.npr.org/2012/05/11/152480805/pew-poll-more-americans-support-gay-marriage

Kool, V.K., and M. Sen. 1984. *The Nonviolence Test*. In D. M. Pestonjee (ed.), *Second handbook of psychological and social instruments* (pp.48-54). Ahmedabad, India: India Institute of Management.

Kool, V. K. 2008. *The Psychology of Nonviolence and Aggression*. New ork: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kornbluh, Peter (ed). 2006. *Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, September 11, 1973.* National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.8. www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm (available Jan 20, 2013)

Kornbluh, Peter, and Yvette White (eds). 2006. *Pinochet: A Declassified Documentary Obit - Archive Posts Records on former Dictator's Repression, Acts of Terrorism, U.S. Support*. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 212. www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB212/index.htm (available Jan 20, 2013).

Kraska, P., & Kappeler, V. (1997). "Militarizing American police: The rise and normalization of paramilitary units." *Social Problems*, 44(1), 1-16.

Krauze, Enrique. 2011. *Redeemers: Ideas and Power in Latin America*. Hank Heifetz and Natasha Wimmer (trans.). New York: HarperCollins.

Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Malečková. 2003. "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(4): 119-144.

Krugman, Scott, Leonardo Mata, and Richard Krugman. 1992. "Sexual abuse and corporal punishment during childhood: a pilot retrospective survey of university students in CostaRica." *Pediatrics* 90: 157-161.

Kundera, Milan. 1981. *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*. New York: Penguin.

Kurlansky, Mark. 2006. *Nonviolence: Twenty-Five Lessons from the History of a Dangerous Idea.* New York: Random House.

Kurtz, Lester R. 2009. "Chile: Struggle against a military dictator (1985-1988)." International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. www.nonviolent-conflict.org/

LA (Landmine Action). 2010, May 5. "UK ratifies international treaty banning cluster bombs." www.landmineaction.org/index.asp Retrieved 11/3/2011

Lachs, John and Robert B. Talisse (eds.). 2004. *American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia* (Google eBook). New York: Psychology Press.

Lakey, George. 1973. *Strategy for a Living Revolution*. New York: Grossman.

Lakey, George. 2012a. “How Swedes and Norwegians broke the power of the ‘1 percent.’” January 25. http://wagingnonviolence.org/2012/01/how-swedes-and-norwegians-broke-the-power-of-the-1-percent/

Lakey, George. 2012b. “The more violence, the less revolution.” March 6. http://wagingnonviolence.org/2012/03/the-more-violence-the-less-revolution/

Lamola, John. 1987. “Debate on Violence,” Pp.233-252 in Buti Tlhagale and Itumeleng Mosala (eds.). *Hammering Swords into Ploughshares: Essays in Honor of Archbishop Mpilo Desmond Tutu*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing.

La Nacion. 2009. Piñera y su acalorado apoyo a Pinochet en 1998. La Nacion, December 10. www.lanacion.cl/pinera-y-su-acalorado-apoyo-a-pinochet-en-1998/noticias/2009-12-10/141341.html Retrieved 2/6/2012

Landau, Simha F. and Daniel Fridman. 1993. “The Seasonality of Violent Crime: The Case of Robbery and Homicide in Israel.” *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 30(2): 163-191.

Landsberger, H. A., and A. Saavedra. 1967. “Response Sets in Developing Countries.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 31: 214-229.

Lawrence, William. 2011. “Saami and Norwegians Protest Construction of Alta Dam, Norway, 1979-1981.” Global Nonviolent Action Database. nvdatabase. swarthmore.edu

Lane, Jeremy F. 2006. *Bourdieu’s Politics: Problems and Possibilities*. New York: Routledge.

Leahey, Christopher R. 2010. *Whitewashing War: Historical Myth, Corporate Textbooks, and Possibilities for Democratic Education*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 2000. “What’s So Different About a Counterfactual?” *World Politics* 52(4): 550-585.

Lederman, Josh. 2013. “Lawmakers rush to catch up as gay marriage views shift.” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, Oregon), March 29, p.A6.

Lee, Adrienne. 2005. “Taco Bell boycott finally over.” *The Daily Texan*, March 9. www.dailytexanonline.com

Lemonick, Michael D. 2007. “The Flavor of Memories.” *Time*, January 29, pp.102-104.

Levins, Richard and Richard Lewontin. 1985. *The Dialectical Biologist*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Levi-Strauss, Claude. 1953. *Race and History*. Paris, France: UNESCO.

Levi-Strauss, Claude. 1976. *Structural Anthropology*, Vol. 2. Monique Layton (trans.). New York: Basic Books.

Library of Congress. c.1907. “Addams Letter to Darrow.” LC-USZ62-95722. Retrieved from http://darrow.law.umn.edu/photo.php?pid=1219 Retrieved February 24, 2012.

Lindlaw, Scott. 2008. “Remote-control warriors suffer war stress.” Associated Press article. August 7. www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26078087/ Retrieved November 17, 2010.

Lindo, Jason M., Isaac D. Swensen, and Glen R. Waddell. 2012. “Are Big-Time Sports a Threat to Student Achievement?” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4(4): 254-274.

Lindsay, James M. and Caroline Smith. 2003. “Rally ‘Round the Flag: Opinion in the United States Before and After the Iraq War.” *Brookings Review*, Summer, pp.20-23.

Linkins, Jason. 2011. “Colbert Study: Conservatives Don't Know He's Joking.” Blog posted January 29. www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/27/colbert-study- conservativ_ n_191899.html Retrieved 2/11/2012

Lipschutz, Ronnie D. 2000. *After Authority*. New York: SUNY.

Listhaug, Ola. 1986. “War and Defence Attitudes: A First Look at Survey Data from 14 Countries.” *Journal of Peace Research* 23(1): 69-76.

Loewen, James W. 1995. *Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Loewen, James W. 2007. *Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong* (Revised ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster.

Logan, Lara. 2009. “Drones: America’s New Air Force.” *60 Minutes*. CBS. May 10.

Long, Chrissie. 2010. “Why Rush Limbaugh would go to Costa Rica if Obama's healthcare plan passes.” *Christian Science Monitor*, March 11. www.csmonitor.com/World/2010/0311/Why-Rush-Limbaugh-would-go-to-Costa-Rica-if-Obama-s-healthcare-plan-passes

Long, Chrissie. 2010. “U.S. Warship Docks in Costa Rica's Limon Port.” *Tico Times* (San Jose, Costa Rica), August 23. *InfoTrac Newsstand*. Web.

Long, Chrissie. 2010. “Chinchilla to Send More Police to Border.” *Tico Times* (San Jose, Costa Rica), December 1. *InfoTrac Newsstand*. Web.

Longley, Kyle. 1997. *The Sparrow and the Hawk: Costa Rica and the United States During the Rise of Jose Figueres*. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press.

Lorentzen, Svein. 1990. “Patriotism as Part of Citizenship Education: a review of Norwegian History Textbooks Throughout the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.” *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research* 34(2): 103-110.

Lowenfish, Lee. 2007. *Branch Rickey: Baseball’s Ferocious Gentleman*. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.

Lucas, Jennifer A. and David Matzko McCarthy. 2005. “War is its Own Justification: What Americans Think About War.” *Political Theology* 6(2): 165-192.

Lunch, William L. and Peter W. Sperlich. 1979. “American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam.” *Western Political Quarterly* 32:21-44.

Lupia, Arthur. 1994. “Shortcuts vs. Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections.” *American Political Science Review* 88:63-76.

Lynd, Staughton and Alice Lynd. 1995. *Nonviolence in America: A Documentary History*. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis.

Lyons, Matthew. 1999. “The Grassroots Movement in Germany, 1972-1985,” pp.81-95. In Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher (eds.). *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective*. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell.

MAC (Mines Action Canada). 2008. “Who is banning cluster bombs?” www.minesactioncanada.org/peoples_treaty/fact_sheets/en/Who%20is%20banning%20cluster%20bombs.pdf Retrieved February 9, 2012

Mahoney, James. 2000. “Path dependence in historical sociology.” *Theory and Society* 29:507-548.

Malcolm X. 1992. *By Any Means Necessary*. New York: Pathfinder Press.

Malkin, Elisabeth. 2011a, May 24. “Guatemala to Restore Legacy of a President the U.S. Helped Depose.” *The New York Times*, p.6.

Malkin, Elisabeth. 2011b, October 21. “An Apology for a Guatemalan Coup, 57 Years Later.” *The New York Times* on the Web. www.nytimes.com

Mandela, Nelson. 1999, December 31. “The sacred warrior: The liberator of South Africa looks at the seminal work of the liberator of India.” *Time* 154(27), 124-126.

Mann, Arthur. 1957. *Branch Rickey: American in Action*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Mannheim, Karl. [1928] 1952. “The Problem of Generations.” Pp.276-322 in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, by Karl Mannheim. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Mannheim, Karl. 1936 [1997]. *Ideology and Utopia* [Collected Works Volume One]. New York: Routledge.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 1995. “Democratization and the Danger of War.” *International Security 20*: 15-38.

Mara, Wil. 2003. *Rosa Parks*. New York: Scholastic Inc.

Marcos, Subcomandante. 2001. “The Punchcard and the Hourglass.” Interviewed by Gabriel García Márquez and Roberto Pombo. *New Left Review* 9:69-79.

Marin, G., Gamba, R. J., and Marin, B.V. 1992. “Extreme response style and acquiescence among Hispanics.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 23: 498-509.

Mariani, Giorgio. 2009. “Ad bellum purificandum, or, Giving Peace a (Fighting) Chance in American Studies.” *American Literary History* 21(1): 96-119.

Mariani, Mack D. and Gordon J. Hewitt. 2008. “Indoctrination U.?: Faculty Ideology and Changes in Student Political Orientation.” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 41(4): 773-783.

Markoff, John. 2010. “War Machines: Recruiting Robots for Combat.” *New York Times*, p.A1. November 28.

Marlantes, Karl. 2012. “What It’s Like to Go to War.” Interviewed by Bill Moyers, Moyers & Company, television program (PBS). July 27 episode. Transcript retrieved from billmoyers.com/episode/full-show-what-its-like-to-go-to-war/

Marrin, Patrick. 2008. “Protest Follows Catholic Peace Award.” *National Catholic Reporter*, June 27, p.16.

Marsden, W. E. 2000. “Geography and Two Centuries of Education for Peace and International Understanding.” *Geography* 85(4):289-302.

Marshall, Monty G. 2012. “Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2012.” Last updated on October 31, 2012. State Fragility and Warfare in the Global System 2011. Vienna, Virginia: Center for Systemic Peace. www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm

Martin, Brian. 2008. “How Nonviolence is Misrepresented.” *Gandhi Marg* 30(2): 235-257.

Marty, Martin E. 1958. *The New Shape of American Religion*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Marvin, Carolyn and David W. Ingle. 1999. *Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. [1848] 1955. *The Communist Manifesto*. Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson.

Mayton, Daniel M., Danya J. Peters, and Rocky W. Owens. 1999. “Values, Militarism, and Nonviolent Predispositions.” *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 5(1): 69-77.

Maynard, Guy and Michael Carrigan. 2013. “King’s Dream Was For Peace As Well As Equality.” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, Oregon), March 18, p.A7.

McAdam, Doug. 1988. *Freedom Summer*. New York: Oxford University Press.

McAdam, Doug. 1999. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970* (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, Doug, and Sidney Tarrow. 2000. “Nonviolence as Contentious Interaction.” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 33(2):149-154.

McAlister, Alfred, Pamela Orpinas, and Luis Velez. 1999. “International Variation in Attitudes toward Violence.” Pp.247-256 in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, Vol.2.

McAlister, Alfred, Patrick Sandstrom, Pekka Puska, Anitta Veijo, Razvan Chereches, and Lenne-Triin Heidmets. 2001. “Attitudes towards war, killing, and punishment of children among young people in Estonia, Finland, Romania, the Russian Federation, and the USA.” *Bulletin of the World Health Orgnization* 79(5): 382-387.

McAlister, Alfred L., Albert Bandura, Steven V. Owen. 2006. “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Support of Military Force: The Impact of Sept. 11.” *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 25(2): 141-165.

McCallum, John. 1956. *The Tiger Wore Spikes: An informal biography of Ty Cobb*. New York: A. S. Barnes and Company.

McCarthy, Ronald M. and Gene Sharp, eds. 1997. *Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide*. New York: Garland Publishing.

McCrae, Robert R. and Costa, P.W. 1997. “Personality trait structure as a human universal.” *American Psychologist* 52: 509-516.

McGowen, Roscoe. 1954. “Robinson, Dodgers Face Threat of Suit in Sequel to Bat Tossing.” *The New York Times*, June 4, p.30.

McSherry, J. Patrice. 2005. *Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America.* Boulder, Colorado: Rowman & Littlefield.

Medeiros, Susana. 2012. “Costa Rican women teachers defend schools, help bring down a dictator, 1919.” Global Nonviolent Action Database. nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu

Megoran, Nick. 2008. “Militarism, Realism, Just War, or Nonviolence? Critical Geopolitics and the Problem of Normativity.” *Geopolitics* 13:473-497.

Melander, Ingrid. 2007. “CAR president admits rights abuses by gov't forces.” October 26. Reuters –AlertNet. http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/car-president-admits-rights-abuses-govt-forces

Merton, Thomas. 1967. “Blessed Are the Meek: The Roots of Christian Nonviolence.” *Fellowship*, May, p.20.

Merton, Thomas. 1980. “Danish Nonviolent Resistance to Hitler.” Pp.165-167 in Gordon C. Zahn (ed.). *The Nonviolent Alternative*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.

Messerschmidt, James W. 1995. “Managing to Kill: Masculinities and the Space Shuttle Challenger Explosion.” *masculinities* 3(4): 1-22.

Meyer, David S., and Sidney Tarrow. 1998. “A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century.” Pp.1-28 in D. S. Meyer and S. Tarrow, eds., *The Social Movement Society*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.

Meyer, Matt. 2012. “The ‘Beautiful Trouble’ of nonviolent revolution.” April 5. http://wagingnonviolence.org/2012/04/the-beautiful-trouble-of-nonviolent-revolution/

Michel, Jean-Baptiste et al. 2011. “Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books.” *Science* 331(176): 176-182.

Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti. 2004. “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflicts: An Instrumental Variables Approach.” *Journal of Political Economy* 112(4): 725-753.

Milani, Feizi M. and Angela Uchoa Branco. 2004. “Assessing Brazil’s Culture of Peace.” *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 10(2):161-174.

Milne, June. 1990. *Kwame Nkrumah – The Conakry Years: His Life and Letters.* London: Zed Press.

Mittelman, James H. 2004. "Where Have All the Protesters Gone?" Yale Global Online. yaleglobale.yale.edu. October 4.

Molina, Ivan and Steven Palmer. 2009. *The History of Costa Rica*. San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica.

Mondak, Jeffrey. 1993. "Source Cues and Policy Approval: The Cognitive Dynamics of Public Support for the Reagan Agenda." *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 186-212.

Montalvo, J. G. and M. Reynal-Querol. 2005a. "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars." *American Economic Review* 95(3): 796-816.

Montalvo, J. G. and M. Reynal-Querol. 2005b. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Development." *Journal of Development Economics* 76: 293-323.

Mor, Ben D. 1997. "Peace Initiatives and Public Opinion: The Domestic Context of Conflict Resolution." *Journal of Peace Research* 34(2):197-215.

Morales, J. Francisco and Jose Antonio Leal. 2004. "Indicators for a Culture of Peace in Spain." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 10(2):147-160.

Morris, A. D. 1993. "Birmingham Confrontation Reconsidered: An Analysis of the Dynamics and Tactics of Mobilization." *American Sociological Review, 58*(5), 621-636.

Moskos, Charles C., and John Whiteclay Chambers II (eds.). 1993. *The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Moughrabi, Fouad. 2001. "The Politics of Palestinian Textbooks." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31(1):5-19.

Muñoz, José. 2006. "International Opportunities and Domestic Protest: Zapatistas, Mexico and the New World Economy." *Social Movement Studies* 5(3): 251-274.

National Public Radio (NPR). 2010. “Extending The Law Of War To Cyberspace.” September 22. Morning Edition. www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=130023318. Retrieved September 25, 2010.

National Public Radio (NPR). 2010. “Nicaragua Blames Google Map For Costa Rica Invasion.” NPR.org. November 9.

National Public Radio (NPR). 2011. “Egypt’s Democracy At Risk, Amnesty International Warns.” June 26. Morning Edition. www.npr.org/2011/06/26/137429509/egypts-democracy-at-risk-amnesty-international-warns. Retrieved June 26, 2011.

National Public Radio (NPR). 2011. “Veterans, Civilians Don’t See Eye to Eye on War.” October 8. Weekend Edition Saturday. www.npr.org.

National Public Radio (NPR). 2012. “Liu Xiaobo: ‘No Enemies, No Hatred,’ Only Courage.” February 16. www.npr.org/2012/02/16/146988012/liu-xiaobo-no-enemies-no-hatred-only-courage

National Public Radio (NPR). 2012. “Inconsistency: The Real Hobgoblin.” Morning Edition, March 5. www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=147807206

National Public Radio (NPR). 2013. “Explosions At Syrian University Kill More Than 80, Injure Hundreds.” All Things Considered, January 16. www.npr.org/2013/01/16/169543642/explosions-at-syrian-university-kill-more-than-80-injure-hundreds

Navaarro, Kylin and Max Rennebohm. 2011. “Costa Ricans protest open pit gold mining, 2010.” Global Nonviolent Action Database. nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu

Nebehay, Stephanie. 2010, July 29. “US, major powers urged to join cluster munitions pact." http://uk. reuters. com/article/idUK128042231476. _CH_. 2420). *Reuters*. Retrieved November 12, 2011

Nelson, Harold D. (ed.). 1983. *Costa Rica: A Country Study*. Washington, D. C.: Foreign Area Studies – The American University/ Department of the United States Army.

Nelson, Keith L. and Spencer C. Olin. 1979. *Why War? Ideology, Theory, and History*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 2011. *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.

New Encyclopaedia Britannica (NEB), 15th ed. 1998. Micropaedia - Ready Reference. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.

New Republic (NR). 1922, March 29. "Gandhi and the Crisis in India." [Editorial] *The New Republic: A Journal of Opinion*, Vol.XXX (No.382), pp.124-126.

Newport, Frank (ed.). 2011. "Americans Say Reagan Is the Greatest U.S. President." February 18. www.gallup.com/poll/146183/Americans-Say-Reagan-Greatest President.aspx?utm_source=alert&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=syndication &utm_content=morelink&utm_term=Politics. Retrieved 2/18/2011.

New York Times (NYT)/ Reuters. 1948. "Gold Coast Boycotts Imports." *New York Times*, Feb. 10, p.14.

New York Times (NYT). 1950. "Violence in Gold Coast Town." *New York Times,* January 18, p.8.

New York Times (NYT). 1950. "Gold Coast Ends Emergency." *New York Times,* March 19, p.3.

New York Times (NYT). 1954. "Tossed Bat Hits Usher: Robinson Apologizes for Incident – Fans are Incensed." *New York Times*, June 3, p.33

New York Times (NYT). 1954. "No Intent Found in Bat Throwing." *New York Times*, June 8, p.30.

New York Times (NYT). 1956. "Needling Angers Jackie: Dodgers' Robinson Accuses Braves' Burdette of Slur." *New York Times,* August 28, p.21.

New York Times (NYT). 1956. "Nonviolence Talks End." *New York* Times, December 10, p.20.

New York Times (NYT). 1958. "President Scored Over Integration." *New York Times*, September 20, p.10.

New York Times (NYT). 2012, January 16. "Live Blogging the Myrtle Beach Debate." *The New York Times Blogs (The Caucus)*. Retrieved from Lexis Nexis.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1967 [1887]. *On the Geneology of Morals and Ecce Homo.* Walter Kaufmann and RJ Hollingdale (Trans.). New York: Random House.

Nisbett, R. E. and D. Cohen. 1996. *Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South*. New York: HarperCollins.

Nkrumah, Kwame. 1957. *Ghana – the Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*. New York: International Publishers.

Nkrumah, Kwame. 1961. *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology*. New York: Praeger.

Nkrumah, Kwame. 1973. *Revolutionary Path*. New York: International Publishers.

Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, Pippa. 2009. *Democracy Timeseries Data, Release 3.0*. January, 2009. Retrieved from www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm

Norton, Mary Beth, David M. Katzman, Paul D. Escott, Howard P. Chudacoff, Thomas G. Paterson, and William M. Tuttle, Jr. 1998. *A People and a Nation: A History of the United States, Vol. II: Since 1865.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Nugent, Paul. 1995. *Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana: Power, Ideology and the Burden of History, 1982-1994*. New York: Pinter Publishing.

Nunberg, Geoff. 2011, December 7. "'Occupy': Geoff Nunberg's 2011 Word Of The Year." National Public Radio. www.npr.org/2011/12/07/143265669/occupy-geoff-nunbergs-2011-word-of-the-year

Nunnally, J.C. 1978. *Psychometric theory* (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

OCLC (Online Computer Library Center). 2003. OCLC Environmental Scan. Dublin, Ohio: OCLC Online Computer Library Center, Inc. Retrieved from www.oclc.org/reports/escan/economic/educationlibraryspending.htm

Olick, Jeffrey K. 2007. “Collective Memory and Nonpublic Opinion: A Historical Note on a Methodological Controversy About a Political Problem.” *Symbolic Interaction* 30(1): 41-55.

Olick, Jeffrey K. 2003. *States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations in National Retrospection.* Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Olick, Jeffrey K. 1999. “Collective Memory: Two Cultures.” *Sociological Theory* 17(3): 333-348.

Olick, Jeffrey K. and Joyce Robbins. 1998. “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices.” *Annual Reviews of Sociology* 24: 105-140.

Oliverio, Annamarie and Pat Lauderdale. 2005. “‘No Hay Rosas Sin Espinas’: Statecraft in Costa Rica.” Pp.198-223 in Cecilia Menjívar and Néstor Rodríguez (eds.). *When States Kill: Latin America, the U.S. and Technologies of Terror*. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.

Ollman, Bertell. 2003. *Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx’s Method*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Onishi, Norimitsu. 1999, July 7. “Democracy Sprouts in Ghana; Now for the Harvest.” *New York Times*, p.A3.

Orpinas, Pamela. 1999. “Who is violent? Factors associated with aggressive behaviors in Latin America and Spain.” *Pan American Journal of Public Health* 5(4/5): 232-243.

Over, William. 2004. *World Peace, Mass Culture, and National Politics*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Page, Benjamin I. and Marshall M. Bouton. 2006. *The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from our Leaders but Don’t Get*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Page, Benjamin I. and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992. *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Palmer, Steve. 2004. “Getting to Know the Unknown Soldier.” Pp.90-96 in Steven Palmer and Ivan Molina (eds.). *The Costa Rica Reader: History, Culture, Politics*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Pape, Robert. 1996. *Bombing to Win?: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Papini, Giovanni. 1923. *Life of Christ*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

Parkman, Patricia. 1988. *Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador: The Fall of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez.* Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.

Parkman, Patricia. 1990. *Insurrectionary Civic Strikes in Latin America 1931-1961*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Albert Einstein Institution.

Parsons, Talcott, Edward A. Shils, Gordon W. Allport, Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray, Robert R. Sears, Richard C. Sheldon, Samuel A. Stouffer, and Edward C. Tolman. 1951. “Some fundamental categories of the theory of action: A general statement,” pp. 3-29 in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (Eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Paul, David M. and Clyde Brown. 2001. “Testing the Limits of Elite Influence on Public Opinion: An Examination of Sports Facility Referendums.” *Political Research Quarterly* 54(4):871-888.

Paulson, Joshua. 2005. “Ousting a Guatemalan Dictator – 1944.” Pp.149-155 in Gene Sharp. *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*. Boston: Porter Sargent.

Payne, J. L. 1989. *Why Nations Arm*. New York: Blackwell.

Pelikan, J. (1985). *Jesus through the Centuries.* New York: Harper & Row.

Perez, Orlando J. 1999. “Public Opinion and the Future of U.S.-Panama Relations.” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 41(3):1-33.

Perry, Alex. 2007. “How to Prevent the Next Darfur.” *Time*, May 7, pp.38-40

Pettigrew, Thomas, and Linda Tropp. 2006. “A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory.” *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology* 90(5): 751-783.

Pew. 2009. “Public Remains Divided Over Use of Torture.” April 24, Press Release. Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.

Pew. 2011. “The Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era.” Pew Research Center. Washington, D.C. www.pewsocialtrends.org

Philips, Wayne. 1956. “Negro Pastors Press Bus Boycott By Preaching Passive Resistance.” *The New York Times*, February 27, p.17.

Philips, Wayne. 1956. “Montgomery is Stage for a Tense Drama.” *The New York Times*, March 4, p.E6.

Piatigorsky, Alexander. 2005. *Who’s Afraid of Freemasons?* New York: Barnes & Noble.

Pickerill, Jenny and Frank Webster. 2006. “The Anti-War/ Peace Movement in Britain and the Conditions of Information War.” *International Relations* 20(4):407-423.

Pinker, Steven. 2011. *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*. New York: Viking.

Podeh, Elie. 2000. “History and Memory in the Israeli Educational System: The Portrayal of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in History Textbooks (1948-2000).” *History & Memory* 12(1): 65-100.

Polletta, Francesca. 1998. “Legacies and Liabilities of an Insurgent Past: Remembering Martin Luther King, Jr., on the House and Senate Floor.” *Social Science History* 22(4):479-512.

Polletta, Francesca. 1998b. “‘It Was Like a Fever...’ Narrative and Identity in Social Protest.” *Social Problems* 45(2): 137-159.

Polletta, Francesca. 2009. “Storytelling in Politics.” *Contexts* 7(4): 26-31.

Polner, Murray. 2007. *Branch Rickey: A Biography* (Revised ed.). Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company.

Pons, Michael. 2012. “How one national school voucher program fared.” October 25. www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2012/10/25/how-the-worlds-longest-running-school-voucher-program-fared/

Population Reference Bureau (PRB). 2010. *World Population Data Sheet 2010*. Washington, DC. Population Reference Bureau. www.prb.org

Pratto, Felicia, Jim Sidanius, Lisa M. Stallworth, and Bertram F. Malle. 1994. "Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political Attitudes." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67(4):741-763.

Presbey, G. M. 2006. "Evaluating the legacy of nonviolence in South Africa." *Peace & Change* 31(2), 141-174.

Prothero, Stephen R. 2007. *Religious Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know – And Doesn't.* New York: HarperCollins.

Puaca, Brian M. 2011. "Teaching Trauma and Responsibility: World War II in West German History Textbooks." *New German Critique* 112(38.1): 135-153.

Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Qualtrics. 2009. Qualtrics online survey tool. Provo, Utah: Qualtrics Labs Inc.

Raaijmakers, Quinten A. W., Anne van Hoof, Harm 't Hart, Tom F.M.A. Verbogt, and Wilma A.M. Vollebergh. 2000. "Adolescents' Midpoint Responses on Likert-Type Scale Items: Neutral or Missing Values?" *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 12(2): 208-216.

Rabiger, Michael. 2004. *Directing the Documentary* (4th ed.). New York: Focal Press.

Rampersand, Arnold. 1997. *Jackie Robinson: A Biography*. New York: Knopf.

Rathbun, Brian C. 2006. "The Myth of German Pacifism." *German Politics and Society* Issue 79, Vol.24(2):68-81.

Register-Guard (RG). 2013. "Rethinking gay marriage: Some opponents are changing their minds" [op-ed]. *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, Oregon), April 9, p.A8.

Reifman, Alan S., Richard P. Larrick, and Steven Fein. 1991. "Temper and Temperature on the Diamond: The Heat-Aggression Relationship in Major League Baseball." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 17(5): 580-585.

Rénique, Gerardo. 2006. “Strategic Challenges for Latin America’s Anti-Neoliberal Insurgency.” pp.35-46 inTeo Ballvé and Vijay Prashad (eds.). *Dispatches from Latin America: On the Frontiers Against Neoliberalism.* South End Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Reporters Without Borders (RWB). 2010. World Press Freedom Index 2010. Paris, France: www.rsf.org

Reuters. 1948. “Curfew Placed on Accra: African Ex-Servicemen Riot in Protest on Grievances.” *New York Times,* March 1, p.9.

Reuters. 1983, August 26. “Uruguayans Bang Pots to Protest Army Rule.” *New York Times*, p.A5.

Reuters. 1983, November 28. “Uruguayans Rally Against Military Rulers.” *New York Times*, p.A7.

Reuters. 1984, January 20. “Uruguay Breaks Up Plant Sit-In.” *New York Times*, p.A2.

Reynal-Querol, M. 2002. “Ethnicity, Political Systems and Civil War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 29-54.

Reynolds, Louisa. 2011. “Guatemala: Why Did War-Torn Areas Vote for Pérez Molina?” December 12. Latinamerica Press. http://upsidedownworld.org/main/news-briefs-archives-68/3354-guatemala-why-did-war-torn-areas-vote-for-perez-molina Retrieved 12/19/2011

Rhoden, William C. 2006. *$40 Million Slaves: The Rise, Fall, and Redemption of the Black Athlete.* New York: Crown Publishers.

Rickey, Branch. 1956. Speech for the “One Hundred Percent Wrong Club” banquet. Atlanta, Georgia, January 20. Broadcast on WERD 860 AM radio. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Branch Rickey Papers). Retrieved from http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/robinson/branch.html

Ripsman, Norrin M. 2007. “Peacemaking and Democratic Peace Theory: Public Opinion as an Obstacle to Peace in Post-Conflict Situations.” *Democracy and Security* 3 (1): 89-113.

Ritzer, George. 2003. *Contemporary Sociological Theory and Its Classical Roots: The Basics*. Boston: McGraw Hill.

Roberts, Keith A. and David Yamane. 2012. *Religion in Sociological Perspective*, 5th ed. Los Angeles: Sage.

Robinson, Jackie. 1997 [1955]. "Now I Know Why They Boo Me!" pp.193-202 in Tygiel, Jules (ed.). *The Jackie Robinson Reader: Perspectives on an American Hero*. New York: Penguin.

Robinson, Jackie (with Alfred Duckett). 1995. *I Never Had It Made: An Autobiography of Jackie Robinson.* New York: HarperCollins .

Robnett, Belinda. 2002. "External Political Change, Collective Identities, and Participation in Social Movement Organizations." Pp.266-285 in David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (eds.). *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Roden, Philip, Bruce Kraig, Robynn L. Greer, and Betty M. Bivins. 1984. *Life and Liberty: An American History.* Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company.

Rojas, Fabio. 2012. Presidents Who Kill People are Popular. April 12. http://thesociety pages.org/socimages/2012/04/12/presidents-who-kill-people-are-popular/

Rokeach, Milton. 1973. *The Nature of Human Values*. New York: Free Press.

Rolbein, Seth. 1989. *Nobel Costa Rica: A Timely Report on our Peaceful Pro-Yankee, Central American Neighbor.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Roof, Wade Clark. "Religion and Spirituality: Toward an Integrated Analysis." Pp.137-148 in Michele Dillon (ed.). *The Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rose, Richard. 1985. "National Pride in Cross-National Perspective." *International Social Science Journal* 37(1): 85-96.

Ross, Marc Howard. 1986. "A Cross-Cultural Theory of Political Conflict and Violence." *Political Psychology* 7(3): 427-469.

Ross, Marc Howard. 1993. *The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective.* New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Rowland, Stanley, Jr. 1956. "2,500 Here Hail Boycott Leader: Head of Montgomery Negro Bus Protest Gets Hero's Welcome in Brooklyn." *The New York Times*, March 26, p.27.

Russett, Bruce, and John R. Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Ryder, Norman B. 1965. "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change." *American Sociological Review* 30(6):843-861.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. "What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48: 814-858.

Sandoval-García, Carlos. 2004. *Threatening Others: Nicaraguans and the Formation of National Identities in Costa Rica.* Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Sapiro, Virginia. 2003. "Theorizing Gender in Political Psychology Research." Pp.601-634 in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds. *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sarup, Madan. 1993. *An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism*, 2nd ed. New York: Pearson Education.

Saunders, Debra. 2006. "Do colleges teach them anything?" *The San Francisco Chronicle* reprinted in *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, Oregon), September 29, p.A13.

Schell, Jonathan. 2003. *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People.* New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Scheuch, Erwin K. 1993. "Theoretical Implications of Comparative Survey Research." *Historical Survey Research* 18(2): 172-195.

Schock, Kurt. 2003. "Nonviolent Action and Its Misconceptions: Insights for Social Scientists." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 36(4):705-712.

Schock, Kurt. 2005. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Social Movements, Protest, and Contention, Vol.22. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Schooler, Carmi. 1996. "Cultural and Social-Structural Explanations of Cross-National Psychological Differences." *Annual Reviews of Sociology* 22: 323-349.

Schrafstetter, Susanna. 2004. "The Long Shadow of the Past: History, Memory and the Debate over West Germany's Nuclear Status, 1954-69." *History & Memory* 16(1): 118-145.

Schudson, Michael. 2012. "Telling Stories About Rosa Parks." *Contexts* 11(3): 22-27.

Schuman, Howard. 1972. "Two Sources of Antiwar Sentiment in America." *The American Journal of Sociology* 78(3): 513-536.

Schuman, Howard and Cheryl Rieger. 1992. "Historical Analogies, Generational Effects, and Attitudes Toward War." *American Sociological Review* 57:315-326.

Schumpeter, J.A. 1919 [1951]. *Imperialism and Social Classes*. Translated version. London: Oxford University Press.

Schutt, Russell K. 2001. *Investigating the Social World*, 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press.

Schwartz, Barry. 1996. "Memory as a Cultural System: Abraham Lincoln in World War II." *American Sociological Review* 61:908-927.

Schwartz, Barry. 2009. "Collective Forgetting and the Symbolic Power of Oneness: The Strange Apotheosis of Rosa Parks." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 72(2): 123-142.

Schwartz, Barry and Howard Schuman. 2005. "History, Commemoration, and Belief: Abraham Lincoln in American Memory, 1945-2001." *American Sociological Review* 70(2):183- 203.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 1992. "Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 25: 1-65.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 1994. “Beyond individualism/ collectivism: New cultural dimensions of values.” In U. Kim, H.C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S. Choi, and G. Yoon (eds.). *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method and Applications*, pp.85-119. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 1994b. “Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values?” *Journal of Social Issues* 50(4): 19-45.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 2007. “Basic Human Values: Theory, Methods, and Applications.” The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Unpublished document.

Schwartz, Shalow H. 2011. “Computing Scores for the 10 Human Values.” European Social Survey. www.Europeansocialsurvey.org.

Schwartz, Shalow H., and Wolfgang Bilsky. 1990. “Toward a Theory of the Universal Content and Structure of Values: Extensions and Cross-Cultural Replications.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 58(5): 878-891.

Schwartz, Shalow H., and Klaus Boehnke. 2004. “Evaluating the structure of human values with confirmatory factory analysis.” *Journal of Research in Personality* 38: 230-255.

Schwartz, Shalow H., and Lilach Sagiv. 1995. “Identifying culture-specifics in the content and structure of values.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 26(1): 92-116.

Schwarz, N., and Clore, G. L. 1983. “Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45, 513–523.

Seelye, Katharine Q. and Janet Elder. 2003, December 21. “Strong Support is Found on Ban for Gay Marriage.” *The New York Times*, p.39.

Seevak. 2000. “Jackie and Martin Luther King, Jr.” Boston Latin School website. http://www.learntoquestion.com/seevak/groups/2000/sites/Robinson/NEWVERSION/drking.html Retrieved 1/14/2011

Secrest, Donald, Gregory G. Brunk, and Howard Tamashiro. 1991. “American Elite Views on the Conduct of War.” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 19: 195-216.

Segal, Robert A. 2004. “Introductory Essay.” Pp.vii–xxxviii in Otto Rank. *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero: A Psychological Exploration of Myth.* Gregory C. Richter and E. James Lieberman (trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Segall, M. H. 1986. “Assessment of social behavior.” InW. J. Lonner & J.W. Berry (Eds.), *Field methods in crosscultural research* (pp. 265-290). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Sewell, William H., Jr. 1996. “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille.” *Theory and Society* 25:841-81.

Shanker Institute. 2010. American Labor in U.S. History Textbooks: How Labor’s Story is Distorted in High School History Textbooks. www.shankerinstitute.org/docs/american-labor.pdf Retrieved 1/10/2012. Washington, D.C.: Albert Shanker Institute.

Shapiro, Robert Y. and Harpreet Mahajan. 1986. “Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50(1):42-61.

Sharp, Gene. 1959. “The Meanings of Non-Violence: A Typology (Revised).” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3(1): 41-66.

Sharp, Gene. 1973. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 3 volumes. Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers.

Sharp, Gene. 1985. *Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defense.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harper & Row.

Sharp, Gene. 1990. *Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Sharp, Gene. 1996. “Beyond Just War and Pacifism.” *Ecumenical Review*, April, 233-250.

Sharp, Gene. 2005. *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential.* Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers.

Sherrow, Victoria. 2000. *Encyclopedia of Youth and War: Young People as Participants and Victims*. Phoenix, Arizona: Oryx Press.

Sicinski, Andrzej. 1970. "'Don't Know' Answers in Cross-National Surveys." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 34(1): 126-129.

Sidanius, Jim and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sidanius, Jim, Shana Levin, James Liu, and Felicia Pratto. 2000. "Social dominance orientation, anti-egalitarianism and the political psychology of gender: An extension and cross-cultural replication." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 30: 41-67.

Sidanius, Jim, C. van Laar, S. Levin, and S. Sinclair. 2003. "Social hierarchy maintenance and assortment into social roles: A social dominance perspective." *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 6: 333-352.

Sidanius, Jim, Stacey Sinclair, and Felicia Pratto. 2006. "Social Dominance Orientation, Gender, and Increasing Educational Exposure." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 36(7): 1640-1653.

Simon, Scott. 2002. *Jackie Robinson and the Integration of Baseball*. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

Sims, Christopher. 2012. "Guantanamo Bay." *Contexts* 11(2): 58-65.

Skocpol, Theda and Margaret Somers. 1994. "The uses of comparative history in mascrosocial inquiry." Pp.72-95 in Theda Skocpol. *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skowronski, J. J., & Carlston, D. E. 1987. "Social judgment and social memory: The role of cue diagnosticity in negativity, positivity, and extremity biases." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52, 689–699.

Smiley, Tavis. 2011. "MLK: A Call to Conscience," Episode 2. Tavis Smiley show, Public Broadcasting Station. Aired: August, 2011.

Smith, Emily E. 2009. "Sports fans linked to sexism." *Oregon Daily Emerald* (University of Oregon – Eugene), April 22. Online edition, www.dailyemerald.com

Smith, Jessie Carney (ed.). 1998. "Jackie Robinson." *Notable Black American Men*, Book I. Farmington Hills, Michigan: Gale. Retrieved 1/14/2011 from www.gale.cengage.com/free_resources/bhm/bio/robinson_j.htm

Smith, Peter B. 2004. “Acquiescent Response Bias as an Aspect of Cultural Communication Style.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 35(1): 50-61.

Smith, Tom W. 2003. “Developing Comparable Questions in Cross-National Surveys.” Pp. 69-91 in Janet A. Harkness, Fons J. R. Van deVijver, and Peter P. Mohler (eds.). *Cross-Cultural Survey Methods*. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Interscience.

Smith, Tracy K. 2012, January 27. Newspoet: Tracy K. Smith Writes The Day In Verse www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=145985904. National Public Radio, All Things Considered.

Smithey, Lee and Lester R. Kurtz. 1999. “‘We Have Bare Hands’: Nonviolent Social Movements in the Soviet Bloc.” *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective.* Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher (eds.). Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell.

Smithey, Lee. 2011. “The Power of Nonviolent Resistance.” *The Atlantic*, February 22. www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/02/the-power-of-nonviolent-resistance/71544/

Snow, David A. 2004. “Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields,” pp.380-412 in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” *American Sociological Review* 51(4): 464-481.

Snyder, Jack. 2000. *From Voting to Violence*. New York: Norton.

Solis, Luis G. Rivera 2012. Filmed interview. San Jose, Costa Rica. Film: *A Bold Peace*. Producers and Directors: Matthew Eddy and Michael Dreiling.

Sosnowski, Saúl and Louise B. Popkin (eds.). 1993. *Repression, Exile, and Democracy: Uruguayan Culture*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Soss, Joe, Laura Langbein, and Alan R. Metelko. 2003. “Why Do White Americans Support the Death Penalty?” *The Journal of Politics* 65(2): 397-421.

Spini, Dario. 2003. “Measurement Equivalence of 10 Value Types from the Schwartz Value Survey Across 21 Countries.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 34(1): 3-23.

Stack, Steven. 2004. “Public Opinion on the Death Penalty: Analysis of Individual-Level Data from 17 Nations.” *International Criminal Justice Review* 14: 69-98.

Stagner, Ross. 1942. “Some Factors Related to Attitude Toward War, 1938.” *The Journal of Social Psychology, S.P.S.S.I. Bulletin* 16: 131-142.

Stein, R. Conrad. 2003. *Denmark*. New York: Scholastic.

Stempel, Carl. 2006. “Televised Sports, Masculinist Moral Capital, and Support for the U.S. Invasion of Iraq.” *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 30(1): 79-106.

Stephan, Maria J. and Erica Chenoweth. 2008. “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.” *International Security* 33(1):7-44.

Stiehm, J. 1968. “Nonviolence is Two.” *Sociological Inquiry* 38: 23-30.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2012. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers Retrieved February 13, 2012.

Stockwell, John. 1978. *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*. New York: Norton.

Stout, Lynn. 2011. *Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Strauss, M.A. 1983. “Ordinary violence, child abuse, and wife-beating: what do they have in common?” pp.213-234 in D. Finkelhor, R.J. Gelles, G.T. Hotaling, and M.A. Strauss (eds.). *The Dark Side of Families: Current Family Violence Research*. Beverley Hills, California: Sage Publications.

Suarez, John. 2008. “Guevara’s Lamentable Legacy.” http://www2.fiu.edu/~fcf/che.html December 11, 2008. Retrieved 5/21/2010.

Sugden, John. 1997. *Tecumseh: A Life*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Sullivan, Michael J. III. 1991. *Measuring Global Values: The Ranking of 162 Countries*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Tajbakhsh, Kian. 2001. *The Promise of the City: Space, Identity, and Politics in Contemporary Social Thought*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Tannenbaum, Frank. 1921. *The Labor Movement: Its Conservative Functions and Social Consequences.* New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

Tannenbaum, Frank. 1933. *Osborne of Sing Sing*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Tannenbaum, Frank. 1946. *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas*. New York: Vintage.

Tedla, Aden. 2010. "Costa Rican communities defeat U.S. oil companies to protect local environment, 1999-2002." Global Nonviolent Action Database. nvdatabase. swarthmore.edu

Terkel, Amanda. 2010. "63 Percent of Americans Oppose War In Afghanistan." www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/30/63-percent-of-american-public-opposes-war-afghanistan_n_802765.html. Retrieved 12/ 30/ 2010

Terkel, Amanda. 2013. "Distinguished Warfare Medal Honoring Drone Pilots Faces Bipartisan Backlash." March 11. www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/11/ distinguished-warfare-medal-drone-pilots_n_2852677.html

Tessler, Mark and Ina Warriner. 1997. "Gender, Feminism, and Attitudes Toward International Conflict: Exploring Relationships with Survey Data from the Middle East." *World Politics* 49: 250-281.

Tessler, Mark, Jodi Nachtwey, and Audra Grant. 1999. "Further Tests of the Women and Peace Hypothesis: Evidence from Cross-National Survey Research in the Middle East." *International Studies Quarterly* 43:519-531.

Teune, Henry. 1977. "Analysis and Interpretation in Cross-National Survey Research." Pp.95-128. In Alexander Szalai and Riccardo Petrella (Eds.). *Cross-National Comparative Survey Research: Theory and Practice.* Elmsford, New York: Pergamon Press.

Therborn, Goran. 2013. *The Killing Fields of Inequality*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Thorpe, Holly. 2010. “Bourdieu, Gender Reflexivity, and Physical Culture: A Case of Masculinities in the Snowboarding Field.” *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 34(2):176- 214.

Thyne, C. L. 2006. “ACB’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980-1999.” *International Studies Quarterly* 50: 733-754.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.

Tilly, Charles. 1985. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” Pp.169-187 in *Bringing the State Back In.* Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1994. “Afterword: Political Memories in Space and Time.” Pp.241-256 in *Remapping Memory: The Politics of TimeSpace*. Ed. Jonathan Boyarin. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Tilly, Charles. 2001. “The Historical Analysis of Political Processes.” Pp.567-88 in *Handbook of Sociological Theory,* edited by J. Turner. New York: Springer.

Time. 2012. *TIME Almanac 2013*. Powered by Encyclopaedia Britannica. Chicago: Time, Inc.

Times. 2010. “Nicaragua Stands Its Ground Over Google Maps Border Dispute.” *The Times* (London), November 16, p.30.

Timothy, Bankole. 1955. *Kwame Nkrumah: His Rise to Power*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Tir, Jaroslav and Paul F. Diehl. 1998. “Demographic Pressure and Interstate Conflict: Linking Population Growth and Density to Militarized Disputes and Wars, 1930-1989.” *Journal of Peace Research* 35(3): 319-339.

Togeby, Lise. 1994. “The Gender Gap in Foreign Policy Attitudes.” *Journal of Peace Research* 31(4):375-392.

Tolstoy, Leo. 1945 [1882 and 1884]. *A Confession* and *What I Believe*. Aylmer Maude (Trans.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Tonry, Michael. 2008. “Crime and Human Rights – How Political Paranoia, Protestant Fundamentalism, and Constitutional Obsolescence Combined to Devastate Black America: The American Society of Criminology 2007 Presidential Address.” *Criminology* 46(1): 1-34.

Torres-Reyna, Oscar. 2011. “Getting Started in Factor Analysis (using Stata 10).” http://dss.princeton.edu/training Retrieved November 1, 2011.

Transparancy International (TI). 2011. Corruption Perceptions Index 2011. www.transparency.org

Triandis, Harry C., Gerardo Marin, Judith Lisansky, and Hector Betancourt. 1984. “*Simpatía* as a Cultural Script of Hispanics.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 47(6): 1363-1375.

UCLA. 2012. “Stata FAQ: How can I compute effect size in Stata after an ANOVA?” UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group. From www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/faq/ effectsize.htm Retrieved Dec.15, 2012.

Ulanov, Ann Belford. 1971. *The Feminine in Jungian Psychology and in Christian Theology*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

UN (United Nations). 2012. Convention on Cluster Munitions. Disarmament Treaties XXVI 6. http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY &mtdsg_no=XXVI-6&chapter=26&lang=en Retrieved February 9, 2012

UNESCO. 1995. *UNESCO and a Culture of Peace: Promoting a Global Movement*. New York: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

UNESCO. 2012. "Library books by country", UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Retrieved from www.NationMaster.com/red/graph/edu_lib_boo-education-library-books&b_printable=1 Retrieved July 2012.

UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). 2001. “The Effects of Armed Conflict on Early Childhood,” pp.36-39. *The State of the World’s Children.* New York: UNICEF.

UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2011. Global Study on Homicide. Vienna: United Nations.

Unkelbach, Christian, Klaus Fiedler, Myriam Bayer, Martin Stegmu¨ller, and Daniel Danner. 2008. “Why Positive Information Is Processed Faster: The Density Hypothesis.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 95(1): 36-49.

United Press International (UPI). 1971. “U.S. Cancels Nuclear Carrier Visit to Chile.” *Los Angeles Times*, February 28.

United Press International (UPI). 1975. “Ex-Costa Rica Leader Tells of His CIA Role.” *Los Angeles Times*, March 10, p.A1, p.A12.

University of Iowa. 2013. “The University of Iowa Libraries - Collection Management.” http://www.lib.uiowa.edu/collections/ Retrieved 4/26/2013.

U.S. Department of State. 2012. Singapore – Country Specific Information. www.travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1017.html#country Retrieved June 28, 2012

Urdal, Henrik. 2005. “People vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Revisited.” *Journal of Peace Research* 42(4): 417-434.

Van de Vliert, Evert, Shalom H. Schwartz, Sipke E. Huismans, Geert Hofstede, and Serge Daan. 1999. “Temperature, Cultural Masculinity, and Domestic Political Violence: A Cross-National Study.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 30(3): 291-314.

Vanhanen, T. 2000. “A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-1998.” *Journal of Peace Research* 37:251-265.

van Laar, C., J. Sidanius, J. Rabinowitz, and S. Sinclair. 1999. “The three R’s of academic achievement: Reading, ‘riting, and racism.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 25: 139-151.

Veblen, T. 1919. *An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation*. New York: B. W. Huebsch.

Verkuyten, Maykel, Jochem Thijs, and Hidde Bekhuis. 2010. “Intergroup Contact and Ingroup Reappraisal: Examining the Deprovincialization Thesis.” *Social Psychology Quarterly* 73(4): 398-416.

Voss, K.E., D.E. Stem, Jr., L.W. Johnson, and C. Arce. 1996. “An Exploration of the Comparability of Semantic Adjectives in Three Languages: A Magnitude Estimation Approach.” *International Marketing Review* 13: 44-58.

Wajcman, J. 1991. *Feminism confronts technology*. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Wainer, Howard. 1976. “Estimating Coefficients in Linear Models: It Don’t Make No Nevermind.” *Psychological Bulletin* 83(2): 213-217.

Wald, Kenneth D., Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel S. Hill. 1989. “Habits of the Mind? The Problem of Authority in the New Christian Right.” Pp.93-108 in T. G. Jelen (ed.). *Religion and Political Behavior in the United States*. New York: Praeger.

Ward, Geoffrey C. and Ken Burns. 1994. *Baseball: An Illustrated History*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Washington Post. 2012. “Violence against women deeply rooted.” Reprinted in *The Dallas Morning News* (Dallas, Texas). December 30, p.23A.

Weart, Spencer R. 1998. *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Weber, Max. 1922. *The Sociology of Religion*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Weber, Max. 1930 [1992]. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Talcott Parsons (Trans.). New York: Routledge.

Weber, Max. 1958 [1916-1917]. *The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism.* Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Trans. and Eds.). Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Weber, T. 2003. “Nonviolence is who? Gene Sharp and Gandhi.” *Peace and Change* 28(2): 250-270.

Weinstein, Martin. 1988. *Uruguay: Democracy at the Crossroads*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Weissenstein, Michael. 2012. “Latin Americans rank as happiest people on planet.” *The Register-Guard* (Eugene, Oregon), The Associated Press, December 20, p.A3.

Wells, H.G. 1905. *A Modern Utopia*. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons.

Wells, H.G. 1927 [1920]. *The Outline of History*. New York: Macmillan.

West, Cornel. 1999. *The Cornel West Reader*. New York: Basic Civitas Books.

West, Cornel. 2011. “Dr. King Weeps From His Grave.” August 26, p.A27 [op-ed]. *New York Times*.

White, Hayden. 1973. *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Wicker, Allan W. 1969. “Attitudes versus Actions: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt Behavioral Responses to Attitude Objects.” *Journal of Social Issues* 25(4): 41-78.

Wiener, Tim. 2009. “Robert S. McNamara, Architect of a Futile War, Dies at 93.” *New York Times*, July 7, p.A1.

Williams, Adam. 2010, October 21. "Costa Ricans Being Threatened as Nicaragua Begins Dredging Rio San Juan." *Tico Times* [San José, Costa Rica]. *InfoTrac Newsstand*. Web.

Williams, Adam. 2010, October 29. "Border Showdown Continues: Eruption on Rio San Juan." *Tico Times* [San José, Costa Rica]. *InfoTrac Newsstand*. Web.

Williams, Adam. 2010, November 1. "Nicaraguan Troops, Flag Reported in Tico Soil." *Tico Times* [San José, Costa Rica]. *InfoTrac Newsstand*. Web.

Williams, Adam. 2010, November 19. "Costa Rica Takes Dispute With Nicaragua to the Hague." *Tico Times* [San José, Costa Rica]. *InfoTrac Newsstand*. Retrieved Dec. 5, 2010.

Williams, Adams. 2010, December 6. "Chinchilla deems Nicaragua an 'enemy'." *Tico Times* [San José, Costa Rica]. *InfoTrac Newsstand*. Web. 17 Jan. 2011.

Williams, Adam. 2011, January 13. "Costa Rica foreign minster sparks army debate." *Tico Times* [San José, Costa Rica] *InfoTrac Newsstand*. Web. 17 Jan. 2011.

Williams, James G. (ed.). 1996. *The Girard Reader*. New York: Crossroad.

Williams, Raymond. 1982. *The Sociology of Culture*. New York: Schocken Books.

Williams, Robin M. 1970. *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation*. 3rd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Williamson, Elizabeth. 2012. "Two Ways to Play the 'Alinsky Card.'" *The Wall Street Journal Online*, January 23. Retrieved through Factiva.

Wilson, John R. M. 2010. *Jackie Robinson and the American Dilemma*. New York: Pearson.

Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min. 2009. "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set." *American Sociological Review 74* (April): 316-337.

Wineburg, Sam. 2013. "Undue Certainty: Where Howard Zinn's *A People's History* Falls Short."*American Educator* 36(4), Winter (2012-2013), pp.27-34.

Wink, Walter. 1987. *Violence and Nonviolence in South Africa: Jesus' Third Way.* Philadelphia: New Society Publishers.

Wink, Walter. 1992. *Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Wink, Walter. 1998. *The Powers that Be: Theology for a New Millennium*. New York: Doubleday.

Wink, Walter. 2003. *Jesus and Nonviolence: A Third Way*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Wintz, Cary D. 2004. "Tannenbaum, Frank." *Encyclopedia of the Harlem Renaissance*. New York: Taylor & Francis.

Wise, David and Thomas B. Ross. 1964. *The Invisible Government*. New York: Random House.

Wolfe, Alan. 1998. *One nation, after all: What middle-class Americans really think about God, country, family, racism, welfare, immigration, homosexuality, work, the right, the left, and each other.* New York: Viking.

Wolpin, Miles D. 1981. *Militarism and Social Revolution in the Third World*. Totowa, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun.

Woodhead, Leslie. 2009. *How the Beatles Rocked the Kremlin* [film]. New York, New York: WNET.org.

World Peace Index (WPI). 2001. *World Peace Index: Assessing the State of Peace in the Nations of the World.* Seoul, Korea: World Peace Forum – Committee for the Culture of Peace.

World Peace Index (WPI). 2007. *World Peace Index: Assessing the State of Peace in the Nations of the World.* Seoul, Korea: World Peace Forum.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1989. "The comparative project on class structure and class consciousness: An overview." *Acta Sociologica* 32: 3-22.

Yang, Xiyn and Michael Wines. 2010. "Stitching the Narrative of a Revolution From Scraps of Declassified Files in China." *New York Times,* p.A5.

Yeager, Matthew G. 2011. "Frank Tannenbaum: The Making of a Convict Criminologist." *The Prison Journal* 91(2): 177-197.

York, Richard. 2011. Personal communication.

York, Richard and Christina Ergas. 2011. "Women's Status and World-System Position: An Exploratory Analysis." *Journal of World-Systems Research* 17(1): 147-164.

Young, Iris Marion. 2007. *Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination and the Responsibility for Justice.* Malden: Polity Press.

Zajonc, R.B., S.T. Murphy, and M. Inglehart. 1989. "Feeling and facial efference: Implications of the vascular theory of emotion." *Psychological Review* 96: 395-416,

Zald, Mayer N. 2000. "Ideologically Structured Action: An Enlarged Agenda for Social Movement Research." *Mobilization* 5(1):1-16.

Zang, David W. 1995. *Fleet Walker's Divided Heart: The Life of Baseball's First Black Major Leaguer.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Zeitlin, Irving M. 2001. *Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory* (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Zerubavel, Eviatar. 1996. "Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past." *Qualitative Sociology* 19(3):283-299.

Zhao, Nathan. 2009. "The Minimum Sample Size in Factor Analysis." www.encorewiki.org/display/~nzhao/The+Minimum+Sample+Size+in+Factor+ Analysis. Retrieved 11/20/2011.

Zimring, Franklin E. and Gordon Hawkins. 1986. *Capital Punishment and the American Agenda*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Zinn, Howard. 1995. *A People's History of the United States: 1492 – Present*. New York: HarperPerennial.

Zinn, Howard, Mike Konopacki, and Paul Buhle. 2008. *A People's History of American Empire*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Zizek, Slavoj. 2008. *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections*. New York: Picador.

Zizek, Slavoj. 2008b. "Language, Violence and Non-Violence." *International Journal of Zizek Studies* 2(3):1-12.

Zunes, Stephen, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher (eds.). 1999. *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Zunes, Stephen. 2011. "Nonviolent Revolution in the Middle East." *Peace Review* 23(4): 396-403.